Runnymede: Intelligence for a Multi-ethnic Britain

Runnymede is the UK’s leading independent thinktank on race equality and race relations. Through high-quality research and thought leadership, we:

• Identify barriers to race equality and good race relations;
• Provide evidence to support action for social change;
• Influence policy at all levels.

Disclaimer
This publication is part of the Runnymede Perspectives series, the aim of which is to foment free and exploratory thinking on race, ethnicity and equality. The facts presented and views expressed in this publication are, however, those of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the Runnymede Trust.


Published by Runnymede in June 2016, this document is copyright © Runnymede 2016. Some rights reserved.

Open access. Some rights reserved.
The Runnymede Trust wants to encourage the circulation of its work as widely as possible while retaining the copyright. The trust has an open access policy which enables anyone to access its content online without charge. Anyone can download, save, perform or distribute this work in any format, including translation, without written permission. This is subject to the terms of the Creative Commons Licence Deed: Attribution-Non-Commercial-No Derivative Works 2.0 UK: England & Wales. Its main conditions are:

• You are free to copy, distribute, display and perform the work;
• You must give the original author credit;
• You may not use this work for commercial purposes;
• You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work.

You are welcome to ask Runnymede for permission to use this work for purposes other than those covered by the licence. Runnymede is grateful to Creative Commons for its work and its approach to copyright. For more information please go to www.creativecommons.org

www.runnymedetrust.org
# Contents

**Foreword**  
Kaliani Lyle  

**Introduction: A ‘Scottish Approach’ to Race Equality?**  
Nasar Meer  

1. *Race Equality and Scotland – Forwards and Backwards?*  
Rowena Arshad  

2. *‘Race’ and Ethnicity in Scotland*  
David McCrone  

3. *Self-reported Discrimination in Scotland*  
Nasar Meer  

4. *Connecting Race Equality with Anti-poverty Initiatives*  
Gina Netto  

Carol Young  

6. *A View from Below*  
Danny Boyle  

7. *A Welcoming Scotland?*  
Murray Stewart Leith and Duncan Sim  

8. *Deflections, Displacements and Disengagements*  
Peter Hopkins  

**Afterword: Race Equality and Scotland – a Runnymede Perspective on the UK**  
Omar Khan  

**Appendix I**  
Martin Hayward  

**Biographical Notes on Contributors**
I was delighted when Professor Naser Meer and Runnymede asked me to provide a foreword to this new collection of essays on ‘race’ equality in Scotland, particularly as it is some time since there has been a compendium of critical thinking on issues relating to ‘race’ and racism in Scotland. And while there has been a continuing debate on Scottish approaches to ‘race’ equality, it all too often feels as if that debate is conducted at the margins of a broader consideration about opportunity or identity, providing a voice or a perspective, but not worthy of its own space.

So I welcome this report. It breathes life into the story of race relations in Scotland. It reminds us of the distance we’ve travelled and the challenges we still face collectively as a nation. I first arrived in Scotland from apartheid South Africa in 1964. Looking back now two things strike me.

First that while it is certainly true that the UK I encountered then was very different from the country (i.e. S. Africa) I had just left, there were disturbing resonances: 1964 was the year Peter Griffiths, a Tory, was elected as an MP in Smethwick on a platform of ‘if you want a “ni**er” for a neighbour, vote Labour’, prompting the only visit by Malcolm X to these shores shortly afterwards.

The question of whether Peter Griffiths was simply an English phenomenon, that the experience of racism in Scotland is different and distinctive from that in England, is a recurring theme then as now. And it is one that runs through many of the essays in this report, providing much food for thought.

It is also the case that for all Peter Griffiths’, Enoch Powell’s and Alf Garnett’s use of what Hanif Kureishi calls ‘fool’s gold or crack cocaine’ to appeal to the worst in people, there were many, many ordinary men and women who recoiled from prejudice. And many of today’s leaders of Scotland grew up in those anti-apartheid days, cutting their teeth on civil rights issues that they would later translate into local or national politics back here at home.

Second, with respect to equality broadly, the evidence would suggest that we have certainly travelled some distance. In 1964, Scotland was a country in which many women stopped working when they got married, where disabled people lived in institutions and gay people lived in the closet. The sight of a black person in the workplace was enough to be remarked on, and it was remarked on, often unkindly.

Fast forward to 2016 and what we see is a Scotland led by a woman in a gender-equal Cabinet. We have gay, disabled and Muslim MSPs all taking a leading role in politics. We are rightly lauded for having some of the most progressive policies and laws in the world.

But as many of the essays in this collection show, the concern is that we could be living in a country of gestures – a country where the rhetoric of equality outshines its all too uncomfortable reality. We can indeed talk a good game. But there are still far too many whose prospects are blunted by the barriers they face, because of who they are and because of other people’s attitudes and assumptions about them. Too many people experience hate crimes and discrimination and too many face economic and social exclusion. The tremendous gains young people from BAME communities have made in education have yet to be translated into their advancement in the workplace. Unemployment and underemployment remain critical issues for Scotland’s ethnic minority communities, and poverty falls disproportionately on these communities.

While, on balance, we are making progress in many areas, it is not happening quickly enough. The stark fact remains that to be born into an ethnic minority household in Scotland today means you are twice as likely to be born into a workless household, a deprived household, an overcrowded household.

This report from Professor Meer and the Runnymede Trust then is an important and timely document. By taking stock of existing activities across different sectors of Scottish society it questions the old orthodoxies about race and racism in Scotland, and presents an interesting range of perspectives on Scottish approaches to race equality. And that’s good, because it opens up discussion and debate on how to address racial inequality in Scotland at a time when newly devolved structures and powers present – as one of the authors remarks – a wonderful opportunity to respond positively to an ethnically diverse population.

Kaliani Lyle
Scotland Commissioner
Introduction: A ‘Scottish Approach’ to Race Equality?
Nasar Meer

Scottish approaches to Race Equality have come a long way since Martin MacEwen (1980) wondered if ‘race-relations’ in Scotland were best characterised by ‘ignorance or apathy’. This complaint looks firmly out of place today even though matters of equality are formally reserved to Westminster in the Scotland Act (1998).

Scotland, as does the UK, has broadly understood tackling discrimination as something active in seeking to treat people equally rather than resting on a benign ideal of equal treatment. In theory at least, this reaches beyond how different groups might blend into society, and relies on group-specific instruments to outlaw discrimination based on gender, disability, age, sexual orientation and so forth, as well as monitoring the institutional under-representation among such groups (Meer, 2010). Amongst this increasingly intersectional configuration, approaches to race equality have developed what Hepple (2011) calls an ‘unsettled apparatus’ that is also reflected in Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act 1998 (c46), which incorporated the functions of the third Race-Relations Act (1976). Other developments, however, can be traced to a distinctively Scottish, rather than UK, experience.

First, in terms of categories, successive Scottish Acts tackling religious bigotry and incitement to religious hatred have adopted tariffs and sanctions that make the treatment of religious discrimination more symmetrical with racial discrimination than is the case in England and Wales. So while there is a lively debate over the form and scale of sectarianism in Scotland (Raab and Holligan, 2012), Government initiatives, through legislation such as the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012, are innovative in so far as they make special mention of religious discrimination, and offer equivalent protection on the grounds of race, colour, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity and disability. It is worth remembering also that Scotland recognised Gypsy/Traveler communities as racial and ethnic groups even prior to the test case confirming this.

Second, as the new Race Equality Framework (Scottish Government, 2016) illustrates, Scotland has retained a public commitment to race equality and explicitly sought to entrench its mainstreaming. During the UK-wide consultation on harmonizing different equality bodies and different equality legislation, one repeated concern was the risk of rolling back equality achievements. Where there was no immediate ‘dilution’ and settlements were ‘levelled up’ across different grounds, a concern remained that separate commissions would no longer be able to agitate for equality on specific grounds. With more streamlined legislation, it was feared, a less favourable political administration in more cash-strapped times would encounter lower resistance if they moved to undermine existing settlements.

Craig and O’Neil (2013) point to these developments in England, noting that the budget of the harmonised Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) was reduced by the Coalition government (2010–2015) to the equivalent of less than one of its constituent bodies (from £70m when it started in 2007 to £17m presently). While this affects Scotland too, the EHRC in Scotland and the Scottish Government has tried to mitigate this by bolstering its commitment to equality (see Appendix I on EHRC race equality activity in Scotland). Thus, in May 2012, the Scottish government placed specific duties on public authorities, also known as the Scottish Specific Duties, requiring a listed authority to publish a mainstreaming report on the progress it has made in integrating the three needs of the General Equality Duty (GED) to: (i) Eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimization; (ii) Advance equality of opportunity, and (iii) Foster good relations.

This is in contrast to the discontinuation of statutory equality impact assessments in England, and possibly marks a divergence from understanding race equality instruments as an administrative burden, signalled by placing the public sector equality duty in the UK government’s ‘red tape reduction challenge’.

Nonetheless, there were 4807 racist incidents recorded by the police in 2013–14 (an increase of 3.9% compared to 2012–13) (Scottish Government, 2015) and just under a third of a representative sample of black and ethnic minority people in Scotland report having experienced racial discrimination in Scotland in the last five years (Meer, 2015). In the ways that the authors in this collection show, ethnic penalties continue to permeate life-chances in education and employment. Moreover it is not yet clear how successfully, from a race equality perspective, the new Public Sector Equality Duty that accompanied the Equality Act 2010 has been embedded in Scotland. So whilst Scotland...
has much that is distinctive, it is uncertain how the various initiatives and policies intended to promote race equality are being delivered, or indeed what the overall national pattern is.

One way we can look at this is to explore the new Race Equality Framework Scotland (2016), brought together by the Coalition for Race Equality and Rights (CRER) and Scottish Government’s Equality Unit. In addition to its wide range of stakeholders, it reflected a broad consultation with strategic partners including the Council for Ethnic Minority Voluntary Organisations (CEMVO), the Black and Ethnic Minority Infrastructure in Scotland (BEMIS), the Scottish Refugee Council (SRC), and the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), and so reflects a collective commitment to this issue from a range of colleagues.

Does this point to evidence of a distinctive ‘Scottish Approach’ to race equality? Given the proposed period of the new Framework it is reasonable to expect that if there is more formal commitment to race equality in Scotland, then greater divergence is plausible. The Framework document itself shows that there has been a sincere effort to reflect on the successes and limitations of prevailing race equality approaches in Scotland, and an attempt to identify gaps in data and other kinds of practice-based knowledge that might hinder the delivery of effective race equality strategies.

In November 2015, and as part of a Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE) personal research fellowship, a conference at the RSE provided the forum for a discussion on race equality issues and policy directions in the Scottish context. This conference, supported by additional partners that included Strathclyde University, the Runnymede Trust, the Social Policy Association (SPA) and the Political Studies Association (PSA) Britishness Studies Group, has given rise to the edited collection of papers that constitutes the body of this report. While the report does not paint a rosy picture of race equality advances in Scotland, it does, nevertheless, contain robust and competing views that reflect the distinctive positions of its contributors. In this respect it does not offer a uniform opinion; good anti-racist research, however, needs to make a virtue of this and not overlook critical debate.

With contributions from leading researchers and practitioners of race equality in Scotland, the report has three main objectives. First, it aims to take stock of existing activities across different sectors of Scottish society; contributors and participants from organisations are asked to tell the story of how they have understood the implications - and where appropriate the delivery – of existing race equality approaches in Scotland. Second, contributors reflect on the successes of and obstacles affecting the prevailing race equality approaches, from issues of procedure to being able to measure outcomes. Third, the report identifies gaps in data and other knowledge that might hinder a full and proper account of race equality in Scotland, and highlights what additional evidence is needed to support the development of race equality policy in Scotland.

References
1. Race Equality and Scotland – Forwards and Backwards?
Rowena Arshad

Until the late 1990s, the dominant narrative had been that Scotland had ‘good race relations’ (Miles and Muirhead, 1986: 125) and that there was ‘no problem here’ (Dunlop, 1993). Consequently, racism did not feature in any significant way within Scottish political or policy discourse. This narrative had sat alongside another which was that Scotland has long been associated with improvement, enlightenment and fairness. This led, as McCrone (1992) says, to forms of Scottish vernacular which allude to notions of common humanity in ‘we’re a’ Jock Tamson’s bairns’ – a common saying which means we are all of the same stock and will lend each other a helping hand when troubles and difficulties arise (as in Robert Burns’s song ‘A Man’s a Man for A That’). While it is now accepted that there is great differentiation within Scottish society, largely based on wealth but also on gender, the cultural icon of an egalitarian nation persists.

Miles (1993) has suggested that Scotland has not undergone the racialisation processes that have largely dominated England’s discussions about race. Scotland has not used racial superiority as a central concept in shaping its identity or its nationalism. This in part explains why far right groups such as the Scottish Defence League, Settler’s Watch and, more recently, groups like Pegida have all failed to gain any traction in Scotland. Recent research into the everyday experiences of black and minority ethnic young people found that they affiliated themselves to Scotland and Scottishness, echoing the view that Scotland was a ‘fair society’ that was ‘diverse’ and ‘friendly’ (Hopkins et al., 2016).

The psyche of the ‘tolerant and fair Scot’ has played a large part in influencing the nature and quality of racial equality work and policy development in Scotland. Racism has always existed in Scotland: with talk of the ‘menace of the Irish race’ being pervasive in the early 1920s; with occurrences of race-related deaths such as the racist murder of Somalian refugee Ahmed Sheikh in 1989; and more recently the tragic death of schoolboy Imran Khan in Glasgow and the murder of Surjit Singh Chokkar in 1998. The most recent survey of black and minority ethnic people (n = 503) about their everyday experiences found that 31% of people surveyed had experienced discrimination in the last five years. Of this 31%, 82% attributed this to their ethnicity and 42% to their real or perceived religion (Meer, 2015).

Scotland continues to be uncomfortable with talking about race discrimination. For example, while acknowledging its role in slavery, it very quickly moves to talking about its role in the abolition of that slavery (Education Scotland, 2007). There is a clear willingness to promote good relations, such as through the One Scotland, Many Cultures campaign, but a less clear and systematic message of zero tolerance on racism. The messages are about multiculturalism, diversity and celebration of difference. These are all excellent messages and a carrot approach is both enabling and uplifting; however, such an approach has also allowed different forms of racism and racial discrimination (overt, covert, personal, cultural and institutional) to continue to be masked. The fact that the ‘majority’ (even though they might acknowledge racism exists) largely do not have personal experiences of racial prejudice, racial discrimination or racism has meant that the syllogism appears to be that the absence of racial incidents means all is well.

Such an approach could at best be considered naïve, but could also constitute what Bourdieu would call ‘symbolic violence’, in that it diminishes and potentially denies and/or misrecognises the everyday experiences of many people who live in Scotland and who experience racial micro-aggressions and invalidations.

The prevailing approach to race equality prior to the mid-1980s was largely assimilationist. The assimilationist approach was characterised by the belief that everyone should be treated exactly the same, as basic human needs are universal. It was considered inappropriate to notice or emphasise cultural or racial difference. The ‘same for all’ and the ‘colour-blind’ approach were seen as the best ways to ensure equality of treatment. Policy and practice therefore largely ignored race.

For example, in 1966, Section 11 of the Local Government Act (Scotland) made funds available ‘to help meet the special needs of a significant number of people of commonwealth origin with language or customs which differ from the rest of the community’. This included funding to support the education of children for whom English was not their first language. Scotland never utilised this funding on the basis that the numbers did not justify accessing...
it. The emphasis in Scotland was on assisting these children to ‘catch up’ with their English-speaking peers. The goal was social cohesion through cultural re-socialisation so that ‘incomers’ could become more like the indigenous population.

From the mid-1980s, there was growing recognition that the prevailing policy of assimilation was an inadequate response to an increasingly diverse population. Measures were adopted by local authorities with input from the voluntary sector to implement equal opportunity policies, set up multicultural units and commission studies of the needs of minority groups (Arshad and McCrum, 1989; SEMRU, 1987). A multicultural approach was adopted and a central tenet of this approach was that much racial intolerance was caused by a lack of knowledge of cultural and lifestyle differences. It was believed that through better understanding we might achieve better racial harmony.

However, such an approach ignored the existence of power relations and imbalances and that it was not a level playing field. There was a need for an approach that would analyse the real meaning of experience in a society which claimed to be pluralist, but in which racial discrimination continued to be legitimised and was often ignored. There was a need for an approach to develop awareness of the inter-relationship of the processes of structural oppression. The onset of devolution in 1999, which coincided with the publication of The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (the Macpherson Report) (HMSO, 1999) and the enactment of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, contributed to a conceptual shift. Scotland started to take a more systematic look at the needs and rights of black and minority ethnic communities (de Lima 2001; Netto et al., 2001); and for the very first time there was a national race equality action plan for Scotland which provided recommendations for change at institutional levels in areas such as housing, education, employment, enterprise and so forth.

In 2008, Audit Scotland evaluated the impact of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 on local authority services. Their report found that public bodies needed to embed race equality more effectively into improvement programmes and stated that more was required to identify and share good practice. It is therefore disappointing that some recent Government commissioned reports aimed at modernising provision, such as the Calman Commission’s 2009 report (The Commission on Scottish Devolution) of its examination of Scottish devolution, the 2010 Christie Report (Commission on the Future Delivery of Public Services in Scotland) on local authority reorganisation, which refers mainly to socio-economic inequality, and the Donaldson Review of Initial Teacher Education (Teaching Scotland’s Future, 2010) makes little or no recommendation regarding the equalities field as a whole, collectively providing no mention of how to address race equality in 21st-century Scotland.

It would appear that even before the engine of race equality had fully revved up, Scotland was taking its foot off the pedal in relation to race. Three possible explanations as to why this might be include: firstly, it is much simpler to revert to the default position of ‘nae problem here’, secondly, a mistaken assumption that with all the emphasis on equalities work in the early 2000s there was no more race equality work to be done, and the onset of austerity meant that precious resources needed to be diverted elsewhere; and thirdly, an assumption that embedding race through mainstreaming has meant race was addressed.

Successive Scottish governments since devolution have strongly favoured mainstreaming as the primary tool for the delivery of public policy. Mainstreaming was a strategic approach adopted by the European Union in promoting gender equality. In Scotland, mainstreaming is defined as ‘a social justice-led approach to policy making in which equal opportunities principles, strategies and practices are integrated into the everyday work of government and other public bodies’ (McKay and Bilton, 2003). McKay and Bilton suggest it is an approach that promises much but is not without its challenges. For McKay and Bilton the approach can only work if there is the political and policy will to make it work, a good understanding of issues by policy writers, and ownership by middle managers and staff. They conclude that in their view sustained high-profile political support is the single most important factor in whether mainstreaming succeeds. This needs to be accompanied by, as they say, ‘a more sophisticated understanding of the impact of “simultaneous” experience of different dimensions of difference and disadvantage’ (2003: 153).

In 2016, in the area of race equality, several areas require attention. There is the gap between what is espoused in the policy elite group, what is said in announced policy and then what is happening on the ground. It would be fair to say that the politicians in Scotland are united in condemning racism and promoting racial equality. However, is this commitment sufficiently high-profile and sustained? How is this commitment transmitted to policy writers, middle managers of services and to ground staff? What continuous education is offered to all to improve their awareness not just of overt racism but
also of subtle, daily acts which corrode and impact on life opportunities? There is a need for policies to be evaluated in terms of how effectively they have been translated into practice.

There is a need to be far more sophisticated in conceptualising and implementing policy for a diverse citizenry. A generic catch-all phrase such as ‘inclusion’ can be interpreted and emphasised in different ways. Given Scotland’s tendency to assume all is well, the more difficult-to-address issues, such as racism, Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, for example, can register low on the radar of policy makers and those who implement policy. While the Equality Act brought together different types of equality issues, there is still a need to look for the intersections of these issues and also to understand the specificities of each one. An approach that assumes that generic policies of inclusion and diversity can address specific equality areas is lazy and naïve.

In education for example it could be argued that, through the Additional Support for Learning Act (2004), amended in 2009 and adopting a mainstreaming approach, race matters are ostensibly covered. However, another lens could reveal that such coverage might be problematic. It can be argued that the ASL Act, by focusing attention on individual pupil needs, has enabled Scottish education to disengage from considering institutional forms of discrimination, as suggested by the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry report (Macpherson, 1999). The ASL Act’s main focus is to ensure that learning and teaching provision is adjusted to ensure every child is included, which may or may not require adjustments at institutional level. The Macpherson Inquiry report emphasised the need for institutions to change, to recognise the existence of racism at different levels and to make changes accordingly. It is entirely possible for the ASL Act to fall short of meeting these requirements.

Finally, there is a need to have a polity make-up that is far more representative of the growing ethnic, religious, linguistic and culturally diverse Scotland that we are today. Social diversity is a feature of contemporary Scotland driven by migration and globalisation. Operationalising equality is a big challenge, both financially and conceptually. Policy responses generally work if they are not too complex to be viable. Yet the challenge of addressing issues of inequality, discrimination and multiple layers of identity may mean this is a well-nigh impossible task for any public policy to achieve. Making sure that diversities are strongly represented and embedded within the policy-writing and implementation teams would make this task a little easier.

References


2. ‘Race’ and Ethnicity in Scotland

David McCrone

This contribution does three things. The first of these is to consider what we mean by terms like ‘race’ and ethnicity in Scotland. Second, we want to understand why these terms matter in making sense of social and cultural relations in Scotland, especially as there seem to be taken-for-granted assumptions surrounding them. Third, we explore public attitudes to ‘the other’ to see what they tell us about racism in Scotland. Making sense of ‘race’ and ethnicity can only be done comparatively, by comparing societies and, in this particular case, Scotland with England.1

The first issue relates to our use of terms. Bob Miles (1993) persuaded us over twenty years ago to put ‘race’ in inverted commas lest we treat it as ‘real’. The social anthropologist Thomas Eriksen (1993: 5) put it this way: ‘Social science studies “race” not because it believes that people can be divided biologically into “races”, but because the object of study is the social and cultural relevance of the notion that race exists.’ A concept related to ‘race’ is ‘ethnicity’, which at one level seems to raise fewer public issues than ‘race’, but is equally problematic. In everyday (and official) speech, it evokes ‘minority issues’ and ‘race relations’. In social science, notably social anthropology, it signifies social relationships based on cultural differences, and hence is defined more broadly than ‘race’. For example, the 2011 Census asked people: ‘What is your ethnic group?’, and offered a choice of categories such as ‘white Scottish’, ‘white other British’, ‘Asian Scottish’, ‘Asian British’, ‘African Scottish’, and so on. The implication is that everyone belongs to some ‘ethnic’ category or other, even though it is a fair bet that few ‘white Scots’ (or ‘white English’ for that matter) would think of themselves as ‘ethnic’.

Leaving aside the fact that the Census categories fuse ‘race’ (e.g. ‘white’) and national identity (e.g. ‘Scottish’), how valid is it to think of ‘Scots’ as an ethnic group? We might take the (official) view that everyone has to fit into a category whether that is meaningful to them or not. Perhaps Scots are what Michael Banton (1983) helpfully called ‘minus-one ethnics’, that is, an implicit benchmark against which ‘ethnic others’ are to be measured. In other words, ‘minus-one’ is the norm against which others are deemed to deviate. Banton’s example is as follows: In Britain, the English have regarded Scots, Welsh, Gujaratis, Afro-Caribbeans, Poles, etc., as groups defined by ethnic attributes. They [the English] have not regarded themselves as possessing an ethnicity, because, being the largest group and the dominant element in the population, there has been no pressure upon them to distinguish their group from the society as a whole. (Banton, 1997: 17)

Scots may well cavil at that, and consider themselves to belong to a ‘nation’, and not an ‘ethnic group’ nor, indeed, a ‘national minority’, neither term being in common currency north of the border. As Eriksen points out, ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’ are connected terms but not synonyms. Simply put, ‘national’ implies cultural difference (‘ethnicity’ in the anthropological sense) plus territoriality.

Running through this definitional minefield is a useful distinction between categories people use in everyday life (‘emic’), and categories that analysts (including Census-takers) treat as meaningful (‘etic’). Thus, treating ‘white Scots’ as an ethnic group may have little meaning in ‘real life’ because that is not, by and large, how people view themselves, although it may be useful for analysts to do so. Many concepts used in social science are of this nature, such as ‘social class’, ‘gender’, and so on. It is of little use arguing that these have only one meaning (emic or etic) when clearly they do not.

There is a further distinction we need to mention briefly: between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’, the former being close in meaning to ‘race’ (‘tribe’, ‘blood’ and so on), and the latter concerned with territoriality. The distinction is easier to grasp if we ask the question: is being Scottish to be defined in terms of belonging to a ‘tribe’ (ethnicity) or in terms of ‘place’ (residence) such that living in Scotland makes you Scottish? The dominant political discourse opts for the latter rather than the former. In truth, the question is more interesting than the answer, because it helps to uncover the criteria for being accepted as ‘Scottish’, and as such it defines the nature of the political argument rather than offering hard and fast analytical criteria.

There is a wider political debate behind all this. Put at its simplest, are Scots racist? How can we tell? And what do we mean by ‘racist’ anyway? And against
whom? And compared to whom? Is it a matter of attitudes, or of behaviour? What evidence is there that people in Scotland see ‘ethnic minorities’ as a threat? The Scottish Social Attitudes surveys for 2002, 2006 and 2010 asked respondents to agree/disagree with the statement: ‘People from ethnic minorities take jobs from Scottish people’. In 2002, 20% agreed, and 42% disagreed, a ratio in favour of the ‘liberal’ opinion of roughly 2 to 1. By 2006, the proportions were 27% to 37% (a ratio of only 1.4:1), and by 2010, 31% to 37% (down further to 1.2:1). In other words, people in Scotland were significantly less liberal at the end of the decade than at the beginning.

A second question, asked in 2006 and 2010, asked people if they thought that Scotland’s identity was threatened by increased numbers of migrants, specifically in relation to three ‘migrant’ groups: Muslims, Black/Asians and East Europeans. Almost half of people thought that there was a threat, and this was a consistent response over the two time-periods. Furthermore, the perceived threat to identity from ‘Muslims’ was greater than from the other two groups. Indeed, the more ‘Scottish’ the respondent felt, the more likely they were to think that ‘ethnic minorities’ take jobs from Scots, and to see Muslims as a threat to Scottish identity. We can explain this in terms of the way people who do not feel very Scottish are far less likely to care whether Scotland’s identity is under threat or not. Furthermore, the less education people have received, the more likely they are to perceive the ‘threat’.

The most comprehensive survey of public attitudes to Muslims in Scotland was carried out by Asifa Hussain and Bill Miller using 2003 Scottish and British Social Attitude surveys. As well as collecting data on ‘Islamophobia’, Hussain and Miller also explored ‘Anglophobia’ (in Scotland), to see whether there is any relationship between them; whether, for example, people prejudiced against Muslims are also prejudiced against the English. Their study also has the merit of comparing Scotland and England using comparable survey questions. They concluded that ‘Islamophobia is significantly lower in Scotland than in England – despite the growth of Scottish national identity and the advent of a separate Scottish parliament’ (2006: 49). ‘Exclusive Scots’ (people who said they were Scottish, not British) did not display such high levels of Islamophobia compared with their English counterparts, which is more closely linked to English nationalism south of the border, than to Scottish nationalism north of it.

Nevertheless, Scotland does not come out of this analysis with a clean bill of health. Anglophobia exists in Scotland, albeit at a fairly low level, and somewhat lower than Islamophobia. In other words, Scots have different phobias from the English, and not simply lesser ones. Hussain and Miller explain the difference using helpful metaphors, the wall and the bridge:

For English immigrants culture is the bridge and identity the wall. Their culture is close to that of the majority Scots and more important, it is flexible … but English immigrants can’t easily or quickly adopt a ‘Scottish’ identity. For ethnic Pakistanis, culture is the wall and identity the bridge. They identify quickly, easily, and in large numbers with Scotland; but they want to change Scotland by adding to the variety of Scottish culture and traditions. (2006: 169)

Thus, Muslims can claim to be ‘Scottish’ (the bridge) whereas the English may share symbolic repertoires of culture with the Scots (shared understandings) but cannot think of themselves as ‘Scottish’, nor for that matter be accepted as such (the wall). These findings help us to understand why significantly more ‘non-white’ people living in Scotland are prepared to call themselves “Scottish” (usually in hybrid form as, for example, ‘Scottish Muslims’) than their counterparts in England (where they are far more likely to say they are ‘British’, and not ‘English’).

Making comparisons is the key to understanding. In 2003, the question ‘Scotland would begin to lose its identity if more Muslims came to live in Scotland’ was asked in an English form in England. A majority (55%) of English natives (people born and living in England) took the ‘ethnic’ response to this question by agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement. In Scotland, the relevant figure was 41%. The respective ‘liberal’ or civic responses, based on those disagreeing with the proposition that Muslim in-migration would lead to a loss in national identity, are 25% in England, and 39% in Scotland. So whereas Scots split almost equally between ethnic and civic (41% to 39%), the equivalent English split is roughly 2 to 1 (55% to 25%). In terms of a similarly worded question about the in-migration of English people in the 2003 Scottish survey, around 33% of Scottish natives gave an ‘ethnic’ response, and 46% a ‘civic’ one.

If we combine this with the answers to the question about Muslims coming to live in Scotland, we have a good measure of the proportion who take an overall ‘ethnic’ or a ‘civic’ view of the impact on Scottish identity. We find strong associations in the responses people give: thus, 29% of Scottish natives have broadly ‘ethnic’ views, and 36% ‘civic’ ones. The ‘ethnic’s tend to be older, to be of a lower social class, to have no educational qualifications, and
slightly more likely to be ‘exclusive Scots’. ‘Civics’ on the other hand tend to be younger and more highly educated, but, perhaps surprisingly, national identity is not a significant factor. Taking all these possibilities together, we find that it is level of education, rather than age, sex, social class or national identity, which differentiates the ‘ethnics’ from the ‘civics’ in Scotland. Furthermore, asked who should get a Scottish passport, that is, only those ‘truly Scottish’ or ‘anyone permanently living in Scotland’, there was a strong association with ethnic/civic divide. Among the ‘civics’, 73% thought everyone living in Scotland, and only 18% would restrict it to ‘true Scots’. The figures for ‘ethnics’ were respectively 46% and 43%, showing that even a small majority of ‘ethnics’ were prepared to issue a passport on the basis of residence alone, rather than to those they consider ‘echt’ Scots.

So let us return to our question: are Scots racist? On the one hand, we have seen that a higher proportion of people in Scotland perceive a threat to jobs and identity as a result of immigration; that is not unexpected, given the ramping up of media coverage of events since 9/11 and 7/7. On the other hand, there are significant differences between Scotland and England such that levels of expressed racism in Scotland are significantly lower. Why? The short answer lies in understanding the politics of ‘race’ in the two countries.

What Satnam Virdee has called the ‘racialisation’ of the political process is the touchstone of difference. Put simply, in Scotland it is the lack of political oxygen for ‘race’ politics to flourish (much weaker support for UKIP and the Conservative party; the main political battles between left-of-centre parties like the SNP and Labour), and the fact that the Scottish political system squeezes out ‘ethnic’ politics which makes the difference, aided by the iconic presence of a Scottish parliamentary system distinctive from Westminster. Political-constitutional developments in Scotland (and Wales, for that matter) provide an important context within which migration and ethnicity are framed. If being Scottish is an ‘ethnic’ identity, then being ‘English’ is possibly more of one. Its mobilisation by the political Right in England is one of the more interesting features of modern politics (see Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Kenny, 2014).

This is not to deny that in Scotland the ‘raw materials’ of racism in the form of people’s attitudes to incomers and ethnic minorities have the potential to ignite under the right conditions, but the political ‘sparks’ are absent. As in many other respects, Scotland is not better, merely different.

Notes

1. For an extended discussion of national identity in the two countries, see McCrone and Bechhofer (2015).

References


3. Self-reported Discrimination in Scotland
Nasar Meer

This chapter provides an overview of a recently completed cross-sectional survey of 502 Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) people in Scotland – the first quantitative survey of its kind to focus exclusively on BAME experiences of discrimination in Scotland (Meer, 2015).

Survey findings
There is both good and bad news to report. BAME groups in Scotland have firmly established themselves in Scottish society; feel a strong attachment to it, and like all groups hold diverse sets of views on what they think Scottish society should be like. The experience of discrimination, however, is one that cuts across BAME experiences and appears to be under-reported. Tackling this should be of central importance to policymakers.

The key findings include:

- 31% of the aggregated sample ‘Agreed’ with the statement ‘I have experienced discrimination in Scotland in the last 5 years’.

- This, however, varied amongst different groups, e.g. nearly 45% of respondents with a Black African Caribbean heritage, compared with 29% of Asian heritage and 23% of the Mixed heritage respondents, agreed with the statement that they had ‘experienced discrimination in Scotland in the last five years’.

- Slightly more men (33.7%) than women (28.4) agreed with the same statement, and while 18–34 year olds (30.8%) and 35–54 year olds (29.7%) were similar, there was an increase for those aged 55+ (35.5%), as Figure 1 reports.

- When asked similar (less personalised) questions, nearly 35% agreed with the statement ‘discrimination is a widespread problem in Scotland’ and 42% agreed with the statement that ‘other people would perceive discrimination to be a problem in Scotland’.

- Of those who reported experiencing discrimination, more than four-fifths (82%), felt that this was due to their real or perceived ethnicity, and a further 42% felt it was due to their real or perceived religion (see Figure 2).

Background to the survey
Undertaken during the summer of 2015, data were made representative by being weighted by sex, age, ethnic group and region of Scotland. Targets were derived from the 2011 Scottish Census regarding the demographics of different ethnic groups in Scotland. Respondents were recorded at the local authority level but grouped into three large regions for weighting purposes (North East and Highlands, Eastern Scotland and South Western Scotland). Those giving an ethnic group of ‘Other’ were not weighted up or down by ethnic group but were held constant on that aspect of their weighting, as we considered that there was room for ambiguity in the definition of an ‘other’ ethnic group and were concerned that people who gave this answer by phone might differ from those who gave this answer to the paper census questionnaire, on which it was clear that ‘other ethnic group’ was mostly for those who considered themselves to belong to the ‘Arab’ ethnic group. In terms of geography, this was recorded at the local authority level but grouped these into three large regions for weighting purposes, as the bulk of the BAME population in Scotland are concentrated in the Greater Glasgow urban area (broadly analogous to the South Western Scotland region).

Our survey data breaks down numerically within the four weightings as follows:

- Gender: Male (241); Female (261)
- Age: 18-34 (253); 35-54 (198); 55+ (51)
- Ethnicity: Asian (379); African & African Caribbean (71); Mixed (40); Other (12)
- Scottish region: NE & Highlands (67); East (193); South West (242)

The survey achieved a rim weighting efficiency of 91.4%. The maximum respondent rim weight was 2.471 whilst the minimum respondent rim weight was 0.556: these weights are well within acceptable quality bounds and reflect the good quality sampling during the fieldwork stage.
Those who reported facing discrimination did not restrict it to a single area, but identified instead perceived discriminatory experiences in employment – either ‘in getting a job’ (36%) or ‘in being promoted’ (31%) – as well as ‘in education’ (35%), and in the use of transport services (35%). Smaller proportions, though still around one-fifth of the representative sample, said they experienced discrimination in ‘achieving equal pay’ (22%) and in ‘using health services’ (18%). Over half of the sample (52%) also said they had experienced discrimination ‘in other areas’ during the last 5 years (see Figure 3).

Interestingly, the survey found that 60% of respondents who had experienced discrimination in the last 5 years did not report it to any kind of authority (see Figure 4).
This was despite 82% of the entire sample insisting they would encourage a friend or family member to make a formal complaint if they thought they had experienced discrimination (see Figure 5), which suggests that perceptions of both low-level and more obvious experiences of racial discrimination in Scotland go under-reported. This is despite 65% of the entire sample ‘Strongly or Somewhat Agreeing’ with the statement ‘I have confidence in the laws against discrimination’ (with 20% disagreeing), and 64% agreeing that they had confidence in the authorities and other organisations to pursue discrimination cases (25% disagreed).

When respondents were asked if they felt incidents of racial discrimination were increasing or decreasing, 21% stated they have become ‘more frequent’, 22% ‘less frequent’, and 43% that they had ‘stayed the same’ over the last 5 years. Over half (54%) agreed and nearly a quarter (24%) disagreed with the statement ‘the Scottish government is doing enough to tackle discrimination in Scotland’.

The study also asked respondents about national identities, and found more than one-third of the entire sample (35%) described themselves as ‘equally Scottish and British’, with Scottish Muslims notably more likely to do so at over 42%. Precisely 38% of respondents voted in favour and against Independence in the 2014 referendum respectively. When asked whether an Independent Scotland ‘would be better or worse placed to tackle discrimination in Scotland’, 22% said it would be ‘better placed’ and 17% said it would be ‘worse placed’, and 47% said it would ‘make no difference’ (12% answered ‘Don’t Know’ and 2% refused to answer).

How do these findings compare with other surveys?

The way we quantitatively measure experiences of discrimination varies from one survey to another. For example, the British Social Attitudes survey asks people the following question: ‘Would you describe yourself as very prejudiced / a little prejudiced against people of other races?’ Using the same question between 1983 and 2013, they report that in 8 of the 10 years following 2001, levels of a self-reported affirmative to this question were at 30% or higher (see Figure 6), compared with the low point of 25% in 2000–2001 (the ‘rolling average’ moves from 28% to 34%). The BSA survey interprets this as a trend that
was falling during the 1990s but which ‘ticked up’ in the first decade of this century. Interestingly, they find that Scotland has the lowest level of reported prejudice in the UK outside London.

In a more practice-based study which tested for racial discrimination in recruitment processes in British cities, including Glasgow (see Table 1), it has been shown that ‘people from ethnic minorities were less likely to be successful with their applications, even discounting differences such as age and education’.2

While this relates only to the early stage of the recruitment process, the shortlisting, to secure a job interview the researchers had to send out 74% more applications for ethnic minority candidates compared to white candidates. When they controlled for other factors the researchers attributed this to having a name associated with a black and ethnic minority background. Unfortunately, the numbers of applications sent to employers are too small for differences between the cities to be statistically significant. The authors conclude, however, that there was little to suggest racial discrimination was a problem confined to particular cities across Great Britain. What the results do suggest is that there are high levels of discrimination in recruitment practices across the board (Wood et al., 2009: 41).

In another study, Nicholls et al. (2010: 5) use the concept of ‘unfair treatment’ to take in questions of discrimination and prejudice as encountered across the equality ‘strands’ of gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, religion and belief, and age. Rather than a study of the scale and frequency of discrimination per se, however, these authors showed that ‘discrimination was a term that the participants were familiar with’, and that respondents provided a clear account of how discrimination ‘was directly linked to difference and people being treated differently because of their characteristics’.

This is especially relevant for our purposes because the view that BAME groups have a familiarity with the concept of discrimination, to the extent that they can answer direct questions on this, has long been supported by qualitative findings, but is also expressed in the largest study of BAME groups ever undertaken in Britain. While some years out of date, the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities

Table 1. Discrimination in practice based recruitment in the UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>All sets of applications (%)</th>
<th>Positive response among set of three (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford and Leeds</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other areas</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base (n)</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6. Aggregated self-reported prejudice in the UK
(Modood et al., 1997: 131) asked direct questions about the perception of discrimination in the course of reporting, for example, a significant increase since the previous survey (1984) in the belief that employers discriminate on the grounds of race and ethnicity.

We certainly know from other fieldwork that racial discrimination occurs across the UK – for example, that BAME applicants are less likely to be successful in applying for a job even discounting differences such as age and education. As this survey shows, we cannot assume this is not an issue in Scotland too.

Notes
1. http://www.natcen.ac.uk/blog/is-racial-prejudice-on-the-rise

References


4. Connecting Race Equality with Anti-Poverty Initiatives
Gina Netto

Efforts to address racial inequality often appear to be separated from broader efforts to tackle poverty. The race equality agenda is undoubtedly broad. Goals that are widely shared include equality of access to and outcomes of using public services, labour market participation and progression, freedom to practise religious and cultural beliefs, and protection from hate crime.

Yet, substantial research has revealed the significant overlap between experiences of migration and poverty, and even destitution, including among asylum-seekers, refugees and other recent migrants (Fitzpatrick et al., 2015; Netto et al., 2011). For instance, a review of literature and key datasets revealed substantial disadvantage in material, social and economic terms that was closely related to ethnic minority status (Netto et al., 2011). This was manifested in disproportionately high levels of homelessness, high rates of unemployment among certain ethnic groups, mismatches between pay and educational qualifications as well as experiences of deep stigmatisation and isolation. The same review called for closer interrogation of the links between various dimensions of ethnic minority identity, including that related to legal status (whether asylum-seeker, refugee or economic migrant), length of residence in the country of migration, age, gender, disability and religious and sexual orientation.

Substantial evidence of poverty within ethnic minority communities clearly indicates that more effort needs to be made to link attempts to progress race equality with anti-poverty initiatives. Yet, these connections often appear to be overlooked, leaving gaps and mismatches in service provision which, in some cases, fall to under-resourced ethnic minority voluntary organisations to address (Netto et al., 2011). Further, research has shown that programmes which are meant to increase employability as a route out of poverty may not be effective in reaching ethnic minority communities and other equality groups, as reflected in the low take-up of Modern Apprenticeship schemes in all four UK Nations (Sosenko and Netto, 2013). In relation to the place-based strategies for tackling poverty in areas of multiple deprivation, Matthews et al. (2012) has revealed that such policies may not be effective in reaching equality groups, including ethnic minorities, since the majority do not live in these areas. Overall, these studies indicate the need for a nuanced, informed approach to tackling poverty in ethnic minority communities, which involves the use of both mainstream and targeted interventions.

The recent inquiry carried out by the Scottish Parliament’s Equal Opportunities Committee (2016) on ‘Removing Barriers: race, ethnicity and employment’ was a welcome development in raising public awareness of the need for vigilance against racial discrimination in organisational structures and processes related to employee recruitment and progression. As Hudson et al. (2013) revealed, while individuals across all ethnicities in low-paid work in the public, private and voluntary sectors face barriers to their progress, ethnic minorities face additional barriers that relate to their identity and migration status. Netto et al. (2015) suggest that this demonstrates, at a macro-level, how a diversity of knowledge and ability at the low-paid worker level is being neither utilised, nor recognised. This has major implications for the development of a skilled workforce within a globalised market economy, especially in those areas where migrant workers and other ethnic minorities tend to be over-represented. Steps could be taken by employers and managers, however, to raise awareness of the role of informal workplace cultures, and the ways in which they can operate to undermine equal opportunities policies and processes.

It hardly needs saying that regardless of the weight of evidence relating to ethnic inequalities, there is a real danger of these issues remaining hidden from the public eye, a phenomenon referred to by Craig (2013) as the ‘invisibilising’ of race in public policy’. This is especially the case within Scotland where, until recently, the ethnic minority population has been present as only a small percentage of the population (Bailey et al., 1997). The validity of additional demands placed on public services, already overstretched by new arrivals, is often questioned (Blake et al., 2008), and in the case of asylum-seekers, sometimes responded to with open hostility (Barclay et al., 2003; Leudar and Hayes, 2008). These concerns have been exacerbated within the current climate of austerity and extensive cuts to public services. Further, fear of ‘the other’ is evident in the frequent presentation of immigrants in the media as threats to social stability that will undermine ‘British
cultural distinctiveness’, and therefore constitute ‘a serious social problem’ (Lynn and Lea, 2003).

Within Scotland, where some aspects of welfare are beginning to be transferred to Holyrood, following the Smith Agreement, it is not yet clear how newly devolved structures of governance will respond to rapid population change and increasing ethnic diversity. Analysts have long debated the inclusivity of Scottish multiculturalism, with proponents claiming that an aging population and awareness of the need for a young skilled workforce have resulted in a more open approach towards migrants compared with England (Wren, 2007). Barker (2015) argues that while both the ruling Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) politicians and Scottish Labour have diverged on the degree of institutional power necessary to achieve national immigration and integration goals in Scotland, both parties have sought to promote an inclusionary ‘Scottish approach’ that contrasts with the increasingly restrictive policies of Westminster.

Conversely, others have claimed that Scottish multiculturalism is characterised by complacency, a reluctance to recognise racism as a problem and a tendency to view England as the dominant Other (Williams and de Lima, 2008). Furthermore, while it has been claimed that community cohesion has not featured as a cause for concern in Scotland as it has in England (Kintrea and Suzuki, 2008), whether this is warranted or merely indicative of complacency is debatable, particularly in the light of persistent levels of racially motivated harassment and crime (Netto and Abazie, 2012).

As Barker (2015) argues, since issues relating to identity and culture are so often at the root of contestation between central and substate levels, it becomes particularly pertinent to examine where migrants fit into the evolving identity of devolved Scotland. This relates not only to their circumstances within the four major cities of Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Dundee where ethnic minorities have traditionally been concentrated, but to the most rural and remote locations of the Highlands and Islands where small numbers of ethnic minorities are increasingly dispersed, as evidenced since the 1991 Census (Bailey et al., 1997).

Increased transfer of welfare powers from Westminster includes powers for the Scottish Government to set up its own employment programmes to help long-term unemployed and disabled people find work. There are clear opportunities here for ensuring that some of this support is targeted towards refugees and other ethnic groups with high levels of unemployment. Such support may include increased provision of ESOL and adult learning classes, as well as culturally sensitive childcare facilities to support the greater participation of women in the labour market. The Scottish Parliament will also have the powers to legislate for discretionary payments in any area of welfare and set up a system to identify risks to the wellbeing of individuals. Here, too, there is potential for increased responsiveness to the high levels of mental ill-health among certain groups of individuals, including refugees traumatised by loss of family and possessions through war and political conflict.

Other powers which will be transferred to the Scottish Parliament include control over benefits for disabled people and their carers, provision for the Regulated Social Fund (including payments for Winter Fuel, Cold Weather and Sure Start Maternity Payments) and Discretionary Housing Payments. While Universal Credit is reserved, the Scottish Parliament will have powers to determine how claimants are paid and how much claimants obtain for housing support. As the take-up of means-tested benefits would clearly contribute to poverty reduction, it would be important for the Scottish Parliament to encourage benefits take among all eligible households, which would include removing the barriers to under-claiming among certain ethnic minority groups (Barnard and Pettigrew, 2003).

More broadly, the transfer of powers relating to welfare in Scotland presents a welcome opportunity to review how decision-making processes relating to anti-poverty policies can respond positively to an ethnically diverse population. This requires transparent structures of governance, knowledge of how to engage with diverse communities and effective communication mechanisms. Perhaps most importantly, it requires the political will to more closely connect anti-poverty strategies with race equality initiatives.

References


5. Race Equality in Scotland’s Public Sector: Five Missing Links?
Carol Young

Since devolution, Scotland has developed a distinctively positive rhetoric on race equality. As well as in the previous Runnymede publication on this topic, “Achieving Race Equality in Scotland” (Runnymede, 2010), this can also be seen in public-sector responses to the Scottish Specific Public Sector Equality Duties (Equality Act 2010 (Specific Duties) (Scotland) Regulations, 2012). The Coalition for Racial Equality and Rights (CRER) has a long history of engaging with Scotland’s public bodies on their approaches to race equality. These interactions vary in their depth and effectiveness, but each offers a valuable insight into the practices, attitudes and processes that impact race equality policy in Scotland.

Many of the individuals we work with in the public sector are deeply committed on a personal level; some have invested countless hours in the development of race equality action plans, schemes and outcomes. Despite these good efforts and intentions, however, progress on race equality in Scotland has been limited. CRER’s recent work with both communities and practitioners in the public sector shows that the same pressing concerns about inequality and discrimination in Scotland persist, decade after decade (CRER, 2015a, b, c, d, e). This is backed up with statistical evidence on inequalities in areas such as employment, housing and poverty (CRER, 2015f, g, h, i). There is a clear disconnect between the theoretically positive activity within the public sector and the outcomes for minority ethnic people themselves.

Our research suggests that many public bodies still struggle with race equality. Some have adjusted poorly to the new cross-strand equalities environment, diverting their focus away from specific protected characteristics in favour of a general ‘fairness’ agenda which is often so generic that it does little to reduce inequalities (CRER, 2013). However, it seems that even those public bodies which do prioritise race equality find it difficult to make discernible impacts. We believe that the lack of concrete progress is at least partly a result of common flaws or ‘missing links’ in the approach to designing and delivering race equality policy. In particular, we feel there are deficiencies with regard to understanding race and racism; involving people; using evidence effectively; making stronger, bolder commitments; and achieving outcomes.

**Link 1. Understanding race and racism**

Effective policy development requires an in-depth understanding of the issues at stake. Within many public bodies, race, racism and their implications for people’s life-experience are not well understood. This is affected by the misframing of racism in wider society – racism is seen as an aberration, something linked primarily to far right movements or celebrity scandals rather than a mechanism that pervades social and organisational structures. To challenge racial inequality effectively, Scotland’s public sector needs to get to grips with some concepts it may find uncomfortable.

White privilege is a key example of this; a concept that is absolutely central to understanding racism, yet is frequently dismissed as threatening and divisive. This is a knee-jerk reaction and part of a pattern of deficit-based discourse around race in Scotland. This discourse accepts that minority ethnic groups face disadvantage but refuses to recognise that where one group is disadvantaged, the other is clearly at an advantage. It uses language which belittles minority ethnic groups, for instance describing them as ‘vulnerable’. It focuses on ‘building capacity’, as though a lack of skill or understanding amongst minority ethnic groups is to blame for inequality. Above all, it ignores the advantages that social and organisational structures confer to white groups. Whiteness, of course, is about more than skin colour. The whole concept of whiteness and the social norms, stereotypes and perceptions of belonging and acceptability which underpin white privilege are also poorly understood within the public sector.

Understanding these concepts is fundamental to challenging racism on an institutional level. Policy and practice is overwhelmingly designed to suit the majority population (in this case, white Scottish people). They have the privilege of being perceived as ‘the average person’, the very essence of white privilege. Where policy making focuses on this imagined ‘average person’ without considering the potential impact on minority ethnic individuals, institutional racism results – as well as other forms of discrimination, including intersectional forms.

Within many public sector organisations this is the default position, creating a doubly negative
situation where inadequate policy collides with the personal racism of some staff or service users. In our experience, organisations often fail to support those who face racism because their largely white management structures are inexperienced and uncomfortable with the issues. Understanding the theoretical concepts involved, however, is only part of the equation. To create effective change, public bodies also need to understand how their organisations and services are perceived by minority ethnic communities.

**Link 2. Involving people**

Genuine reflection of the voices, needs and experiences of minority ethnic communities is an important link that’s currently missing from the policy process. Involvement by public bodies with all the users of its services should encourage and enable policy to adapt in response to new information and changing needs, become accountable to those it serves and demonstrate real results. In our view, this potential is not currently being met.

Involvement requires public bodies to reach people, actively listen to what they say and take action to address their concerns. This means involving people in an accessible way, at an early stage; a far cry from the usual approach of briefly consulting on decisions which have essentially already been made.

It also means being prepared to deal transparently with conflict. This could be conflict arising from criticism of what the organisation does, or conflicting messages from different groups of people. Feedback is important, especially in these cases; if people can’t get what they want, they need to know why. Failure to address this creates ‘consultation fatigue’ and leaves communities feeling cheated (see, for example, SCDC, n.d.).

To be truly effective, involvement has to be complemented by other forms of evidence gathering. Minority ethnic communities are not a homogeneous group, either between or within ethnicities, so the small- to medium-scale involvement activities that public bodies undertake can only ever tell part of the story. These forms of involvement can also easily miss the experiences of minority ethnic people who face multiple forms of discrimination, so an intersectional understanding of the issues is needed (see Crenshaw, 2012).

**Link 3. Using evidence effectively**

Evidence-based policy is a major focus for Scotland’s public sector (Christie, 2011); however, in many cases the evidence base used for developing approaches to race equality is poor (CRER, 2013). Those who design evidence-gathering processes within the public sector could help to address this by maximising the potential for data disaggregation, both in terms of ethnicity and other protected characteristics.

Despite these gaps, however, it is possible to use a mixture of quantitative and qualitative evidence to identify some of the main inequalities that need to be tackled (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2014). Organisations need this analysis in order to understand who experiences inequalities, and what those inequalities are. However, beyond current high-profile topics (for example migration or asylum and refugee issues), evidence on race is simply missing from many policy processes. As a result, we find that much of the current focus of race equality policy within Scotland’s public bodies is on meeting the very specific needs of recent migrant populations. Within this focus, there is a tendency for public bodies to concentrate on issues of personal capacity and ability. Commitments to improved language support (such as interpretation or English as an Additional Language provision) are a common example of this.

Whilst these needs do need to be addressed, this often comes at the expense of tackling the inequalities experienced by wider minority ethnic communities. Improved language support is undoubtedly needed for those recent migrants included in the roughly 9% of Scotland’s minority ethnic population who face challenges in English language capability (calculation based on data from Scotland’s Census; see National Records of Scotland, 2011). The problem is that where this is the sole focus of race equality work, the inequalities facing the remaining 91% (whether they are recent migrants, long-term residents, or the second, third or fourth generation of their family in Scotland) will continue. Examples like this demonstrate why more robust approaches to evidence-based policy are required, and why good quality evidence needs to be combined with a willingness to make commitments that can genuinely challenge inequality.

**Link 4. Making stronger, bolder commitments**

Stronger, bolder commitments from our public authorities are needed to ensure Scotland’s approach to race equality is successful. Organisational commitments on equality are partly about demonstrating leadership and creating the right ethos, but as mentioned previously, positive rhetoric is not enough to create change. Race equality
commitments made by public bodies have to be unapologetically anti-racist. Organisations need to be clear that where inequality and discrimination exist they have a responsibility to face up to that situation and tackle it. An anti-racist approach rejects the deficit based language that is all too common in public policy, and instead recognises that structural, social and personal racism are at the heart of racial inequality (see, for example, Turney et al., 2002).

As a first step towards understanding this at an institutional level, public bodies need to evaluate the impact of what they do in order to move on from damaging, outdated or ineffective practices. For example, many still make commitments to address workforce inequality by targeting recruitment at minority ethnic groups. This will have little or no impact in most cases because, for the majority of organisations, application rates are reasonably representative. Organisations need to look instead at the interview process, which is currently where the bulk of inequalities are encountered (CRER, 2014). Putting anti-racism into practice in the public sector requires commitments which will work in practice as well as on paper. In our experience, these need to be outcome focused, evidence based and achievable.

### Link 5. Achieving tangible outcomes

The final and most important missing link in the policy process is achieving demonstrable progress on race equality. This is partly about ensuring the outcome focused commitments made by public bodies are well designed from the beginning. Combining evidence on the impact of previous work with evidence on inequalities, ideally both qualitative and quantitative, should provide all the information needed to set outcomes. In the case of Equality Outcomes, which listed public bodies are required to develop and implement every four years, these should always relate to the change the organisation wants to see in terms of positive outcomes for people with protected characteristics (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2015). However, organisations also need to be clear about the action they will take within their own processes and policies in order to create that change. It is vital to ensure that implementation and monitoring is well planned and consistently carried out for all commitments made by public bodies. Without this, progress will inevitably falter.

### Reinstating those missing links

The issues raised here can, despite good intentions, trap even the most committed of Scotland’s public-sector bodies in a loop of ineffective policy making. In our experience, however, some organisations have their own structural and attitudinal barriers which need to be tackled before these missing links can be replaced or mended. Overall, organisations need their policy processes to become more flexible and adapt to change, whether that be demographic change or new evidence on the causes of inequality. They need to be less defensive and more responsive to constructive criticism, especially from minority ethnic service users and staff. They need to ensure that work on racial equality doesn’t lose momentum, for example where there are changes in staffing, management or organisational priorities.

Finally, organisations need to be prepared to transparently share evaluation of their activities. The need to understand what works underpins all of the missing links explored here. Legal impetus for this already exists under the Public Sector Equality Duties (Equality Act 2010 (Specific Duties) (Scotland) Regulations, 2012), but these duties need to be treated as an opportunity to excel, not a tick-box exercise. Where information is shared openly on the strengths and weaknesses of race equality initiatives, the public sector as a whole can draw on this to create innovative practice with less fear of failure. If these challenges can be overcome and missing links repaired, opportunities to create change will multiply. Then perhaps Scotland can move from positive rhetoric to positive progress on race equality.

### References


CRER (2015f) Interim Evidence on Community Cohesion and Safety. Glasgow: CRER.

CRER (2015g) Interim Evidence on Participation and Representation. Glasgow: CRER.

CRER (2015h) Interim Evidence on Education, Employment and Income. Glasgow: CRER.


Equality Act 2010 (Specific Duties) (Scotland) Regulations (2012).

Equality Act 2010, section 149.


SCDC (n.d.). Don’t Treat Us All The Same! National standards for community engagement advice note. Glasgow: SCDC.

BEMIS Scotland is a national umbrella equality organisation working for a Scotland that is equal, inclusive and responsive, in which people from diverse communities are actively participating without barriers, are valued, and treated with dignity and respect, and where they experience equality in their opportunities, quality of life and citizenship. Our core objectives can be highlighted as a determined focus on empowerment and capacity building, influencing policy development proactively at various levels, and progressing an equal and inclusive society, through Democratic Active Citizenship (Participative Democracy) & Human Rights Education.

The myriad of policy areas that we work across include, but are not reserved to, equality, community development, employment, tackling racism and discrimination, citizenship and cultural heritage recognition, education, socio and economic disadvantage, media narratives and immigration. We are an organisation that supports Empowerment and Active Citizenship – but for this to have an impact, the aspirations of communities must also be reflected by a legislative culture and approach which fully recognises the validity of Scotland’s diversity and responds accordingly. A positive, proactive partnership approach with statutory bodies, as well as with researchers, the third sector and local authorities is required in order to advance our shared equalities objectives.

An obstinately familiar culture of antagonism, fear, uncertainty and ignorance persists around what we mean by ‘Race Equality’. Wrapped up in this is the fear of saying the wrong thing, adopting the wrong language or acronyms, bickering over the validity of communities recognition, and apportioning blame for lack of real or perceived progress or outcomes to, on occasions, individuals but most prominently to organisations, sectors, local authorities and national government, agencies or bodies. No single entity holds ultimate responsibility for failings but there is undoubtedly both frustration and negativity, a symptom of stagnant or slow progress. Government can show leadership but we, as citizens and stakeholders, must respond accordingly.

So where do we go from here? Scotland’s shared narrative on ‘equalities’ issues is generally regarded to be progressive, positive, and distinguishable from those of our UK and European partners. The Scottish Parliamentary elections took place in May 2016, and prior to this we have had the launch of the Scottish Government’s/CRER’s Race Equality Framework for Scotland – 2016–2030.1 This ‘picture’ of Scotland is a chance, a starting-point from which to drive things, a key to bring about change, an opportunity to learn who we are. This fresh start represents a real chance for the diverse communities of Scotland to delineate new horizons – we hold the right cards to make a difference, to shape a bright future for our country.

What is needed is a robust civic sense, individual and collective responsibility, a strong identity and a sense of shared belonging. These are crucial components to make a difference and to allow for sustainable and durable change.

BEMIS proposes that we work to progress the understanding of race equality work beyond a static conception of black/white; racism/discrimination. Race equality should be approached within a dynamic process that acknowledges equal citizenship (rights and responsibilities). This does not in any way negate or ignore the reality of racism and discrimination, nor our commitment to challenging it. On the contrary it allows us to open up new dimensions of challenging inequality to progress a complex agenda. In Scotland racial discrimination, as a single entity, has been pervasive across ethnicities and generations, and perpetuates a cycle of disadvantage culminating in social, political and economic illiteracy.

As Scotland’s diversity increases it is imperative that we are better positioned to respond to demographic and social challenges. While it is crucial to acknowledge that colour-based racial discrimination has been and continues to be a fundamental barrier to progressing race equality issues in Scotland, the singular ‘silver bullet’ policy solution is an unattainable objective. We need additional options. It would be unintentionally mendacious in a ‘Scottish race equality’ context not to acknowledge the experience of ‘white minorities’, particularly the Irish experience in Scotland, which deserves more than a rendering into a ‘homogeneous white’ narrative.²
While ‘White Privilege’ in a global context may hold, it is not enough of a blanket concept in ‘Scotland’ to analyse our social heritage or, singularly, shape policy of the future. In Scotland we may unintentionally ignore lessons from the past, in which some of today’s race equality challenges could find a degree of repetition.\(^3\) As Scotland’s preeminent historian Sir Tom Devine put it in 2010:

> Irish Roman Catholics achieved, to use the social scientist term, then I’ll explain it, occupational parity in the USA at the census of 1901. The descendants of Irish Roman Catholics, by this stage mainly third, fourth, fifth generations, the descent group of Irish Roman Catholics in this country (Scotland) achieved it only at the census of 2001.\(^4\)

Scotland cannot afford, economically, socially or culturally, to repeat the Irish experience for our burgeoning Scottish-African, Polish, Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Gypsy Traveller, Indian, etc., communities. It would be more prudent to acknowledge and learn from past experience as a framework for comparable progress for fundamental employment gaps in 2016.\(^5\) Here three category issues emerge, which are worth dwelling on:

1. When using generic and all-encompassing ethnic categories (such as ‘Asian’, ‘East European’ and ‘Black’, for example), the real diversity that exists within these categories is being disregarded and diluted. The fluidity and multifaceted nature of ‘ethnicity’ is thus reduced to a mere tick-box option and often conflated with ‘race’ leaving many individuals with little to relate to.

2. Ethnicity is still very much understood and approached in simplistic colour terms – as a black/white dualism – thus, again, concealing much of the diversity that exists among ethnic minorities.

3. There seems to be a ‘single-lens’ focus on individuals’ identities thus overlooking the intersectionalities, diversities and complexities that exist within and between ethnic groups.

While recognising that the ‘diversity of diversity’ is key to pursuing equitable policy responses to the myriad of policy issues across sectors, this must be reflected in a culture of rights and responsibilities in which individual citizens and communities respond proactively to self-identified priorities. Democratic Active Citizenship offers a vision of citizenship that is global and cosmopolitan, and where its content and practice are underpinned by human rights principles and social justice. It promotes an active citizen who is not solely aware of their own rights, but able to act upon them as well as upon responsibilities.

This context can assist in addressing a historically established a dependency culture that has, directly and indirectly, impacted negatively on progressing race equality and empowerment. The need for a cultural shift in understanding and advancing the concept of race equality beyond the traditional framework and definitions is a crucial objective for us all to consider. This could have profound positive implications, as mere empathy has to be replaced with responsibility and outrage to make communities be ‘part’ of rather than the ‘recipient’ of race equality, and then can ‘act’ for a more equitable and sustainable society. As ‘active’ citizens, our diverse minorities can develop and enhance greater ownership of their actions and responsibilities, participating fully in civic society and pro-actively shaping a representative Scotland we all share as a core objective.

Tackling racism, encouraging a culture of active citizenship, working proactively and in concert with key stakeholders, agencies, citizens and communities must be at the heart of our race equality future. However, in advancing these goals we must proceed with caution and never at the expense of ignoring the pernicious nature of socio-economic disadvantage and gender inequality. Democratic Active Citizenship can be seriously undermined by national or local governmental neglect of socio-economic, cultural and civil rights. Civic and Political rights are only as valuable as the individual citizen’s ability to engage with them, fundamentally undermined by poverty and inequality.

In 2015/16 BEMIS conducted a series of consultations on the relationship between poverty and ethnicity – from our perspective, a fundamental interaction in the way racial inequality prevails (see Figure 1). People in Scotland across all ethnicities continue to experience poverty on a daily basis. People from Polish, African, Asian Chinese, Asian Other, African, Caribbean or Black and other Ethnic Groups live disproportionally in the most deprived circumstances.\(^5\)

As part of the Joseph Rowntree Foundations review into ‘poverty and ethnicity’ in Scotland BEMIS made a series of recommendations to the Scottish Government and key stakeholders. Some of these recommendations chimed with key findings by other national bodies such SCOWR,\(^7\) SURF\(^8\) or the Poverty Alliance,\(^9\) while others were BEMIS specific, focused on the nuanced reality of Scotland’s demographics. Here I highlight three in particular:
• The Scottish Government should continue to lead in supporting the payment of the Scottish Living Wage across all sectors in which it has influence. For example ‘The Agricultural Sector’ where pay is administered by the ‘Agricultural Wages Board’. While the board is an Independent body with statutory authority, Scottish Ministers appoint four independent commissioners to sit alongside representatives from Farmers’ Unions and Trades Unions. We know this sector employs significant numbers of Polish citizens and others who reside disproportionally in poverty despite being the most economically active.

• While stagnation in local authority recruitment accompanies budget restrictions, national infrastructure projects and procurement such as Housing provision and potential forthcoming development of 50,000 new homes should be subject to an Equality Impact Assessment (EQIA) within all facets of their development to maximise potential in location, allocation, sustainability and procurement. Companies with accessible and transparent evidence of equalities training, representative workforce targets and a commitment to positive action in apprenticeship targets and employment as part of the tendering process should be given priority. Green, clean, affordable and representative, fulfilling our obligations to progressing economic, social and cultural rights in public life and decision making.

• The Scottish Government should consider as a priority the potential inherent in the devolution of further social security powers. The Nepalese community in Aberdeen, for example, have identified ‘no recourse to public funds’ as a primary variable in their mitigation of community susceptibility to in-work poverty. This is despite many being in full-time employment. They have identified that access to ‘Child Tax Credits’ for those most vulnerable would have a significantly beneficial impact. With the ability to create new benefits, and to fulfil our obligations under the United Nations Charter on the Rights of the Child, we should give serious consideration to those who currently reside in this immigration ‘grey area’ to ensure that all the children of Scotland have an equal chance in life at the earliest stage.

Scotland’s Race Equality Sector, its organisations, communities and individuals, must set itself loose from the shackles of solely focusing on ‘Racial Discrimination’ and, in addition, drive forward policy areas which directly affect our communities. The Polish and Nepalese experiences and policy responses outlined above cannot be adequately acknowledged, responded to or resolved within a simplistic framework. While closing the gaps we need to think outside the box. For example, our biggest economic lever is procurement, particularly at a time of public sector recruitment freezes, and yet we give it almost no focus from a ‘Race Equality’ perspective, despite this being the primary catalyst for employment in the coming parliamentary cycle. In this respect it is time to look outward to the bigger picture.
Notes
7. A Welcoming Scotland?
Murray Stewart Leith and Duncan Sim

With 40 to 80 million people around the world claiming Scottish ancestry, Scotland has long been a county of both inward and outward migration (MacAskill and McLeish, 2007). Outward migration has long occupied and exercised academic and political thought and has strongly influenced wider public perceptions of being Scottish. However, although migration to Scotland also has a long history, more recent patterns of migration have brought significant change to our population and great challenges to how we view ourselves. In order to understand the relationship between race, ethnicity and identity in Scotland today, it is this late 20th-early 21st-century pattern of migration we focus upon here. For, while politicians and wider public elites often celebrate the diversity of Scotland and the inclusiveness of contemporary Scottish identity (or Scottishness), such celebrations should take place within an understanding of how limited that diversity actually is and the limitations on belonging that many people in Scotland adhere to.

For the first time in some decades the trend has reversed and the overall population of Scotland has increased, with the largest contributor to this pattern being inward migration, currently running at around 13,000 per annum (Registrar-General, 2013). The three most significant groups are: ‘Other White British’, who have long seen Scotland as an attractive location in which to retire (Short and Stockdale, 1999); ‘Other White’, which includes a significant proportion of eastern Europeans, especially Poles, who were attracted to a variety of jobs in the hospitality and catering, agriculture, manufacturing or wider public sectors (Pollard et al., 2008); and the third largest group is the ‘Black’ category, which for the 2011 census was subdivided. The largest subgroup was Africans, of whom 29,000 reside in Scotland, many being asylum seekers settled in and around Glasgow, a city to which they feel a strong connection (Netto, 2011), indicating that they plan to stay.

Modern inward migration
Overall, the pattern of migration in the last fifty years has been from the West Indies and the Asian continent. South Asians often took up menial positions (Maan, 1992) and many public sector jobs were filled by direct recruitment from their homelands (Edward, 1993). Over time, many ethnic groups have moved into self-employment in greater numbers than the majority white group. The 2001 Census reported just over a three to one chance that Pakistanis are self-employed, while it is ten to one for white Scots residents.

As mentioned, more recent large-scale migration has been from Eastern Europe, and since the 1999 Asylum and Immigration Act refugees and asylum seekers have been more widely dispersed within Britain, with Scotland being an active partner in the process. In 2003, Glasgow Council housed more than 6000 refugees, with the strong support of the Scottish Government. Even in light of the increase in refugee numbers caused by the conflict in Syria, the Scottish Government rhetoric has remained much more positive than that of the UK Government.

The result of all such wider activity is a changing ethnic demographic in Scotland. Census data from 2001 and 2011 clearly illustrate this change. In 2001, 2% of Scottish residents could be classified as BME – which roughly equated to 102,000 people. By 2011 this had more than doubled to 4%, or 211,000 people. The largest increase could be recorded among ‘Black, African and Caribbean’ people, who went from being 0.2% of the population to being 0.7%.

Such numbers are not representative of the dispersion across Scottish society, however. While 4% is the all-encompassing population of Scottish ethnic minorities in 2001, Glasgow had a minority population of 12%, with both Edinburgh and Aberdeen close behind with 8%. This clearly illustrates the geographic concentration of minorities in specific locations.

Elite political rhetoric and responses
Once again, we must note that the attitude of all the major political parties in Scotland has long been inclusive. All the major parties are pro-immigration, especially the SNP majority Government, in power since 2011. Both the Scottish parliament (Sanderson, 2016), and the Scottish Affairs Committee at Westminster (Parliament, 2016) have called for a relaxation of more stringent visa regulations, especially in the area of post-study visas to aid migration into Scotland. This approach is only continuing a theme
long developed within Scottish political elite circles. The Fresh Talent Initiative of 2004–2008 was a direct attempt to increase high level migration directly into Scotland, although this programme was discontinued by the Home Office against the wishes of the Scottish Government. In a 2013 Scottish Government report, entitled ‘New Scots: Integrating refugees in Scotland’s Communities’, it was argued that all sectors of Scottish society – Universities, Trades Unions, Business, and the third sector – agree that immigration is both a must and a positive move for Scotland. Such reports only underpin that fact that Scottish elite discourse on migration remains dominantly positive, and has been since the introduction of legislative devolution sixteen years ago.

Mass attitudes towards migration, identity and belonging in Scotland

The presence of a consensus among the political elite, and a widespread rhetoric of inclusiveness and positivity is not necessarily reflected among the attitudes held within Scotland by the masses (Leith, 2006; Leith and Soule, 2012). The masses within Scotland, when questioned in surveys, tend to be both more restrictive and less welcoming than the elite.

First, the elite idea of Scottishness, or Scottish national identity, as an open and inclusive sense of belonging that can be acquired by anyone who chooses to move to Scotland and identify with Scotland, irrespective of their origins, must be challenged. Claims such as ‘Scotland has become stronger and more culturally diverse in the past twenty years’ (McCrone, 2001: 174) addressed the 1980s and 1990s, when the BME population was less than 2%, and therefore seem to be somewhat directed towards more European (or white) forms of diversity. It is certainly difficult to link such a statement to the cultural diversity one finds growing in London or parts of Yorkshire during the same period. Today, Scotland has only a limited BME population of 4%, and that, albeit larger, minority population still seems to be concentrated into certain specific urban areas, the largest being the 12% BME population found within Glasgow. Wider Scotland, especially in its small-town and rural areas, is still vastly, overwhelmingly, white.

In addition, the majority of people living in Scotland seem to have differing, sometimes contradictory, attitudes towards issues of migration and identity from their political elite – and despite some differences between England and Scotland, where clear elite rhetorical differences have emerged in recent years, the differences are not as large as one would assume. ‘Welcoming’ Scotland does exist, and is larger than ‘Welcoming’ England, but it is far from being the overwhelming majority.

A recent report from the Oxford Migration Observatory (Blinder, 2014) illustrated the more ‘tolerant political culture’ that existed in Scotland, but the figures provided within the report clearly illustrate its limitations. While England records a level of 75% supporting the reduction of immigration, this is only 58% in Scotland, and a clear difference (17%) emerges. Yet, a majority of Scots still wish to reduce migration into Scotland/the UK. Likewise, only a majority of Scottish respondents supported immigration, with 41% seeing it as a positive; but at the same time 31% saw it as a negative, and this illustrates the limitations of support for current levels of immigration into Scotland. Nonetheless, it must be noted that Scotland remains a more migrant-friendly country than England. While only 2% of England would like to see an increase in immigration, that figure in Scotland is 20%. So one in five Scottish residents would like to see more migration – vastly exceeding the proportion of their neighbours to the South.

In terms of the wider sense of belonging, and the inclusiveness of Scottishness and Scottish identity beyond the white ethnic majority, mass attitudes are also less inclusive and less welcoming than those of the political elite. For instance, the barriers to belonging posed by some individuals are not forged around race, but birthplace and accent: 68% of Scots felt that an English-born resident could not be considered Scottish; while 54% felt that any individual had to be born in Scotland to be Scottish (Leith and Soule, 2012). These points clearly related to the idea held by 48% that a non-white person with a Scottish accent could not be considered Scottish (Leith and Soule, 2012). However, such findings are offset by 71% agreeing that a person does not have to be white to be Scottish. As Leith and Soule pointed out (2012) the issue of race and belonging in Scotland is neither as clear-cut as the political elite would like it to be, nor as they express it. Recently, Scottish society and politics was placed under a stress test that many other societies have fractured as a result of, the question of separation. The political elite’s rhetoric during the recent 2014 referendum on whether Scotland should remain part of the UK, or become a separate state, saw civic nationalism projected as a main component of modern Scotland. Ethnicity, colour and race were not issues of any import during the long debate, which stretched back across two years or more. The inclusiveness of Scottish society was indicated, in a somewhat contradictory fashion, by the divisions among the
BME and migrant populations about which position to take and which side to support. Leaving aside the overall result, and the wider, long-term implications of the debate itself, there were no obvious differences between the behaviour of the white majority and that of the BME population, with both divided in almost equal proportions.

**A welcoming Scotland?**

Therefore, what conclusions can we draw for Scotland and its BME population? The mass position/response in Scotland is far more positive than in England, and this, when married to the fact that the political elite consensus is one of support for a broad, inclusive, civic-based identity with a pro-migration position, paints a positive picture overall. Yet we must ensure that the picture remains a fully informed one. The mass attitudes, despite some positives, are less inclusive and less welcoming than those of the elite. Previous patterns of behaviour are not necessarily historically encouraging either. It could easily be said that Scotland is still dealing with the ramifications of large migration patterns from a much earlier period. Sectarianism has remained a problem (Devine, 2000) for Scotland long before legislative devolution began, despite wider social movements to attempt change. For instance, Nil by Mouth was an anti-sectarian interest group set up in the 1990s (Kelly, 2003) but the problems continue two decades or more later. The Scottish Parliament has legislated on this specific issue of sectarianism around football and football supporters because the wider Scottish public see this area as the main cause of sectarianism (Hinchliffe et al., 2015).

However, sectarianism in Scotland is far from the problem it once was, and there is both the political and social will to address it (though the mass and elite attitudes may well differ on this front too). Perhaps Scotland’s concerns remain on the horizon. Firstly, it does not, despite further devolution, have political control over such issues as migration and borders. Secondly, the BME population of Scotland remains quite limited in both numbers and locale. It can be fair to say that the majority of the Scottish population has not witnessed the significant levels of migration of their neighbours to the South, and how its population would react to such figures is pure conjecture.

**References**


8. Deflections, Displacements and Disengagements
Peter Hopkins

Miles and Dunlop (1987: 199) once noted that ‘what distinguishes Scotland from England is the absence of a racialization of the political process since 1945, rather than an absence of racism per se’. So, although racism in Scotland is distinctive in some important ways, ‘in Scotland as in England there is an all too familiar catalogue of insults, assaults, damage and harm, effected through both personal racism and political extremism, undermining health, welfare and wellbeing, and contributing to the separation and segregation of social life’ (Hopkins and Smith, 2008: 105). The persistence of racism in Scotland has been highlighted by many researchers (e.g. Arshad, 2003; Bowes et al., 1990; de Lima, 2004) and government-focused reports (e.g. Kidd and Jamieson, 2011; Netto et al., 2001; Scottish Parliament, 2016), yet there remains a culture where matters of race equality are disengaged with, displaced onto other parts of Scotland or deflected onto England. I explore these processes here and argue that Scotland needs to engage with issues of race equality rather than avoiding them (Kilomba, 2013). That Scotland does not have a problem with racism could not be further from the truth.

Deflections
What is most concerning about debates on race equality in Scotland is the way that such issues are more-often-than-not redirected elsewhere. In this respect Scotland fails to take responsibility for issues of racism; instead, any concerns about racial inequality and tension are deflected across the border onto England. These deflections often draw upon problematic stereotypes about the ‘innate tolerance’ of the Scottish people that reinforce the idea that Scotland is a nation free of racial tension. What we see here is that any accusations of racism and racial inequality are quickly redirected south – rebounded, averted and resisted.

Debates about levels of ethnic diversity and segregation are often drawn upon in order to justify such deflections. The problematic assumption here is that places with more black and minority ethnic people – such as London or other cities in England – are more likely to experience racial tension. The problem with deflecting racism in this way is that it relies on the idea that less ethnically diverse places are necessarily less racist, and we know that this is not the case (de Lima, 2006). As Kilomba (2013: 109) reminds us, when black and ethnic minorities are ‘positioned as solo in arrangement resulting from segregation’, this is ‘an expression of racism’. Furthermore, such arguments overlook the fact that Glasgow has ethnic minority communities that are just as residentially segregated as many cities in England.

A second explanation for such deflections is that immigration matters are not devolved to Holyrood and instead sit with Westminster. The apparent logic here is that since Scotland does not have power over immigration, then any mistreatment of minorities is the fault of Westminster. Here, Scotland refuses to take responsibility for incidents of racial abuse and discrimination by deflecting the blame onto England. Although immigration is a reserved matter, many other policy issues that affect the lives of black and minority ethnic people, such as education, housing and social services, are devolved to the Scottish Parliament; deflecting matters of racial inequality onto England as a result of immigration matters not being devolved is itself a racist act that reinforces white supremacy and denies the Scottish population the right to engage with – and challenge – matters of racial inequality.

Displacements
Closely interrelated with the deflecting of issues of racism south of the border, there is also evidence of racism being displaced to other localities, including those south of the border but also to other places within Scotland. Here, we see people actively disconnecting and disengaging from experiences of racism as they are silenced because of Scotland’s inability to face up to the challenges of racial inequality.

One tactic employed is to argue that racism happens in other places, elsewhere – over there – rather than in all places. Although there is much evidence to demonstrate that black and minority ethnic people in Scotland experience everyday racism, the deficient way in which Scotland deals with race equality results in people disconnecting from and disarticulating experiences of racism as they are silenced because of Scotland’s inability to face up to the challenges of racial inequality. As a result of disconnecting and dislocating from matters of race equality, Scotland silences
communities, as such issues are seen to be either too sensitive or politicised to discuss or, worse still, insignificant and not worthy of attention. This general avoidance of issues of racism works to create a discursive deficit whereby people lack the vocabulary to be able to openly articulate their views about racial inequalities. The lack of attention given to race equality results in those at the sharp end of everyday racial abuse being silenced and not offered a forum through which to raise their concerns; such silencing heralds racism, keeps black and minority ethnic people in their place, and allows racial inequality to flourish (Kilomba, 2013).

**Disengagements**

Scotland has exhibited a lack of prioritisation of – and general disengagement from – issues of race equality. A new Race Equality Framework which aims to tackle racism and inequality between 2016 and 2030 was published on 21 March 2016. Whilst this is to be welcomed, Scotland's disengagement from matters of race equality is such that matters of racism remain of serious concern now as well as in the future (indeed as far ahead as 2030). Disengaging from tackling racial inequalities is evidence of racism in itself; this process of withdrawal and of abandonment needs to be challenged. As noted above, Miles and Dunlop (1987) claimed that the political process in Scotland had not been racialised to the extent that it has in England. They also pointed out that Scotland had to face up to the challenges associated with conflict between Catholics and Protestants and so matters of racism were not seen to be as important. The sense here is that Scotland has more urgent and important matters to deal with than racial equality; whether this is about funding projects connected with anti-sectarianism or poverty, matters of racism are disengaged from. This does not necessarily mean that racial equality is ignored completely; instead, it may be regarded as less urgent, not as important and less worthy of attention compared to other matters.

One way in which disengagement from racial equality manifests itself is through the issue of racist misrecognition as people belonging to different ethnic and religious minority groups are mistaken for being Muslim and experience Islamophobia as a consequence (Hopkins et al., 2015). Such experiences of misrecognition point to the homogenisation of diverse ethnic and religious groups alongside a general lack of understanding about the embodied practices and religious or other beliefs of different ethnic and religious minority groups. Furthermore, the attention given to matters of religion and belief – whilst important – may also work to marginalise experiences of racial inequality.

Disengaging from matters of racial equality at best separates and partitions off matters of racism and at worst results in a sharp withdrawal from, and abandonment of, matters of racial justice. It is time for Scotland to stand on its own feet; it should stop deflecting and displacing racism and start to engage with matters of racial equality directly.

**References**


Afterword: Race Equality and Scotland – a Runnymede Perspective on the UK

Omar Khan

Runnymede describes itself as the ‘UK’s leading race equality thinktank’, having been founded in 1968 to ‘nail the lie’ of racism. Over the years we have engaged directly and indirectly with Scotland, working most rewardingly with local partners. In addition to being a collaborator on the conference reported in this volume, we have partnered with CRER in a consultation event designed to feed the NGO response to the UK’s examination by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in Geneva later in 2016.

Reflecting on the day itself and the contributions to this volume, one clear opportunity is devolution. With devolution different administrations may develop particular policies on race equality, in a way that Westminster would not perhaps consider, and which may prove more relevant to the black and minority ethnic communities in Scotland. It is good to see Scotland developing a distinctive race equality framework, but it would be better still if other devolved administrations, and indeed the UK government, would first of all take up the learning from the nascent ‘framework’ in Edinburgh, and maybe improve on it in terms of being even more strategic, wide-ranging and underpinned by measurable targets and resource allocation.

Of course not everyone in Scotland thinks that devolution is or should be a blueprint primarily for spreading good or better practice across the UK. This suggests a second observation or perhaps opportunity: that the engaged debate on Scottish independence, and the articulation of Scotland as a country more committed to social justice, offers clear opportunities for race equality. As other contributors to this volume suggest, this promise is not yet fully realised. But it can only be a good thing if all political parties agree that race equality is a defining feature of a future Scotland – whether independent or as part of the UK – and develop policies to make that vision a reality.

For us as a UK-based race equality organisation, however, it’s obvious that Scottish independence also poses a challenge. As the attachment to ‘Britishness’ weakens in Scotland, whether or not Scotland becomes independent, one likely consequence is further affirmation of “Englishness” in the rest of the UK. Yet as the 2011 Census shows, black and minority ethnic people living in the UK (including Scotland) generally are more willing to identify as ‘British’. If it is only ‘cosmopolitan’ Londoners and BME people who ultimately identify as British, that could lead to negative outcomes, not just in terms of attitudes about who belongs, or who we (whether in Scotland, England or elsewhere) ‘really are’, but also in terms of discrimination, and continued unequal outcomes in employment.

From a Scottish perspective, this may seem like someone else’s problem, and may even underline why a nativist version of Englishness is a danger to be avoided north of the border. However, there are (at least) two reasons why all Scots, independence-minded or otherwise, should be concerned about this development.

First, they should reflect somewhat more deeply on the extent to which Scottishness has truly and fully become a multi-ethnic identity. It is undoubtedly positive to see politicians across the political spectrum, including nationalists, affirm that Scottishness is a modern identity; but doing so arguably requires deeper reflection on Scotland’s history, its relationship to England and indeed Empire, and the contribution of and opportunities for ethnic minorities living in Scotland both now and in the past. Simply affirming inclusiveness isn’t enough. And like all national identities some deeply embedded or unarticulated notions of Scottishness may require wider reflection and challenging. Nor is it just a question of history or discourse: ensuring an independent Scotland really is a successful multi-ethnic democracy will require a further strengthening of the race equality framework to address inequalities today.

Second, Scottish people – nationalist or otherwise – should not be sanguine about the inevitable insularity of Englishness compared to Scottishness (or Britishness?). Research suggests that some white and ethnic minority Scots seem to believe that life is unequivocally far worse for ethnic minorities in England, with some even adopting a version of ‘model minority’ Scots compared to the disadvantaged and pathologised situation of BME people south of the border. As the authors of the research have suggested, this account of less well-off and more segregated English ethnic minorities fits within a wider narrative of anti-Englishness that has
the capacity to significantly unite ethnic minority and white Scots. While this obviously only tells part of the story, and there’s undoubtedly been some progress in building a multi-ethnic Scotland, it’s in Scotland’s interest not just to have an outward looking neighbour, but also to support ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups in England, a country with which it shares such a long history, and where many ethnic minority Scots have studied, lived and maintained family connections, and will continue to do so.

Could Englishness therefore follow Scottishness, and indeed Britishness, in becoming a more multi-ethnic or even postnational identity? Of course Englishness can become more inclusive, and there is no shortage of past resources showing how it could be done. All identities change, and keep changing, as time and society moves on. Conscious action is required: direct challenges to preconceptions, and recognising how traditional English stories and symbols can be not just interpreted as exclusive but deliberately manipulated to serve the purposes of the far right in their mission to exclude.

This leads to a final challenge or opportunity, one that was directly addressed by Runnymede’s *Future of Multi-ethnic Britain* report (also known as the Parekh report). While most of the coverage and assessment of that report focused on the ways we suggested Britishness needed rethinking, very few noticed that we had included Scottishness, Welshness and Irishness in that reimagining. Fifteen years on from that report this reimagining is long overdue, and not just in England.

Following the hostile press reaction to the report one interpretation was that if it had focused only on its many policy recommendations (or ‘what works’) it would have been far more influential and effective. Instead the ‘vision’ chapter, with its controversial analysis of Britishness, derailed proper consideration of its otherwise reasonable prescriptions for education, employment, housing, health, citizenship and criminal justice.

It is sad but undeniable that the Labour government reacted nervously to this media response, with then-Home Secretary Jack Straw rewriting his speech to distance the government from the report’s findings the night before its launch. Yet if race equality is presently off the policy agenda, it’s not for lack of evidence about how much it’s needed, or because there haven’t been enough policy recommendations over the years on how to respond to those needs.

More likely the reason why race equality remains sidelined at present is because policymakers and the wider public have not yet engaged in a deeper reckoning with Britain’s past, much less deliberated on how to develop a positive and inclusive vision for a successful multi-ethnic country in the 21st century. That reckoning still needs to take place, whether the country in question is the UK, England, Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, and to be supported by race equality policies that will finally ensure how all of these islands’ residents can experience equal chances to succeed, regardless of race, ethnicity or indeed nationality.

**Notes**


Appendix I
Martin Hayward

United Nations Treaties
The United Nations (UN) was founded to promote worldwide cooperation and to protect human rights. Countries which are members sign treaties – agreements under international law – that set out their responsibilities to promote and safeguard the human rights of their citizens.

The UK has signed seven of these treaties, covering civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights, freedom from torture, and the rights of women, ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, and children.

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
As a signatory to CERD, the UK Government and devolved Governments have committed to promoting and protecting the human rights of ethnic minorities in the UK. These rights include the right to be free from discrimination, the right to health and the right to education.

Role of the Equality and Human Rights Commission
The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) is a National Human Rights Institution with a privileged ‘A’ status at the UN. As a National Human Rights Institution, we must monitor how well the UK is promoting and protecting the human rights set out in these treaties. We do this through sending reports to the UN that set out the human rights situation in the UK, and make recommendations to the UK and devolved Governments, such as the Scottish Parliament, on the improvements that are needed.

This work helps to ensure the UK is fulfilling its international obligations and continues to be a global leader for human rights. It also helps to strengthen protections for human rights in the UK and to highlight their importance.

The next State examination of the UK by the UN CERD Committee will take place in August 2016. The UK and devolved Governments will submit a State Report to the Committee. The EHRC will submit a Shadow Report to the Committee and is also funding an independent CERD Civil Society report led by the Runnymede Trust.

The Scottish Government will contribute to the UK State Report. The Scottish Human Rights Commission will have the opportunity to contribute to the EHRC Shadow Report, on which the two Commissions have agreed that the EHRC will lead. The Coalition for Racial Equality and Rights is leading the Scottish input to the Civil Society Report.

Civil Society Report
Through an open tender process the EHRC has commissioned the Runnymede Trust to:

- Facilitate events to build the capacity of Civil Society Organisations working on race equality issues across England, Scotland and Wales to engage with the CERD Committee treaty reporting process and to facilitate input on the key human rights concerns regarding race equality in Great Britain for these CSOs in the form of a joint Shadow Report to the CERD Committee.

- Coordinate and draft a joint CSO Shadow Report with a coalition of race equality CSOs across England, Wales and Scotland for the CERD Committee’s next examination of the UK Government.

Timelines
- 31 March 2016: Deadline for submission of the CERD Civil Society report
- First week of May 2016: EHRC informal briefing to the CERD Committee for the List of Themes
- First week of July 2016: EHRC Shadow Report submission deadline
- August 2016: State examination
Priorities for Inclusion in the EHRC Shadow Report
The proposed structure of the EHRC’s submission consists of the following thematic areas:

- Human rights framework
- Stop and search
- Hate crime
- Legal aid and access to justice
- Caste discrimination
- Media reporting and stereotyping
- Just and fair conditions at work
- Right to housing
- Right to education
- Right to health
- Representation in decision-making
- Violence against Women and Girls

Many of these issues play out differently in England, Scotland and Wales, and part of the process in which the EHRC is now engaged is to make sure that priority issues in each nation are represented appropriately within the final submission in a way which is intelligible to the UN Committee.

There are specific Scottish perspectives on these thematic areas and on related particular issues, including:

- Public Sector Equality Duty
- Human Trafficking and Exploitation
- Gypsy/Traveller Issues
- New Migrants

The UK State Report, EHRC Shadow Report, Civil Society Report and concluding observations from the State examination will all be publicly available later in 2016.
**Biographical Notes on Contributors**

**Rowena Arshad** is Head of Moray House School of Education and Co-Director of the Centre for Education for Racial Equality in Scotland (CERES). Her research focuses on equity and anti-discrimination issues and how these issues are taken forward in the spheres of education and across educational policy more broadly. She was Equal Opportunities Commissioner for Scotland from 2001 to 2008, and sat on the Scottish Further and Higher Education Funding Council from 1999 to 2009. She has been a member of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate for Education and was awarded an OBE in 2001 for services to race equality in Scotland.

**Danny Boyle** is the Parliamentary and Policy Officer with national equalities organisation BEMIS Scotland. He graduated from Glasgow University in 2007 with a degree in Theology and Religious Studies. Since then he has been the Project Manager of the Heritage Foundation Scotland (2010-2013) funded by the Dept. of Foreign Affairs IGESP (Irish Government Emigrant Support Programme), Chairperson of the Glasgow St. Patricks Festival Committee (2011 – 2013) and General Manager of ‘Independence’ an integrated creative movement company. In January 2014 he returned to BEMIS Scotland, with whom he had previously been Capacity Development and Research Officer.

**Martin Hayward** is currently Policy Manager at the Equality and Human Rights Commission in Scotland. Previously he worked for the Commission for Racial Equality in Scotland, managing the promotion and enforcement of good race equality practice in the Scottish public sector. His previous experience includes setting up and managing the Lothian and Borders Police Diversity Awareness training programme, and work for the Equalities Unit of the City of Edinburgh Council.

**Peter Hopkins** is Professor of Social Geography in the School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, UK. His research interests focus upon: geographies of race, ethnicity and religion; young people and place; and the intersections between masculinities and ethnicities. He has completed a number of research projects in Scotland about race, religion and migration and is currently leading an AHRC project about the experiences of religious and ethnic minority young people in Scotland.

**Omar Khan** is Runnymede’s Director. He sits on the Department for Work and Pensions’ Ethnic Minority Employment Stakeholder Group, is a Governor at the University of East London, and a 2012 Clore Social Leadership Fellow. Omar’s other advisory positions include: chair of Olmec; chair of the Ethnicity Strand Advisory Group to Understanding Society; chair of the Advisory Group of the Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity at the University of Manchester; Commissioner on the Financial Inclusion Commission; a member of the 2014 REF assessment; and the UK representative (2009–2013) on the European Commission’s Socio-economic network of experts. Omar completed his DPhil at the University of Oxford.

**Murray Stewart Leith** is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the University of the West of Scotland. He has lectured and researched at universities in Scotland and the US. He has published articles and books on national identity, nationalism and Scottish politics and policy. His most recent edited volume, *The Modern Scottish Diaspora*, published by Edinburgh University Press in 2014, focused on the nature and identity of the Scottish diaspora, the evolving relationship between the diaspora and Scotland, and the policy of the Scottish Government. He is currently working on a text for Manchester University Press, focusing on Scottish society, politics, policy and identity, with Duncan Sim.

**David McCrone** is Emeritus Professor of Sociology, and co-founder of the University of Edinburgh’s Institute of Governance in 1999. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, and a Fellow of the British Academy. He coordinated the research programme funded by The Leverhulme Trust on Constitutional Change and National Identity (1999–2005), and on National Identity, Citizenship and Social Inclusion (2006–2012). He was co-director of the ESRC-funded Scottish Election Study (1997), a principal investigator in the Scottish Parliamentary Election Study (1999), and has held a number of research grants over the years from ESRC, Leverhulme, Rowntree, and Nuffield.

**Nasar Meer** is Professor of Comparative Citizenship and Social Policy at Strathclyde University. He was previously a Minda de Gunzburg Fellow at Harvard University, and is currently a Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE) research fellow. He has been a member of the British Council’s Outreach Program and has worked on Race Equality, Citizenship and Identity across a number of countries.
**Gina Netto** is a Reader/Associate Professor in the School of the Built Environment, Heriot Watt University. She has a longstanding research interest in issues related to social justice and ethnic inequality. In recent years, she has studied the relationship between poverty and ethnicity; refugee experiences of navigating routes into housing and settlement; opportunities for progressing beyond low-paid work; and identity negotiation. Her most recent study is of international lessons on tackling extreme housing, which has involved case study work in eleven countries and is due to be published shortly by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. From 2002 to 2007, she served as a Commissioner with the Mental Welfare Commission and was chair of its Equality and Diversity working group.

**Duncan Sim** is an Honorary Senior Research Fellow (and formerly Reader in Sociology) at the University of the West of Scotland. His research interests lie in issues of ethnicity and identity and particularly in relation to migrants and diasporas. He has undertaken research on the Scottish diaspora in various parts of North America, in northern Europe and within the rest of the UK, as well as with migrants and diaspora visitors within Scotland itself. His work has been funded by a range of central and local government sources and various research bodies and charities. He has published widely in books and journals and he is currently working with Murray Leith on a textbook on Scotland for Manchester University Press.

**Carol Young** is Senior Policy Officer for the Coalition for Racial Equality and Rights. Carol’s remit at CRER includes research, policy work and development, and delivery of equality publications, resources and training. Her work focuses particularly on embedding equalities into organisational policy and practice from an anti-racist perspective. She is currently undertaking work to support the Scottish Government's implementation of a new race equality framework for Scotland. Her background is in cross-strand equality work within the voluntary and public sectors.
Runnymede Perspectives
Runnymede Perspectives seek to challenge conventional thinking about race in public and policy debates. Perspectives bring the latest research to a wider audience and consider how that research can contribute to a successful multi-ethnic Britain.

About the Editor
Nasar Meer is Professor of Comparative Citizenship and Social Policy at Strathclyde University. He was previously co-Director of the Centre for Civil Society and Citizenship (CCSC) at Northumbria University, as well as a Minda de Gunzberg Fellow at Harvard University. He has been a member of the British Council's Outreach Program and has worked on Race Equality, Citizenship and Identity across a number of countries.