Understanding Diversity

– SOUTH AFRICANS
IN MULTI-ETHNIC BRITAIN

A RUNNYMEDE COMMUNITY STUDY
BY KJARTAN PÁLL SVEINSSON
AND ANNE GUMUSCHIAN
About Runnymede Community Studies

In reflecting on the changing nature of ethnic diversity in Britain, it becomes increasingly clear that we have to move beyond binary notions of white and non-white to explain the ways in which racisms operate, identities are formed and people live out their lives. The societies in which we live are becoming more diverse and will continue to diversify as migration patterns change, and the impacts of globalization are reflected in labour markets as well as in transnational movement of capital.

This series of community studies aims to promote understanding of the diversity within and between different ethnic groups. Our intention is to build up a collection of studies which focus on communities; their demography, links to civil society, and key political and social issues. We hope that over time this will provide a rich resource for understanding how diversity is lived and experienced away from the necessarily crude ethnic monitoring form, in a vital and dynamic multi-ethnic society.

To find out more about the Runnymede Community Studies series, please visit: www.runnymedetrust.org
Understanding Diversity –
South Africans in Multi-Ethnic Britain

KJARTAN PÁLL SVEINSSON AND ANNE GUMUSCHIAN

South Africans in London at a Glance

Population and Geography

- According to the 2001 census, there were 140,201 South African-born people living in Britain.
- According to the calculations of Dr Robert Crawford, the number is more likely to be around 550,000.
- A large part of the South African population in the UK live in London. However, South Africans have settled in other parts of Britain as well.
- Although the overwhelming majority of South Africans are black, the reverse appears to be true in the UK. According to the 2001 census, 90% of South Africans in Britain are white, 3% are black, 3% are Indian, 2% are mixed, and 2% are of any other ethnic group.
- A notable feature of the South African presence in Britain is the high proportion of Jewish South Africans. This becomes even more striking when the area is narrowed down to London: 9% of South Africans in London are Jewish – compared to 2% of all Londoners – with a dense concentration in north and north west London.

Immigration and Exile

- South African migration to the UK is well established, and the UK is the primary destination for South Africans. Emigration from South Africa witnessed a number of waves. In the latter half of the 20th century, these were largely reactions to apartheid. As a consequence, an established network of exiles developed, many of whom stayed on in Britain after the fall of apartheid.
- Since the late 1990s, the main push factors include the rise of violence, poor economic conditions and prospects, discrimination, political uncertainty, the impact of the HIV epidemic, the quality of national education and of health services. However, many young people also emigrate to seek the adventures of a travelling experience.
- As members of the Empire, South Africans faced no restrictions on their entry until 1962. However, white South Africans were given what could be seen as preferential treatment, as legitimately homecoming ‘kith and kin’ of the British, then as patrials, and more recently as citizens of other European Union countries.

Networks and Cohesion

- The most obvious manifestation of South African community networks and activities is perhaps the increasing number of South African shops, restaurants, bars and papers found throughout the UK.
- On a deeper and less visible level, South Africans are highly organized in their economic activities. South African business people form a network which could be considered a community in its own right.
- The visa application process has become a professionalized and remunerative business, with a number of companies and agencies offering to manage the whole process of UK work programmes, work permits and visas available to South Africans.

Employment

- Emigrants from South Africa tend to be skilled professionals, and many find employment in the finance and business sectors.
- This is reflected in the London labour market, where South Africans generally appear to fare well, on par with migrants from high income countries rather than developing countries.
- The South African employment rate is amongst the highest in London, with a notable concentration in high paid sectors of employment.
Relevant Organizations and Websites

**South African High Commission and Embassy**
South Africa House  
Trafalgar Square  
London WC2N 5DP  
Tel: 0207 451 7299  
Email: london.general@foreign.gov.za  
Web: www.southafricahouse.com

**South African Business Club**
The Hub, 5 Torrens St  
London EC1V 1NQ  
Tel: 0207 841 8981  
Email: reception@sabusinessclub.com  
Web: www.sabusinessclub.com

**London South Africa Rugby Football Club**
Chancery House  
1 Locheline St  
London W6 9SJ  
Tel: 0208 741 6060  
E-mail: info@londonsouthafricaRFC.co.uk  
Web: www.londonsouthafrica.co.uk

**Sanza**
www.sanza.co.uk

**Saffers Unite**
www.saffersunite.com

**SA Times Newspaper**
5 Alt Grove, Wimbledon  
London SW19 4 DZ  
Tel: 0845 2707885  
Web: www.southafricatimes.co.uk

**The Homecoming Revolution**
Web: www.homecomingrevolution.com.za

**Springbok Supporters Club**
Web: www.springbok-supporters.co.uk

**Braai Club**
www.braaiclub.com

**South Africa Info**
http://www.southafrica.info/

**South African Newspaper**
c/o Blue Sky Publications  
Unit 7 Commodore House  
Battersea Reach  
London SW18 1TW  
Email: info@southafrican.co.uk  
Web: www.southafrican.co.uk

**Community HEART Charity**
UNISON Manchester  
3/5 St John St  
Manchester M3 4DN  
Tel: 0161 254 7505  
Email: info@community-heart.org.uk  
Web: www.community-heart.org.uk

**SAUK Triathlon Club**
Web: www.sauktri.org

**African South**
www.africansouth.co.uk
Introduction

South Africans are one of the largest foreign national groups in the UK. According to the 2001 census, there were 140,201 South Africans living in Britain in that year, but analysts expect this figure to be closer to 550,000. This places them amongst the most populous immigrant groups in the UK. South Africans are by no means invisible – there are numerous South African bars and shops across Britain as well as newspapers and sports magazines, and a number of South African migrants have become well-known figures in British public life. Nonetheless, as an immigrant group they have sparked little interest in the national media – certainly much less than far smaller groups such as Romanians – or indeed in academic research. Phrases such as ‘community cohesion’ and ‘ethnic segregation’ are seldom evoked when speaking of South African migrants, and South Africans are not considered to be adding to the migrant pressure on public services such as housing or the NHS.

South African migration to the UK has a long history, and has seen a number of peaks, most notably in the periods of 1960-1, 1976-9, 1984-6 and from the late 1990s to more or less the present day. During apartheid, these were mostly reactions to political and social events in South Africa, such as the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 and the Soweto uprising of 1976, as well as a series of legislative changes cementing the realities of apartheid. The latest wave, however, has taken place after the fall of apartheid and has been triggered by a number of factors, including concerns about violence and high crime rates, a struggling economy and job insecurity, declining quality of public services, and general pessimism about the future of South Africa.

At the end of apartheid, Archbishop Desmond Tutu coined the term ‘Rainbow Nation’ to capture South Africa’s ethnic and cultural diversity. This diversity is apparent in the demographic makeup of the South African presence in Britain. Proportionately, however, these communities are not representative of the diversity of South Africa; while the overwhelming majority of South Africans are black, the reverse appears to be true in the UK. Accurate figures are hard to come by, as the 2001 census is likely to be out of date. Up until 2001, the biggest group was without doubt white English-speaking South Africans, but anecdotal evidence suggests the ratio may be changing. While white South Africans have been in the overwhelming majority, the number of black South Africans appears to be growing. Amongst white South Africans, the ratio between English speakers and Afrikaners is unclear, but some interviewees suggested that Afrikaners could currently comprise up to a quarter of all South Africans in the UK, and that their numbers are growing. The Jewish South African community is also notable, which according to the 2001 census, comprises 9% of South Africans in London. Due to this great diversity and the high number of South Africans in Britain, it is not appropriate to speak of a single ‘community’ where South Africans are concerned. This also means that a small scale study such as this is unable to capture the breadth of experiences of South African migrants. This report focuses specifically on white Anglophone South Africans, with a sub-focus on Jewish South Africans.

The contents of this report differ in significant ways from Runnymede’s previous Community Studies. South Africans are affluent and well off relative to many other migrant communities, such as Bolivians or the Vietnamese. For instance, the South African employment rate is amongst the highest in London, with a notable concentration in high-paid sectors of employment. A comparison between South Africans and other migrant groups can therefore be revealing in many ways. For example, the visa application process has become a professionalized and remunerative business, with a number of companies and agencies offering to manage the whole process of UK programmes, work permits and visas available to South Africans. Thus, South Africans have access to resources not readily available to less

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1 Crawford (2008)
2 See Torre (2008)
3 The most conclusive study to date is Mark Israel’s South African Political Exile in the United Kingdom (1999), the fieldwork of which coincided with the fall of apartheid. However, three studies were being conducted at the same time as the present one: Dr Robert Crawford of Menzies Centre for Australian Studies/King’s College London; Max Andrucki for the University of Leeds; and Wesley Jordan Oakes for the International Organization for Migration.
4 Crawford (2008)
5 Data Management and Analysis Group (2005)
affluent migrant groups, and are therefore more likely to be successful in their visa or work permit applications. Furthermore, many South Africans have British or European Union passports which give them unrestricted administrative access to Britain, and many are eligible to enter the UK on ancestry visas, which give permission to stay and work for five years and the right to apply for permanent residency. Many of the interviewees of this study had entered Britain in one of these ways. The concept of ancestry visas raises problematic questions about access to citizenship, as it implies that some people are genetically more entitled to citizenship than others. This is particularly apparent in the case of South Africa, where the ‘ancestry’ lines are clearly drawn along racial categories.

However, South Africans can also teach us a lot about how migrant groups can successfully organize themselves in order to optimize their opportunities in Britain. Throughout the apartheid period, the South African exile diaspora was able not only to organize highly effective anti-apartheid organizations which played an instrumental part in the fight against apartheid, but simultaneously integrated into British society and prospered in both economic and social terms. Today, South Africans are an immigrant success story, with a high employment rate and concentration in highly paid sectors.

Methodology

The aim of this study was to explore interviewees’ experiences of living in London, and what they perceived to be the main issues facing Anglophone South Africans in London generally, with a sub-focus on Jewish South Africans. For this reason, the methodology used was primarily qualitative, which is particularly apt in providing insight into the complex, subtle, and often contradictory views, experiences, motivations and attitudes of individuals. Data was gathered through in-depth interviews with 20 individuals. Most were ordinary people getting on with their day-to-day lives, but three interviewees worked within organizations which deal directly with South African migrants, offering services ranging from help with visa and work permit applications to money transfers, bank accounts and job assistance. These interviewees were very knowledgeable in terms of legal requirements, and had a broad overview of the main administrative issues facing South Africans in the UK. Access to interviewees was facilitated by community organizations as well as snowballing. Most interviews were conducted in homes, but also in offices, pubs, cafes and restaurants. The small sample size means that the results cannot be read as statistically representative of all South Africans in London. The specific focus of this study was on South African migration after the fall of apartheid. As Jewish South Africans are, proportionately, the largest Jewish foreign national group in London, this group received particular attention. It should be noted, however, that the ethnic diversity within the South African community in Britain is vast, and it is beyond the scope of this study to take account of the views of every single group, many of which are likely to have quite different experiences. A purposive sampling technique – where interviewees are selected specifically a) for their specific experiences or knowledge, and b) to capture the diversity and breadth of views within the sample group – was adopted in order to get as broad a perspective as possible. Every effort was made to have a broad sampling range in terms of gender, age, length of time in the UK, etc. to ensure that the sample was as representative as possible.

This report does not purport to represent a conclusive ethnographic account of South African experiences in Britain. Indeed, the sheer size of the South African presence in the UK means that this study can only be indicative rather than conclusive. While the purpose of the study is to map out the main issues identified by the participants of the research, this can only amount to a ‘snapshot’. It must also be stressed that not every issue of importance can be identified or discussed in the report. For example, the small sample size does not allow for a detailed description or analysis of the great diversity within the South African community, although this issue is touched upon. It will be up to later studies to fill in the ethnographical details for a comprehensive understanding of life in London for South Africans.
Background

South Africa has a rich and often tragic history, blighted by ethnic tension and repression, not least in the latter half of the 20th century. To say that South Africa is best known for apartheid would perhaps be contentious, but until the 1990s this was arguably true. The origins of apartheid can be traced back to the 19th century when British colonialism introduced Pass Laws which regulated the movement of Africans. This period introduced white supremacy ideologies and rigid segregation, which was formalized into a system of legalized racial segregation by the Afrikaner National Party government in 1948. The ideology and everyday reality of apartheid was met with fierce resistance within South Africa as well as international condemnation.

In South Africa, a number of anti-apartheid organizations – including the African National Congress (ANC) – organized and coordinated various defiant activities, ranging from peaceful protest and passive resistance to armed and violent insurrection. These were not dealt with lightly by the regime, which brutally suppressed any hint of insubordination and transgression of racial boundaries. Towards the late 1980s, apartheid began to show signs of decline, and the regime finally crumbled in 1994 preceding the election of Nelson Mandela as the ANC became the ruling party. He was succeeded by Thabo Mbeki as president in 1999.

Today, there are 47 million people in an ethnically and racially diverse South Africa. The large majority is black African (79.5%), followed by white (9.2%), coloured (8.9%), and Indian (2.5%). None of these groups are culturally, ethnically or linguistically homogeneous. The black African population is constituted by a variety of ethnic groups, the major ones being the Basotho, Tswana, Swazi, Ndebele and Tsonga. Likewise, the white population is diverse, with larger groups of Dutch, Jewish, German, French Huguenot and British descent, along with smaller groups of Greek and Portuguese origin. South Africa has eleven official languages, which in itself is testimony to its great ethnic diversity.

Emigration from South Africa

Emigration from South Africa witnessed a number of waves, most notably in the periods of 1960-1, 1976-9 and 1984-6. Emigration drastically increased again by the end of the 1990s. In 1999, there was three times more emigration than in 1995. While apartheid was the overriding push factor in previous bouts of migration, the latest one is attributed to the rise of violence, poor economic conditions and prospects, discrimination, political uncertainty, the impact of the HIV epidemic, the quality of national education and of health services. However, many young people also emigrate to seek the adventures of a travelling experience. The most popular destinations are Britain, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.

There is little reliable data on the racial composition of emigration from South Africa, but certain important insights can be gleaned from the data which is available. Despite the overwhelming majority of black South Africans, evidence suggests that the greater part of the emigrating population is white. According to the South African Institute for Race Relations, the white population has decreased from 5,215,000 in 1995, to 4,374,000 in 2005, or by a fifth in a period of ten years. This is partly due to a general population decrease, but the main reason is large-scale emigration from the country for those aged between 20 and 40, some of whom will ultimately settle and have children elsewhere. There is little data on emigration of the Indian population, which is still showing a ‘normal’ population growth.

Britain as Prime Destination

South African immigration to the UK is well established, especially where the white population is concerned. In 1911, there were 15,000 South African born people living in England and Wales. This number had grown to 23,000 by 1931. At the same time, British migration to South Africa was common, where many would work for a period of time before returning to the UK.

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8 A term still widely used in South Africa for mixed race.
10 South Africa Migration Project (2006)
11 Israel (1999)
The UK was the primary destination for South Africans throughout the latter half of the 20th century, followed by the USA and Australia, a pattern that remains today.12 This is partly due to the fact that a large number of South Africans hold British passports because of British ancestry. The preference for Britain, however, can also be attributed to perceived cultural similarities such as language and sports, as well as historical, economic and political ties. Moreover, Britain has been actively seeking the services of doctors, dentists, nurses and other members of the medical profession, as well as teachers and social workers. British recruitment agencies are often involved in promoting jobs and opportunities directly in South Africa. Despite agreements between British and South African governments to prevent draining the population’s skills, agencies are said to still be active in trying to attract workers to the UK. As James, who has worked for a migration agency in London for over ten years, said: “It’s very political, there was an understanding that UK recruiters could not target teachers and nurses. They can’t advertise but they still network … they say they’ll pay you if you come and sign up”.

Due to the poor statistical data on South Africa’s large emigrating population, it is hard to gauge the size and demographic profile of South African immigrants to the UK. When leaving South Africa, individuals do not always declare their intention to emigrate.13 Furthermore, a large number of South African nationals hold British passports, making it difficult to keep track of movements and establish a detailed pattern.14 Moreover, UK immigration data is based on country of birth rather than ethnicity and nationality, which limits the scope for demographic analysis.

Throughout the apartheid era, the South African population in Britain rose steadily. As Mark Israel notes, there was no such thing as a South African community but rather various networks and groups that were linked by a combination of family ties, ethnicity, religion, age, place of origin and shared experience.15 However, at that time, the most important collective identification was through politics and the various positions and involvement in South African political debate that differentiated groups living in the UK. Indeed, there is a clear correlation between emigration and political events in South Africa, where peaks of emigration were partly a consequence of the relationship between the South African state and its opposition. In times of heightened confrontations, opposition and repression, many politically involved people emigrated to the UK.

By 1991, there were 70,000 South African born individuals in the UK, most of whom lived in London. The majority were white, with 2000-3000 black and around the same number of Indian and mixed groups.17 The 2001 census recorded 140,201 South Africans in Britain, but analysts expect this figure to be closer to 550,000 and growing.18 Indeed, the Office for National Statistics recorded 41,000 South African immigrants to the UK in 2005 and 2006, while only 22,000 South Africans left the country in the same period.19 According to key informants of this study, although the greater number of South Africans still live in London and the south east of England, South Africans are increasingly finding their way to other parts of Britain. Although there is little hard data on the demographic breakdown of the ethnic and linguistic groups, anecdotal evidence suggests that the biggest group is still English speaking, followed by a growing Afrikaner population, with smaller, but substantial, groups of Jewish, black African and Indian South Africans. These groups are not entirely separate entities, but appear to have limited contact with one another.

12 In February 2002 the UK was the leading country of destination for South Africans with 21.5% of all emigration, followed by the USA with 5.6%, Australia 4.7%, the remainder shared mainly between Namibia, Germany, Botswana, and Mauritius. (Statistics South Africa, 2005)
13 Myburgh (2004)
14 About 800,000 South Africans hold British passports. Some also hold Dutch as well as other European documentation (Lamont, 2002).
15 Israel (1999)
16 Ibid.: 211
17 Ibid.: 2
18 Crawford (2008)
19 Office for National Statistics (2008)
underway, but at first glance it appears that in London English speakers are concentrated in the south west (Putney, Wandsworth and Wimbledon), Afrikaners in the north east (Leyton and Leytonstone), black Africans in the east (Hackney) and Jews in the north east (Muswell Hill, Kilburn, Highgate).

South Africans in British Immigration Policy
As members of the Empire, South Africans faced no restrictions on their entry until 1962. The race equality implications of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act are well documented. In theory, the 1962 Act should have placed white South Africans in the same administrative situation as any other nationals of countries in the Global South of the economic landscape. In practice, however, “a series of official and unofficial exemptions made their passage far easier than other Third World or New Commonwealth would-be migrants. Even when South Africans did have to apply for political asylum, they were able to call upon a formidable array of political support within Britain”. Thus, white South Africans were given what could be seen as preferential treatment, as legitimately homecoming ‘kith and kin’ of the British, then as patrials, and more recently as citizens of other European Union countries. The indirect – but arguable intentional – racial discrimination inherent in the UK Ancestry Entry Clearance is a case in point, as it would only be available to white South Africans.

Subtle understandings of race are seldom far away in the debate about immigration in the UK. As the history of immigration legislation since 1962 has shown, white and English speaking immigrants have never been considered a problem to the degree that non-white and/or non-English speaking have. As a result, many South Africans were able to use their social invisibility to bypass immigration restrictions.

Most interviewees were aware of this state of affairs, and many had gained entry on the grounds of their European ancestry. This was not always straightforward, and some reported having to pass several hurdles to obtain full administrative permission to live and work in Britain – in some cases not entirely by official means. Nonetheless, there was an awareness of the role of race and culture in the options available to them, and many interviewees said that they would have had a harder time had they not been white and English speaking: “You know, there’s a whole hierarchy of how foreign you are, and I don’t think white, English speaking South Africans are seen as that foreign, because of the, I suppose, of the colour and the connection” (Lana).

Migration During the Apartheid Era
The main text of this report considers recent South African migration to the UK, largely occurring after the end of apartheid. However, any discussion on the South African presence in Britain would be necessarily partial and fragmentary without a mention of the political exiles during the apartheid era. As Israel notes, many exiles returned to South Africa after the end of apartheid; but many also stayed on in Britain, for a variety of different reasons. The “romantic political dream” of exile faded, and many became “just like much of the rest of the host society, worried about their jobs, their houses, their mortgages, their pensions, their kids”. Thus, the significance of the presence of the exiles as a shaping factor persists for some parts of the South African population in the UK. Indeed, post-apartheid migrants often tap into networks of their parents’ friends, whose children were born in Britain. It is therefore necessary to briefly outline the main themes of South African migration to the UK during the apartheid era. The following discussion draws heavily from Mark Israel’s research and analysis.

The several waves of migration from South Africa to Britain, as Israel demonstrates, were mostly reactions to political and social events in South Africa, such as the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 and the Soweto uprising of 1976, as well as a series of legislative changes reinforcing apartheid. Throughout this period, Britain was

20 Crawford (personal communication)
21 Crawford (2008)
22 Spencer (1997)
23 Israel (1999: 8)
24 Ibid.: 93
25 Ibid.: 86
26 Ibid.: 228
27 Ibid.: chapter 2
the main destination for South African emigrants. Most of those who reached Britain were white and English speaking,\textsuperscript{28} with a relatively large Jewish population.\textsuperscript{29}

In his comprehensive study of South African exiles, Israel highlights the many different reasons people had for leaving South Africa during apartheid, although most of them were connected to the development of apartheid in one way or another: “They left for economic, social and political reasons, sometimes for a combination of all three. Indeed, in a country where economic and social life was tightly controlled by the state, it was very difficult to disentangle the three.”\textsuperscript{30} Not everyone was strictly speaking forced out of South Africa, and many of Israel’s interviewees said that fatigue was as much of a factor influencing their decision to emigrate as coercion or violence. “They had had enough of the increasing segregation of social life. They had had enough of the restrictions on political activity. Finally, in some cases, they had had enough of fighting the regime.”\textsuperscript{31}

However, force and violence take many forms, and the narrative of coercion and displacement was strong amongst the South African exiles. Violence – whether physical or symbolic, actual or anticipated – made life intolerable for those opposing the South African state,\textsuperscript{32} even if they were not directly involved in anti-apartheid work.

Still, during the years of apartheid, exile was a prominent factor shaping the South African presence in Britain. It would be misleading to speak of the development of a singular exile community; rather, “a set of interacting, interrelating sets and circles emerged”.\textsuperscript{33} These partial networks were largely configured by ideological considerations as well as practical ones (such as finding jobs, accommodation, childcare, etc.), and for many, the experience of exile became central to their sense of self and a collective identity: “they were anti-apartheid, anti-Pretoria and not at home in Britain”.\textsuperscript{34} Importantly, however, the networks were also strongly drawn along ethnic lines, with groups forming around particular identities such as Muslim, Jewish, Tamil or Zulu.

The end of apartheid in South Africa did not, as one may have expected, lead to mass return of exiles to their former home. Indeed, Israel highlights an empirical and theoretical blind spot in the academic literature on exile – namely, reactions to the end of exile.\textsuperscript{35} For many, after years or even decades of exile, ‘home’ had become a term full of confusion and dilemma. As Paul, who has been living in London for over two decades and has children and grandchildren in Britain, said:

\textit{Migration, I’ve always said, is an attitude of the mind. And although you don’t block out the past, you must think ahead. So when I went back and went to Cape Town … it’s a beautiful place, but it’s only a place. My home is in London. And people have said, ‘Oh, are you going home?’ No, I’m not going home, London’s my home; I’m going to visit Cape Town.}

Some had spent most of their adult lives in Britain, and had children and careers which would be uprooted by a move back to South Africa. As a result, those who arrived during apartheid are still a notable part of the South African communities in Britain.

\textbf{Post-Apartheid Migration}

The end of apartheid and the introduction of democracy turned an important page in South African history. Fourteen years on from the first democratic elections, however, many challenges remain. The legacy of apartheid still looms over many aspects of life in the country. This has had a pronounced effect on emigration from South Africa, which increased dramatically from 1992 to 1994, then gradually rose until jumping drastically again in 2003.\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, a comparison between the 1991 and 2001 UK census data reveals a dramatic increase in South African immigrants to Britain in this period, coinciding with the fall of apartheid.\textsuperscript{37} The main destination for South African emigrants continues to be the UK. This trend, coupled with the settled presence of the former exiles and their children, means that the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid.: 2
\item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid.: 131
\item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid.: 53
\item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid.: 24
\item \textsuperscript{32} Ibid.: 18
\item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid.: 135
\item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid.: 136
\item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid.: chapter 9
\item \textsuperscript{36} Statistics South Africa (2005: vi)
\item \textsuperscript{37} Crawford (2008)
\end{itemize}
legacy of apartheid is undeniably present amongst the various South African communities in London. Importantly, however, post-apartheid migration has introduced a changing demographic picture of the South African presence in Britain. Black South African professionals and Afrikaners appear to be arriving in Britain in greater number than before, challenging the domination of white Anglophone South Africans.

Second Generation South Africans
As has been mentioned, many exiles chose not to return after the end of apartheid. According to Israel, family life was a major factor influencing this decision. Many had brought their young children with them into exile, or had children while in Britain. This was certainly the case with the three interviewees in this study who had left South Africa for political or social reasons during apartheid. Furthermore, four interviewees had migrated with their parents during childhood or early adolescence, and one had spent more or less all her life in the UK. Thus, these five interviewees went to British schools where they were introduced to British life in different ways than those who came as economic migrants. Importantly, however, all five still identified strongly with South Africa and four of them had South African partners. Furthermore, all were involved with South African community activities in different capacities and to varying degrees; they had formed networks that more recent migrants were able to tap into, and had a deeper knowledge of life in the UK, which they would share with their fellow South Africans.

Working Holiday Makers
A popular route into Britain for South Africans is the working holidaymaker visa. According to key informants, these may represent half of South Africans migrants in the UK. They also account for a majority of visa application for young South Africans. Throughout the 2005-2006 financial year, 19,589 working holidaymaker applications were made in Pretoria, with an 86% issue rate. The working holiday visa allows Commonwealth citizens between the age of 17 and 30 to live and work in the UK for up to two years. During those two years, holders of the visa are only permitted to work for a total of 12 months and will not have access to public funds. In fact, qualifying for the visa involves providing evidence that the applicants can support themselves without recourse to public funds and are able to pay for their return ticket for South Africa. After the allowed year of work runs out, employers can sponsor working holidaymakers to get a work permit for them to remain in the country, and thereby continue their work for the company.

There are various reasons for Britain being the primary destination for South African working holidaymakers. Familiarity of culture and language facilitate short term integration, but Britain’s location and centrality is also appealing to young working holidaymakers. Once in the UK, it is easy to reach the rest of Europe, and travelling is in many cases the primary reason for migration amongst young working holidaymakers. With the phasing in of the points-based system, working holiday makers will fall under Tier 5 – incorporating youth mobility and temporary workers – scheduled for autumn 2008. At the time of writing, South Africa was not set to be part of the new youth mobility scheme (within Tier 5) from the beginning of the scheme. If this decision remains unchanged, it could mean that South African prospective migrants will no longer have access to this administrative route into Britain.

Highly Skilled Migrants
The highly skilled migrant status is another popular route for settling in Britain. The permit is initially granted for a period of two years after which the holder can apply for an extension of another three years, at the end of which he or she qualifies for permanent residence. After a year of permanent residence, the holder qualifies for citizenship. This option also is appealing to highly skilled South African migrants as no restrictions are imposed on them. The work permit allows them to start their own business and manoeuvre their professional life as they see fit, without any significant administrative hurdles.

The recent changes to immigration policy favour highly skilled migrants to enter the UK, and those entering under Tier 1 in the points-
based system – replacing the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme – are more likely to settle permanently or for longer periods of time than others. Because of the accommodating aspects of British immigration policy towards this group, many of the highly skilled South Africans wishing to settle in the UK are offered employment before migrating and can eventually obtain citizenship fairly easily.

Migration Agencies
An increasing trend amongst New Commonwealth citizens is the use of immigration and financial assistance agencies. This appears to be a growing industry, with companies such as Breytenbachs, 1st Contact, and Smooth Landings offering a variety of services. These agencies generally assist Antipodeans with the formalities of migration, such as immigration and visa matters, but also with finding employment, opening bank accounts, money transfers and taxation as well as offering financial management services for those who have settled such as money placements, mortgages or pensions. This assistance can start from the decision to migrate and sometimes continues all the way through to the return home.

Diversities and Identities
As has already been mentioned, South Africa is demographically a very diverse nation, with a wealth of different cultural, ethnic and linguistic groups. In many ways, this diversity translates over to Britain, although the proportions are radically different. The biggest group up until the end of apartheid was without doubt white Anglophone South Africans, but anecdotal evidence suggests that this may be changing. Companies providing services specifically tailored to South Africans have reported an increasing number of black clients, although they are still very much in a minority. As to the white segment of the South African presence, the ratio between English speakers and Afrikaners is unclear. Some interviewees suggested that Afrikaners could currently comprise up to a quarter of all South Africans in the UK, and that their numbers are growing. The Jewish South African community is also notable, which according to the 2001 census, comprises 9% of South Africans in London.

Experiences of Diversity in South Africa
The term Rainbow Nation was in many ways a call for the development of a collective and inclusive national identity, as opposed to the narrow and racist nationalism under apartheid. Throughout the apartheid era, of course, different ethnic and racial groups were segregated from each other and in many cases had little history of contact or relationships until the 1990s. Many interviewees said that their only real experiences with black South Africans had been as their servants. Laura, a Jewish woman who moved to Britain with her family in the 1980s, reflected on her experiences of diversity in South Africa:

South Africa, I didn’t find diverse. There were black people, there were coloured people, but ... my only real relationships were in a working context. We had black people working for us, professionally you’d come across black people, but you don’t socially, you wouldn’t in schools, everything was segregated. So I wouldn’t see it as diverse. In fact, in South Africa, our community was very homogenous. Completely.

Laura was speaking of her experiences under apartheid, but the issue of race has by no means been eradicated from the political and social agenda in South Africa. The dismantling of apartheid threw race into question again for all South Africans, as racial and cultural differences had to be conceptually rethought in a new social and political context. The concept of race never left the political foreground; it acted as platform and rationale for the creation of apartheid, but is still present in its legacy. The reality and continued relevance of racial difference imposed new challenges to both groups and individuals that are still problematic, a point interviewees were all too aware of. Tom, a young man doing his postgraduate studies in
London, said: “People often refuse to talk about race because they think it’s racist, they’d rather talk about class.” Indeed, many interviewees somewhat contradicted themselves. On the one hand, several interviewees embraced the concept of the Rainbow Nation and claimed that today race had no place in South African society; the younger generation did not see the world in black and white in the way their parents did. On the other hand, many expressed a concern that South Africa is still a very segregated society, and that race – in one form or another – was at the heart of what impeded social development. Adam captured this aptly when he expressed the incongruous state of race relations in post-apartheid South Africa: “It’s a funny old country. People love it. but the whole racism thing is always just below the surface. It’s a very strange phenomenon, having had apartheid, having embraced racism as a political ideology. And it still exists.”

Experiences of Diversity in London
Experience of diversity – or lack of it – in South Africa impacted greatly on the way many interviewees described their experience of diversity in London. All spoke of the multi-ethnic aspect of Britain as enriching and beneficial, but many found the contrast to what they had previously known hard to comprehend. This was especially the case for those who had left during apartheid, under which social status was relatively unambiguous as relationships with your own as well as with other groups had been clearly defined by the regime. Laura said that her community in South Africa had been very homogenous, and as a result of this, she struggled getting to grips with the dynamics of multiculturalism and diversity in Britain: “Coming here I had difficulties with the diversity, initially, because probably on a subconscious level I didn’t really know where I stood.” To illustrate this, she went on to describe how soon after she arrived in England, her family’s house had been burgled. “And I would walk down the streets in [my area], and look at people, and I didn’t know where to place people, you know, kind of ‘Is that a good guy?’ It’s a terrible thing to say, but this is the way I was brought up. It’s engrained … it took a while to get used to.”

Those of the younger generation, who had lived under the democratic state for the greater part of their lives, seemed to find it easier to accept cultural, racial and religious diversity in London. Many said that London’s relative racial harmony provided them with a sense of relief. Lana, who had lived in South Africa both under apartheid as well as after its fall, said that South Africa is still a very unequal society, and that inequality is still drawn along racial lines:

And so you end up living in a kind of bubble of privilege, because it’s dangerous to breach those boundaries … So it’s very hard to live a normal life in South Africa. And for me, that’s what I like about this part of London, particularly, it’s just so many different communities, and there’s really no problem. You know, everyone gets on really well.

In this way, the legacy of apartheid was still present in many interviewees’ experiences of diversity in Britain. Ashley, for instance, mentioned a certain degree of self-consciousness in her interaction with other ethnic groups:

Coming over here is quite liberating at times. Because now in a lot of areas in London you have to interact with many, not only South Africans but lots of different Africans and others. It does change from the dynamics we might experience at home … I’ve made friends here like black South Africans that I might not have made back home. Depending on your mind set, mixing in London is easier.

Having been born under apartheid and living part of her life in its shadow, constructing relationships with members of other groups was a novel and not entirely straightforward experience. In this sense, British multiculturalism was seen by some as breaking down boundaries between South African groups as well. A number of interviewees said that they had made black South African friends in London, something which had not been an easy option in South Africa.
In spite of the generally positive evaluation of diversity and race equality in London, most interviewees acknowledged the presence of racism, and their own place within the structure of British society. Indeed, they were still acutely aware that their ethnicity was a great advantage in Britain in everything from employment prospects to being accepted in their local community:

I mean Brits are always very nice to us, and they are to all foreigners. Who are white, I imagine. I mean, I think if you come from the Cameroon it can be a bit different. Anywhere in Europe. It’s easier immigrating to Europe as a white person than a person of colour. (Nathan)

Jewish South African Community
The large proportion of Jewish people as a notable feature of the South African demographics in the UK has already been mentioned. Mark Israel comments on the cohesive element of the South African Jewish community that formed in London throughout the period of exile, and a substantial part of his sample appears to have been Jewish. The strong Jewish component in the South African presence in London quickly became apparent through the course of this study, as half of the participants turned out to be Jewish. This was largely the effect of snowballing, but not entirely as many interviewees were contacted through different sources. This unforeseen course of the research process, as well as the striking statistics, gives good reason for delving deeper into the particularities of the Jewish South African community.

A clear distinction between Jewish South Africans and English speaking South Africans is inappropriate, as most Jewish South Africans are English speaking as well. Apart from this linguistic overlap, Jewish South Africans also shared many similar experiences and circumstances with their non-Jewish English speaking compatriots. The Jewish interviewees related parallel accounts of their reasons for leaving – or not wanting to go back to – South Africa, including concerns about violence and high crime rates, a struggling economy and job insecurity, declining quality of public services, and general pessimism about the future of South Africa. They also shared a number of socio-economic characteristics, as most came from relatively affluent backgrounds and entered the higher levels of the London job market. Many had links with Europe and held European passports which facilitated the administrative aspects of employment. South African-ness was nonetheless important to their sense of identity, and many said that they would ideally like to move back to South Africa one day.

In spite of these similarities, it can plausibly be said that Jewish South Africans comprise a community in their own right. Although most said that they identify with South Africa, this was in many ways secondary to a strong sense of Jewishness, with many interviewees also identifying with London, and some with Britain. These identities are dynamic and overlap, and their significance varies between different times and circumstances, but Jewishness was deemed to be constantly at the fore. Danielle, who had lived most of her life in London but was born to South African parents and had married a Jewish South African man, summed up her sense of belonging:

I identify myself, I think, predominantly as Jewish, I would say, first. And then South African. But you know, identity changes. So it depends on who I’m with. If I’m with, say, English Jewish, then I think of myself as South African. If I’m in South Africa, I probably think of myself as more English. And I definitely would say that Jewish comes first.

Similarly, Tina came to Britain with her parents as a teenager, and had also married a Jewish South African man:

I would say that the top level is being Jewish. Even though I don’t identify strongly with the beliefs, or particularly with the culture of Judaism. But when I meet Jewish people, I instantly feel a kindred spirit, even if I don’t particularly like them as individuals, there’s like a

45 Israel (1999: 131)
sense of sameness. Then South African, and then British. If I meet British people abroad, I don’t feel any particular kinship with them. But if I meet South African people abroad, I definitely do.

Those who had spent their entire childhood and adolescence in South Africa were less willing to subscribe to an English or British identity. They acknowledged a debt to their host country, many had British passports, and some doubted that they would ever go back to South Africa, as much as they might want to. Still, most did not feel British as such. Adam had lived in London for 15 years and had settled down with his Jewish South African wife. They had no intention of moving back, but maintaining links with South Africa was extremely important to both of them. The family goes back to South Africa as often as they can, and Adam and his wife are part of a close-knit community of Jewish South Africans in London. Commenting on his sense of self, he said: “I feel like a South African Londoner. I certainly don’t feel English. London is a global community.” Similarly, Nathan recognized the important role played by the UK for himself and his family: “In terms of political and economic stability, and a civilized country where the police don’t carry guns, Britain is amazing. And that’s why I ended up being here.” Nonetheless, he stated that London was the only place in Britain he felt a sense of belonging, and that he would not consider living elsewhere: “We went to Oxford, we lived in Oxford for a year and a half, two years. It was terrible. Absolutely terrible.”

In spite of identifying with South Africa, most of the Jewish interviewees made a distinction between themselves and other South Africans. Many had not wanted to leave South Africa, but felt they had to, and they certainly did not see themselves as any less South African than other ethnic groups. But many said that the Jewish part of their identity had helped them come to terms with what they considered an involuntary exit. This was attributed to what some interviewees called a ‘diaspora mentality’ amongst Jews, which they felt was not present amongst Afrikaners or non-Jewish English-speaking South Africans:

Whereas, and once again this is a Jewish thing coming up, we’re not in our homeland. You know? We don’t even have a homeland. To liberal Jews who’ve grown up outside Israel, you know, I would never go and live there. So I don’t really have a homeland. I basically feel we always keep moving. (Nathan)

The distinction between Jewish and non-Jewish South Africans was certainly considered part of the Jewish South African identity, but for many this also translated into friendships and networks. Interviewees commented on the cohesive character of the Jewish South African community in London, which was considered distinct from, but related to, the wider South African presence in Britain. Of course, interviewees were involved with this community to varying degrees, and expressed differing levels of belonging. Some said that they were only marginally involved with other Jewish South Africans. Others, when asked whether they could put the researchers in contact with other South Africans, had a difficult time finding non-Jewish South African friends. All, however, affirmed the existence of a cohesive Jewish South African community in north-west London. Israel comments on this attribute of Jewish South Africans in Britain during apartheid, who formed strong networks amongst themselves.47 This was indeed the case for Paul and Laura, who left South Africa with their children in the 1980s. Describing the support networks they tapped into when they first came to Britain, they explained that the relatively small size of the Jewish community in South Africa meant that they could always find some connection with Jewish South Africans in London:

So somebody in Cape Town knows that I’ve come to London, they’ll know somebody else who’s come to London and contact that somebody else, and that somebody else having been through what we are now going through would’ve come to us and tried to be supportive. That’s as far as it goes, they didn’t fall over themselves. But they were there. (Paul)

47 Israel (1999: 131)
I don’t know if it was a South African thing or a Jewish thing, I can’t comment really, because all the people we knew here initially were Jewish. (Laura)

They stressed, however, the importance of making English friends, not least to “integrate and not always be the foreigners, to feel like we belonged” (Laura).

Paul and Laura are an example of those who did not return to South Africa after the fall of apartheid but decided to stay in Britain. They are part of the generation which formed the subject matter for Israel’s study, many of whom chose not to go back to South Africa after 1994. It was the children of this generation that were interviewed for the present study, as well as many of their friends or children of their families’ friends who had joined them and tapped into their networks in London. Many spoke of the advantages of being Jewish South Africans in terms of accessing tight networks which could provide advice and help with most problems associated with migration, such as finding a job or a place to live. Describing his group of friends, Adam portrayed the current network broadly in the same terms as Paul and Laura: “There’s a big Jewish South African community. Strongly connected. All know each other, or if they don’t know each other they know someone who knows someone”. This network is accessible to newcomers, as Lana explained. For her, the network she was able to access gave her emotional as well as practical support. She felt lonely and alienated from the British population, and socializing with South Africans gave her a sense of security. Although she knew many non-Jewish South Africans, second generation Jewish South Africans formed a large part of her network:

So I think that Jewish South Africans who left later tend to be able to tap into a whole network of their parents’ friends, whose children were born here. Like [my friend], her parents left, she pretty much grew up here. And there are people who were two or three when they came. So that is a really entrenched network, going back a couple of generations.

None of this implies that the Jewish South Africans in north west London are in some way insular, self-segregating and unwilling to engage with people outside the Jewish South African community. All interviewees expressed not only a commitment to forming relationships and friendships with people from other ethnic groups, but that this was a desirable goal in its own right. Indeed, most said that the multi-ethnic character of London had two valuable attributes. Firstly, it allowed them to be Jewish South African Londoners, a term in which none of the interviewees saw any contradiction. For them, it was very viable to nurture their sense of identity while at the same time belong to a larger social entity. Secondly, the ethnic diversity of London was conveyed as an enriching experience, particularly in comparison to the segregated nature of ethnic relations in South Africa. Thus, the strong intra-community cohesion in no way precludes Jewish South Africans to create and maintain meaningful and positive extra-community relationships.

Life in London

Work

Emigrants from South Africa tend to be skilled professionals, and many find employment in the finance and business sectors as well as setting their own businesses and enterprises. Indeed, a strong Pound relative to the Rand, and a range of job opportunities not available in South Africa, were cited by many interviewees as reasons not only for migrating to the UK, but for staying on as well. According to Statistics South Africa, 27% of economically active self-declared emigrants in 2003 were professionals, followed by 12% working in the clerical and sales sector. This is reflected in the London labour market, where South Africans generally appear to fare well, on a par with migrants from high income countries rather than developing countries. South African representation in the ‘business activities’ sector

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48 Statistics South Africa (2005: v)
49 The category in which South Africa falls in the Labour Force Survey categorisation of seven ‘World Region’ areas (Data Management and Analysis Group, 2005: 94).
is nearly twice the average for developing countries (30% and 16% respectively) and for the ‘financial intermediation’ sector South African representation is over two and half times the average for developing countries (13% and 5% respectively). These two sectors are generally highly paid and include banking, insurance, computing and accounting. The third most popular sector is ‘health and social work’ (11%). Furthermore, the South African employment rate (84%) is second only to Australians (86%) and well above the London average (73%).

Most of the interviewees in this study worked in these three sectors, but the sample also included people from the creative industries. Few complained about discrimination or other barriers to employment; quite the contrary, most had found challenging jobs suitable to their skills, and some even said that the South African job market did not really meet their needs or ambitions. Only one interviewee said that her South African qualifications were not recognized in Britain, and that as a consequence she could not practise her trade. Indeed, many were of the opinion that their South African identity was an asset in the job market rather than a disadvantage. They were white and spoke good English, but felt they were not impeded by the class structure to which they believed the British subject themselves. When asked why South Africans seem to fare so well in the job market, Nathan – who worked in the City for a number of years – remarked:

\[\text{Cause Brits can’t pigeon hole us. I always had this when I was working; you can walk into the managing director’s office and say hi to him, whereas Brits would never do that, because Brits are completely aware of the hierarchy, you went to Oxford and this and that. Whereas we can’t be pigeon holed. So on a micro level, we’re not invisible, but we’re not in any class.}\]

The one issue mentioned by some interviewees was obtaining administrative permission to work in Britain. This, however, was spoken of more in terms of being a nuisance rather than a major problem, and many detailed ways to get around this. Most prominently, many South Africans who do not have a job offer from a British employer before leaving South Africa apply for a working holiday visa to begin with:

\[\text{So basically, you’re allowed to work part time for two years. Any commonwealth citizen can come on a working holiday, like backpacking or whatever. A lot of people do that until they find a job, a good job. Then when they find a good job, they return to South Africa, apply for a different visa, and then come here to take up the job. Because you have to leave the country if you want to change visa status. (Tom)}\]

This process is often managed by professional companies specializing in visa and work permit applications.

**Networks and Cohesion**

In the last ten to fifteen years, there has been a proliferation of services catering for South Africans in London. The development of these services represent the growth of the South African community in London, but also tell us a lot about the social and economic level at which South African migrants operate in Britain. The most obvious manifestation of South African community networks and activities is perhaps the increasing number of South African shops, restaurants, bars and papers found throughout the UK. Many shops selling biltong and boerewor have been established across Britain, including London, Monmouthshire (Wales), Newhaven (East Sussex) and various other parts of the country. South African themed bars are also increasingly visible in London, and many serve as a meeting place for young South Africans who go there to meet friends and see their favourite South African bands perform. Furthermore, a number of community newspapers are in operation; of these, the most established one is arguably the weekly SA
Times, which has a circulation of 80,000 papers. Apart from providing news, sports and business headlines from South Africa, SA Times markets itself as connecting “South Africans living abroad by telling their stories, helping them network and informing them about what’s happening in the South African community abroad” as well as helping “South Africans abroad find their feet by offering useful advice on topics such as visas, finance, careers and investing in property”.54

On a deeper and less visible level, South Africans are highly organized in their economic activities. For example, the visa application process has become a professionalized and remunerative business, with a number of companies and agencies offering to manage the whole process of UK work programmes, work permits and visas available to South Africans. As Tom, who was very involved in the business community, put it:

The whole thing has been professionalized now, so you don’t even go through governments … as a South African you’re dealing with a professionally run company, and you say ‘Do you think I’ll be able to do X, Y and Z? Will I be able to get this kind of visa?’ They process everything for you, they give you an answer back.

Many of these services are provided and run by South Africans, and even though most companies also cater for other nationalities such as Australians, New Zealanders and Canadians, fellow South Africans are clearly a main target audience. As Tom, who was very involved in the business community, put it:

Going Back

Crime and Security
Crime is often cited as the primary push factor influencing emigration from South Africa. The rates of violent crimes are high in South Africa as a whole, and Johannesburg has one of the highest murder rates in the world. Burglaries, carjacking and assaults – often with the use of weapons – have become something of a national anxiety regarding everyday safety, particularly in the urban centres. A common, albeit fairly recent, response to fear of crime has been the development of an increasing number of gated communities in cities, guarded by armed security guards.56 The legality of many of these fortresses has been disputed, as they have enclosed public spaces without due authorization from local authorities, and they have provoked controversy as a threat to human rights, democracy and social justice. Nonetheless, businesses as well as middle and high income households increasingly use privately owned security companies and their armed security guards for safety. This has lead to a social and economic segregation agenda and “a ‘new apartheid’ that bears frightening similarities to old apartheid structures”.57 As a

54 SA Times (not dated)
55 www.sabusinessclub.com
56 Lemanski (2004)
57 Ibid.: 101
result, groups become ever more secluded and segregated, causing further community divisions. Many interviewees commented on the state of crime in South Africa, and the effect this is having on race relations. Lana, who said that the fear of crime leads to the affluent living in a ‘bubble of privilege’, was not optimistic about the future of South Africa:

I don’t know if I like the kind society it’s turning into. I think it’s still very divided, broadly still on racial lines. Although I think if you now have money you can cross those boundaries. So I suppose strictly speaking it’s now an economic kind of apartheid. But it’s a very, very unequal society.

The South African government has been widely criticized for inadequately responding to crime and the effectiveness of the police is often questioned, which has caused the government considerable political difficulties. In 2006, the minister of safety and security, Charles Nqakula, caused outrage by responding to opposition MPs in parliament that those who ‘whinge’ about the country’s crime rate should leave. Since then, the South African government has promoted itself as taking the link between crime and development seriously as it launched a campaign to change the world’s perception that South Africa is losing the war against crime. In April 2007, Nqakula visited Britain to reassure foreign investors that the government is serious about tackling crime. His speech included an address to South African expatriates, during which he acknowledged that many had left because of personal experience of violent crime and made a promise that the situation would improve in the near future.

A large number of emigrants from South Africa state that crime was an important factor in the decision to leave, and it appears to be a major factor for not going back as well. Most interviewees mentioned the issues of crime and insecurity as unsettling everyday life, which became particularly prominent amongst those with families, as the prospect of raising their children in a safe environment became a top priority: “Now that I have a child, the security issue, for the first time, is a big deal … It’s not about yourself anymore” (Lana); “People don’t necessarily want to leave but taking control of your own future and that of your kids is paramount. Consciousness or guilt is not going to make you stay” (Bob). Thus, hesitations about going back to live in South Africa for those who had had children while living abroad were often explained and justified by high rates of violent crime and concerns about the protection of family members.

**Politics and the Economy**

The end of apartheid was a true watershed moment in the history of South Africa. Nonetheless, the task of consolidating the nation’s transition to democracy has been a difficult challenge for the post-apartheid governments. The first multi-racial and democratic elections were held in 1994, followed by the second elections of 1999 and third of 2004. Nelson Mandela was the first president to be elected under the new constitution, and he was then succeeded by Thabo Mbeki, the present president, in 1999. As the constitution limits the president’s time in office to two terms, Mbeki will not be able to stand in the next election; in his place, Jacob Zuma will be representing the ANC. He was elected in 2007 as leader of the governing political party despite his dismissal from the government in 2005 for allegations of corruption.

Since the fall of apartheid, expectations of the ANC governments to improve the quality of essential services to the majority of the population, and to improve opportunities in education and professional activity, have been immense. Despite the fact that the ANC holds major support from the South African population, Zuma’s election as leader, and the prospect of him becoming president, was the subject of a great deal of worry amongst most of the interviewees. Some mentioned the vagueness of his policies – especially relating to the economy – others the transition from academic leadership to populism, and many were concerned about the accusations of illegal actions.

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58 Caroll (2006)
59 SouthAfrica.info (2007)
60 Dixon (2008)
Many interviewees shared concerns and fears about the political and social unrest in Zimbabwe and the way it could affect their own country. Because of the geographic proximity and certain historical similarities, but also Mbeki’s politics of ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Mugabe’s regime, many South Africans fear alliances between the political bodies as well as the prospect of social unrest spreading throughout the area. Some mentioned fears about South Africa becoming “just another African country” – both Debbie and Bob expressed concerns about this. For some interviewees, the political instability in Zimbabwe and the threat it might pose reinforced the fear that, in spite of its status as the most economically advanced country on the continent, South Africa remains part of developing Africa.

South Africa is Africa’s largest economy with strong financial and manufacturing sectors. It is a leading exporter of minerals, and tourism is a significant source of foreign exchange. But many South Africans remain poor and unemployment is high. Although certain economic sectors are on a par with the developed world, the South African economy has a number of weak links, mainly because the legacy of apartheid has left a large section of the population in poverty, but also because of the country’s international isolation until the 1990s.61 A major source of anxiety and public debate in South Africa is Eskom, the public utility which provides electricity to the country, and since 2007 has failed to provide sufficient generation capacity. As a result, in January 2008 Eskom introduced rolling blackouts timed on rotating schedules. This has had an adverse impact on the economy, especially the mining industry. Furthermore, this has undermined confidence in Mbeki, and contributed to feelings that the government is failing to provide basic services. Nonetheless, the South African economy remains strong relative to neighbouring countries, with business becoming internationally more integrated and foreign investment increasing. This, however, has presented South Africa with new economic challenges, not least the increasing impact of brain drain.

Brain Drain

Brain drain is a growing concern in South Africa. With young professionals and other skilled South Africans leaving the country in great numbers, the phenomenon is having a big impact on both economic and social development. The end of apartheid led to greater opportunities and choice of education for many young South Africans. At the same time, however, an ever increasing number of students are seeking tertiary education abroad, or emigrating directly after graduating, which has contributed to a colossal loss of skills. The loss of skilled workers and upper-end consumers, alongside the return deficit on direct investment in training and education, has had an impact on the economy. As well as slowing down development, shortage of skills and ongoing emigration dissuades foreign investment, further disabling growth and economic progress. Moreover, immigration to South Africa does not compensate for the shortage of skills as a large number of migrants joining the country – mostly from the rest of the African continent – tend to be unskilled.62 Public services – particularly the health and education sectors – have suffered great strain from the loss of a large number of doctors, nurses and teachers who can earn up to double their wages in Europe, Canada, the US, Australia or New Zealand.

The South African government is aware that by making the most of the diaspora, the brain drain can in fact be turned into a brain gain.63 Thus, the government has responded to the brain drain by campaigning with various organisations – most notably, perhaps, the Homecoming Revolution64 – for the homecoming of South Africans living abroad. However, the growing industrial unrest and the persistently high levels of poverty and unemployment have contributed to the failure to present a positive picture to attract emigrants to come home, in spite of a real concern that many South African migrants have for the state of South Africa.

61 BBC (2002)
64 The Homecoming Revolution is a non-profit organisation sponsored by the First National Bank promoting return to South Africa. It aims at “encouraging and helping South Africans living abroad to return home” (Homecoming Revolution, not dated) by offering a range of services – such as social, financial advice and information – for South African migrants wishing to move back to South Africa.
Most interviewees were aware of the effects of the brain drain and the role they themselves played; many lamented not contributing to the process of progress. For some, this represented a dilemma. Debbie, a 26 year-old young woman who had been working in London for three years, said: “I keep getting emails [from the Homecoming Revolution] asking me to come home. I think it’s helping to some extent because it certainly got through to me”. At the same time, however, motivations to deal with the developmental challenges facing South Africa were, for many, secondary to individual motivations for emigration. As Adam put it, “Most people would think about it for a bit, but people mostly just think about themselves”. Similarly, Tom professed that: “A lot of people will tell you that they want to go back home, but they’re waiting for X to happen”. This turned out to be true for a large number of the younger interviewees, many of whom said they would go home when crime levels were down and the economy had stabilized. Because of this, some interviewees welcomed the tightening of immigration law, and the prospects of restricted access for South Africans to Britain with the phasing in of the points-based system:

One thing that occurs to me is, shutting down the amount of access that South African have to come to England could have some quite positive consequences, in which case a lot more people in South Africa would be forced to stay there, and make the best of what they have there. (Bob)

Affirmative Action

One of the reasons popularly given for the state of the brain drain is the government’s affirmative action policies, which have become a major political issue in South Africa. The government initiated the Black Economic Empowerment programme, aimed at promoting equal opportunities in the workplace and reducing racial inequalities. Under the quota based system, the government employment legislation reserves 80% of new jobs for black people.\textsuperscript{65} The policy has met fierce hostility and resistance from opposition parties, and is commonly blamed for the brain drain of skilled white male South Africans who now find it harder to get employment in their own country.

Most interviewees agreed that the affirmative action policies have been badly implemented by the government, but opinions differed to a great extent when evaluating the need for it. Most held strong views on the topic, and perceived it either as exclusive or as a necessary policy strategy to promote equality. Thus, some interviewees echoed sentiments often heard from the anti-affirmative action lobby in South Africa: “There are a lot of arguments for affirmative action; it’s supposed to benefit people who were previously disadvantaged. And that’s fine. However, when ‘previously disadvantaged’ translates to ‘black’, then it’s reverse racism. There’s absolutely no doubt about it” (Derrick). These interviewees tended to blame affirmative action for a range of economic and administrative failures – such as the Eskom power-cuts and declining quality of public services – as well as the ongoing ‘white flight’ from the country.

Others, however, voiced their support for affirmative action as a principle and stressed its necessity:

I supported affirmative action. I thought it was a required strategy of policy. There’s still need for a certain form of affirmative action in the workplace and the sporting field but now the previously underprivileged who have put themselves in better position financially and career-wise are wanting fairer recognition. There’s still requirement for affirmative action but not as strongly as before. (Dave)

These interviewees considered affirmative action to be fundamental not only to establishing social and economic justice but also as a mechanism for the white population to symbolically distance themselves from apartheid and the privileges it carried for them. Describing those opposing affirmative action, Tom said:

Most of those people have never stopped to think, for a second, about what it

\textsuperscript{65} Wood (2006)
means to be a white South African. About what it means to have benefited from apartheid, what it means that from your very existence you’ve excluded other people from opportunity, from growth, from wealth. The problem with positive discrimination in South Africa is that there is not enough of it!

Nonetheless, and perhaps paradoxically, some of the interviewees voicing support for affirmative action also felt that they were now excluded from its benefits, and that there was therefore no longer a place for them in South Africa. As Nathan put it: “There’s such a nostalgia, for the ridiculously amazing life we had. I mean, we were like trust fund kids. We had everything. Only because of apartheid.” Thus, an acceptance of the principles of affirmative action did mean that people were not entirely willing to give up the benefits they used to have, and for some, this was a strong motivation – or at least justification – for emigrating.

Transnationalism and Relationship with Home
Maintaining close links with South Africa was important to all interviewees, regardless of whether they had made the decision to stay in Britain for good, or still had aspirations to one day move back. These links take a variety of different forms, from keeping in touch with friends and family back home to taking an active interest in social and political developments. Some mentioned attending functions at the High Commission in London or events organized by various other community organisations not only as important for networking, but for keeping in touch with life at home as well, and all interviewees showed great interest in South African current affairs. The online South African press is an important source of information about developments back home, as well as the press published in Britain for South African migrants. South Africa’s growth and development was a hot topic for the interviewees, who would bestow their opinions with great passion. Reflecting on the Eskom power cuts, for example, Ashley said: “Looking back and seeing these things happening gives you perspective, thinking:

What can I get from here, learn here and take back with me and use to improve at home?”

As mentioned above, many were aware of the growing shortage of qualified workers and the skilled emigration from South Africa. As a consequence, a number of interviewees saw their time in the UK as an opportunity to learn skills or establish contacts to make use of in, and for, South Africa.

Not everyone, of course, intended to go back to South Africa. Nonetheless, all interviewees went back to South Africa on a regular basis, generally at least once every year, and some stayed for an extended period of time. To a large extent, this was seen as crucial to sustaining a sense of South African-ness: “The interesting thing about me is that after I emigrated, I did feel moreBritish, and I had absolutely lost my ties to South Africa. It’s only in recent years, with actually going back to South Africa, that I feel that that identity is getting stronger” (Tina).

Going back helps to keep in touch with friends and family which was described as essential to maintain an attachment to home. Even those who were not planning to go back and live showed interest in South African news and planned to invest capital and skills in some shape or form. Furthermore, sending remittances is common for personal savings, but also to pay off mortgages, buying property or helping out relatives.

Importantly, many of those who had settled indefinitely took an active part in various South Africa focused charity projects in the UK. This provided a sense of being proactive in spite of having emigrated, thereby reinforcing their South African identity:

It’s very important for me. I’m involved with various charities but at the moment our biggest involvement is with a university in Johannesburg at which we sponsor about 200 students … I always put time aside to visit the projects. When you see the benefits of it, it’s great. I just wish we could do more. (Dave)
Conclusion

In the context of Runnymede’s Community Studies series, South Africans represent a certain anomaly. Previous reports have focused on relatively disadvantaged migrant and minority ethnic groups. The dominant themes in these studies have revolved around barriers to full participation in British society – such as lack of language skills, discrimination and poverty – resulting in a feeling of voicelessness and a general lack of confidence to navigate administrative systems. Few of the problems identified in previous studies apply to white Anglophone South Africans. On the contrary, South Africans are something of an immigrant success story. They are concentrated in the high-paid sectors of employment, have low unemployment rates, and have in the last 50 years managed to successfully organize themselves economically, politically and socially.

The successes of South Africans in Britain are apparent on various different levels. On an economic level, they are clearly surpassing other migrant groups from developing countries. Migrant communities such as Francophone Cameroonian often form informal networks to provide mutual help with often distressing and unfortunate situations, or set up community organizations as a response to discrimination, disadvantage, and to assist their clients or members with access to mainstream services and barriers to employment on a grass-roots level. South Africans, on the other hand, have established businesses and professional companies which manage most of the administrative aspects of migration on behalf of their clients. Furthermore, organizations such as the SA Business Club in many ways epitomize the socio-economic space within which a large part of South African migrants function. What these types of businesses and institutions indicate is that South Africans are operating on a fundamentally different social and economic level than those migrant groups which Runnymede has so far studied as part of the Community Studies.

On a social and political level, South Africans have managed to maintain the relative invisibility and designation as non-immigrants which Israel deemed one of their most prominent characteristic traits during the years of apartheid. These features have a significant effect on the place of South Africans both within migration policy as well as in British society. Israel argues that from 1962 onwards, South Africans were able to bypass immigration laws to an extent many other migrant or refugee groups could not, and that the procedures allowing this were largely informed by British understandings of race and kinship. This appears to be the case still, albeit in somewhat different forms. Ancestry visas and European Union passports continue to provide many white South Africans with access to Britain. However, economic as well as cultural capital play a crucial role as well, as affluence in South Africa gives access to various resources. The fact that Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa have the highest issue rates for working holiday visas – while Ghana, India and Bangladesh have the lowest – is telling. Furthermore, the whole process of admission has been professionalized to a far greater extent than for most other migrant groups from developing countries. Again, agencies and companies offering migration services typically target Australians, New Zealanders and South Africans, and more recently Polish immigrants as well.

South Africans have also by and large managed to elude the anti-immigrant sentiments from the right wing press in a way many other migrant groups of a similar size have not. This was in many ways reflected in the narratives of the interviewees, few of whom spoke of hostilities towards them from the English population. The logical question to ask, then, is why white Anglophone South Africans are not seen as a social and economic threat. Race is an obvious factor, and most interviewees explicitly stated that the colour of their skin made acceptance – both administratively and socially speaking – into life in the UK far less problematic than for black migrants. But race is only a partial explanation, which does not satisfactorily clarify the differences in British attitudes towards

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66 Sveinsson (2007)
67 UKvisas (2007)
68 Unfortunately, black South Africans did not form part of the sample for this study. This is regrettable, and a more detailed study comparing the experiences of black and white South African migrants could elucidate the exact influence of race and racism on the process of migration.
As the results of this study were being written up, violent and disturbing events were taking place in South Africa. Migrants – mostly from neighbouring Zimbabwe – were targeted by mobs throughout the country in a string of extremely violent attacks. Dozens have been killed, many have been forced to flee their homes, and aid agencies have struggled to feed and shelter the tens of thousands of displaced migrants. The source of the violence is disputed. Former president F. W. de Klerk said that the events were indicative of the failings of the current government rather than the legacy of apartheid.72 The esteemed South African academic, professor Sean Jacobs, argues on the contrary that colonialism and apartheid has left a legacy of xenophobia which permeates every aspect of South African society.73 It is clear, however, that the xenophobic violence taking place in South Africa is indicative of severe social unrest in one of the world’s most unequal societies. This is likely to trigger further emigration from South Africa, especially amongst affluent professionals fearful of their futures. At the same time, however, Britain continues to tighten its borders, and South Africans will be affected along with other developing countries. At the time of writing, it seemed unlikely that South Africa would be part of the youth Mobility Scheme which falls under Tier 5 of the Points based System, and will replace the popular working holiday visa. It is hard to predict what this will mean for the development of the South African presence in Britain. Israel notes that South Africans have always had the capacity to elude or bypass immigration restrictions to a greater extent than many other migrant groups.74 Given the extensive and sophisticated operation of agencies and companies specializing in the formalities of migration, this may continue to be the case. Nonetheless, there appears to be an unease amongst South Africans – those in Britain as well as prospective emigrants within South Africa – that access to Britain will be severely restricted.

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69 Gaine (2006); Markova and Black (2007)
70 McLaren (2008)
71 Israel (1999: 93)
72 BBC (2008)
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