In September 2007, Runnymede, alongside 596 other organizations, submitted its response to a consultation on proposals for a single equality bill. Runnymede expressed its disappointment that the framework which the Discrimination Law Review (DLR) was proposing (after more than a year of research and gathering of evidence) omitted or inadequately incorporated what Runnymede regarded as essential for equality legislation in the 21st century. Many of the concerns expressed by Runnymede were shared by the three equality commissions in their twilight days, and by the Discrimination Law Association, the TUC and other organizations engaged in different equality areas.

Nine months later, in June 2008, the Government Equalities Office (GEO) published a White Paper, Framework for a Fairer Future: The Equality Bill, which sets out in fairly general terms how it intends to deal with particular issues, including:

- A new equality duty on public bodies;
- Powers to extend protection against age discrimination;
- Greater workforce transparency;
- Extended scope for positive action;
- Strengthened enforcement.

At the end of July 2008 the GEO published The Equality Bill – Government Response to the Consultation. This more informative (209 page) document restates the Labour Party 2005 manifesto commitment to introducing a single equality bill in this session of parliament; it summarizes the responses the government received to each of the questions in the DLR consultation, indicating conflicting views – for example between equality organizations and private sector business organizations – where these were relevant. For each question there is an assessment, based not only on external responses but also on the initial DLR position, and the government’s conclusions. This document offers both the government’s arguments to support the proposals in the earlier White Paper and some information on how the new legislation will meet its objectives of ‘streamlining’ and ‘decluttering’ equality law. There is, however, still a long way to go from detailed statements of policy to the fine print of a bill in parliament. Lawyers and equality campaigners outside government are still waiting for more precise details, for example definitions of key concepts, which under current anti-discrimination law have proven to be of critical importance.

Influencing change
From its response to the consultation it is clear that the government has listened to outside views and, looking back to Runnymede’s submissions, some changes of approach should be welcomed.
Particularly important is the decision to establish a new public sector equality duty to replace the current separate race, disability and gender duties with a single duty for all protected grounds: race, disability, sex, gender reassignment, age (18+), religion or belief and sexual orientation. This would include a general duty on all public authorities to eliminate unlawful discrimination and promote equality, and specific duties, such as to publish an equality scheme, for listed authorities. This approach, rather than the far less rigorous duty proposed by the DLR had very broad support. The government estimates that if the single equality bill is approved in 2009 the new equality duty would not come into force before 2010/2011.

Extending protection against age discrimination beyond employment was supported by some 500 individual respondents as well as most organizations, other than a few representing private sector interests (with warnings about costs from local government bodies and devolved governments). The government now proposes that the SEB will give the government powers to outlaw unfounded age discrimination by those providing goods, facilities or services or carrying out public functions. This would, however, apply only to people age 18 and over and could be brought in by regulations at a later stage after further consultation, possibly introduced in separate phases.

There will be wider scope for positive action. The SEB will permit an employer to take under-representation (on any of the protected grounds) into account when selecting between ‘two equally qualified candidates’. Lawyers and others familiar with European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law, from which this approach appears to derive, query how often employers will, in practice, be faced with this situation and suggest this is an area in which the detail of the law will be critical. Positive action to meet special needs for education, training or welfare - that now applies to race, religion or belief and sexual orientation - will be extended to all protected grounds. Political parties will continue to be able to adopt women-only shortlists until 2030. Noting a lack of consensus, including among BME MPs, the government is not proposing a parallel provision in the SEB to permit ethnic minority-only shortlists, although there will be some positive action measures which political parties may take. The government response did not indicate how the SEB will ensure that political parties do not discriminate on any protected grounds, a question that needs an answer. Although the House of Lords and Court of Appeal considered cases involving allegations of race discrimination in the selection of Labour Party candidates, it is still not clearly established how, if at all, the Race Relations Act 1976 applies to the activities of political parties including their selection procedures.

The government has agreed that the SEB will give employment tribunals new powers when they uphold a complaint of discrimination to make a recommendation to protect the wider workforce from similar forms of discrimination. How such a recommendation could be enforced is not explained; if this potentially valuable lever for change is to have a real impact then should there not be a more timely sanction in addition to evidence of non-compliance being considered in future discrimination litigation against the same employer?

While employers are unlikely to make changes if they (choose to) remain unaware of inequalities within their workforce, many respondents are disappointed that the main way the government is proposing to tackle the gender pay gap and inequality in employment of ethnic minorities and disabled people is by greater ‘transparency’. The SEB will impose mandatory monitoring and reporting obligations on public sector employers. For the private sector there will be no legal duty, but the government will seek to encourage greater transparency, including by means of a new ‘kite mark’, and it will review progress after five years, when consideration may be given to statutory reporting requirements.

Transparency within the private sector will be encouraged through public procurement. Runnymede was among a large group of respondents, including business organizations, who supported a clear statutory requirement on public bodies to make equality part of their procurement process; the government does not appear to disagree, but has not clarified how, if at all, it might use the SEB for this purpose.

**Negative and delayed decisions**

The government has rejected proposals for the SEB supported by Runnymede and other equality organizations including:

- Inclusion of a purpose clause which, by stating basic principles, could aid public understanding and could guide courts, tribunals, employers and service providers as to how it should be applied and interpreted.
• Protection for children against age discrimination outside employment and including equality rights for children in the public sector equality duty.

• Full harmonization of equality rights so that for all grounds there would be the same protections against discrimination and harassment.

With a conflict between equality organizations including Runnymede and business organizations, the government is still considering whether the SEB should allow discrimination claims on combined multiple grounds, for example on grounds of race and sex.

**Europe cannot be ignored**

For the first time, the drafting of UK primary legislation on equality will (should) be directly affected by decisions of the ECJ as well as EU legislation.

A few days after the White Paper, the European Commission published its proposals for a new equality directive which would prohibit discrimination on grounds of disability, religion or belief, sexual orientation and religion or belief in areas such as social security, healthcare, housing, education and access to goods and services. This draft directive is still in its early stages, and ultimately requires unanimous approval by the Council of Ministers. Depending on its final content, it could require the UK government to reconsider some of its decisions, for example to exclude children from protection against age discrimination or to omit specific protection against harassment on grounds of religion or belief or sexual orientation.

The government is now considering the decision in Coleman v. Attridge Law, in which the ECJ held that under EU law protection against disability applies not only to a disabled person but also to a person associated with a disabled person. This is not the approach the government had been proposing.

The ECJ decision in Heyday v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry - which is likely to precede introduction of the SEB in parliament - may affect the contents of the bill in relation to age discrimination.

**Next steps**

The government is currently consulting further within government and with selected external stakeholders. While one of the stated aims is to ‘declutter’ the law, if the government proceeds with proposals for different levels of protection for particular grounds and/or particular areas of activity, this will create a new hierarchy of protection and make the SEB unduly complex. In this writer’s view, this prospect, and the limitations on parliamentary time, makes it critically important for anyone concerned about the content of equality law and how it is enforced to make their views known now. This could be to challenge certain conclusions in the government response to the consultation or to highlight problems under current legislation which have not been addressed. Once there is an actual SEB before parliament it will be far more difficult to secure any change, and there is unlikely to be another opportunity for a comprehensive equality bill for many years.

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**The Benefits and Impacts of Migration:**

**Analysis of the Government’s Current Thinking**

As immigration policy reforms gather pace, Communities and Local Government recently published a document outlining a cross-Government approach to ‘maximise the benefits of migration and minimise the impacts at local level’. As such, it provides an interesting overview of current Government thinking on immigration. Kjartan Páll Sveinsson explores what the publication tells us of the direction the Government’s immigration agenda is taking, and how this sits with the changing nature of diversity in Britain.

**Facing the fact of super-diversity**

The point of departure in *Managing the Impacts of Migration* is that patterns of migration have been changing, presenting Britain with a new set of challenges. This implies that politicians and policy makers are beginning to wake up and respond to these changes, which is encouraging. Through our Community Studies programme, Runnymede has been arguing that public policy has been slow to get to grips with super-diversity. What we have found is that the lived reality of many of the new migrant groups includes experiences of severe discrimination, exploitation and violation of rights. This reality, however, is not wholeheartedly acknowledged by the CLG.

The document lists a range of measures aiming at minimizing the impacts of migration at a local level. Some of the proposals are quite sensible, such as providing funds to tackle homelessness, strengthening measures to protect vulnerable workers and to provide additional support to children for whom English is an additional language. How these measures will be realized is another matter, and it is easy to be cynical. For example, if recent developments in the crackdown on irregular migrants are anything to go by, the
immigration


Squeezing more out of migrants

As always, the question arises about how the government will pay for their proposed changes. The answer lies in a Transitional Impacts of Migration Fund, which will be made available to local authorities most affected by demographic changes. The money in this fund, however, will be raised by increasing fees for immigration applications. In other words, migrants will pay the bill. What’s more, the Green Paper, The Path to Citizenship, shamelessly states that the government will target the most vulnerable migrants – and points particularly to those with children and older people – to pay higher fees than others, as they ‘tend to consume more in public services’. This would perhaps be acceptable if it were true. Except it isn’t, and the government is quite aware of this. In this sense, Managing the Impacts of Migration follows the trend set out in other recent policy documents on migration. The paper outlines the many ways in which migrants contribute to the British economy, and how they take little out of the public purse in return. Ultimately, then, we’re left with an absurd algebra, which can be characterized as follows: ‘Migrants bring clear gains to the British economy and take very little out of it in terms of benefits and public services. We can therefore legitimately expect them to contribute more and further restrict their rights’. This narrative sits uncomfortably with the realities of diversity in 21st century Britain.

Most migrants want to contribute to the British economy, and have pragmatic reasons for doing so. Contribution is a prerequisite for acceptance into the mainstream of British life. Acceptance, in turn, leads to inclusion and increased capacity of economic participation, a major concern for economic migrants. If the aim is to make the most of migrants’ contribution to Britain, it would be more fruitful to focus on how migrants can be given a stake in society. Such a focus would necessarily have equality and migrants’ rights at its centre. If we take the London labour market as a case in point, there are clear connections between nationality, immigration status and inequality. Ninety per cent of people working in London’s low paid ‘elementary jobs’ – that is to say contract cleaning, hospitality work, home care and food processing – are migrant workers, predominantly from Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe. These migrants do not end up in this sector because they lack skills; around 50% have tertiary level education, and severe deskilling and downward social mobility is common. It is therefore clear that there is a wealth of wasted talent, which is detrimental for the British public, for migrants themselves, and for the sending countries.

Conclusion

It is disheartening that the government’s current policy responses to Britain’s emerging super-diversity tend to ignore the actual experiences of different groups and individuals, how they interact amongst themselves and with others, and how they see their place in Britain. The CLG’s Managing the Impacts of Migration reveals a stance towards migrants as undeserving and suspect by default. This is far from both the purpose as well as the outcome of Runnymede’s Community Studies programme. Most of our interviewees expressed a clear desire to contribute positively to their host society. Indeed, most conveyed a sense of appreciation for Britain giving them a chance to contribute. However, most also described difficulties in trying to do so, because of widespread prejudice and discrimination.

If maximizing the benefits of migration is the primary concern of the government, it must recognize that the legitimate interests of migrant workers are by no means antithetical to the interests of Britain. In any case, it is nonsensical to speak of the interests of Britain as if Britain was a homogenous mass, without hierarchy, stratification and conflicts of interests. While some segments of British society may benefit from violating migrants’ rights and exploiting migrant workers, the majority of British workers do not. Indeed, exploitation is arguably a larger threat to local communities than new migrant communities disproportionately accessing benefits or public services. Cementing migrants’ rights and protecting them from exploitation is the most effective way to ensure healthy labour market participation and prevent migrant destitution.
The Long Path to Citizenship

Elisabetta Dolzan, compares the ‘next steps’ in reforming the immigration system with the existing legislation.

With the partial draft of the Immigration and Citizenship Bill 2009 presented to Parliament in July 2008, the ‘next steps’ in reforming the immigration system announced in the Home Office’s The Path to Citizenship are now being enacted. The draft Bill does not move away from the proposals advanced in the Green Paper, but confirms the legislative changes presented in February 2008, seemingly disregarding concerns and opinions of the majority of consultation respondents, including those of the Runnymede Trust. In particular, it maintains the criticized concept of active citizenship and the introduction of three stages of citizenship, resulting in longer qualifying periods for naturalization. In fact, not only does the existence of ‘probationary citizenship’ delay the moment a person can apply for naturalization, but the length of such a probationary period will depend on whether the applicant has played an ‘active role’ in his or her community, resulting in an eight year long journey to naturalization should the active citizenship condition not be met. Table 1 below summarizes the most relevant proposals presented in the reform.

### Table 1. Key changes in legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three stages of citizenship</th>
<th>Existing legislation</th>
<th>Path to Citizenship/Partial Draft Bill</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Temporary residence</strong></td>
<td>a. Five years (migrant workers); b. Two years (family members).</td>
<td>a. Five years for: • economic migrants; • highly skilled migrants who have studied in the UK; persons given protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. One year before applying for citizenship; b. Three years before applying for permanent residency.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Probationary citizenship</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>a. Six years (economic migrants, refugees, their dependants); b. Three years (family members).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(minimum time)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3a. Citizenship</strong></td>
<td>a. Five years (migrant workers); b. Two years (family members)</td>
<td>a. Eight years (economic migrants, refugees, their dependants); b. Five years (family members).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(minimum qualifying period)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3b. Permanent residency</strong></td>
<td>a. Five years (migrant workers); b. Two years (family members)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(minimum qualifying period)</td>
<td></td>
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### Conditions for naturalization

| Knowledge of English language and Life in the UK test | Test is necessary to obtain permanent residency. In case of failure, test can be retaken and a temporary right to remain is granted. | Test is necessary to progress to probationary citizenship. In case of failure, migrants are required to leave the UK. |
| Active citizenship | No | Minimum qualifying period for citizenship applies to people playing an active role in their community. |
| Crime | No access to citizenship for those convicted to a sentence of 30 months or more. | Slower progress to citizenship if the applicant has committed minor offences. No access to probationary citizenship and removal from the UK if the applicant has been in prison. |

**Notes:**
- Economic migrants: Tiers 1 and 2 of the Points-based System (PBS);
- Family members: family of British citizens or permanent residents;
- Highly skilled who have studied in the UK; persons previously under Tier 4 of the PBS.
by the Home Office in the Green Paper The Path to Citizenship, comparing them with existing legislation and with the provisions of the recent draft Bill. It highlights how no relevant changes have been brought forward by the Bill from the Green Paper. Table 2 shows how long it would take to qualify for naturalization. As Runnymede pointed out in its response to the Green Paper, the Migrant Integration Policy Index analysis made clear that, should the newly introduced conditions be adopted in the final Bill, the process of naturalization in the UK would become one of the most onerous in Europe and the country’s score on access to nationality would fall from the 5th most favourable position for promoting integration to 10th, just around the EU average.

Parliament will be debating the ‘earned citizenship’ proposals starting in December this year; the consultation process on the draft Bill runs until the end of September 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. active citizenship condition is not met; b. applicant has not been convicted of a prescribed offence.</td>
<td>Eight years (five years for family members).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. active citizenship condition is met; b. applicant has not been convicted of a prescribed offence.</td>
<td>Six years (three years for family members).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. active citizenship condition is not met; b. applicant has been convicted of a prescribed offence.</td>
<td>Eight years and years prescribed in relation to offence (five plus conviction years for family members).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. active citizenship condition is met; b. applicant has been convicted of a prescribed offence.</td>
<td>Six years and years prescribed in relation to offence (five plus conviction years for family members).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Qualifying period for naturalization under the Immigration and Citizen (Partial Draft) Bill


Jessica Mai Sims reviews this release from Communities and Local Government, which provides headline findings for the 2007-08 Citizenship Survey, covering all four quarters from April 2007 to March 2008.

The sample for the survey is much smaller than other national surveys, covering only 10,000 adults with an additional boost sample of 5,000 people from minority ethnic groups. Despite its relatively small sample size, it has been designed as a household survey with specific aims to gauge the public’s levels of volunteering and civic engagement, and also their perceptions of community cohesion and racial prejudice and discrimination. The data generated from the survey can give us an idea of the degree to which the public is participating in voluntary and civic activity, and throw some light on their perceptions of equality and diversity in society.

Active and empowered communities

The first section on active and empowered communities details the results on volunteering and civic engagement for England. The indicators for civic engagement were broken down to: civic activism, civic consultation and civic participation. Prior to 2005, data on civic activism and consultation were not collected. Aside from measuring engagement, the survey records respondents’ perceptions of influencing decision-making. All groups were more likely to report that they felt they could influence local decision-making than decision-making at a national level. Interestingly, respondents from every minority ethnic group were more likely than White people to feel they can influence decisions affecting both their local area and Britain as a whole. Within the minority ethnic groups, Black African are most likely to feel that they can influence their local area (53%) or Britain (41%), while Chinese/Other feel they have the least influence in their local area (42%) and in Britain (29%).

In 2007/08, 73% of adults who have volunteered once in the last 12 months and 48% volunteered at least once a month over the course of the year. Additionally, 41% of people at risk of social exclusion volunteered at least once a month during the past 12 months. Since 2001, overall levels of volunteering have not changed, though there are more people regularly volunteering informally (35%) rather than formally (27%).

When broken down by ethnicity, the groups least likely to volunteer either informally or formally were Pakistani (29% and 16%), Bangladeshi (24% and 15%), and Chinese/Other (27% and 16%). Respondents most likely to volunteer both informally and formally were Mixed Race (36% and 26%), White (35% and 28%) and Black Caribbean (39% and 27%).

Community cohesion

In 2003, questions on cohesion were included for the first time in the Citizenship Survey (though only covering England). The cohesion section covers opinions on whether the respondent feels that their area is cohesive, the extent to which they feel they belong to their local area and Great Britain, and whether people...
in their area mix socially with others from different backgrounds. The latest survey shows that 82% of the respondents perceived their local area as cohesive. In fact, regardless of age, ethnic and gender group, the majority of respondents perceived their community as cohesive. Compared to the 2003/04 period, perceptions of cohesion in 2007/08 remained largely unchanged between individual ethnic groups, though there was a decrease in perceptions of cohesion among Bangladeshis (from 87% to 83%) and an increase among Indians (from 81% to 86%) and Black Africans (78% to 83%).

When comparing the question on cohesion with that of mixing socially with other ethnic and religious groups, there are some interesting findings. For example, people aged 75 years or more had the most positive perceptions on cohesion (91%) but were the group least likely to mix socially with people from other backgrounds (52%). People in the 16-24 age group had the least positive views of community cohesion (76%) but were most likely to mix socially (93%).

Racial prejudice and discrimination
Feelings of discrimination have decreased for people from minority ethnic groups since 2001.

The police and prison service are the two public service organizations (out of eight) that are considered the most discriminatory on the grounds of race by people from minority ethnic groups. People from the White group, on the other hand, were less likely to think that these two organizations would treat them worse. While people from minority ethnic groups’ expectation of discrimination by council housing departments or associations remained unchanged since the 2001/02 survey, the expectation by White people has increased (from 15% in 2001 to 25% in 2007). Council housing departments/associations were the only organizations where perceptions or racial discrimination was higher among White people than minority ethnic groups.

White people are more likely than people from minority ethnic groups to feel that there is more racial prejudice than five years ago. This may indicate that White people think there is more racial prejudice towards them (such as in public services) or that there is more prejudice towards others – this question of perception does not tell us where the prejudice is directed. The survey reported that people from minority ethnic groups were more likely than White people to think that racial or religious harassment is a problem in their local area, and cited race and colour as reasons for being turned down for a job and for being treated unfairly at work in terms of promotion and progression. This focus on perceptions – as with the questions on community cohesion and belonging – focuses on the judgements of people, which may be overly optimistic or may be ill-informed.

Conclusion
The data contained in the Citizenship Survey leaves us wanting more information and explanation. How useful is it to include the ‘diverse Chinese/Other’ group in a report of this kind? Will the perceptions and activities of Chinese people dramatically change in subsequent Citizenship Surveys after the Chinese category is relocated to the Asian category? How does economic activity impact civic engagement – do civic engagement and volunteering levels correlate with social class?

It would be interesting to do further research on volunteering, both on people’s motivations for volunteering, and the reasons preventing other people from volunteering. In light of the recent proposals set out in the government’s green paper, The Path to Citizenship, requiring immigrants to volunteer, it would be useful if the Citizenship Survey showed the percentage of respondents who are either immigrants or naturalized British citizens. This information would be useful for informed policy on integration and community cohesion, as it could provide evidence on whether these groups are more or less likely to feel discriminated against, and whether they feel that they belong to their neighbourhood, or to Britain, are more or less civically engaged, and how much time they have spent volunteering in the past 12 months.

The Path to Citizenship had described active citizenship as volunteering, even though no evidence was presented in the paper to verify that formal volunteering promotes integration or cohesion. Interestingly, information from the Citizenship Survey shows that the majority of groups strongly felt that their local area was cohesive and that they belong to their local area and to Great Britain, even though less than half of each group reported volunteering on a monthly basis. Additionally, for 2007/08, Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani respondents were more likely to feel that they belonged to Britain than White people do, despite being less likely to volunteer than White people. This suggests no straightforward link between active citizenship (as in volunteering) and integration. In fact the Citizenship Survey asserts, ‘not surprisingly, people from minority ethnic backgrounds are more likely than White people to mix socially with people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds (95% compared to 78%) reflecting their greater opportunity to do so’.

Other Recently Published Government Documents of Interest:

The Equality Bill – Government Response to the Consultation has been published, bringing together the responses of 500 people from regional consultation events and 597 responses from organizations and 3,629 responses from private individuals. Nearly all respondents agreed with streamlining the law.

Managing the Impacts of Migration: A Cross-Government Approach by the DCLG focuses on how government will maximize economic benefits of migration and minimize pressures on local service providers. See Kjartan Pall Sveinsson’s article about this document on page 3 of this issue of the Bulletin.

Review of Migrant Integration Policy in the UK by the DCLG focuses on the gaps identified in Our Shared Future by the Commission for Integration and Cohesion (CIC). It also addresses the feasibility of an Integration Agency to help new migrants, as recommended by the CIC.
Financial Inclusion and Ethnicity

On 16 July 2008, New Philanthropy Capital, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the Runnymede Trust, with support from Friends Provident Foundation, held a joint launch event to share the findings from their latest research into financial inclusion. Omar Khan, author of the Runnymede’s report, looks at the experience of black and minority ethnic communities in accessing financial products and services, and suggests further research and policy action to tackle inequalities.

Runnymede’s report, Financial Inclusion and Ethnicity, points to significant differences between white and black and minority ethnic communities in areas such as savings, pensions, financial awareness, insurance and risk. The report identifies 24 specific points for further research and policy action to tackle this inequality and argues that we should think of financial inclusion as being a necessary component of social justice. Before explaining those findings, we first explain the meaning of financial inclusion, and the background in which it developed.

Understanding financial inclusion

Financial inclusion refers to access to a range of financial goods and services, including bank accounts, credit, insurance, savings and advice. Access to such goods and services is of course vital for economic well-being, but financial exclusion may also affect broader measures of deprivation in education, employment and housing. As Runnymede argues in Financial Inclusion and Ethnicity, to tackle financial inclusion effectively, it should be considered in the broader context of social justice, especially because lack of access to financial goods and services has wider effects on individuals.

The idea of financial inclusion can in fact be linked to another topic, namely social inclusion. Notably, the Financial Inclusion Task Force at the Treasury was first conceived as part of the Social Inclusion Unit at the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. They defined social exclusion as ‘what can happen when people or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low income, poor housing, high crime, bad health and family breakdown’. A key benefit of thinking in terms of social inclusion is that it seems to highlight the importance of participation for everyone in a democratic society. There is increasing commitment to the idea that everyone who is affected by a decision should be included for that decision-making process to be truly democratic, and it is obvious that being excluded from other important social interactions has bad effects for individuals.

On the other hand, the concept of social exclusion has been criticized for failing to explain the causes of disadvantage, for failing to address the question of inequality, and for narrowing the goals and ambitions of government policy. Those who think that New Labour governance has been too focused on managerial concerns are particularly likely to interpret social inclusion as a way of backing off from more expansive and legitimate aims such as reducing inequality and increasing participation. For critics, ‘social inclusion’ has an ambivalent relationship to ‘social justice’ because the latter concept makes the tackling of inequality and the achievement of a just society legitimate and desirable ends of government policy.

Whatever the force of such criticism in terms of social inclusion, it may seem less relevant in the context of financial inclusion. Most financial goods and services are delivered in large part according to market forces, and are not the object of government policy, though they are of course regulated to ensure customers’ rights. It may then seem more appropriate to discuss financial inclusion because few people view access to credit or insurance as being a right in the sense that participation in political institutions or indeed the labour market might be. Furthermore, financial institutions don’t have the same obligations or responsibilities to their customers as political institutions have to their citizens.

Finally, whereas social inclusion is sometimes criticized for suggesting that governments have no causal responsibility for disadvantage, this assumption isn’t always unjustified in the case of financial institutions. That is, people may be financially excluded for reasons that have little to do with the policies or practices of financial institutions. On the other hand, financial exclusion has knock-on effects on people’s well-being, explaining why Runnymede sees it in terms of wider social justice concerns.

Explaining financial inclusion policy

Although financial inclusion is a relatively new policy area, in the past few years the UK Government has adopted a range of policies aimed at tackling financial exclusion, including basic bank accounts, the Saving Gateway and the Child Trust Fund. In general, the topic is
divided into five areas: banking, credit, savings, insurance and advice. Policy on banking is probably the most developed, and policy on insurance the least developed, but each of these areas has been subject to significant government research and policy.

But despite the growing research and policy in addressing financial exclusion, there is virtually no research, data collection or analysis on levels and experiences of financial exclusion by ethnicity. Policy is being rapidly developed in this area without gathering and considering evidence on the possible differential impact of the policy on black and minority ethnic (BME) groups. For example, funding under the Social Inclusion Fund is being granted to a range of organizations, including at least one major consortium of community based money advice/support providers, without exploring whether or not there may be a need for targeted outreach to BME groups.

Runnymede’s report, Financial Inclusion and Ethnicity, is the conclusion of a wide-ranging scoping exercise with the purpose of gaining a better understanding of the similarities and differences between white and black and minority ethnic groups in their experiences of financial exclusion. However, the report is not simply a literature review, but makes 24 recommendations for future research and policy action. The most significant is that financial inclusion should be conceptualized more broadly as a component of social justice. By considering the impact of financial inclusion on a person’s capacity to participate in society and indeed to make important choices in their own lives, we can better understand why inequality of access to financial goods and services is bad, and how policy can best respond to financial exclusion.

**Risk: statistical scoring and its limits**

In fact, there are already limits to the extension of market principles in the delivery of financial goods and services. Perhaps most notable are the restrictions on the operation of risk. Most financial goods and services, such as credit (including mortgages) and insurance as determined in line with assumptions regarding how likely an individual is to keep up with payments or, in the case of insurance, to make a claim. Statistical scoring is now quite sophisticated, and arguably most well known to the general public in the case of gender and postcodes. Scoring is, however, necessarily probabilistic, meaning that a particular characteristic – say postcode – may positively correlate with higher or lower risk, but individual members sharing that characteristic may in fact contradict that general tendency. This raises a key question for statistical scoring, namely its accuracy in evaluating the actual risk of various individuals, or indeed a particular characteristic.

But even if statistical scoring were perfectly capable of predicting a person’s risk, there is the additional question of whether some characteristics are unethical or otherwise undesirable to use in risk-scoring. For example, research has suggested that ethnicity is a fairly good predictor of risk, but financial institutions in the UK reject its use in determining risk-scoring for their various products. This raises a more general issue: are some risk-predictive characteristics unethical to collect, even if they accurately predict risk?

In response to this question, we probably need to decide collectively how we want to distribute – or indeed redistribute – risk in our society. As all of us are likely to end up on the wrong end of a risk assessment at some point in our lives (from young male drivers to older people applying for travel insurance), this is not simply a technical question, but one that affects everyone. Furthermore, it may seem particularly worrying that certain disadvantaged groups – including BME people – would have to pay more for a financial product such as home contents insurance because they are more likely to be burgled.

On the other hand, it may also seem unfair to make low-risk people pay the costs of high-risk behaviour. Take the case of bungee-jumping or skydiving in the context of travel insurance. Should those who refuse to take such risks pay higher premiums because those who take such risks raise the cost of travel insurance for all through their higher incidence of serious accidents? Here we can draw an important distinction: some risks are associated with individual choices or preferences, where we generally think people should be responsible for at least some of the consequences of their choices; other risks derive from characteristics that people do not choose, but nevertheless have a negative impact on their access to financial goods and services. In fact, the question of individual preferences is considerably more complex, as people may have particular views on risk or in terms of employment choices (i.e. choosing a job with higher satisfaction but lower salary) that may have an indirect but nevertheless significant impact upon their access to financial goods and services.

**Conclusion: from financial inclusion to social justice**

We may now need to make more explicitly political decisions about how we as a society wish to tackle these difficult questions. Collective decision-making is often considered necessary where social outcomes need to be guided by principles of fairness. A social justice model of financial exclusion is necessary for these and other reasons. In existing free-
market democracies such as the UK, access to basic financial goods and services — starting from a bank account — are necessary for individuals to participate fully in most social institutions. Lacking financial goods and services is not simply a disadvantage in financial terms, but it has wider effects on a citizen’s capacity to participate as an equal in British society.

Furthermore, reduced access to financial goods and services makes it more difficult for individuals to pursue their own choices in life. Part of the original justification for the Child Trust Fund was that 18-year olds shouldn’t have to take the first job on offer and should instead be able to make choices that better match their preferences and capacities. To the extent that access to financial goods and services enhances personal autonomy, it again has wider implications.

Wherever a group of people is more likely to be disadvantaged, principles of social justice require that policy responds to those disadvantages. The link between social justice, BME disadvantage and financial exclusion is as follows. Disadvantages among BME groups indicate greater risk of financial exclusion, which in turn impacts not only access to banking or credit, but also a person’s economic well-being, autonomy and participation in democratic society. Runnymede’s report Financial Inclusion and Ethnicity is animated by the thought that BME people’s experience of disadvantage may make them more at risk of financial exclusion. The report, and in particular the 24 recommendations for further research and policy action explain how financial inclusion could better realize the important goals of economic well-being, personal autonomy and participation in British society.

### Reviewing the Business Case

**Omar Khan** considers the findings of a recent and important report, commissioned by the Department for Work and Pensions¹ which analyses the empirical evidence for equal opportunity policies in business.

What sorts of considerations are likely to make businesses behave in socially responsible ways? The most obvious is the fact that doing so would be good for a business’s bottom-line. An example that will be familiar to readers of the Bulletin is the so-called ‘business case for diversity’, namely the idea that a diverse base of employees can increase a business’s profitability in a variety of ways. Consequently, businesses should be willing to promote equal opportunity policies for their real business benefits.

Two criticisms confront the business case for diversity, and indeed other arguments that socially responsible behaviour can be economically profitable. First is that it is notoriously hard to measure the actual benefits and costs of equal opportunity and indeed other policies. Even if a business has improved profits in a year in which they hire more women or black and minority ethnic people, how can they be sure that such benefits derive from equal opportunity policies, and not other aspects of their business?

Second is that equal opportunity policies are arguably not best justified in terms of business profits, but with reference to fairness or equality.² Should we really say that it is acceptable for organizations to discriminate in hiring or promotions as long as that makes them more profitable? On the other hand, do we really believe that the reasons why fair hiring procedures are justified is because they are likely to increase a company’s annual profits? Less stridently, we might say that a demonstrable business case is a good pragmatic way to get companies to adopt equal opportunity policies, even if profitability isn’t the reason why the policies in question are justifiable.

### Evaluating the business case: data and limitations

A recent and important report commissioned by the Department for Work and Pensions analyses the empirical evidence on whether equal opportunity policies make an organization more profitable. The report is an admirable attempt to answer the first criticism of the ‘business case’, namely that the evidence base is poor. Significantly, the report only briefly touches on the second criticism, namely that equal opportunities are better justified in terms of social justice rather than on their putative business effects.

The report’s findings are ultimately quite cautious: “[T]he evidence presented in this report suggests that, on average, individual employers do not necessarily gain (nor lose) from implementing policies and practices to promote equality of opportunity¹. The conclusion that equal opportunity policies have no clear impact on a business’s bottom-line is in fact hedged with some serious caveats, principally because of the limits of the data used in the report. The econometric methods used in this report will be difficult for most readers (including this reviewer) to follow. However, the analysis of the data is quite succinct and understandable.
Reviewing the Business Case

The analysis only addressed equal high­lights another concern – that policies? In fact, the report briefly encourages equal opportunity: or does greater profitability lead to greater profitability, – do equal opportunity policies admit to concerns on causality and terms of data, the report is quite cautious about its claims and the difficulty of determining staff. any measurement of the business case for diversity. This is that what counts as good business is itself not clear. While year-on-year losses obviously undermine any organization, sometimes organizational change can take a few years to take effect. That is, it’s not obvious that a loss of profits or indeed a fall in labour productivity in the short term is bad business in the long term. It takes time for the effects of business changes to run their course, particularly when it comes to hiring and training staff. Any measurement of the ‘business case for diversity’ should probably consider whether a diverse workforce will yield long-term profits and profitability even if it has no impact (or even a negative impact) on shorter term profits and productivity. In a competitive market, such long-term effects can be vital.

A more fundamental challenge to the report is that the ‘business case for diversity’ is in fact a poor justification for equal opportunity policies. Instead, there is a moral argument for ensuring that hiring and promotion practices are fair, regardless of the profitability of fair employment. If an organization were to be more profitable if it excluded an entire part of the population from its workforce, we wouldn’t typically say that such practices were justified by a business case.

We would emphasize one further difficulty for any data-based analysis of the ‘business case for diversity’. This is that what counts as good business is itself not clear. While year-on-year losses obviously undermine any organization, sometimes organizational change can take a few years to take effect. That is, it’s not obvious that a loss of profits or indeed a fall in labour productivity in the short term is bad business in the long term. It takes time for the effects of business changes to run their course, particularly when it comes to hiring and training staff. Any measurement of the ‘business case for diversity’ should probably consider whether a diverse workforce will yield long-term profits and profitability even if it has no impact (or even a negative impact) on shorter term profits and productivity. In a competitive market, such long-term effects can be vital.

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Criticisms of the report

There are two possible rejoinders to the findings of this report. First is to question the data use and second is to question the research question in a more fundamental way. In terms of data, the report is quite cautious about its claims and admits to concerns on causality – do equal opportunity policies lead to greater profitability, or does greater profitability encourage equal opportunity policies? In fact, the report briefly highlights another concern – that the analysis only addressed equal opportunities that were written down. This fails to capture any informal measures by which organizations try to make hiring practices fairer, and especially in smaller organizations these are likely to have a greater impact than formal equal opportunities statements, which in many cases are relatively banal.

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The benefits of diversity

To be fair, the report is explicitly concerned with the business case only. Indeed, it points out that social justice arguments have become less prominent since the early 1990s (in part because of Government policy), and it is indeed important to study whether the more narrow economic benefits of equal opportunities do in fact hold. Nevertheless, there is a growing literature that suggests that diversity yields more wide-ranging benefits than this review – and indeed most policy literature on the business case – considers.

Perhaps the best recent text that covers this area is Scott Page’s The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools and Societies (Princeton University Press, 2007). The basic point of this book is that a diverse number of people will typically outperform a single person in finding a solution to problems, even if the single agent is much more talented. This is because many problems – whether in businesses, schools or the public sector – are extremely complicated, and it is very unlikely that a single person will be able to solve them. Different people not only have different talents, but different perspectives, and if a workforce is suitably diverse, they will bring different perspectives that make businesses more successful.

Most effective businesses are aware of the efficiencies that result from utilizing different employees’ various strengths. In a different context, many democratic theorists increasingly endorse the idea of ‘deliberation’, not only as a way of encouraging greater participation, but also because they believe that a diverse range of citizens that reasonably discusses questions of policy will be more likely to come to an efficient solution. Unless we think only one or a few people are capable of fully understanding the complexities of the social world, and are fully capable of realizing the real needs of every citizen, there
are good reasons to think that diverse decision-making will lead to better solutions.

Moral reasons for equal opportunity
While these benefits of diversity should be considered in any future analysis of the (business) benefits of equal opportunity policies, they will never completely overwhelm moral arguments for equal opportunities. Such arguments may not fit the aim or content of the reviewed report, but they must not be sidestepped, in particular for public institutions. That is, many of the managers interviewed in the report were in public sector organizations, and thus are under a legal obligation to fulfil equality duties.

Furthermore, public bodies can never justify unfair hiring practices, and have a greater obligation to ensure that their services are delivered to every citizen. This is in fact a crucial difference between the public and private sector: while public goods and services must typically be delivered to every citizen, private goods and services may be offered at market prices that some consumers may not be able to afford. Even if it may be difficult to motivate private sector firms to develop equal opportunity policies through moral arguments, public sector organizations must adopt fair hiring to conform with their underlying aim, and indeed to ensure their democratic legitimacy. This explains why the civil service has recently set targets (but not quotas) for increasing the numbers of women and black and minority ethnic people, particular at higher management roles.3

Conclusion
It is indeed worthwhile to study the actual economic costs and benefits of equal opportunity policy. It is also interesting that current data suggest little correlation (positive or negative) between equal opportunity policies and business benefits. Future research in this area should, however, expand their understanding of business benefits not only to capture more long-term effects, but also to interrogate the ‘perspectival’ benefits of diversity increasingly identified in management literature.

Finally, we should not give up on moral or social justice arguments for equal opportunity policies. Few would want to justify explicitly immoral practices merely because they were profitable, nor is it good public relations to benefit from social injustices (explaining why few multinational businesses operated in apartheid South Africa). But whatever the pragmatic difficulties of invoking moral arguments to change hiring practices in the private sector, they should always be kept in mind in the public sector. If we want our public institutions to be fair and to represent the needs of every citizen, equal opportunity policies will be necessary for as long as some groups in society are unjustly disadvantaged.

Faire de la Diversité un Atout Économique (2008)

Another recently published report also addresses the theme of the business case for diversity. Based on research in the UK, Norway, Spain, Singapore and Quebec, the report was produced by the Fondation Nationale Entreprise et Performance, created in 1969 under the patronage of the President of France. The following is a rough translation of the summary of the report:

Diversity is an increasingly debated topic at a national level, as well as within private sector businesses and society more generally. The ethical arguments for respecting diversity are obvious and whether one focuses on combating discrimination or promoting equality, the objective is the same: to ensure the participation of the largest numbers of people in society. This is where the business case for diversity is the strongest: to enhance opportunities for realizing human capacities and potential.

In order to ensure that diversity provides real economic benefits, it is important to intervene early in education, to reinforce equality and integration strategies and to find innovative ways of managing companies and businesses. As any sensitive subject, especially one that touches on the most personal and intimate characteristics of individuals, mechanisms to get the most out of the economic benefits of the diversity are complex, and require the engagement of all key players in society.

In addition, policies should be adopted to the relevant and specific national context in which they operate, as our visits to UK, Norway, Spain, Singapore and Quebec have shown. Without pretending that we have all the solutions, this report aims to open up new perspectives and make suggestions to achieve the true economic potential of diversity.
Engaging the Second-Generation: Vietnamese UK Youth Action

Jessica Mai Sims discusses the thinking behind the Vietnamese UK Youth Action 2008, for Vietnamese youth aged 14-18, which took place recently, and was aimed at engaging the younger Vietnamese generation in community activities.

In 2007, the Runnymede Trust published its second Community Study, *The Vietnamese Community in Great Britain – Thirty Years On*. While the mention of the involvement of Vietnamese migrants in running cannabis farms received significant press attention after publication, Vietnamese community organizations were more interested in the findings regarding the opinions of second-generation British Vietnamese. These organizations wanted to engage this age group in community events and activities, as the activities they offer were only attracting young people under 14, and they worried that they were losing touch with the rest of the younger generation.

The second-generation participants in the research felt some unease over their connection to Vietnamese culture, having been brought up in Britain, and often not being fluent in the Vietnamese language. They stated that there was a lack of opportunities for young Vietnamese to meet and socialize, due to location and lack of relevant activities. Being British and Vietnamese was by no means a contradiction; however, they felt that the lack of representation, knowledge and understanding of Vietnamese people and culture in Britain did not contribute to their self-confidence.

Spurred on by the finding of our report, the UK Vietnamese Network, which serves as a national body striving to link Vietnamese community organizations in the UK, established a committee to plan a national event, Vietnamese UK Youth Action 2008, for Vietnamese youth aged 14-18. Chau Nguyen, Chair of the UK Vietnamese Network and volunteer for the event, explained the motivation of the UK Vietnamese Network, ‘We thought it important to organize this event to show Vietnamese young people that community workers are willing to engage with them. Hopefully from this event there will be some continuity, and we can link Vietnamese community groups to share in more events like this’. She outlined the aims for the event as being very simple: involving second-generation Vietnamese in planning and participating in community related activities, and providing a space for young Vietnamese to meet.

The planning committee and volunteers, which consisted of both Vietnamese and non-Vietnamese people from Australia, France, Britain, US, and Vietnam, separated the 60 young people into teams of mixed age, gender and city to compete against each other in a series of team challenges. Meeting at the Camden Chinese Community Centre, the teams undertook a series of activities, such as choreographing and performing bamboo dances (*múa s.p*), testing their knowledge of Vietnamese spices, and team building exercises such as a circle game¹ and team member trivia. Throughout the morning teams were rotated in groups of three to Room 33 of the British Museum. Once there, they were presented with a riddle to find a particular Vietnamese historical artefact, a question about the object’s use, and a second riddle directing them to an associated object from a neighbouring country. After lunch, all teams relocated to London Bridge for a game of paint ball.

Hoa Nguyen, who acted as the Treasurer for the event and volunteer on the day, spoke of how her teenage nieces and nephews were disappointed at the lack of activities for their age group within the Vietnamese community, and how they were excited to participate in the day’s activities. And the feedback from the young people was positive – they especially enjoyed meeting others from different cities and playing the circle game. Even despite the many complaints about the day, such as walking to and from the British Museum in the cold rain, the majority stated they would do it again.

For more information on the group or future events, please see: http://vnukyouth.wordpress.com/.

¹ In which teams were judged on who could untangle their crossed arms the fastest without letting go of each other’s hands.
Mixed Identities in Areas of Conflict: A Personal Essay

In May 2008 a number of European ‘experts’ on immigration and integration were invited to discuss this issue in the context of Israeli policy. Omar Khan and Tallat Shakoor report on their own experiences of this visit to Israel, focusing on how questions of personal identity interact in a politically charged environment, and pointing to the limits of self-identification in a place of conflict.

Background

In May 2008 a number of European ‘experts’ on immigration and integration were invited to discuss this issue in the context of Israeli policy. For a week they had the opportunity to engage with (mainly) Israelis on the topic of immigration and integration, and were taken to various sites around the country, meeting government and military officials, academics, local activists, authors and recent and long-term migrants to Israel. While there are a number of interesting (and difficult) experiences to relate from this trip, this essay focuses on how questions of personal identity interact in a politically charged environment, and point to the limits of self-identification in a place of conflict.

Conflicts are about access to power and privileges, whether it is political power, economic resources, territorial accessibility or the power to make distinctions and erect or tear down social barriers. Conflicts are played out between human beings belonging (or presumed to belong) to social groups. Membership of these social groups is based on social status, which can be defined by ethnicity, religion, job, language, skin colour and so forth. Group membership requires overlap and agreement on the defining characteristics of the group. Since social status or symbolic capital is tied to access to power and privileges, and because power is never equally distributed amongst the social groups in any society, membership is always guarded by formal and informal requirements. Membership entails enjoying the privileges of the group, the ‘us’ – as well as the disadvantages of the belonging to the ‘them’ of other groups.

Received identity in Ben-Gurion airport

The hosts of the trip to Israel had made sure that we would pass easily through customs and security, and everybody in the group was thankful for this considerate and exclusive treatment. However, the following accounts of Tallat’s and Omar’s experiences demonstrate the suspicion of Israeli authorities with regard to those with Muslim names.

On arrival in Israel, Tallat was asked ‘Why do you have this name?’, and tried to explain to the security officer that his name is a result of a mixed Christian/Danish and Muslim/Pakistani background. The officer stared at Tallat with an air of doubtful disbelief and asked ‘Are you Muslim?! What is the name of your father? What is name of your grandfather? What were you doing in Pakistan in November? How many times have you been there?’ Tallat’s passport contains a Pakistani visa, so he explained that he visited the Pakistani branch of his family residing in Islamabad. He was glad he didn’t have his old passport, papered as it was with Pakistani visas; if he had, it is likely that Tallat would never have set foot outside the Ben-Gurion Airport. Forty-five minutes later his suitcase and hand luggage were scanned in a room with a ‘Private. Do not enter’ sign on the door. At 4 a.m. a security officer made his way through our group and asked ‘Where is Daniel Tallat Shakoor?’ Tallat

‘You must choose! Don’t be a little of this and a little of that! Choose!’ This man is not beating around the bush. He is sitting on a narrow stool in his souvenir shop in the Muslim Quarter of Jerusalem, and he is giving his unconditional advice to two people who have the curse of being brought up in one house of two nationalities and two faiths. His advice is directed towards the only customers in his shop this quiet Sunday afternoon in May. His shop is a mixed bag of Israeli flags, ram horns, crucifixes and images of the Dome of the Rock and the Tomb of Ibrahim. This mixture of religious and national symbols is not the expression of successful interfaith and intercultural intentions, but the result of a hard-headed commercial calculus. There are many tourists from the three big monotheistic religions in Jerusalem. The two of us – men in our early thirties – are a part of this mélange. The discrepancy between our names and our faces is the reason behind the outburst of opinion from the shop owner: Pale faces with dark eyes and Muslim names – names we pronounce in a non-Arabic way. We are sons of Pakistani migrants and European women. But sons of Muslim fathers, none the less. His opinions are clear.

Tallat Shakoor in front of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. [Photo courtesy of Omar Khan]
presented himself as Tallat Shakoor, and was taken to a small office, where he had to explain his name, his presence in Israel, and his relation to the country.

Omar had arrived a few hours earlier, and took two hours to pass through security, despite having letters from the hosts (in English and Hebrew) and from the head of an academic department at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and having mobile phone numbers of these and other Israeli citizens. The first security officer ignored all these documents and instead inquired into the names of Omar’s father (who left Pakistan in 1970), grandfather, uncles and cousins in Pakistan, and whether he knew any Palestinians or people living in the West Bank or Gaza. She pressed him further about his last visit to Pakistan in 2003 and had difficulty understanding his father’s non-Arab name (assuming it was Ahmed or Muhammad), and generally treated him disdainfully. After another hour of waiting (without his passport), Omar was interviewed by a more senior security official, who apologized for the inconvenience, and proceeded to ask the same questions about his family in Pakistan and his last visit there. This security office was also perplexed by Omar’s Irish passport, and seemed genuinely surprised that his mother could be from Ireland. On reading the itinerary, including meetings with prominent security and government officials, Omar was admitted into Israel, where a cab was waiting to take him to his hotel in Tel Aviv.

**Mixed identity and social categorization**

People with mixed ethnic heritage carry various ethnic, cultural and religious identities which problematize routine social categorization and the granting of privileges. In an area of conflict, where formal categorization in the form of ID-cards and X-ray scans is part of everyday life, mixed identities can be a risky matter – they mark one as out of place. The anthropologist Mary Douglas reminds us that perceptions of risk are part of the social processes within a social group or a society. In this process, socially defined values are continuously defined and redefined – concurrently as the risks and threats to these values are defined and redefined. In Ben-Gurion Airport the definition of a possible threat to security were younger men with Muslim names and Pakistani visas (our group contained both female Muslims and middle-aged Pakistani and Somali males who were not questioned). Granted, it is not surprising that younger men with Muslim names and Pakistani visas in their passports are stopped and questioned in an Israeli airport. The point is that the security check is one form of social categorization, where individuals with certain personal traits are identified and categorized. And in our case it was sufficient to bear a Muslim name and a Pakistani visa to be categorized as Muslims. This categorization is an external one; that is, a categorization done by non-Muslims as part of a security check.

**Received identity at Al-Aqsa Mosque**

Later when Tallat and Omar entered the courtyard in front of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, they were barred from entrance to the mosque, on the grounds that they didn’t fit the criteria for membership of the Muslim community. They were told: ‘Just leave your passport in your pocket. Cite Al-Fatehah!’ Like the Ben-Gurion Airport, this is a contested area. Not everybody is allowed entrance; you have to be able to meet certain requirements. Both the Al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock mosques are places of worship that have deep and strained historical roots. The mosques are situated on the Temple Mount, which was the location of the Second Temple of the Jews, and constitutes the holiest place in the world of Judaism. The Dome of the Rock and the Al-Masjid Al-Aqsa is believed to the third holiest mosque in Islam, preceded only by the mosques in Mecca and Medina. The Wailing Wall, which is the only visible remnant of the Temple, is part of the wall that surrounds Al-Aqsa. The gates to the courtyard of the mosques are heavily guarded by security personnel with bullet-proof vests and heavy machine guns. The courtyard is routinely screened for non-Muslims by security personnel, who have authority to assess and evaluate the religious faith of anyone entering. Non-Muslims are not permitted entrance on Fridays, Saturdays or Muslim holidays.

Although their stories differ, Tallat and Omar were both deemed non-Muslim and denied entry to Al-Aqsa because of their failure to recite significant parts of the Quran. In a sense, there is nothing surprising about this decision. Most practising Muslims can easily meet these requirements, and neither Tallat nor Omar go regularly to mosques nor do they self-identify as practising Muslims. On the other hand, this denial of entry is surprising. Both Tallat and Omar have been to mosques on many occasions in Pakistan and Europe and for both Muslims and non-Muslims their names and paternal descent is more than enough to confirm their ‘Muslimness’. Indeed, the Israeli border agency is not alone in slowing down entry on grounds of name: Western governments are increasingly concerned about the intentions of young men with Muslim names. Interestingly, in both cases a number of Palestinians gathered around Tallat and Omar, and seemed to be arguing for their admittance solely on the basis of their names in the courtyard of Al-Aqsa.

In the end Tallat and Omar respected the...
Furthermore, by some estimates as many as half of Orthodox Rabbis on more traditional grounds. marriage law, which is still administered by grandparent doesn’t mean that these migrants are able to avail themselves of the full benefits of Jewish or Israeli identity, especially including marriage law, which is still administered by Orthodox Rabbis on more traditional grounds. Furthermore, by some estimates as many as half of the Russian Jews who came to Israel from the 1990s are actually practising Christians. The question of who is a Jew has not been unequivocally answered even in Israel.

For Muslims in Israel the situation is similarly complicated. While Tallat and Omar were not able to enter Al-Aqsa, this was arguably less because of their ‘secular’ nature, but rather due to their poor Arabic pronunciation. This raises four further issues: first, not all Arabs in Israel are Muslim; second, not all Muslims are practising; third, in the context of the Arab-Israel conflict ‘Muslimness’ is not necessarily as relevant as ‘Arab-ness’; and fourth, not all Muslims visiting Al-Aqsa are Arabs. These issues point to the difficulties of defining insiders (Muslims) and outsiders (Non-Muslims) – or as one may put it in the words of Mary Douglas – risky outsiders. After all, risky outsiders can mean an end to human life, as has been so bitterly experienced within Israel within the last 30 years. The painful memories are plenty: the Gush Emunim Underground’s attempts to blow up Al-Aqsa in 1984; the bombing of busses on Jaffa Road to and from Jerusalem during the second Intifada in 2000, to name but two.

At the same time, it is obvious that polemical attacks on Muslims for endorsing the deaths of unbelievers have little basis in fact. If the question of ‘apostasy’ was an empirically relevant one, Tallat and Omar would not have been denied entry to Al-Aqsa – one of the holiest sites of Islam and with strict monitoring – but, according to the Islamophobes, condemned and murdered. In fact, they got ‘insider’ access in a number of interactions with Muslims because of their names, and hardly felt threatened by their experience at Al-Aqsa. So, although the decision to exclude Tallat and Omar from Al-Aqsa was justified on doctrinal grounds, the immediate question was more political, and the guards were even apologetic about having to do so. Their problem was not of a secular nature, but was rather caused by being non-Arab and mixed heritage.

Conclusion: identity and politics in Europe
Finally, these questions do not arise only in the context of conflict in the Middle East but also have relevance within the European experience. While it is of course true that conflict situations harden identities and make it more difficult to work across different social groups, these concerns are not absent in Europe or the West. One cannot simply choose one’s identity or one’s social group, and Tallat and Omar have often been told by their co-nationals that they are or aren’t some particular identity group (‘But where are you really from?’) is a question directed not only at mixed heritage.
people, but also children of migrants). European government policies clearly understand different ‘mixed’ identities in various ways – consider the difference in the UK between being a mixed Muslim/Irish person and being a mixed Black/Welsh person. Some of the mixed heritage literature seems to assume a too ‘voluntaristic’ notion of personal identity – that is, that people can simply choose whatever identity they want out of a fan of accessible identities.

But while everyone in society – of mixed heritage or not – has multiple identities, and while everyone can in part choose to emphasize particular aspects that are important to them, none of us can simply define who we are to others. Social identities are simply not accessible to everyone. One is reminded here of third or fourth generation descendants from Muslim migrants holding European (i.e. Danish) passports still being considered as a potentially risky outsider. For some, such people can never really be from Denmark.

We may not like the politics of identity, but the apparent tidiness of nation-states cannot hide the diversity of human experiences and social connections. The emphasis on national values and cultures in the face of migration within and from outside European nation-states implicitly affirms a particular notion of identity. This emphasis on cultural essences can unfortunately elide into a virulent form of nationalism and new racism. Given the reality of an increasing diversity of identities within European nation-states, the ‘politics of identity’ is not best understood as a question of personal comprehension or individual psychology, and still less the putative ‘separatism’ of minority ethnic groups, but one in which the equal treatment of every citizen is at stake.

In July this year, Runnymede published a study by Kjartan Páll Sveinsson of one of the largest foreign national groups in the UK: South Africans. The aim of this study was to explore interviewees’ experiences of living in London, and to investigate what they perceived to be the main issues facing them, with a sub-focus on Jewish South Africans. Whilst previous reports have focused on relatively disadvantaged migrants and minority ethnic groups, South Africans are something of an immigrant success story. The report considers the reasons for this ‘success’. This publication is available online at http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/UnderstandingDiversity-2008.pdf.

In the Runnymede’s latest Community Study, published in August, Jessica Mai Sims explores the experiences of the UK Nepalese population. Beginning with an overview of the population, settlement patterns and grassroots based initiatives, the report describes some of the migration routes and experiences of the Nepalese in the UK. The report then focuses on retired Gurkhas and their families, because of the recent change in settlement restrictions, and their experiences in accessing local services. As many families live and work in mainly white areas, their settlement adds a unique perspective to multi-ethnic Britain. This publication is available online at http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/TheNepaleseInBritain-2008.pdf.
Parenting ‘Mixed’ Children: Negotiating Difference and Belonging in Mixed Race, Ethnicity and Faith Families

Chamion Caballero, Rosalind Edwards and Shuby Puthussery
Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2008
Reviewed by Jessica Mai Sims

This recently published JRF funded report provides new information about mixed couples in Britain. Aside from reviewing past literature on the subject – including the stereotypes about mixed children and their parents – it gives a picture of parents’ experiences of bringing up their children and examines how they pass on aspects of belonging and heritage across generations.

The project analysed census and Sample of Anonymised Records (SARs) data which identified areas with high proportions of mixed families in England and Wales, called ‘hotspots’. These 50 ‘hotspots’ for mixed couples were located mainly in outer London (58%), Birmingham (22%) and inner London (21%). After isolating these areas, the authors sent surveys to selected schools and also outside the ‘hotspots’ to gather the experiences and opinions of parents on passing on their heritage to their children. Supplementing the survey, the researchers interviewed 35 couples with at least one mixed child between the ages of 7 and 12, because the authors felt this age profile meant that, ‘by then, parents will have established a mode of negotiating difference and belonging, as well as having negotiated their everyday practices with their children’.

The report’s analysis of the census and SARs data presents interesting information on mixed families. In the literature review, the report highlights how mixed couples are stereotyped in the media as being working-class and from the inner-city. The research found that while these couples are more likely to be living in ‘multicultural metropolitan’ areas which may encompass the inner city, many are also living in ‘prosperous metropolitan’ and ‘suburban’ wards. There is a strong middle-class profile of these couples. Also, in contrast to the assumption that mixed relationships are more prone to break up, the data shows that 87% of children of mixed backgrounds are living with both their biological parents, as opposed to the national average of 65%.

Approaches to difference and belonging

In the primary research, the authors focused on the approaches and experiences of parents in mixed couples on passing on difference and belonging to their children. The authors isolated three ‘typical’ approaches to passing on heritage identities from their sample: individual identities not rooted in any particular heritage, single heritage identities based on one heritage aspect of the parents, or mixed heritage identities that either centre on a specific combination of heritages or on being mixed.¹

The individual approach stresses that a child’s mixedness enables endless and flexible possibilities of identity and life choices. The thinking is that, in this approach, children should not be restricted by the cultural norms associated by the heritage identities of their parents; children have the choice to adopt their parent’s heritage. This approach was very different to the single approach, in which one aspect of a heritage identity is stressed. Sometimes this manifests out of the belief that a ‘particular aspect of heritage is seen as an intrinsic part of the family and children’s identity’, which is why one aspect is chosen to be promoted as the heritage identity. The mixed approach sits between the other two, as parents sometimes stressed a specific heritage mix and sometimes presented being mixed as an identity in and of itself. Patterns were found within the sample of who was more likely to adopt particular typifications – middle-class parents were the only ones who adopted the individual approach, the mixed approach was only found in terms of mixed ethnicity or race and the single approach was most often promoted for faith identities.²

The typifications in the report were described more in terms of a continuum rather than discrete choices. Within couples different approaches were used, and sometimes couples compromised understandings or combined approaches. Much of the popular discourse of mixed couples, or of children of mixed heritage, speaks of identity confusion or culture clash. In this sample, however, the differences in approaches between couples were often presented as self-chosen values or inclinations to be negotiated, rather than differences attributed to culture.³ Couples tended to see their family lives as being ordinary and like other families, often facing the same challenges and having the same concerns. Another theme to emerge from the sample was the role of mothers in daily childrearing; as they maintained the primary role.
Citizenship in Contemporary Europe

This book is published at a time when debate about the future development of integration in Europe has intensified following the recent rejection of the European Union’s (EU) Lisbon Treaty by voters in the Irish Republic.

The increase of migration within Europe and the expanding role of supranational organizations, such as the EU, have challenged the traditional notion of citizenship which was closely associated with the nation state.

Citizenship in Contemporary Europe focuses particularly on theories of citizenship and the ways in which citizenship functions in practice. While analysing liberal, communitarian and republican ideas on citizenship, the book also notes the similarities and differences between the ideas. With each theory claiming to have its own universal appeal, feminist and multicultural approaches point out that universal assumptions can lead to the oppression of women and minorities. Each of these theories has influenced the debate on citizenship, but they are classically linked to citizenship operating in a nation state. Citizenship is no longer purely concerned with the legal relationship between a citizen and the state, as transnational or global citizens travel between countries. This is a point that Lister and Pia explore when taking into account the literature on factors which influence and motivate identity choice, and even siblings may choose and report different identity options.

In terms of parenting and family support, the authors suggest that services should be alert to the diversity of family circumstances, and ensure that assumptions do not guide service delivery, such as questioning the ability of mixed families to build positive identities for their children. There are also no universal messages contained in the report on the right or wrong way to raise children of mixed heritage backgrounds, perhaps only that any approach should be open to negotiation and compromise between the preferences and opinions of parents and children.

This report gives an account of the lives and experiences of mixed couples, and, while each family had its own set of unique circumstances, they also had qualities and concerns similar to those experienced by non-mixed families. It seems that the difficulties mixed families often face come in the form of wider social attitudes which still consider mixed relationships doomed to culture clashes. In light of this, the authors recommend a need for a more nuanced understanding of race and diversity in the wider public consciousness, readers’ negative assumptions and material inequality. Overall, this report will appeal to anyone interested in childrearing, relationship negotiation or mixed heritage, and will give and need to tackle a fuller understanding of the experiences of mixed families in contemporary Britain.
As highlighted in previous Runnymede reports,¹ there is remarkably little work focusing on the prevention of racist violence. By using a victim-centred approach, the author is able to tell us a lot about the perpetrator of hate crime and the context in which he/she is offending, thus proving a valuable insight for anyone wishing to focus on prevention work.

Iganski starts by unpicking the definition of ‘hate crime’, arguing that although the term is used quite commonly, the word ‘hate’ is rarely used in actual legislation, such as in the US and UK, where words used are ‘bias’, ‘prejudice’ or ‘hostility’. One explanation given by Iganski is that ‘hate’ is not necessarily the best description of the motivation behind the crimes. Iganski uses an analysis of data on hate crime in a particular setting (anti-Semitic incidents in London) and figures from London Metropolitan Service to challenge certain assumptions on hate crime. First, Iganski shows that victims of hate crime are affected by it on a daily basis and they are as affected by the smaller routine occurrences as they are by the more violent and physical assaults generally given publicity. It is therefore important to acknowledge the impact of ‘everyday’ racism, and not just focus on the violent crimes committed. Second, hate crime tends to be carried out by ‘ordinary’ people rather than extreme-right, ideologically filled ‘hate mongers’, acting out of their hatred of someone’s colour, disability or sexual orientation. In fact, people who carry out hate crimes tend to be ‘ordinary citizens’ carrying out the offending in the context of their ‘ordinary lives’ (p. 42). Although it is hard to accept that people who commit racist offences are people ‘like us’, it is important to keep this in mind in order to develop appropriate prevention interventions.

Although hate crime is not so much used as a concept in legislation, Iganski argues that it is a useful notion to capture a ‘scholarly domain’ where the once disconnected areas of analysis focusing on oppression, discrimination and bigotry against different groups actually fall under the conceptual banner of ‘hate crime’. This has advantages, not least because it has been proven that perpetrators of hate crime against one group (e.g. LGBT communities) often perpetrate violence against another (e.g. ethnic minorities).

Another important dimension needed to understand hate crime is that it is grounded in ‘societal oppression’, in other words, the context of discrimination and racism of society at large must be kept in mind when examining why and how hate crimes occur. This understanding is particularly important when looking at debates on hate crime legislation. Indeed, the latter presents a dilemma for liberals, in particular around the way in which it might conflict with freedom of expression. Using a ‘societal oppression argument’ Iganski demonstrates that the main justification for having aggravating sentences for hate crime is that these crimes harm more than parallel crimes. He demonstrates this by examining British Crime Survey patterns and figures, in particular the fear provoked by, and impact on victims, of hate-related crimes and incidents. As a result, it can be argued that the aggravated sentence is proportionate to the aggravated harm. In addition, if, as explained through a ‘societal oppression’ argument, perpetrators operate in the context of a perpetrator community, then hate crime laws also go beyond the individual victim and are a representation of collective conscience that recognizes the need for the state to intervene in challenging this environment where hate crime flourishes.

Finally, Iganski turns to examine how agencies working to tackle hate crime can involve victims not just in the resolution of their case but actually as actors in the criminal justice policy process. Using material from an evaluation carried out by a multi-agency forum (the London Race Hate Crime Forum), he highlights the importance of including community organizations and leaders representing the victim communities in any multi-agency partnership.

In conclusion, this book argues that we need a victim-centred approach to understand and conceptualize hate crime. However, at the same time, Iganski illustrates the need to examine the offending act and its context, and therefore includes not only an analysis of the perpetrator, in order to understand better who and why perpetrators commit hate crimes, but also the context of societal oppression in which these crimes tend to occur. In this way, Iganski’s book advances the prevention agenda. 

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Promoting Equality for BME Pupils

Shaila Sheikh assesses the usefulness of the General Teaching Council for England’s (GTC) review of research on promoting equality for BME pupils.

The General Teaching Council for England (GTC) has published a review of research on Promoting Race Equality for Black and Minority Ethnic Pupils.¹ It is an anthology of the evidence on the key strategies teachers can use to maximize their black and minority ethnic (BME) pupils’ learning potential. It aims to bring this evidence to practical life through a set of taster activities or case studies that can be applied to improve practice.

This review acknowledges the considerable research and concern that exists around the underachievement of certain groups of BME children and young people. However, what is refreshing and interesting is that rather than focusing on collating the evidence around problems and issues, this anthology explores the important contribution of teachers and the practical strategies and solutions they can use to promote equality for BME pupils. This rationale and also the tone of this paper is immediately engaging, it has a ‘can-do’ feel to it and as such it is likely to be warmly received by schools and all staff working within and with schools.

The cumulative findings from the research highlight not surprisingly that BME students learn the same way other students learn – though they face additional obstacles flowing from:

- teachers who lack a detailed picture of BME pupils’ experiences and who find it harder to identify strengths and build on them and harder to pinpoint specific needs;
- the fact that many BME pupils learn in schools where the fundamental processes of making themselves heard and understood feels unachievable because organizational norms are not sufficiently informed by their experiences and perspectives.

The research also identifies that schools which are successful at promoting equality of opportunity for BME pupils are characterized by certain principles:

- high expectations;
- high quality teaching and learning;
- an ethos of inclusivity and respect;
- effective partnerships between parents and schools.

Again, these findings are not especially revelatory but identified here they are a very clear and stark reminder that when we are talking about improving the achievement of BME pupils we do not have to resource new and innovative approaches. What we need is good quality teaching and learning that is the entitlement of all pupils; where schools and teachers recognize and develop their best practice they are going to make a difference to the lives of our BME children and young people.

Each of the main principles are explored in detail in this anthology, such as in ‘Section 1: Beliefs and expectations’. This section explains what effective teachers expect of their pupils and how teachers encourage pupils to have high expectations themselves. The information shared in these sections is concise and affirming of good practice. But particularly helpful is that each section concludes with implications for practice in schools based on the evidence presented. These implications are often phrased as a question or challenge, for example ‘What you praise and how you praise matters. What more could you do to ensure pupils receive praise in ways they appreciate’. These can be used as prompts for thinking at an individual level but especially to stimulate discussion and debate at staff/curricular meetings or training.

Also included in this research summary are a number of case studies carried out by teachers that illustrate some of the key messages. For example, there is a case study on ‘The usefulness of specific praise’, that shows the form of praise which is most helpful for learning and enhancing confidence and self-esteem. There are seven case studies, two focused specifically on the needs of English as an Additional Language learners studies. These taster activities are very useful as they are based on real experiences and show how schools and their workforce might use and adapt the ideas presented and translate research into practice. The final section of this paper provides suggestions for related research, summaries of research, and helpful resources.

Reading through these findings, schools determinedly working on improving teaching and learning for all pupils will feel reassured. However, no one should feel complacent because hidden within the seemingly simple messages that this research has pulled together is the fact that some BME children and young people are still denied the chance to learn and ‘respond powerfully to beautifully planned, crafted and responsive teaching and learning activities’ (Donald McIntyre, cited in this GTC research paper). Therein lies the challenge for all schools to deliver on these practical strategies and solutions.

¹ Available at: http://www.gtce.org.uk/shared/contentlib/xs/8541/9/137277/199948/achieve_rom_anthology_may08.pdf
The fading red monstrosity for which the Elephant and Castle or London's 'Lost Quarter' is perhaps best known was the first shopping centre of its kind in Europe and a 'once bold and radical emblem of modernist thinking' (p. 4). The appeal of architect Ernö Goldfinger's post-war designs was, however, relatively short-lived and the area is now one of Europe's largest regeneration schemes.

The MA Photojournalism and Documentary Photography students at the London College of Communication are charting this redevelopment. This book, the first in the series, is made up of 105 bright and gritty photographs of The Elephant's residents and their homes, and will be appreciated by local residents, photo-documentary students, social historians and the wider public alike. The photos provide a vivid, varied and at times hard-hitting portrayal of the lives of their subjects; what is perhaps most remarkable is their sense of intimacy, reflecting the level of involvement the photographers have with their subjects. One of the residents, Rob, is photographed taking his last bath at his home on Harper Road before having to move out to an as yet unknown location as his block is no longer considered safe. Other photos show graphic images of drug taking and drug paraphernalia from the 'small and detached world' that the Heygate Estate can sometimes be (p. 55).

Home: The Elephant and Castle portrays a rich and multicultural community, a community whose unique identity will soon no longer exist. The area is a popular hub for the Latin American community, in particular those from Colombia and Ecuador.

For outsiders, it is easy to overlook what the redevelopment will mean for the thousands who call it home, many of whom have lived there all their lives. To Charlotte, the teenage mum whose life is closely documented, her neighbours on the estate are her friends and ‘aunties’ to her children: ‘Where we’ve all grown up together, all my friends started having their kids, so we all help each other out. Everyone’s an Aunt, all our kids call ‘em Auntie’ (p. 13). It is unlikely that the relocation plans will spare such relationships thought.

The varied approach of the photo-documentary students, the sense of intimacy that shines through the photos and the way in which the book deviates from the obvious and the ordinary make it a pleasure to read.

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The publication of this book coincided with the UK celebrating its first Gypsy, Roma and Traveller History Month. With its focus on identity, the authors' account of Gypsy groups in the UK and their relations with gaujos (non-Gypsies) presents alternative commentary on the recognition of diversity in British society. This book would be ideal for students or policy makers interested in questions of identity or in Gypsy studies.

Despite the longstanding presence of Gypsy groups in the UK, in both rural and urban areas, the representation of these groups is rarely other than vilification or exoticification. In either scenario, the Gypsy exists as ‘the other’; they are seen as outsiders of mainstream society. Both these stereotypes contribute to the negative ways in which Gypsies are seen and have long been used to disadvantage Gypsy communities. In addition, positive aspects to Gypsy culture are not represented, as the authors describe:

The appearance of trailers from distant parts of the country is regarded not as a demonstration of strong family ties and celebration, but rather as a cause of great apprehension amongst the local non-Gypsy community that the families might remain. (p. 33)

The book is separated into chapters which deal with the response of the academy to Gypsies and Gypsy culture, theoretical analysis of Gypsies as ‘strangers’ and ‘others’, case studies on Gypsy families’ experience of education, media representations of Gypsies and the space Gypsies inhabit in British multicultural discourses. Throughout the book, the authors argue that Gypsies have not been represented outside of the exotic/scoundrel dichotomy, and that both tabloid press and liberal and ‘protective’ interested parties are at fault for this misrepresentation.
In what way do young people in culturally diverse neighbourhoods in European cities feel they belong to where they live? A DVD presenting a series of short films has been produced during a five day workshop held in August 2008 in the London Borough of Newham, the first of a series of three events, as part of this international project.

Newham is a culturally rich and ethnically diverse area and one of the poorest areas of London, where many people of different origins have settled at different times. A group of young people aged 15 to 18 gathered together for the creation and production of bold and exciting video essays – opening up the subject of ‘inter-cultural dialogue’. The objective of the workshops was to give a voice to urban youth and to engage them with the question of ‘who belongs?’ – and related social issues of immigration, xenophobia, and identity in today’s Europe.

Belonging is a transnational initiative devised and led by Manifesta in collaboration with the Runnymede Trust. It is supported by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, the Portuguese public service broadcasters RTP and the Equality and Human Rights Commission. The Newham workshop was organized with the support of Forest Gate City Learning Centre, and Newham Young People Online Project. The next workshops will be in Casal da Boba, a neighbourhood in Amadora, near Lisbon in Portugal, challenge of being (artistically) imaginative, the workshop facilitators guided and encouraged them to design and shoot in small groups, while ensuring that each workshop participant produced a one to three minute video work of her/his own, related to the theme of ‘Belonging’.

After considering how global history has caused people to move from one part of the world to settle in another – and how this might have shaped our place here, in London, each young participant interpreted in her/his own way what ‘belonging’ means, through their personal experience, or that of someone they know.

Inspiring the young people with the

1. Julia Millette, Su Tomesen and participants look at films made by other people
2. A film gets a lot of attention from the participants
3. Matthew Thomas, Marion Vargaftig and Riffat Ahmed look at Umer Iqbal’s video while he creates his own music.
4. Rehana Siddique editing her film
The photographs on pp. 23 and 24 are copyright © Benedict Hilliard 2008.

This issue was edited by Robin Frampton and in the 20th arrondissement, in the North East of Paris in France, where other groups of young people will, in turn, consider what ‘belonging’ and ‘who belongs’ mean for them. In a second stage, the project will bring together the video works to compare and discuss differences and similarities between the three locations and countries.

After local screenings in each of the communities, a selection of videos from the three locations will be screened in London, Lisbon and Paris. The Paris screening will take place during the final celebrations of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue, on 18 December. The video works will then be exhibited widely, from narrowcasting to broadcasting, including in museums, galleries, community centres and at festivals.

And last, but not least, educational packs will be produced and disseminated in the three countries and more, using the best of the project’s video works to address intercultural dialogue, social inclusion and anti-racism to be used in a range of educational settings. We anticipate launching the educational materials, together with a screening, in London in early 2009.

For more information on Belonging contact the Project Director, Marion Vargaftig, at marion@manifesta.org.uk

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5. Rehana Siddique, Riffat Ahmed and Krishna Kanzaria filming in Green Street in Forest Gate
6. Veronia Anadaraja and Robert Kiff in Trafalgar Square
7. Crystal Ajaelu filming in Oxford Street
8. Ayeman Khan celebrates receiving his Certificate of Participation