Islamophobia
Still a challenge for us all

Edited by Farah Elahi and Omar Khan
Runnymede: Intelligence for a Multi-ethnic Britain

Runnymede is the UK’s leading independent thinktank on race equality and race relations. Through high-quality research and thought leadership, we:

- Identify barriers to race equality and good race relations;
- Provide evidence to support action for social change;
- Influence policy at all levels.

20th-anniversary report

This report marks the 20th-year anniversary of Runnymede’s 1997 report Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All. Part I represents Runnymede’s position, including 10 recommendations to address Islamophobia, Part II outlines the evidence on Islamophobia in various social domains, and Part III includes differing perspectives on how to understand Islamophobia. The latter chapters present the views of the individual chapter authors and not necessarily those of the Runnymede Trust.

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Foreword
Baroness Sayeeda Warsi

It has been 20 years since the publication of the Runnymede Trust’s report Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All and, as this report highlights, in the last two decades the phenomenon has become more complex and entrenched.

In 2011, I said that Islamophobia had passed the dinner-table test. I was speaking about those who display their bigotry overtly, but also those who do so more subtly in the most respectable of settings – middle-class dinner tables. It is this more covert form of Islamophobia, couched in intellectual arguments and espoused by think tanks, commentators and even politicians, that I have spent the last decade trying to reason with.

The rationalizing of bigotry is not new. Discrimination has always been subject to ideological and intellectual justification. Whether this is directed against women, black people, Jewish people or LGBT communities, history shows that it’s always possible to rationalize racism and couch bigotry in ‘acceptable’ arguments; this form of hatred is the most dangerous. Muslims are the latest in a long line caught in the crossfire of these so-called rational arguments. Islamophobia is Britain’s latest bigotry blind spot.

Sadly, six years on from my first keynote speech on Islamophobia, there has been little funding for work combating Islamophobia and little political will to tackle the issue. Indeed, decades on from Runnymede’s early attempts to define Islamophobia, the UK government still does not have an agreed, published definition.

To challenge Islamophobia the starting point must surely be a definition, a mechanism that leads to accountability. The Runnymede Trust’s definition is a starting point for discussion. We also need to bring together a cross-section of community organizations and individuals, parliamentarians and government, to agree a definition.

Hate crime figures for the last 12 months have been the highest since records began, and in one month alone anti-Muslim hate crime increased by 500%. The number of Islamophobic incidents recorded is at an all-time high, and all while it’s accepted that the problem is under-reported. The government’s latest Hate Crime Action Plan accepts that only 25% of actual hate crimes are reported to the police. The plan, published in 2015, made some 80 recommendations, of which many have been either not followed, such as the work with IPSO (the Independent Press Standards Organisation), or not fully implemented. We are simply skimming the surface of the problem.

Some within British Muslim communities tasked with tackling this issue have also proved disappointing, seeming to spend more energy on in-fighting than fighting the challenge of Islamophobia.

Of all the challenges to a cohesive Britain at ease with its Muslims, the hostile press environment is the most worrying. The daily poisoning of the discourse around British Muslims has intensified, and shapes our collective understanding of the challenges we face. It informs dialogue across the country, from Parliament to the local pub. The fact that as a country we have allowed this scourge of Islamophobia to grow should worry us all.

This important and timely report is an important resource for those interested in understanding and addressing Islamophobia. It offers insight into the experiences of Muslims in Britain today, who, as I highlight in my book The Enemy Within, feel they are caught in a no-win place. If they engage with politics and British institutions they are viewed as suspicious, as ‘entryists’, but if they keep themselves to themselves they are viewed as ‘separatists’, disengaged from mainstream society.

This report should be a wake-up call for politicians, civil society and public services to address Islamophobia in all its forms and its recommendations should be engaged with seriously.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the past two decades awareness of Islamophobia has increased, whether in terms of discrimination against Muslims, or in terms of public and policy discussion of it. Runnymede has produced this report, *Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all*, to gather together the evidence on Islamophobia in Britain today, and to suggest how we should respond to it.

This report is being published on the 20th anniversary of our initial report *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*, which first brought the term to public and policy prominence, in Britain and indeed beyond. This edited volume updates and extends the evidence over the past 20 years in three main sections.

Part I outlines Runnymede’s understanding of Islamophobia, Part II maps out the evidence on Islamophobia in various domains, while Part III presents different conceptions of Islamophobia. The report may be viewed as moving from chapters that fully reflect Runnymede’s corporate view in Part I, to those that reflect individual authors’ viewpoints in Part III. While this volume therefore presents Runnymede’s position on Islamophobia, we have also included a range of voices to cover the diversity of current debates.

Too many of the public debates on Islamophobia lack the nuance of the chapters in Part III, or fail to refer to the evidence we gather in Part II. Our aim in this report is to improve the accuracy and quality of public and policy debate and action in response to Islamophobia. We do not claim to cover all the issues affecting British Muslims, nor are we arguing that Islamophobia is the only challenge Muslims face. Instead, this report outlines why Islamophobia matters to everyone in 21st-century Britain, and how we all can and should respond to it.

To that end, we offer a short and long-form definition of Islamophobia. As we explain at greater length in the Introduction, we fully recognize the complexity of issues that ‘Islamophobia’ picks out, and acknowledge some limitations of the term.

The original Islamophobia report states that the term refers to three phenomena:

- Unfounded hostility towards Islam;
- Practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities;
- Exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social affairs.

We mainly agree with this broad definition. In our view, the focus should be on the second and third phenomena. To clarify the scope of how Islamophobia should be understood in a social and policy context in Britain, we offer the following definition of Islamophobia.

**Definition:** Islamophobia is anti-Muslim racism.

This is obviously a short definition. We have also developed a longer-form definition, building on the United Nations definition of racism generally.

**Longer definition:** Islamophobia is any distinction, exclusion, or restriction towards, or preference against, Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslims) that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

We have offered these definitions to forestall further confusion about the nature of Islamophobia, but also to focus policy and social change on what could best tackle Islamophobia and so improve British Muslims’ lives. The definition therefore is not simply what Runnymede thinks is the best analytical account of what Islamophobia is, but also points to our various recommendations on how to respond to it.

Reflecting on the evidence in the report, and the need to chart a better response to Islamophobia, Runnymede offers the following 10 recommendations.
Recommendations

1. The government should adopt our definition of Islamophobia as anti-Muslim racism. As with many Black and minority ethnic groups, Muslims experience disadvantage and discrimination in a wide range of institutions and environments, from schools to the labour market to prisons to violence on the street. Policies to tackle Islamophobia should be developed in line with policies to tackle racial discrimination more generally, with the focus also on the real effects on people. Islamophobia is a complex issue, but so too are all forms of prejudice and discrimination.

2. Public services but also private and charity sector employers should collect more data on Muslims and other faith/non-faith groups. Given evidence of a specific ‘Muslim penalty’ across different sectors, and the diversity of the Muslim population, using existing census group ethnicity categories cannot capture the experience of Muslims in the public and private sectors. This should be part of wider efforts of public services and employers to improve their data collection, including response rates, on ethnic monitoring. Historically, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group categories were used as proxies for Muslim; these groups currently account for just over half (55%) of British Muslims.

3. The government should reintroduce a target to reduce child poverty, and develop a wider anti-poverty strategy. Given that over half of Bangladeshi and Pakistani children live in poverty, and given that the rates of poverty among Muslims generally are much higher than the average, tackling poverty would greatly improve British Muslims’ opportunities and outcomes. Preventing poverty is especially important for children not just morally but also because it is a good preventive strategy for reducing inequalities in later life and for improving integration.

4. Following up on its strong and commendable commitment to collecting race equality data, the government should adopt a wider strategy to tackle those inequalities which particularly affect British Muslims. This should be a central plank of its integration strategy. The Race Disparity Audit has revealed inequalities across a range of outcomes, from health, housing and environment to education, employment and criminal justice. Tackling these inequalities – including but not limited to barriers to accessing English language provision – should be a priority for every government department (and local authority), and should also be linked up across government departments in a wider strategy to tackle racial inequalities at every stage of the life course.

5. Employers and employment support organizations should address barriers to equal labour market participation. Policies addressing racial discrimination within the labour market will also improve outcomes for minority faith groups. This includes: publishing pay gaps, name-blind CVs, ensuring long- and shortlists reflect the local working-age population, measuring managers’ ability to progress minorities as a key performance indicator, and accountability for outcomes not just by human resources or senior leadership but at every level of management.

6. Race equality, Muslim and other faith-led civil society groups and organizations should work more closely together to build a common platform to challenge all forms of racism and prejudice. It is not enough for people or organizations to challenge only the form of discrimination that directly affects them; anti-discrimination and equality are universal principles that must be defended even when doing so doesn’t have a direct effect on us personally. It is important to understand that different forms of racism have different attributes, whether anti-Jewish, anti-Muslim or anti-black, and that it is therefore reasonable and justifiable to understand and respond to specific forms of racism. But challenging racism requires challenging it in all its forms, and understanding anti-racism as a wider human rights and equality position entails defending other groups that experience discrimination too.

7. Local mayors and Police and Crime Commissioners should ensure appropriate resources are allocated to tackling hate crime effectively at a local level. In addition to criminal justice sanctions for the most serious hate crime offenders, the government should utilize community-based, restorative and rehabilitative interventions to tackle hate crime.

The Home Office’s 2016 Hate Crime Action Plan commits to preventing hate crime by challenging the beliefs and attitudes underpinning such crimes and to working with young people and schools. This must involve addressing the core curriculum and ensuring the history of migration is taught effectively. See www.ourmigrationstory.org.uk.
Finally, and in line with the concluding recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the government should ensure that public officials do not partake in hate speech, and that they robustly challenge hate speech and condemn any hateful ideas or policies that promote intolerance and hostility.

8. There should be a full independent and fully transparent inquiry into the government’s counter-terrorism strategy. The government should recognize its statutory equality obligations as set out in the public sector equality duty (PSED) in the implementation of all counter-terrorism policies. Counter-terrorism measures must not lead to discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, religion, descent, or national or ethnic origin, in purpose or effect.

There is substantial evidence that among the government’s four counter-terrorism strands, the current Prevent policy is discriminatory, disproportionate and counterproductive. Given the mounting evidence, the independent review must answer whether the Prevent strategy should be withdrawn and how to better separate the state’s security apparatus from wider safeguarding or social policy strategies. The government should develop funding and support Muslim and other disadvantaged communities to improve opportunities, encourage civic participation, and so provide the grounds for effective integration, but these policies should not be conceived in terms of counter-terrorism, and should not target British Muslims only.

9. Full protection of freedom of speech and the freedom of the press is consistent with tackling inaccurate and discriminatory reporting. Media regulators should intervene more proactively in cases of allegedly discriminatory reporting, and in so doing reflect the spirit of equalities legislation, as recommended by the Leveson Inquiry. Where inaccurate or misleading content is published, corrections or retractions should be given equal prominence, and not relegated to a small box in an inconspicuous position.

A press regulator should investigate the prevalence of Islamophobia, racism and hatred espoused in the press. This should focus on accuracy and discrimination, but also consider whether individual stories have wider negative effects on whole ethnic groups, and on wider social attitudes. The press and the wider media should publish data on the ethnic and class diversity of their journalists, editors and senior management, and establish targets in line with local working-age populations.

The government should establish a group of media practitioners, and representatives from the press, local authorities and race equality NGOs, to initiate new strategies to combat racial prejudice in the media and negative public perceptions of minority ethnic groups. All politicians should show greater accountability for the impact on race relations of negative media coverage and misrepresentation of minority ethnic and religious groups.

10. Tackling Islamophobia is a responsibility for all of us. There is a need for greater awareness of how Islamophobia and all forms of racism affect people’s lives in modern Britain. It is good that British Muslims increasingly challenge Islamophobia. However, to challenge and end Islamophobia and all forms of racism effectively, we all need to confront and condemn it where we see it, and commit to raising awareness in others of its wider effects. Tackling Islamophobia and all forms of racism is not only the responsibility of Muslims or ethnic minorities, but nor is it only the government or the state that must show greater responsibility in tackling it. Employers, neighbours, teachers and fellow citizens must all work to raise awareness and to act to combat racism wherever and however it appears.
PART I: UNDERSTANDING
1 Introduction: What is Islamophobia?
Farah Elahi and Omar Khan

Introduction
In November 1997 the Runnymede Trust published Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All. At the time the term ‘Islamophobia’ was relatively uncommon, but we argued that it was justified because ‘anti-Muslim prejudice [had] grown so considerably and so rapidly in recent years that a new item in the vocabulary is needed’. According to Wikipedia, Islamophobia as a term only ‘reached public policy prominence’ with the publication of Runnymede’s report.

Twenty years on, it is of great concern to Runnymede – but more importantly to British Muslims – that anti-Muslim prejudice has grown further and wider. Public and policy debate now addresses Islamophobia more directly, but not always in a productive or coherent way.

In the intervening 20 years much has changed. Three particular changes are worth highlighting in the context of this 20th-anniversary report.

The first change is that the context – domestically and, perhaps more importantly, globally – has transformed fundamentally. After 9/11 and 7/7, Muslims became a greater focus of policymakers in the UK and around the world, but framed largely in terms of terrorism or as a civilizational threat. This framing of Muslims is, of course, centuries old, but has re-emerged in new and toxic ways since we published our report two decades ago.

Of course, the terrorist threat is indeed real. Attacks in 2017 alone included those at Westminster Bridge, Manchester Arena, London Bridge, Finsbury Park and Parsons Green tube station, a frequency that inevitably increases public concern and fear, as well as requiring long-term support for the victims of these terrible attacks. For the most part the government, police, mayors, other officials and indeed victims’ families have responded sensitively to these incidents.

As this report is about Islamophobia we do not discuss these issues in much greater detail. The issue of terrorism in Britain and across the world of course deserves policy and public focus and is a significant challenge for our society. At the same time, it’s clear that the fear and threat of terrorism can be inflated by Islamophobia, and that Islamophobia can increase in the wake of terrorist attacks. One of the 2017 terrorist attacks referenced above – in Finsbury Park – was in fact an Islamophobic attack deliberately targeting British Muslims. Race hate crime figures show that Islamophobic crimes increase following a terrorist attack (Travis 2017), and there is increasing awareness – not just among political leaders and the police but among the wider public and media – that we must be more considered in reporting on terrorist attacks, and not jump to the conclusion that all incidents involving injury are necessarily acts of Islamist terrorism (or that all public decisions involving Muslims are inherently suspect).

The second change is that, compared with 20 years ago, British Muslims are a larger, better-organized and more settled community. Compared with 1997 the population has grown considerably, to nearly 3 million (from approximately 1.2 to 1.4 million), with a young median age and a large number born in Britain. Furthermore the British Muslim population, especially compared with 1997, is much more organized, with a wide range of public, private and civil society voices, ranging from the arts and media to sports and politics. As part of this growing, more socially mobile, younger and more activist community, they have also challenged Islamophobia directly.

The third key change is that we have much more data on British Muslims – their population, distribution, attitudes and outcomes, in the labour market, education, housing and health. The original Runnymede report had to rely much more on other forms of data and analysis, though even today data on British Muslims is not as comprehensive as we need. Most prominent in the 1997 report was extensive media analysis, demonstrating the extent of Islamophobia in the press. Some of the more vulgar cartoons seen then would be unlikely to be republished now, but on the other hand Islamophobic narratives are now reproduced and shared globally, and the reach of social media has amplified those voices. Perhaps most worrying is the pernicious and acceptable suspicion towards Muslims generally, with misleading or outright incorrect stories and headlines, sometimes even driven by poorly designed surveys or proactive but inaccurate investigative journalism (notably the recent case of a Muslim family adopting a Christian child; Grierson 2017).
We do not include a chapter on the media in this report, in part because we now have so much further evidence on Islamophobia and in part because such data has been analysed and published elsewhere (Baker et al. 2013, Saeed 2007). However, this should not be interpreted as Runnymede being relaxed or uncritical about the extent and nature of Islamophobia that we still see in the British (and international) press. There are not enough Muslims (or members of other ethnic minorities, or indeed non-Oxbridge graduates) working in the British press and for British broadcasters, and stories about British Muslims are still likely to cast them as exotic or aberrant, when not directly associating them with terrorism. We have made a recommendation on how the media should better respond to Islamophobia, and seek to change its culture more widely. There should be no conflict between accuracy, non-discrimination and free speech, or in ensuring violations of these important press standards are provided with an adequate and proportionate response.

The original report was different from this report in some other respects too. This report, recognizing the range of issues that need to be addressed in relation to Islamophobia, is an edited volume. This means it contains a variety of chapters with a range of voices. The first two sections are a relatively coherent whole, with the first outlining what Islamophobia is conceptually or definitionally, and the second then mapping the evidence of Islamophobia in various social domains. The third and final section of this report gathers a more divergent but incisive range of some of the most important voices and arguments about Islamophobia as they've developed since 1997.

In contrast, the 1997 report was collectively produced by a Commission, as recommended by a previous Runnymede Commission on antisemitism. Robin Richardson, then Runnymede's director, explains this background in Chapter 16, and also highlights how and why the Commission's focus was then somewhat controversial. In particular, Runnymede followed many other race equality or anti-racist organizations in studiously avoiding too much discussion of or focus on religion or faith. Religion, faith and belief were seen to raise a different set of issues from those relating to race and ethnicity, which might even have more in common with gender or sexual orientation than with religion.

These challenges have, if anything, become more complex since 1997. The New Labour government that came into power in 1997 passed legislation that extended anti-discrimination protection on grounds of religion or belief in the 2006 Equality Act and the 2006 Racial and Religious Hatred Act. These bills were not without controversy, and the relationship between race and religion, and indeed between religion and other ‘equality grounds’ (gender, disability, sexual orientation and age), remained somewhat unsettled. The creation of the Equality and Human Rights Commission in 2007 and the inclusion of religion and belief in wider ‘equality and diversity’ policies has somewhat papered over these issues.

This report – and the individual chapters – focuses on Islamophobia specifically, as a form of discrimination that affects British Muslims and those who are perceived to be Muslim. It does not offer a comprehensive account of British Muslims or Islam. Rather it offers an overview of the way in which Islamophobia affects individuals and communities in ways that are either structural or interpersonal. The purpose of the report is to put forward a definition of Islamophobia, create a resource for those working to challenge Islamophobia and discrimination in all its forms, and improve public policy and discourse on the issues affecting Muslims in Britain.

**Terminology and definition**

Islamophobia in 2017 is complex and multifaceted. In this report, we focus on the manifestations of Islamophobia that we describe as anti-Muslim discrimination or racism. There is not sufficient public understanding of the ways in which Muslim individuals and communities experience discrimination, and this should also be the focus of policymakers and anyone else seeking to, or in a position to, improve the lives of British Muslims.

It must be acknowledged that the term ‘Islamophobia’ has itself led to some confusion. On the one hand, the term ‘phobia’ suggests a mental illness or a fear, rather than effectively picking out discriminatory attitudes and behaviours. The original report was clear and explicit about the link to discrimination, prejudice and exclusion; and the term can be interpreted similarly to the way ‘homophobia’ is, or rather should be, understood as discrimination towards lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people.

More than the suffix ‘phobia’, the first part ‘Islam’ has generated greater and deeper challenges. Many have argued that Islam as a religion is a system of beliefs, and so can and should be subject to criticism. We don’t object to that formulation. At the same time, many who affirm their right to criticize
Islam as a religion don’t consider enough how Muslims do indeed face discrimination and prejudice that has real effects in their lives – from the labour market to educational outcomes to violence in the street. Runnymede believes the focus on ideas (or ‘ideologies’) has obscured what instead should be a focus on people.

Social phenomena are often defined by terms that don’t precisely correspond to those phenomena in a literal, dictionary way. Just as criticisms of ‘antisemitism’ that argue ‘Arabs are Semites too’ are pedantic distractions, so too many criticisms of Islamophobia suffer from bad-faith literalism.

In this context it is worth reminding ourselves of Runnymede’s 1997 definition. The original Islamophobia report states that the term refers to three phenomena:

• Unfounded hostility towards Islam;
• Practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities;
• Exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social affairs.

We mainly agree with this broad definition. In our view, the focus should be on the second and third phenomena. To clarify the scope of how Islamophobia should be understood in a social and policy context in Britain, we offer the following definition of Islamophobia.

**Definition: Islamophobia is anti-Muslim racism.**

This is obviously a short definition. We have also developed a longer-form definition, building on the United Nations definition of racism generally.

**Longer definition: Islamophobia is any distinction, exclusion or restriction towards, or preference against, Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslims) that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.**

We have offered these definitions to forestall further confusion about the nature of Islamophobia, but also to focus policy and social change on what could best tackle Islamophobia and so improve British Muslims’ lives. The definition therefore is not simply what Runnymede thinks is the best analytical account of what Islamophobia is, but also points to our various recommendations on how to respond to it.

We recognize that Islamophobia as a form of racial discrimination is not the only challenge facing British Muslims. There are clearly widespread bigoted and false perceptions about Islam as a faith. These feed Islamophobia as a form of discrimination, for example justifying discrimination in the labour market. Justifying discrimination or inequality by referencing the cultural practices of minority groups is a defining characteristic of all forms of prejudice and racism.

As indicated above, our longer-form definition derives from the UN definition of racism. It is perhaps necessary to explain our use of the term ‘racism’, and why we have chosen it over a possible alternative: ‘anti-Muslim hate’.

Among sociologists it is common to talk about different forms of racism, processes of ‘racialization’, and even ‘racism without races’. The notion that ‘race’ is a social construct is more familiar today and indeed widely affirmed even outside the university and across the political spectrum. Just because something is a social construct, that doesn’t mean it doesn’t drive or explain individual and group outcomes in the real world. In fact, it is sometimes argued that the relevance of race to social outcomes was first justified by Enlightenment thinkers who deliberately created an essentialized notion of race to deny the otherwise universal proposition of equal moral worth to those human beings who were enslaved and colonized by Europeans.

The UN definition above picks out the ways racism operates: not simply as an attitude or prejudice, but by denying people dignity, rights and liberties across a range of political, economic, social and cultural institutions. Referring only to ‘anti-Muslim hate’ (or even ‘anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination’) doesn’t fully capture the widespread (or structural) ways racial inequalities persist. It may also get things back to front: prejudicial attitudes about a group develop to justify the economic or political disadvantages experienced by that group.

This helps us understand how all forms of racism have contained a ‘cultural’ component. It is sometimes argued that current forms of racism are more ‘cultural’ than previous forms of racism based more on skin colour. It is understandable why far-right groups might want to assert such a defence,
especially where public understandings of racism still focus on ‘colour’: they claim only to object to the culturally illiberal or otherwise undesirable practices of certain groups, but assert that they are not otherwise ‘racist’. Yet all forms of racism have contained a cultural element, symptomatically by attributing pathological, dangerous or aberrant behaviours to groups ranging from black to Chinese to Jewish people. Nonetheless, the focus on culture as a key component of current forms of racism is useful for understanding why racism and its effects persist even as essentialist biological claims about race have become unfashionable.

A definition of Islamophobia as anti-Muslim racism clearly, then, fits with historical and academic accounts of racism.

All forms of racism are based on non-scientific accounts of ‘races’ that seek to justify the persistent and extensive disadvantages and inequalities those groups face in society. It is of course true that there is a wide range of diversity among and within British (to say nothing of international) Muslim communities. At the same time, all Muslims are vulnerable to Islamophobia as a form of racism, and responding to that continued challenge is the main focus of this report.

**Recommendations**

1. **The government should adopt our definition of Islamophobia as anti-Muslim racism.** As with many Black and minority ethnic groups, Muslims experience disadvantage and discrimination in a wide range of institutions and environments, from schools to the labour market to prisons to violence on the street. Policies to tackle Islamophobia should be developed in line with policies to tackle racial discrimination more generally, with the focus also on the real effects on people. Islamophobia is a complex issue, but so too are all forms of prejudice and discrimination.

2. **Public services but also private and charity sector employers should collect more data on Muslims and other faith/non-faith groups.**

   Given evidence of a specific ‘Muslim penalty’ across different sectors, and the diversity of the Muslim population, using existing census group ethnicity categories cannot capture the experience of Muslims in the public and private sectors. This should be part of wider efforts of public services and employers to improve data collection, including response rates, on ethnic monitoring. Historically, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group categories were used as proxies for Muslim; these groups currently account for just over half (55%) of British Muslims.

3. **The government should reintroduce a target to reduce child poverty, and develop a wider anti-poverty strategy.**

   Given that over half of Bangladeshi and Pakistani children live in poverty (DWP 2017), and given that the rates of poverty among Muslims generally are much higher than the average, tackling poverty would greatly improve British Muslims’ opportunities and outcomes. Preventing poverty is especially important for children not just morally but because it is a good preventive strategy for reducing inequalities in later life and for improving integration.

4. **Following up on its strong and commendable commitment to collecting race equality data, the government should adopt a wider strategy to tackle those inequalities which particularly affect British Muslims. This should be a central plank of its integration strategy.**

   The Race Disparity Audit has revealed inequalities across a range of outcomes, from health, housing and environment to education, employment and criminal justice. Tackling these inequalities – including but not limited to barriers to accessing English language provision – should be a priority for every government department (and local authority), and should also be linked up across government departments in a wider strategy to tackle racial inequalities at every stage of the life course.

5. **Employers and employment support organizations should address barriers to equal labour market participation.**

   Policies addressing racial discrimination within the labour market will also improve outcomes for British Muslims. This includes: publishing pay gaps, name-blind CVs, ensuring long- and shortlists reflect the local working-age population, measuring managers’ ability to progress minorities as a key performance indicator, and accountability for outcomes not just by human resources or senior leadership but at every level of management.

6. **Race equality, Muslim and other faith-led civil society groups and organizations should work more closely together to build a common platform to challenge all forms of racism and prejudice.** It is not enough for people or organizations to challenge only the form of discrimination that directly affects them; anti-discrimination and equality are universal principles that must be defended even when doing so doesn’t have a direct effect on us personally. It is important
to understand that different forms of racism have different attributes, whether anti-Jewish, anti-Muslim or anti-black, and that it is therefore reasonable and justifiable to understand and respond to specific forms of racism. But challenging racism requires challenging it in all its forms, and understanding anti-racism as a wider human rights and equality position entails defending other groups that experience discrimination too.

7. Local mayors and Police and Crime Commissioners should ensure appropriate resources are allocated to tackling hate crime effectively at a local level. In addition to criminal justice sanctions for the most serious hate crime offenders, the government should utilize community-based, restorative and rehabilitative interventions (see Walters et al. 2016) to tackle hate crime.

The Hate Crime Action Plan (Home Office 2016) commits to preventing hate crime by challenging the beliefs and attitudes underpinning such crimes and to working with young people and schools. This must involve addressing the core curriculum and ensuring the history of migration is taught effectively. See [www.ourmigrationstory.org.uk](http://www.ourmigrationstory.org.uk).

Finally, and in line with the concluding recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the government should ensure that public officials do not partake in hate speech, and that they robustly challenge hate speech and condemn any hateful ideas or policies that promote intolerance and hostility (United Nations 2016).

8. There should be a full independent inquiry into the government’s counter-terrorism strategy, which must be conducted with transparency. The government should recognize its statutory equality obligations as set out in the public sector equality duty (PSED) in the implementation of all counter-terrorism policies. Counter-terrorism measures must not lead to discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin, in purpose or effect.

There is substantial evidence that among the government’s four counter-terrorism strands, the current Prevent policy is discriminatory, disproportionate and counterproductive. Given the mounting evidence, the independent review must answer whether the Prevent strategy should be withdrawn and how to better separate the state’s security apparatus from wider safeguarding or social policy strategies. The government should develop funding and support Muslim and other disadvantaged communities to improve opportunities, encourage civic participation, and so provide the grounds for effective integration, but these policies should not be conceived in terms of counter-terrorism, and should not target British Muslims only.

9. Full protection of freedom of speech and the freedom of the press is consistent with tackling inaccurate and discriminatory reporting. Media regulators should intervene more proactively in cases of allegedly discriminatory reporting, and in so doing reflect the spirit of equalities legislation, as recommended by the Leveson Inquiry. Where inaccurate or misleading content is published, corrections or retractions should be given equal prominence, and not relegated to a small box in an inconspicuous position.

A press regulator should investigate the prevalence of Islamophobia, racism and hatred espoused in the press. This should focus on accuracy and discrimination, but also consider whether individual stories have wider, negative effects on whole ethnic groups, and on wider social attitudes. The press and the wider media should publish data on the ethnic and class diversity of their journalists, editors and senior management, and establish targets in line with local working-age populations.

The government should establish a group of media practitioners, and representatives from the press, local authorities, and race equality NGOs, to initiate new strategies to combat racial prejudice in the media and negative public perceptions of minority ethnic groups. All politicians should show greater accountability for the impact on race relations of negative media coverage and misrepresentation of minority ethnic and religious groups.

10. Tackling Islamophobia is a responsibility for all of us. There is a need for greater awareness of how Islamophobia and all forms of racism affect people’s lives in modern Britain. It is good that British Muslims increasingly challenge Islamophobia. However, to challenge and end Islamophobia and all forms of racism effectively, we all need to confront and condemn it where we see it, and commit to raising awareness in others of its wider effects. Tackling Islamophobia and all forms of racism is not only the responsibility of Muslims or ethnic minorities, but nor is it only the government or the state that must show...
greater responsibility in tackling it. Employers, neighbours, teachers and fellow citizens must all work to raise awareness and to act to combat racism wherever and however it appears.

Before summarizing the evidence and argument of this report it’s worth saying something further about the original report’s first plank of Islamophobia, namely ‘unfounded hostility towards Islam’. There is little doubt that this still exists – if anything such hostility now has a wider platform and has been developed and promoted in new, disturbing ways (see the Introduction, and the Introduction).

In the intervening years, therefore, two contradictory concerns have emerged: it is both more necessary than before to explain and outline why Islam as such is not a threat to, or in inherent conflict with, ‘the west’; and, at the same time, to allow and defend criticism of Islam (and all religions and beliefs) as a clear consequence of free speech. One reason we have chosen to focus our definition is that so much of the debate about free speech and criticism of Islam is irrelevant, or at best orthogonal, to the question of whether Muslims in Britain (and elsewhere) face discrimination – and what we in Britain should do about that discrimination.

The original report was of course concerned about this issue too. This is shown in the 1997 Commission’s distinction between open and closed views of Islam, to differentiate between legitimate criticism or disagreement and unfounded prejudice or hostility. Even 20 years ago Runnymede recognized the limitations of the term ‘Islamophobia’, and the initial report’s focus was similar to that of the current volume: to name anti-Muslim prejudice so that it can be identified and acted against.

An increasingly common argument is that Islam is a set of ideas and so there is no more a concept of Islamophobia than there is a concept of ‘Communismphobia’ or ‘Christophobia’. Proponents of this view typically argue they are being rebuked for criticism of ideas, and many further argue that the term ‘Islamophobia’ itself is dishonestly used to shut down debate. The consequence of this line of reasoning, as Claire Alexander outlines in the Introduction, is that it has become possible to hate and fear Islam without any reference to actual Muslims. The chapter traces the demonization of Muslim communities in Britain, linking the contemporary debate with the historical positioning of Muslims within the British imagination. Alexander sets out the consequences of the ‘separation of Islamophobia as ideology from Muslims themselves and, in a parallel move, the separation of anti-Muslimism from the longer and broader historical and social context of racial discrimination and racism’.

**Report summary**

Alexander’s chapter concludes Part I of our report where we outline what Islamophobia is conceptually and definitionally. Part II presents a summary of the evidence of Islamophobia in various domains, provides an account of how things have changed since 1997, shows the impact of Islamophobia on the individual and communities, and addresses a range of key policy issues. Throughout Part II we have included individual stories and perspectives on Islamophobia. We greatly appreciate the contributions of all who were willing to share their personal experiences with us. The case studies often make for difficult reading and highlight the impact of Islamophobia on Muslims or those perceived to be Muslim.

**Twenty years of progress?**

There has been a Muslim presence in the UK for hundreds of years; however, it was only after the 2001 census that hard data was available on the demography of Muslim communities. In 1991 the national census did not include any questions on religion, and its addition in the 2001 census emerged out of campaigning by Muslim organizations. In the Introduction, Serena Hussain covers the emergence of Muslims as a faith community, where previously they were viewed primarily in terms of their ethnicity. The chapter provides an overview of what we know about Muslims in Britain. Some of the key patterns covered include population size and demography, ethnicity, geographical spread, education, employment, health and housing.

When the 1997 Runnymede Islamophobia report was published there was a small emerging Muslim civil society, with limited expertise to respond adequately to the challenges identified. In the last 20 years Muslim organizations have been catalysed to change and now are significant actors within the civil society landscape, the Introduction by Chris Allen, considers the journey these groups have undertaken over two decades, how key socio-political factors have shaped and/or hindered it, and the impact of counter-terrorism policies. Allen identifies two key crucial socio-political factors that have shaped how Muslim communities are perceived and, in turn, determined how they are able to engage in public and political spaces.
The first is counter-terrorism policy, framing the Government’s thinking about Islam and Muslims, and the second is the requirement for groups to unequivocally accept and support certain government assumptions. As a result Muslim groups ‘were faced with having to be complicit and agreeable or be excluded from the discussion’. The chapter goes on to discuss the impact of top-down approaches to structuring Muslim political representation. These factors have significantly impaired the capacity of Muslim groups and organizations to address Islamophobia, something that might not have been envisaged in 1997.

Another feature of the last 20 years has been the proliferation of political mobilizations against Islam by far-right groups and ‘counter-jihad’ movements. This has extended across many European and North American countries and included campaigns against mosques and halal meat and for ‘burqa bans’. Ed Pertwee, in *The Introduction*, traces the extensive international networks that share organizational models, strategies and resources. Pertwee argues that this sphere of activity goes beyond casual prejudice or bigotry towards Muslims and is grounded in a developed political ideology, supported by complex organizational structures. The chapter provides an overview of this transnational movement, the political ideology underpinning it and its internationalization. A key aspect of the ideology is that it is premised on a vision of western crisis and conspiratorial narratives of left-wing collusion with Muslims to bring about the ‘Islamization’ of the west. It relies on the idea of Islam as a hostile ‘alien’ culture. The impact of these counter-jihad movements has been violence directed towards Muslims, while their ideas are now influencing and spreading across the West. It relies on the idea of Islam as a hostile ‘alien’ culture. The impact of these counter-jihad movements has been violence directed towards Muslims, while their ideas are now influencing and entering the mainstream, as is most visible in the US with the election of Donald Trump.

**Impact on the individual and community**

As outlined at the start of this chapter, despite widespread use of the term ‘Islamophobia’ there is very poor understanding of its impact on individuals and communities. Much of the public debate separates the phenomenon from Muslims themselves and fails to account for its practical consequences. This report includes a range of chapters mapping the impact of Islamophobia on Muslims, or those perceived to be Muslim, in some key domains.

British Muslims have some of the lowest employment rates and earnings for any group in Britain, and concurrently suffer significant economic disadvantage. Removing the barriers to economic integration must be a cornerstone of addressing inequality. *The Introduction*, by Anthony Heath and Asma Mustafa, investigates the relationship between Islamophobia and poor labour market outcomes for Muslims. The evidence covered in this chapter disentangles religious penalties from ethnic penalties, including evidence from the Social Mobility Commission and numerous field experiments. In addition to particular barriers at application and progression stages, Heath and Mustafa also cover the impact of perceptions of discrimination on potential applicants and the ‘chill factor’. We do not suggest that Islamophobia is the only driver of poor labour market outcomes for Muslim people, but it is clear that without addressing Islamophobia outcomes will not improve.

The relationship between Islamophobia and mental health is seldom addressed, despite the fact that much research has identified racism to be a focal element of ethnic inequalities in health. In *The Introduction*, James Nazroo and Laia Bécares chart the health inequalities experienced by Muslim people, and the relationship between Islamophobia as a form of racism and health. They show the harm that Islamophobia does to ethnic minority people’s health, both directly and through consequent social and economic disadvantage. A core aspect of their argument focuses on the need to address the stress associated with having a negatively racialized identity, and the importance of tackling structural inequalities.

Hate crime is one of the most obvious dimensions of Islamophobia, and over the last few years the numbers of recorded incidents has seen a sharp rise. Imran Awan and Irene Zempi, in *The Introduction*, identify patterns in Islamophobic hate crime as well as the impact on both the individual and community. On an individual level, Awan and Zempi highlight the increased vulnerability that is experienced as a result of being targeted for being (or appearing to be) Muslim, and the consequent implications for levels of confidence and self-esteem. They draw attention to mechanisms that victims use to decrease vulnerability, such as changing the way they live their lives or how they express their Muslim identity. The significant gendered element of Islamophobic hate crime often means that women’s options and life choices are particularly constrained. They also highlight how the harm associated with hate crime is not restricted to direct victims, but rather extends to all group members by impacting on notions of belonging and cohesion.

A core aspect of the state’s interaction with Muslim communities in Britain takes place through the security apparatus and counter-extremism policies.
One of the most criticized elements of this policy has been the government’s Prevent strategy – in particular since the establishment of the Prevent duty, which requires schools, universities, hospitals, local councils and prisons to prevent people being drawn in to terrorism. In the Introduction, Barbara Cohen and Waqas Tufail address the discriminatory nature and impact of the Prevent policy. This includes its breach of the public sector equality duty, the impact on free speech and the poor quality of training currently on offer. The chapter highlights the relationship between the Prevent duty and the normalization of viewing Muslims with suspicion, reflected in the substantial over-representation of Muslims among Channel referrals. The chapter authors argue that it is in the interests of all citizens to be safe from terrorism, but that ‘it is contrary to both equality and human rights law that Muslims, far more than any other group, are expected to pay for such safety at the cost of being subject to suspicion, demonization, racial stereotyping and unwarranted interference with their private lives’.

Not long after the publication of the 1997 report, Muslims and their perceived lack of integration emerged as a key area of public policy concern. Over the last 20 years numerous inquiries and reports have characterized Muslims as leading “parallel lives” and as distinctive in their behaviour and values. The Introduction by Ajmal Hussain and Nasar Meer, covers 20 years of integration policies and the positioning of Muslims as a ‘fifth column’ within them. In particular they note how the integration debate is played out with reference to Muslim ‘no-go areas’ and images of niqab-wearing women. Schools have become the frontline of managing this, through transmitting so-called ‘fundamental British values’ and the policing of transgressors. The ‘Trojan horse’ hoax symbolized the inflection of Islamophobia in the policing of Muslim mobilization. Most recently the Casey review highlighted the ‘mood in government that sees Muslims as “outsiders” who need to be brought “inside”’.

The last chapter in Part II addresses the gendered discourse in media and policy debates about Islam. The Introduction by Naaz Rashid, analyses how debates about the veil, gender violence and the ‘war on terror’ contribute to stereotypes of Muslim women: as oppressed, passive victims, symbolic of Muslim communities’ alleged failure to integrate, and increasingly as potential extremists. These stereotypes deny Muslim women (and men) agency or the ability to make the moral and social choices other groups are assumed to enjoy. While she emphasizes the importance of addressing gender-based issues affecting Muslim women, Rashid highlights the need to centre the voices of Muslim women and to tackle sexism and patriarchal practices and structures wherever they exist. Tackling gender inequality without tackling Islamophobia is not sufficient for addressing the inequalities facing Muslim women. Rashid concludes by reaffirming the need to challenge all forms of gender and racial inequality.

Different conceptions of Islamophobia

At the beginning of this chapter we set out a definition of Islamophobia as a form of racism. That definition should be taken as Runnymede’s position, and one that informs all of our recommendations.

Part III of this report is a collection of essays that raise important questions about and challenges to our definition. We recognize that definitions or accounts of Islamophobia address a variety of complex issues, and that people genuinely and reasonably disagree about how Islamophobia should be conceived. Part III recognizes this diversity of views, and aims to foster a healthy and better-informed debate about Islamophobia.

Runnymede is fortunate to be able to publish contributions from some of the most influential and insightful thinkers on Islamophobia: Tariq Modood, Shenaz Bunglawala, Kenan Malik, David Feldman and Robin Richardson. Some of the various questions that they address are: the role of group identity within an anti-essentialist struggle against Islamophobia; the focus on negative views about Islam as central to the experience of Islamophobia; the consequences of criminalizing dissenting speech; the commonalities and differences between antisemitism and Islamophobia; and the history of the original 1997 Runnymede Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia.

The authors may disagree on how precisely we should define and understand Islamophobia, but they all agree we need a better and more focused policy and public response to it.
Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all

Introduction: Islamophobia without Muslims?
The landmark 1997 Runnymede report *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All* defines Islamophobia as ‘unfounded hostility towards Islam’. It continues, ‘It also refers to the practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities, and to the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social affairs’ (Runnymede Trust 1997: 4). Islamophobia, the report notes, is a relatively new word (tracing the emergence of the term to late 1980s America, though others have traced it to the early 20th century: see Meer 2015b), but one that refers both to a longer history of hatred and suspicion of Muslims, and to a more recent intensification of this phenomenon from the 1980s onwards. Capturing ‘a new reality’ – the growth of explicitly anti-Muslim sentiment in Britain and elsewhere in the decade prior to its publication – the report seeks to hold two aspects in tension: antipathy towards Islam as a religious ideology and set of practices, and discrimination against Muslims. The latter, the report insists, is inseparable from the former, with ‘dread and hatred of Islam’ leading ‘therefore to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims’ (Runnymede Trust 1997: 2, my emphasis). Of the eight definitional distinctions between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ views that define Islamophobia, there is an equal balance between ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’, and Islamophobia and anti-Muslim prejudice are used interchangeably throughout, linking ideology and people, thought and deed, in important ways (Runnymede Trust 1997: 4).

The 20 years since the publication of the Runnymede report have seen an intensification and banalization of Islamophobic sentiment, policy and practice in Britain, alongside the increased targeting, both violent and mundane, of British Muslims. However, we might argue that one of the most dangerous sophistications in Islamophobic discourse has been the separation of Islamophobia as ideology from Muslims themselves and, in a parallel move, the separation of anti-Muslimism from the longer and broader historical and social context of racial discrimination and racism. The consequences of this are (i) to decouple Islamophobia from racism, so that (as with migration, the other, and parallel, incarnation of early 21st-century racism), it is apparently possible to hate and fear Islam without any reference to actual Muslims; (ii) to deny that anti-Muslimism is racism, because, in an update of the ‘new racist’ paradigm, it focuses on religious or cultural practices rather than inherent ethnic or racial characteristics; (iii) to separate out Muslims from other racialized minority groups, while parasitically building on long-established racist discourses and images around black and South Asian migration and settlement; (iv) to erase the differences within and between ‘Muslim’ groups, including histories, patterns of settlement, practices and politics; and (v) to deny the histories and practices of solidarity, resistance and resilience across black and Asian, Muslim and non-Muslim communities in Britain. An unintended consequence of the focus on Islamophobia, then, has been to undermine the struggle against racism against Muslims.

Islamophobia without racism?

The focus on Muslims in Britain is most usually traced to the *Satanic Verses* affair in 1989, which fractured the fragile liberal anti-racist consensus, and placed Britain’s largely South Asian Muslim communities under the spotlight. The nearly 30 years since the publication of Rushdie’s novel have seen a series of moral panics around British Muslims, first in the protests around the Gulf War in 1991; later, and most dramatically, in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the launch of the ‘war on terror’ and the ‘homegrown’ terror attacks in London in 2005; and more recently in the response to so-called ‘jihadis’ heading to Syria to fight (or marry) for Isis.

These more ‘spectacular’ moments need, however, to be placed against a longer and broader backdrop of Muslim demonization in Britain and, I would argue, cannot be understood without this historical and discursive racist hinterland. As Nasar Meer (2013) has powerfully argued, the Muslim presence in Britain has long been seen as unwelcome and problematic – a perception predating, in fact, modern ideas of biological racism and running in parallel with long historical antisemitic antecedents, which have pathologized and persecuted religious difference marked through descent, ‘race’ and ‘culture’. As the Runnymede report notes (1997: 5), whether we see this discourse as continuous, or as conveniently resurrected, this history provides
a powerful repertoire of anti-Muslim sentiment that feeds seamlessly into contemporary Islamophobic discourse, rehearsing ideas of medieval cultures, barbarism and timeless antagonism to ‘the west’. At the same time, anti-Muslim or Islamophobic discourses draw on ‘modern’ racist and Orientalist (Said 1978) discourses emerging from colonialism, decolonization and mass post-war migration, in which Muslims form one strand in a broader tapestry of racist stereotypes, images and discourses. It is important to remember, for example, that ‘Muslims’ in post-war Britain were configured as ‘coloured’, then ‘black’, then ‘Asian’, then ‘Pakistani’ and ‘Bangladeshi’ before they appeared as ‘Muslims’ (Alexander 1998, 2002) – and while the labels may have changed, the racist content of the category largely did not.

It is this racist ‘commonsense’ (Lawrence 1982) which places the ‘spectacular’ moments within a broader framework of marginalization and pathologization of ‘the Muslim community’ – what Michael Gove so memorably termed ‘the swamp’ within which extremist ‘crocodiles’ swim (Watt 2014). This has positioned ‘the Muslim community’ as homogeneous, outside of and opposed to Britishness, and understood through stereotypes of poverty and the underclass, criminality, misogyny, cultural and generational conflict, identity crisis, and the clash of civilizations. These older racial and ethnic stereotypes have been dusted down and recycled to explain everything from the 2001 ‘riots’ (Alexander 2004) to grooming, ‘gangs’, forced marriage, FGM (female genital mutilation), mythical Trojan horses (Miah 2017) and electoral misconduct. It is worth noting, for example, that explanations for the ‘Asian gang’ folk devil of the 1990s (Alexander 2000) drew on the same images of cultural dysfunction and identity crisis that demonized black youth in the 1980s (Alexander 1996), urban ‘gangs’ in the 2000s (Alexander 2008), and Muslim ‘grooming gangs’ and ‘fundamentalism’ in the 2010s.

**De )culturing Islamophobia**

The de-raceing of Islamophobia can be traced to four interlinked conceptual sleights of hand: first, the reduction of our understanding of what racism is to explicit and violent interpersonal expressions of hatred focused on narrow biological markers, stripping out its social, structural and historical context (Song 2014); second, the denial of ‘Muslim’ as a racial or ethnic category (unlike, for example, Sikhs or Jews) and a corollary denial of Muslims being victims of racism as Muslims; third, the placing of Islam as a category of choice, rather than ascription, and as therefore separate from the embodied being of its adherents (‘culture’ rather than ‘race’); and fourth, and relatedly, the over-emphasis on ‘Islamic culture’ or ‘Muslim culture’ as a foundational explanation for the slew of assumed pathologies discussed above.

Positioning Muslims/ Islam as a chosen/assumed identity seemingly ascribes an element of volition, of choice, which seemingly removes them from the status of victim. Similarly, the recourse to ‘Muslim culture’ places the focus on beliefs and practices as distinct from Muslims themselves; it is here that what Sayeeda Warsi terms the acceptability of liberal ‘dinner-table’ Islamophobia (BBC News 2011) finds its alibi. At the same time, and paradoxically, ‘culture’ assumes a collective foundation, which works to homogenize all Muslims, erasing differences in ethnicity, nationality, migrant history, legal status, socioeconomic positioning, religious practice or belief, location, gender, sexuality and so on. ‘Culture’ is lifted outside of its historical and social context, and assumed to be unchanging, anachronistic and, most usually, antagonistic to the ‘modern’ west. This is particularly apparent in the gendering of Muslim identities – e.g. in the recent discussions around ‘gangs’ and ‘grooming’, or on the hijab, marriage and English language competency. It can be seen too in the positioning of all Muslims as a ‘suspect community’ through a series of policies around securitization and ‘tackling extremism’. In Britain, there has been an institution(alization) of surveillance of Muslim groups on the streets (as in the Birmingham ‘spycam’ affair; Hussain 2014), by police, in prisons, in the immigration system, in their own homes and on the internet (on suspicion of ‘Googling while Muslim’ as my colleague Wendy Bottero evocatively described it), and, particularly worryingly, across the education system from primary schools to universities. This has particularly affected young people, who bear the brunt of this hostility, creating a climate of fear and suspicion.

This has shifted attention away from broader social and economic structures and can be seen as ‘blaming the victim’ or as exceptionalizing Muslims as a group, and as a ‘problem’. This vicious cultural(zing) circle thus works to place the blame for inequality or discrimination either on the individual’s way of life (or dress, or facial hair) or on the ‘way of life’ of the imagined group. At the same time, it offers an illusion of change and of choice – the cultural promise is that if only Muslims were more like ‘us’, then other problems of inequality, discrimination and exclusion would suddenly disappear. Islamophobia is largely understood to be a question of (their)
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‘culture’. However – and here’s the cultural catch – because questions of culture are primarily understood through the essentializing lens of ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ or ‘religion’, they are seen to be internal, immutable and, therefore, not a problem that can be solved – privileging what the Runnymede report terms ‘closed’ over ‘open’ views of Islam (1997: 5). ‘Muslim’ thus becomes a naturalized category linked to an assumed ‘mode of being’: as Paul Gilroy has previously argued about ethnicity, ‘the cultural flavour of today’s racism may mean that no mention is made of old-style biological races at all. There are of course colour-coded ways of talking about race without using the actual word’ (1993: 56). To paraphrase de Beauvoir (1953), today, it seems, ‘culture is destiny’.

**Conclusion: re-raceing Islamophobia**

Or, perhaps more accurately, Islamophobia suggests that ‘religion is destiny’ – apparently trumping and transcending ‘narrow’ appeals to ‘race’, ethnicity or nationality, while at the same time reducing the richness, textures and diversities of Muslim lives (Alexander et al. 2013) to conveniently packaged and caricatured ‘dog-whistle’ emblems of what Islam ‘is’, or has come to stand for in the dominant cultural imagination – beards and burqas, forced marriage and FGM, sharia law and jihadi outlaws. In so doing, it necessarily conjures the spectre of ‘race’ as a key signifier of religio-cultural difference – it is impossible, and indeed disingenuous, to separate either Islam from Muslims themselves, or ‘Muslims’ from the black and brown bodies who form the largest proportion of Muslims in Britain, and globally. To do so separates ‘Muslim’ bodies from the longer and broader histories of race and racism, and from the broader structures of discrimination and violence that place Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim communities as some of the most socially and economically disadvantaged and vulnerable in the UK today. At the same time, it erases the vibrant history of Muslim communities in Britain, and their role in shaping contemporary British cities, culture and society – from the contribution of Muslim lascars in imperial trade and two world wars to the multi-billion pound ‘Indian’ restaurant trade and the celebration of ‘chicken tikka masala’ as Britain’s national dish (Alexander et al. 2016). It ignores too the broader political solidarities across racial, ethnic and religious differences – from the Asian and African anti-colonial and independence movements of the early to mid-20th century through the Asian Youth Movements of the 1970s and 1980s (Ramamurthy 2013) and the embracing of ‘political blackness’ (Alexander 2002), to the contemporary anti-war and anti-racist campaigns, and the shaping of popular culture from Asian Dub Foundation and Fun-Da-Mental to Riz Ahmed and even Zayn Malik (Kim 2015).

This is not to deny the historical and contemporary specificities and contours of Islamophobic discourse, nor to deny the impact of Islamophobic rhetoric, policy and practice on the lives of British Muslims: quite the opposite. It is, however, to caution against what Meer (2015b) refers to as ‘making a fetish out of words’ and to consider the dangers of focusing too much on the borders of what Islamophobia is rather than what it does – as a form of, and alibi for, contemporary ‘race-making’ (Meer 2015b). Racism has always proven itself to be a multifaceted and malleable force of discrimination, as a form both of categorization and of persecution – what John Solomos and Les Back have termed a ‘scavenger ideology’ (1996). Contemporary Islamophobia builds on, feeds off, transforms and adds to a store of racial, ethnic and religious stereotypes – a ragbag of racist ideas, policies and practices selected according to convenience and wielded against a particularly (if not uniquely) visible and vulnerable community. Nevertheless, it is crucial that we recognize that Islamophobia is not simply ‘a Muslim problem’, that it implicates and affects everyone, and that, importantly, we must build alliances across other minoritized and discriminated people and groups, and all people of good will, to stand against racism in all of its forms. Islamophobia remains, 20 years on, ‘a challenge for us all’.

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PART II: MAPPING
3 British Muslims: An overview
Serena Hussain

Introduction
There has been a Muslim presence in Britain for hundreds of years (Ansari 2004). However, it was not until the 1960s that visible Muslim settlements occurred. As a result of labour shortages after the second world war, citizens of the British Commonwealth, many of whom were Muslim, were recruited to take up work in the United Kingdom. Unsurprisingly, because of the availability of work in the industrial sectors, migrants headed for some of the main industrial centres and communities began to emerge in areas such as Greater London, the South East, West Midlands, West Yorkshire and Lancashire in England; central Clydeside in Scotland; the ports of South Wales; and Northern Ireland’s capital, Belfast (Hussain 2008).

Once the labour shortage was taken care of, the British government introduced legislation to end large-scale migration. However, families of workers were still permitted to join them, and did so until the 1970s. In addition to those from South Asia, who were primarily economic migrants, a different type of migration phenomenon occurred from the 1970s onwards. Those coming from the Middle East to Britain appeared to have a much more diverse profile, originating from various national and social backgrounds. Arabs who had taken advantage of their financial gain from the oil crisis of 1973–1974 invested in property and businesses. In addition, as political unrest increased in the region, professionals from the Middle East took up employment in Britain (Jalili 2004).

The number of refugees from Muslim lands began to grow as a result of ethno-religious and communal conflicts, famines, and natural disasters in a number of locations. This included refugees from Somalia and East Africa, as well as the Middle East; however, from the 1990s onwards, there began a much more apparent arrival of asylum-seeking communities in the form of European Muslims from Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as Kurds and Afghans. Despite this, as will be discussed below, the majority of British Muslim have their origins in South Asia as a result of the British colonial legacy.

Becoming a faith community
Until the 1980s British Muslims were viewed primarily in terms of their ethnicity and countries of origin, rather than as members of a collective faith group. In part this was due to an overall perceived decrease in the importance of religion in Britain. Weller (2004: 5) argued that, in keeping with the secularization thesis, there was an assumption that religion would overwhelmingly be removed from the public into the private sphere for all Britons, including any newcomers. However, as non-European-origin communities became more established in Britain, the emphasis on religious practice did not decrease. A well-known study conducted by Modood and colleagues using the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (Modood et al. 1997: 356) demonstrated clearly that when compared with the sample of White British 16–34-year-olds – among whom only 5% felt that religion was ‘very important’ in how they lived their lives - nearly 20% of Caribbean-origin and around 35% of South-Asian-origin respondents in the same age group reported it being so.

For some groups the separation of religion from the public domain was particularly problematic, especially those for whom regular practice throughout the day, such as the five prayers, was a requirement. Modood et al. wrote, ‘Religion is perhaps the key area where the minority groups manifest a cultural dynamic which is at least partly at odds with native British trends’ (1997: 356). Authors such as Yousif (2000) and Merry (2004) discussed how minority groups would often have to repackage their faith practice as part of ‘cultural preservation’ in order to access public resources and support for faith-based activities (Merry 2004: 127).

There was a growing body of evidence from the early 1990s that not only supported Modood’s findings but suggested that religiosity and religious identification was becoming more salient than ethnic identity among second- and subsequent-generation Muslims (Hutnik 1985, Ballard 1994, Saeed et al. 1999). A popular explanation for the apparent lack of religious acculturation was that Muslim communities in Britain were feeling more marginalized than other groups (Ballard 1994). Globally, developments such as communal tensions in South Asia, as well as the genocide of Muslims in the former Yugoslavia, highlighted persecution based on faith affiliation. In
Britain itself many Muslims felt unsupported in their reaction to Salman Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses* and faced a backlash from those who they felt prioritized freedom of speech above respect for minorities (Khan 2000).

In addition, data collected for the 1991 National Census of Population for England and Wales found that Pakistani and Bangladeshi (Muslim-majority) groups were demonstrating higher levels of disadvantage across a number of measures. Such findings increased frustrations over inadequate service provision for Muslims living in Britain. The Muslim Council of Great Britain, established as an umbrella body for mosques and other Islamic organizations, began lobbying for greater religious-group monitoring. In 1997, the Runnymede Trust published findings which supported much of what was suspected among grassroots communities: that Britain’s Muslim groups faced discrimination on the basis of their faith, and that global events were affecting the way Muslims were being perceived. The report – *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All* – was one of the first publications to highlight how the way Muslims were both perceiving themselves and being perceived had moved beyond simply ethnicity and racism.

The availability of ‘hard facts’ on Muslims was argued by the Muslim Council of Britain as an important step in recognizing the needs of this faith group in a more meaningful way. Active campaigning took place for the inclusion in government surveys of an official category for religious minorities, as many Muslims continued to be hidden among ethnic and country-of-birth categories. Britons of Turkish descent, for example, ticked ‘White’ when presented with no specific category of their own. It was therefore impossible to know how many Muslims there were in Britain using ethnicity data alone, or what their needs as a faith group were.

The campaign for comprehensive countrywide data was an example of how Muslims emerged as political group of actors, pushing their concerns onto policy and research agendas. In 2001, for the first time, demographic data on Muslims across the length and breadth of Britain became available. This information was seen as an imperative tool in both understanding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All people</td>
<td>52,041,912</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>56,075,912</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>+4,034,000</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>37,338,486</td>
<td>71.75</td>
<td>33,243,175</td>
<td>59.28</td>
<td>−4,095,311</td>
<td>−12.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>144,453</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>247,743</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>+103,290</td>
<td>+0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>552,418</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>816,633</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>+264,215</td>
<td>+0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>259,928</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>263,346</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>+3,418</td>
<td>−0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>1,546,625</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>2,706,066</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>+1,159,441</td>
<td>+1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>329,356</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>423,158</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>+93,802</td>
<td>+0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religions</td>
<td>150,721</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>240,530</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>+89,809</td>
<td>+0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>7,709,267</td>
<td>14.81</td>
<td>14,097,229</td>
<td>25.14</td>
<td>+6,387,962</td>
<td>+10.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion not stated</td>
<td>4,010,658</td>
<td>7.71</td>
<td>4,038,032</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>+27,374</td>
<td>−0.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and countering discrimination and disadvantage (Hussain 2008).

Understanding the Muslim profile

In 2001 and 2011 the National Census for Population collected data on religious minorities. The remainder of the chapter will provide an overview of what we now know about Muslims in Britain based on the availability of comprehensive statistics on faith groups.

The 2001 census found there to be just over 1.5 million Muslims in England and Wales. As demonstrated by Table 3.1, 77% of people in England and Wales reported belonging to a religion. The largest faith group was Christian, at 72% of the total population. This was followed by Muslims, who comprised just under 3% of the population, and Hindus (1%), with all other groups making up less than 1%. Those with no religion made up 15% of the population.

By 2011 the Muslim population increased to 2,706,066, forming 4.8% of the total population of England and Wales. There were increases for all the minority faith groups, not only Muslims; however, there were examples of how the British press inflated the impact of the increase through alarmist commentary. Yet as Hussain and Sherif (2014) explain, the increase was in keeping with expected population growth due to the young demographic profile of minority groups, and Muslims in particular.

The increase in the number of Muslims significantly influenced by their younger demographic profile compared with the national population as a whole: 33% of Muslims are aged 15 or under compared with 19% of the total population. This is a consequence of the age at which most people migrate from one country to another; as discussed above, the majority of Muslims who migrated to Britain entered the country as labourers – overwhelmingly they were young men, who later brought their wives and children to join them. Although the earliest migrants have now reached retirement age (4% of Muslims compared with 16% of the population as a whole), births among Muslims continue to outnumber deaths, and as a result the population has increased rather than declined (Simpson 2013).

Ethnicity and country of birth

Today almost 50% of British Muslims are born in the UK, as was the case in 2001. In terms of other regions of birth, 28.5% of British Muslims were born in South Asia, 6.5% in the Middle East, 6% in other European countries and 10% in Africa. The ethnic profile of British Muslims is therefore one of the most diverse in Europe. Table 3.2 shows both the proportion of each ethnic group who are Muslim, and the share of British Muslims who belong to the various ethnic categories. Of the total White British population only 0.17% are Muslims. However, approximately 2.9% of British Muslims are White British. The majority of British Arabs (77%), British Pakistanis (91.5%) and British Bangladeshis (90%) are Muslim. Pakistanis make up the largest share of British Muslims (38%), followed by Bangladeshis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of ethnic group who are Muslim</th>
<th>Percentage of Muslims who belong to ethnic group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Irish</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Gypsy or Irish Traveller</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other White</td>
<td>5.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed/multiple ethnic group</td>
<td>8.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>13.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>91.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>89.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>23.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>20.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Black</td>
<td>20.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>77.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other ethnic group</td>
<td>33.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(15%), Africans (7.7%), Indians (7.3%), Other Asians (7%) and then Arabs (6%). The South Asian heritage groups therefore remain the most dominant in terms of regional origin, but their share in the whole Muslim population has declined since 2001, from 67.8% to 60.2%. The Arab category was added in 2011 and therefore comparisons between censuses for this group are not possible.

**Geography**

Muslims are one of the most diverse faith groups in the UK, reflecting the countries of origin and migration types described above. However, there are some key similarities which will be discussed. A common feature among Muslims is that they remain an overwhelmingly urban population (Mercia Group 2006). Table 3.3 shows the local authorities with the highest numbers and proportions of Muslims in England and Wales.

The areas listed in Table 3.3 have a long-established Muslim presence. However, Muslim communities can now be found across the entire country; and although in 2001 the Isle of Scilly was the only local authority to report no usual Muslim residents, in 2011 this was no longer the case.

Of all Muslims in England, 25% live in Inner London, and 22% in Outer London; 10% live in Greater Manchester, 15% in the West Midlands and 11% in West Yorkshire. The census data provides insight into the ethnic diversity of Muslims in such areas. For Muslims, London is the most ethnically diverse city. Bangladeshis are the largest group among Muslims in Inner London. Outer London, however, demonstrates proportionately more Pakistanis, who make up around a third of the Muslim population here, with only 8% of Muslims being Bangladeshi. The figures for White, Other White and Black African in Outer London remain similar to their respective figures for Inner London.

Nearly 60% of the Muslims in Greater Manchester are Pakistani. This is followed by 15% who are Bangladeshi. The third-largest Muslim ethnic group here is Indian, at 11%, and all other Muslim ethnic categories each make up 5% or less. There is a similar Muslim ethnic makeup in the West Midlands, where the majority of Muslims are Pakistani (nearly 70%), followed by Bangladeshis (14%). Comparatively, there is a much smaller Muslim Indian population in this area, at 5%, and all other ethnic categories each constitute 5% of Muslims or less for this region also.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local authority</th>
<th>Number of Muslims</th>
<th>Local authority</th>
<th>Muslims as a percentage of the population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>234,411</td>
<td>Tower Hamlets</td>
<td>34.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>129,041</td>
<td>Newham</td>
<td>31.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newham</td>
<td>98,456</td>
<td>Blackburn with Darwen</td>
<td>27.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower Hamlets</td>
<td>87,696</td>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>24.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>79,496</td>
<td>Luton</td>
<td>24.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redbridge</td>
<td>64,999</td>
<td>Redbridge</td>
<td>23.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>61,440</td>
<td>Slough</td>
<td>23.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirklees</td>
<td>61,280</td>
<td>Waltham Forest</td>
<td>21.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brent</td>
<td>58,036</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>21.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waltham Forest</td>
<td>56,541</td>
<td>Brent</td>
<td>18.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ealing</td>
<td>53,198</td>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>18.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enfield</td>
<td>52,141</td>
<td>Westminster</td>
<td>18.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luton</td>
<td>49,991</td>
<td>Oldham</td>
<td>17.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td>42,801</td>
<td>Pendle</td>
<td>17.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeds</td>
<td>40,772</td>
<td>Enfield</td>
<td>16.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westminster</td>
<td>40,073</td>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>15.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldham</td>
<td>39,879</td>
<td>Ealing</td>
<td>15.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn with Darwen</td>
<td>39,817</td>
<td>Kirklees</td>
<td>14.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnet</td>
<td>36,744</td>
<td>Haringey</td>
<td>14.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Three-quarters of Muslims in West Yorkshire are Pakistani, compared with only 5% Bangladeshi and 10% Indian. Indian Muslims have high concentrations in Leicestershire and Lancashire. There were no counties in which Africans were reported to constitute the highest percentage among Muslims, but Merseyside came close. Here 17% of the Muslim community, the largest proportion, reported belonging to the White ethnic category, and 14% were Black African.

What the data shows most significantly is that apart from the counties with the largest percentages of Muslims (as detailed above), the ethnic makeup of Muslims in other areas is diverse and by no means evenly distributed.

**Education and employment**

Both censuses confirmed that Muslims demonstrate a more disadvantaged profile than other minority faith groups. This had been suspected among Muslim advocacy organizations and academics working on ethnic minorities, based on outcomes for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Some of the key areas in which this became apparent were education, employment and housing.

Hussain (2008) described how Muslims were more likely to leave school at the age of 16 with no qualifications compared with all other religious groups (see Table 3.4). For those aged 16–24, 22% of Muslims reported having no qualifications, compared with 16% nationally. Yet conversely, Muslims were found to be more likely to go on to further and higher education – 52% had done so, compared with 41% of the population as a whole.

However, between 2001 and 2011 the proportion of Muslims aged 16–24 without qualifications nearly halved to 11.5%, almost reaching the national figure of 11%.

Although the percentage of Muslims with degrees and higher degrees is greater than the national average, just over 15% compared with just under 14% respectively, concerns regarding the rate of social mobility in other areas, such as employment outcomes, have been highlighted by several studies, including a recent report by the Social Mobility Commission (2017).

A breakdown of figures on economic activity provides an indication of disparity between groups. Nationally, 58% of those aged 16 and over are employed compared with 46% of Muslims. Looking at the youngest age cohort, 16 to 24, only 29% of Muslims are in employment compared with nearly 51% of all people within the same age bracket. In part this can be accounted for by a higher proportion of Muslims in full-time education, but this does not explain the divergence in trends. Comparing figures for economic inactivity provides a clearer picture. For all people aged 16 and above 36% reported being economically inactive compared with 45% of Muslims. This figure is more stark for those aged 16 to 24: in this age group 36% of all males are economically inactive compared with 52% of Muslim males, and 39% of all females compared with 60% of Muslim females (see Table 3.5).

The relatively large number of Muslims in the Indian ethnic category has allowed comparison with the non-Muslim Indian population. A research study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.4: Qualification by religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No qualifications, 16–24 year olds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.5: Economic activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All people 16 and over</th>
<th>Muslim 16 and over</th>
<th>All people 16–24</th>
<th>Muslims 16–24</th>
<th>All males 16–24</th>
<th>All females 16–24</th>
<th>Muslim males 16–24</th>
<th>Muslim females 16–24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economically active</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In employment</td>
<td>63.34</td>
<td>55.20</td>
<td>62.68</td>
<td>44.17</td>
<td>64.22</td>
<td>61.11</td>
<td>47.84</td>
<td>40.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>58.64</td>
<td>45.90</td>
<td>50.74</td>
<td>28.76</td>
<td>50.48</td>
<td>51.01</td>
<td>30.73</td>
<td>26.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>47.39</td>
<td>32.84</td>
<td>35.83</td>
<td>17.72</td>
<td>36.27</td>
<td>35.38</td>
<td>18.09</td>
<td>17.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time students</td>
<td>8.89</td>
<td>9.44</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployed</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>11.94</td>
<td>15.41</td>
<td>13.74</td>
<td>10.10</td>
<td>17.11</td>
<td>13.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed (excluding full-time students)</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>7.21</td>
<td>7.55</td>
<td>8.03</td>
<td>9.31</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>9.14</td>
<td>6.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time students</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>7.38</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>7.97</td>
<td>6.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economically inactive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>36.66</td>
<td>44.80</td>
<td>37.32</td>
<td>55.83</td>
<td>35.78</td>
<td>38.89</td>
<td>52.16</td>
<td>59.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically inactive: Student (including full-time students)</td>
<td>21.35</td>
<td>5.80</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking after home or family</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>13.27</td>
<td>30.73</td>
<td>45.21</td>
<td>31.69</td>
<td>29.75</td>
<td>46.67</td>
<td>43.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term sick or disabled</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>13.68</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>9.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically inactive Other</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all

commissioned by the Department for Work and Pensions found that geographical areas with higher concentrations of Indian Muslims demonstrate lower economic activity compared with the Indian average. Despite consisting of only 13% of the British Indian population, Indian Muslims made up approximately 90% of Blackburn East and Batley, the two neighbourhoods which had the lowest economic activity rates in relation to the Indian average (Simpson et al. 2006). The study concludes that ‘it is difficult to unravel consequences and causes here. Further research on cultural and religious aspects is also required, including on the ways in which workplaces take into account people’s religious needs’ (Simpson et al. 2006: 15).

Muslim women in all age brackets are less likely to be economically active not only than their male counterparts, but also than women from all other faith groups. When the figures are broken down by ethnicity, 37% of Pakistani, 37% of Bangladeshi and 35% of Arab women are economically active compared with 62% of Indian women and 57% of women nationally.

Studies have highlighted that Muslim women are more likely to report looking after the family and home, and the census figures, both in 2001 and 2011, confirm this. Even within the youngest cohort, Muslim females are twice as likely to remain at home to look after their families, with 10% of 16–24-year-olds reporting this to be the case, compared with 5% of all females in the same age range.

Exploring the type of employment classifications Muslims are concentrated in, compared with the population as a whole, also provides an insight into the social class structures for this faith group: 6% of Muslims, compared with 10% of the national population, are found in higher managerial occupations; 5% of Muslims, compared with 7% of all people, are in higher professional occupations; 2.5% of Muslims are long-term unemployed compared with 1.6% of all people; and 18% are full-time students compared with 8% of all people aged 16 and above.

**Housing and health**

In some respects the housing profile of Muslims is one of the key ways in which they differ by ethnicity. Of all households in England and Wales, 31% reported owning their homes outright, while 33.5% were homeowners with a mortgage. In comparison, just under 15% of Muslims own their homes outright, and 28% reported owning their homes with a mortgage. When it comes to living in social rented housing, 11.5% of Muslims compared with 8% of all households reported this tenure type.

This appears to show that Muslims are less likely to own their homes compared with the population as a whole and more likely to live in social rented accommodation. However, this is not representative of all Muslims groups and although Pakistanis are still less likely to own their homes outright compared with the national figure, at 23%, they are more likely to own their homes with a mortgage, with 40.5% doing so. When combining the overall figures for ownership, Pakistanis are on par with the population as a whole. However, only 9% of Bangladeshis report outright ownership, and 34.5% do so with a mortgage or loan. Furthermore, Pakistanis are less likely to live in social housing (7%) than both the population as a whole (9%) and Bangladeshis (19%).

Despite the differences in tenure types, Muslims do demonstrate a higher propensity to live in the most deprived neighbourhoods, are most likely to live in overcrowded housing (42% compared with the 12% national average) and score highly on indicators used for measuring poverty, such as living in households without central heating. Hussain and Sherif (2014: 442) explain how ‘higher rates of economic inactivity found amongst this faith category impact on family income and this, coupled with larger family sizes, means that [Muslims] are at a greater risk of poverty’. A recent Social Mobility Commission report (2017) described how almost half of Muslim households lived within the 10% most deprived locations in England, based on classifications used by the Index of Multiple Deprivation. Although all ethnic minority groups are more likely to live in deprived neighbourhoods, analysis by Heath and Li (2015) found that Muslims demonstrated the highest propensity to do so. The impact of poverty, disadvantage and higher levels of economic inactivity, together with growing evidence of anti-Muslim discrimination, have been explored by a number of studies since the initial statistics on Muslims were released more than 15 years ago.

**Explaining the outcomes**

More than two decades ago, Muslim advocacy organizations were calling for large-scale data on faith groups in order to provide hard facts on the disadvantage and discrimination faced by British Muslims. Yet despite the evidence provided by such data, Muslims remain as marginalized in Britain today. There are some obvious differences found among Muslims when looking at the data. A larger proportion
of this faith group are in full-time education compared with the national figure, yet a higher percentage of Muslims are unemployed. In addition, Muslims are more likely to be economically inactive, and of those who are in employment, lower percentages are found within the highest employment classes. A significantly higher proportion of Muslim women reported looking after the home compared with women of all other faith categories, and this is even the case among the youngest age group.

In the last 20 years, global events have mainstreamed the politicization of ordinary Muslims, as described by Meer and Modood (2009). This has led to a normalization of Islamophobic discourse and has cemented Muslims’ position as the ‘ultimate Other’ (Archer 2001). When exploring data on attitudes, Storm et al. (2017) reported that Muslims are on the whole viewed with more hostility than all other groups, by all other groups.

This no doubt has serious implications for an entire generation of British Muslims, who despite higher rates of participation in post-16 education, continue to face multiple barriers to employment and social mobility. Such findings have led scholars to explore whether Muslims experience something known as a ‘religious penalty’ (Cheung 2013, Khattab and Modood 2015, Storm et al. 2017). Discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, analysis tells us that regardless of qualifications, Muslims are still more likely to be unemployed than other minority groups, as is the case for those from Black African and Caribbean ethnic backgrounds. Analysis has also demonstrated that regardless of qualifications and language proficiency, Muslim women are more likely to face challenges in the labour market. Therefore, the most measurable disadvantage of all in terms of employment outcomes can be said to be faced by Muslim women and Muslims who are black.

We know that successful integration into the labour market is paramount for the social mobility of minority groups (Heath and Li 2015); the consequences of economic mobility for better housing and residing in more desirable neighbourhoods, as well as for more positive health outcomes, are well documented. The mounting research on the lack of social mobility of British Muslims, despite better educational outcomes, led the Social Mobility Commission to conclude that young Muslims are being ‘hampered by discrimination’. The lead researcher for the study stated that, ‘Muslims are excluded, discriminated against, or failed at all stages of their transition from education to employment. Taken together, these contributing factors have profound implications’
Introduction
Economic integration is vital in reducing barriers to employment, poverty levels and inequality in the labour market. Equality of opportunity, employability, unemployment rates, earnings levels and occupational positions are all highly relevant to and impact on household poverty levels, social mobility and occupational under-representation (Reynolds and Birdwell 2015).

British Muslims suffer from some of the lowest employment rates and earnings of any group in Britain. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) highlights a clear occupational disparity between British Muslims and the national average. Take for example the finding that 10% of the British population are in ‘higher managerial, administrative and professional’ occupations yet only 6% of British Muslims fall into this category. Over 50% of British Muslims experience household poverty, compared with the national average of 18% (Heath and Li 2015). This is after adjusting for factors such as age, generation since migration, marital status, region of residence and educational level (see Figure 4.1).

Our key question, then, is whether Islamophobia can in whole or part explain these Muslim disadvantages.

Religious penalties
Scholars interested in explaining the disadvantages experienced by Muslim groups in Britain such as those of Pakistani or Bangladeshi background initially focused on ‘ethnic penalties’ in order to explain these disparities between ethnic groups (Heath and McMahon 1997, Cheung and Heath 2007). The remaining gaps between the minority group and a majority, after adjusting for age and educational qualifications, are termed ethnic penalties. However, at the turn of the millennium academics realized that ethnic group status was not sufficiently explaining the gaps, because empirically they were not separating between religion and ethnicity, which are highly correlated. They then turned their attention to disentangling religious from ethnic penalties.

Figure 4.1: Overall poverty rate by religious affiliation in the UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
<th>Percentage Experiencing Household Poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 ‘Ethnic penalty’ measures the difference between ethnic minority group (e.g. Pakistani) and majority group (e.g. white) on a given topic (such as unemployment or employment rates) after taking account of a range of variables such as gender, age, generation, education and so on.
Analyses of various data sources since then have proceeded to highlight the relevance of religious penalties in the labour market (Heath and Martin 2012, Cheung 2013, Khattab and Johnston 2013). Khattab and Modood (2015) analysed unemployment data from 2002 to 2013, split into 14 different ethno-religious groups. They highlight that the six groups with the highest rates of unemployment among both men and women are Muslims and black people, with black Muslims experiencing the highest rate of unemployment (for both men and women) (see Figure 4.2).

Though survey data is useful in emphasizing the disparity between groups, it does not usually explain where this disparity is rooted. A number of possible explanations have been suggested for the clear employment gap between Muslims and other groups. We will briefly touch upon other partial explanations before focusing on Islamophobia and discrimination in the labour market as the crux of this chapter. One explanation is that of human capital: given that most first-generation British Muslims arrived as migrants with lower socioeconomic class background compared with the wider population, the difference in education and human capital could account for differences in labour market outcomes (Connor and Koenig 2015). A second partial explanation is the role of social networks: if certain groups of people have weaker ‘bridging’ social capital in the form of links and connections with economically advantaged sections of society, this can negatively affect levels of knowledge about employment opportunities and where to search for jobs, support to obtain certain employability skills, and mentoring opportunities to enter higher-status jobs (Granovetter 1973, Cheung 2013, Damstra and Tillie 2016).

**Discrimination**

Using European Social Survey data, Connor and Koenig (2015) underline that human capital and migration play a partial role in explaining labour market disadvantages, but that Muslims may also be suffering from potential discrimination given the fact that disadvantage extends to the second (non-migrant) generation and not just to the first (migrant) generation. Discrimination could play a part at the point of recruitment through the deselection of candidates with ‘foreign-sounding’ names or whose residential address is in an area with a high level of minority ethnic and religious concentration. At interview stage, candidates could be rejected because they are visibly Muslim because of religious attire or grooming, for example. Yet these early stages of discrimination do not account for all labour market discrimination: we must also consider employees who are refused promotion within organizations due to their ethnic and religious identity, and employees who are actively marginalized in the workplace due to such discrimination.

**Figure 4.2: Unemployment rate by ethno-religious background and gender of the economically active (economically inactive people excluded)**
Qualitative research exploring discrimination in the labour market has found that discrimination in the workplace means educated Muslim women in particular are not able to achieve what they should in the labour market. Researchers argue that British Muslim women are not achieving the ‘return on education’ that they anticipate (Social Mobility Commission 2016). Another study by the Social Mobility Commission (2017) focused specifically on social mobility for young Muslims. The researchers conducted in-depth focus groups and interviews exploring young Muslims’ perceptions and experiences of education and searching for jobs. The analysis of data underlined the experience of discrimination in the job application process, especially when applicants had names that identified them as members of an ethnic or religious minority, or wore a headscarf. The interviews also highlighted that in-work cultural insensitivity, stereotyping and indirect racism were common.

Chapter five of the House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee report Employment Opportunities for Muslims in the UK (2016) discussed tackling workplace discrimination. It explores community evidence for the existence of anti-Muslim discrimination in the labour market, weighing most heavily on Muslim women. The experiences documented from witnesses in that report are also similar to witness testimonials found five years previously in the report by the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Race and Community (2012). The latter report focused specifically on Pakistani, Bangladeshi and black women, yet the analysis underlined the discrimination experienced by ethnic and religious minority women at every stage of recruitment procedures.

The most rigorous way in which to establish the occurrence of discrimination is to conduct a field experiment. In field experiments on discrimination, what the investigators do is to send matched applications from fictitious applicants for actual, real-life job vacancies. The CVs of the two fictitious applications indicate that the applicants have identical work-relevant skills and experience. A large number of these paired applications are sent out to a selection of randomly chosen vacancies and the researchers then compare the respective positive callback rates (for example, invitations to an interview) for applicants with ‘British names’ and those with ‘minority names’. A higher callback rate for fictitious applications with ‘British names’ than for matched applicants with ‘minority names’ is pretty conclusive evidence of discrimination in recruitment. This is by far the best evidence available for discrimination on grounds of ethnic origins or faith, although it covers only the very first stage of the application process.

We do have quite a good series of field experiments testing for racial discrimination in Britain, going back to 1969. However, these were all based on ethnic background, rather than on religious affiliation. The research demonstrates that both black and Asian minorities experience quite substantial discrimination, whereas white minorities experience very little. Moreover, the level of discrimination has barely changed over time, despite legislation such as the 1976 Race Relations Act and the activities of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission. Unfortunately none of these studies has explicitly compared Muslims with members of other faiths or those with no faith. To be sure, in some cases the studies have distinguished predominantly Muslim ethnic origins such as Pakistani or Bangladeshi. However, it is not clear that British employers can readily distinguish South Asian Muslim names from those of other South Asian faiths, or Pakistani/Bangladeshi names from those indicating other South Asian ethnic origins.

More extensive research has been done in France and Germany. A study conducted in France (Laitin et al. 2010) which submitted matching CVs in the name of a French Muslim Senegalese and a French Christian Senegalese found anti-Muslim discrimination in the French labour market. Another study conducted in Germany also showed much greater discrimination against applicants wearing a headscarf (Weichselbaumer 2016). In Germany it is normal for job applications to include a photograph. This means that, rather relying on differences in the names of the fictitious applicants, one can check whether the well-known Muslim symbol of a headscarf is associated with a greater risk of discrimination. The correspondence test investigated discrimination against Turkish women in Germany, especially against those who are visibly Muslim due to the wearing of a headscarf. The researchers selected two names and created three identities using the same woman, a model who was able to pose as either German or Turkish in the photographs. They designed an identity for Sandra Bauer (German, no headscarf), Meryem Ozturk (Turkish, no headscarf) and Meryem Ozturk (Turkish, with modern-style headscarf). The applications and documentation for all three identities were alike. One job application from one of the three identities was submitted to each of 1,474 accountancy or secretarial positions over a year. The results showed that the applicant with the German name Sandra
Bauer was called back at a rate of 18.8%, while Meryem Ozturk without the headscarf was called back after 13.5% of applications. The Meryem Ozturk who wore the headscarf was only called back for 4.2% of the positions applied for. The study showed that discrimination against an applicant with a Turkish name wearing a headscarf was roughly three times as great as that against a Turkish woman who was bare-headed. Since other research suggests that anti-Muslim sentiment in Germany is not all that different from anti-Muslim sentiment in Britain, one should assume that results in Britain might be quite similar.

One recent field experiment in Britain was designed specifically to test for discrimination against Muslims. In a test designed for the BBC in 2017, two near-identical ‘fake’ candidate CVs were created in the names of Mohamed Allam and Adam Henton. These CVs were submitted to 100 business manager job advertisements in the field of advertising sales in London. In just under three months, Adam Henton was offered 12 interviews, while Mohamed was invited to just four. It is striking that this is a higher rate of discrimination than that found in the great majority of the field experiments on ethnic and racial background. While this is far from definitive, it raises the possibility that there is an additional Muslim penalty.

Another recent and much larger study in Manchester, conducted by Mahmoud Abubaker and Christopher Bagley (2017), found similar results. However, rather than using fictitious CVs, they used a real CV, sending it under different names to different (but statistically matched) employers. They found that ‘Aminah’, a woman in her 20s, qualified at an intermediate level of accountancy, received a positive response to the online submission of her real CV in 151 of her 516 submissions (that is, a positive callback rate of 29%). In contrast, the English ‘Emily’ (whose CV was similar to Aminah’s in every respect, except her name) was successful in 306 of her 527 applications (a positive callback rate of 58%), for job descriptions and company characteristics which were, overall, similar for both applicants. These results in effect mean that Aminah would need to make twice as many applications as Emily in order to have the same likelihood of receiving a positive callback.

These two British studies do not provide quite such compelling evidence of an additional Muslim penalty as do the French and German studies. We are still awaiting results from a new study which further tests these distinctions. Nevertheless, coupled with the qualitative evidence gathered by the Social Mobility Commission, one needs to take very seriously the possibility that Muslims in Britain face particular barriers in gaining employment.

The chill factor
Perceptions of discrimination could also impact on potential applicants applying within certain industries. Inequality in the labour market, perception of anti-Muslim attitudes and wider vocal bigotry have a very detrimental impact within certain job sectors. Muslims may actively avoid such job sectors, which they consider ‘hostile’ to Muslims or whose culture is perceived as ‘antagonistic’. In the academic literature this has been termed the ‘chill factor’ (Li and O’Leary 2007: 557, McCrudden et al. 2004: 390):

the ‘chill factor’ – the various social and psychological factors that may discourage individuals from an under-represented group from applying to a firm – such as historical associations with a different group, real or expected discrimination from workmates in the opposite community, or disapproval from friends and family. (McCrudden et al. 2004: 398)

Muslims may unconsciously avoid applying for or aspiring to join certain employment sectors that they feel would provide an alienating work environment or where they would expect to be ‘pigeonholed’ into stereotypical work. This could include sectors such as the police force, the construction industry, acting, the armed forces and the media.

Increasing securitization has caused a growing rift between Muslims and the security services. Police officers are often viewed sceptically within Muslim communities, with Islamophobic attitudes replacing institutional racism as a reason to avoid the police service as a career (Awan et al. 2013). Perceptions that police see Muslims as a ‘suspect’ community have had a detrimental impact on policing as a career choice (Kundnani 2009).

The perception of institutional racism is one of the biggest hurdles for service career recruitment. If job sectors are exposed as having condoned discrimination for many years, it can take a generation of reform to recognize whether institutions have indeed improved. The Ministry of Defence, for example, has made concerted efforts to increase diversity in the armed forces. According to biannual diversity statistics in 2017, Muslims only make up 0.4% of the UK regular forces, compared with just under 5% of wider British society. Research on perceptions of the armed forces as a prospective
career option among British Pakistanis in the Midlands (Ishaq and Hussain 2002) revealed that 32% of respondents avoided applying to the armed forces due to perceived racism. The same research also surveyed Scottish Pakistanis in Glasgow, asking why they thought ethnic minorities were not applying to join the armed forces, and 22% said the main reason was fear of experiencing racism. There was a similar trend among participants in more recent research on Muslims and the armed forces (Mustafa 2017). The report highlights that young Muslims perceive the armed forces as a sector that may not be welcoming to minorities and where they expect to experience marginalization due to their ethnicity or faith.

Conclusions

In 2015, the British government, along with a number of large corporations (HSBC, Deloitte, the BBC and the NHS, among others), pledged to operate a ‘name-blind’ recruitment strategy in the hope of reducing discrimination. However, while this initiative is to be applauded, this is a very limited pool of employers and we would like to see it rolled out further. Moreover, it covers only the very first stage of the application process. Weichselbaumer’s important research in Germany raises the possibility that if a Muslim woman were to arrive at interview wearing a headscarf, she might be subject to additional discrimination. The way forward, therefore, must be for firms to monitor the results of application processes in order to determine whether there is a level playing field for applicants from different faiths.

The results of statistical analyses strongly suggest that Muslims experience an additional religious penalty over and above any ethnic penalty which they experience. Field experiments have not yet been published in Britain which can unequivocally demonstrate that these religious penalties are due to discrimination against Muslims, but the possibility needs to be taken very seriously. Moreover, if organizations were able to show that Muslims have the same chances of gaining entry and promotion as do members of other faiths, this might go a long way to countering the chill factor too. Organizations need to be proactive in demonstrating that they offer a level playing field. As Prime Minister Theresa May said when introducing the Race Disparity Audit (Cabinet Office 2017), ‘if the disparities can’t be explained, they must be changed’.
Khadija’s story
Writer, British Black African, female

‘No-one is asking for favouritism, just that we’re given equal opportunity in the job market.’

As a black British Muslim woman, I face multiple challenges when it comes to my career opportunities and progression. I graduated with a 2:1 in my field and was writing during my time at university to build a portfolio and enhance my employability with different media outlets. I also volunteered regularly and worked as an editor for a publishing company on low pay. However, when I left university I was unable to even get an internship, let alone obtain an entry-level position in my field.

When I compare myself to white friends and colleagues I notice that I need to work twice as hard for what I want to accomplish. Maybe it’s my non-English name which means my CV gets overlooked. When I do manage to get through to interviews, the fact that I am an ethnic minority who also wears the hijab makes them less likely to offer me a job.

My family told me that wearing my hijab was holding me back in the job market and that if I wore it differently it would increase my prospects. But this is who I am and in 2017 why should I have to change myself into something that I don’t recognise?

There are so many institutional barriers that mean people like me are not given jobs based on our merits and skills. This makes me disillusioned with all of the promises made to me during university and leading up to graduation about what to expect in the world of work. Institutional, systematic racism and Islamophobia are prevalent but I refuse to give up. I continue trying my best to break the barriers that I face and find innovative ways of working in my field to make me stand out.

No-one is asking for favouritism, just that we’re given equal opportunity in the job market.

* Khadija’s name has been changed to protect her identity
Introduction
Racism has been argued to be a focal element of ethnic inequalities in health (Williams 1999, Krieger 2003, Nazroo 2003, Paradies et al. 2015), impacting on the health of ethnic minority people through differential exposure to socioeconomic, environmental, psychosocial and healthcare-related pathways. In this chapter we explore the implications of this for the health of Muslim people in the UK, with the intention of illustrating how Islamophobia, racism targeted towards Islam or Muslims, harms the health of Muslim people. The evidence we draw on is mainly from studies of racism and health, so the primary focus is on ethnic minority people in general, with discussion of a range of health outcomes. Nevertheless, the conclusions from this evidence are clear on the harm of Islamophobia to health.

Ethnic inequalities in health: disadvantages experienced by Muslim people in the UK
The existence of inequalities in the health status of different ethnic groups in the UK has been well established (Nazroo 2001, Erens et al. 2001, Sproston and Mindell 2006). For example, Black Caribbean, Pakistani and Bangladeshi people have between six and nine fewer years of disability-free life expectancy at birth than do White British people (Wohland et al. 2015) and are up to twice as likely as White British people to report poor self-rated health and to have a limiting longstanding illness (Bécares 2015). In addition, the limited evidence we have on variations in ethnic inequalities in health across religious groups suggests that Muslim people are at particular risk of poorer health (Nazroo 2001, Karlsen and Nazroo 2010). For example, alongside the higher risk for Pakistani and Bangladeshi people of a range of adverse health outcomes compared with other ethnic groups, Muslim Indian people have a higher risk of poor self-assessed health, limiting longstanding illness and diabetes than their Hindu and Christian (though not to the same extent Sikh) counterparts (Karlsen and Nazroo 2010).

These differences in health occur when the social determinants of health (factors such as education, social position, income and the local environment) are unequally distributed across ethnic groups, leading to unjust and preventable inequalities in health. One fundamental cause of health inequalities among ethnic minority groups is racism and racial discrimination.

The impact on health of experiencing racism
Racism is a persistent feature of life in developed countries, including the UK, even though the form and expression of underlying prejudice shifts over time (Karlsen and Nazroo 2014, Storm et al. 2017). One of the important shifts in the expression of racism over recent decades has been the rise of Islamophobia. Poynting and Mason (2007), among others, describe how Muslim people have become the primary focus for distrust and victimization in the UK and elsewhere, and studies show parallel increases in experiences of and fear of racism among Muslim people over the first decade of the 21st century (Karlsen and Nazroo 2014). Muslim people are repeatedly described as the social group most frequently discriminated against (Kitchen et al. 2005), and there is evidence that prejudice against Muslim people (as well as gay and lesbian people) is considered more socially acceptable than that against any other group (Abrams and Houston 2006).

Anti-Muslim prejudice, racism and discrimination affect the full range of social and economic outcomes experienced by Muslim people. In addition, there is now convincing evidence that experiences of racism and discrimination directly harm both mental and physical health (Paradies 2006, Paradies et al. 2015). This occurs via several mechanisms: first, racism increases exposure to the internalization of negative messages that may lead to decreased self-esteem and poorer mental health (Jones 2000); second, exposure to racial stressors, such as interpersonal discriminatory treatment, may result in physiological changes and to the subsequent onset and worsening of disease (Clark et al. 1999); and last, racially motivated violence directly affects mental and physical health. Studies of racism and health found that those reporting to have experienced some form of physical racial attack had a prevalence of depression almost three times higher, and a prevalence of psychosis almost five times higher, than that of ethnic minority people reporting no harassment (Karlsen and Nazroo 2002). In the same study, the prevalence of psychosis was 57% higher among ethnic minority people who
believed that the majority of British employers would discriminate against someone on the grounds of race, religion, culture or ethnicity than among those who did not (Karlsen and Nazroo 2002). Similarly a more recent investigation showed that experiences of interpersonal racism (specifically, verbal abuse, physical assault and discrimination in access to or within the workplace) and perceiving racism in wider British society (believing that British employers discriminate on the basis of ethnicity, race or religion) had independent effects on the likelihood of having both a common mental disorder (such as anxiety or depression) and a psychosis-related disorder (Karlsen et al. 2005). Specifically, in multivariate models (which included measures of exposure to three dimensions of racism and adjusted for age, household occupational class and current employment status, and gender), experience of racially motivated verbal abuse or physical assault was associated with between a two- and a threefold increase in the risk of common mental disorder and psychosis; reporting experience of employment-related discrimination was associated with an almost 50% additional increased risk; while believing the majority of British employers to be discriminatory was associated with around a twofold increase in risk.

Is the relationship between racism and health causal, or just a statistical association?

The majority of the literature examining the relationship between experiences of racism and health uses cross-sectional data, leading to concerns that the relationship might not be causal. It is possible that a third factor leads to an increased risk both of racism and of poor mental health – such as living in an ethnically isolated environment – or that the experience of poor mental health may lead to a greater perception of hostility and a consequent greater likelihood to report experiences of racism and discrimination. However, there is an increasing quantity of evidence from longitudinal studies and this uniformly indicates that experiences of racial discrimination predate poor health (Barnes et al. 2008, Gee and Walsemann 2009, Kwate and Goodman 2015, Wallace et al. 2016) and that changes in experience of racial discrimination are associated with changes in mental health (Rosenthal et al. 2015), suggesting the relationship is indeed causal. Equally important is that a causal relationship makes theoretical sense – there is an extensive literature demonstrating the causal relationship between stressful events and the onset of both mental and physical health problems, and on the biological impacts of social and economic stress that leads to poor health. Indeed, there is evidence that chronic exposure to everyday racial discrimination is associated with poor sleep (Lewis et al. 2013), coronary artery calcification (Lewis et al. 2006) and hormonal stress responses such as altered diurnal cortisol patterns and a higher cortisol awakening response (Adam et al. 2015).

The cumulative impact of racism on health

Another, perhaps more important, limitation of the use of cross-sectional data is that it treats incidents of racism as discrete events, without considering how they shape people’s experiences across a life course. This points to the need to improve our understanding of how the accumulation of exposure to racial discrimination over time is associated with increased risk of poor health. Some cross-sectional studies have shown that the accumulation of exposure to racial discrimination across different life domains (such as at work, in educational settings and while seeking healthcare) leads to a dose–response association between racial discrimination and poor health (Harris et al. 2012, Harris et al. 2013). In addition, one longitudinal study has shown a dose–response relation between experiences of racial discrimination across domains and over time and risk of mental illness – the greater the number of domains within which racism was experienced and the greater the number of experiences of racism over time, the greater the impact on mental health (see Figure 5.1).

Indeed, the experience of racial discrimination should be conceptualized as a dynamic process that operates across time, across domains and even across generations (Bécares et al. 2015), and consequently as having cumulative effects on health. Studies that do not take this into account are likely to underestimate the overall impact of racial discrimination on the health of individuals.

The broader reach of racism

Having summarized evidence on the direct harm that racism and discrimination do to ethnic minority people’s health, we now consider how racism has an impact beyond that of the actual experience. One possibility is that living with a fear of experiencing racism, something that survey evidence shows is much more common than directly experiencing racism (Virdee 1997, Bécares et al. 2009), may have an impact on health. This may occur as a result of the anticipatory stress of a possible future racist encounter and consequent enhanced vigilance.
For example, one study found that those people who reported being worried about being harassed were almost two-thirds more likely to report poor health than those who did not (Karlsen and Nazroo 2004). And another study showed that fear of racial discrimination, expressed through reporting feeling unsafe or avoiding spaces or places, had a larger cumulative effect on the mental health of ethnic minority people than direct experiences of racism (Wallace et al. 2016). Other UK-based studies have also reported the increased harm of fear of experiencing racial discrimination on health (Bécares et al. 2009a). These findings suggest that awareness of racial discrimination experienced by others, or previous exposure to racial discrimination over the life course, can have an impact on the mental health of ethnic minority people as a result of the vigilance and fear that they generate.

In addition to the importance of the anticipatory stress that fear of racism produces, studies have shown that vicarious exposure to racism is also harmful to health. Studies focusing on children show that ethnic minority children growing up in an environment where experiences of racial discrimination are common – that is, where their mothers, other family members or other people in the neighbourhood are racially insulted and treated disrespectful and unfairly because of their ethnicity – are more likely to suffer from socio-emotional problems as they grow up than their peers from ethnic minority backgrounds whose families do not report experiences of racial discrimination (Bécares et al. 2015). The impact on children of vicarious exposure to racial discrimination has also been shown with other health outcomes such as obesity (Kelly et al. 2013), childhood illnesses (Priest et al. 2012) and adolescent mental health outcomes (Bennet and Wang 2017). These findings show that racial discrimination that adults experience harms not only their health, but that of others close to them, including their children.

**Racism, social and economic inequality, and ethnic inequalities in health**

If we consider racism to be a system of structuring opportunity and assigning values to people and groups, based on phenotypic characteristics, that results in unfairly disadvantaging some individuals and communities, while unfairly advantaging others (Jones 2000), then it is also important to consider how these broader disadvantages impact on the health of ethnic minority people and shape the ethnic inequalities in health briefly outlined earlier.

Evidence has repeatedly shown that on average people from ethnic minority groups have lower incomes and are concentrated in environmentally and economically poorer geographic areas, live in poorer quality and more overcrowded accommodation, occupy less desirable occupations, and have a higher risk of unemployment and of longer periods of unemployment, than their ethnic majority counterparts. Elsewhere in this report the range...
of social and economic disadvantages faced by Muslim people in the UK, and how these relate to Islamophobia, has been outlined. The impact of these social and economic disadvantages on the health of Muslim people is profound. The relation between social position and health is widely documented (The Marmot Review 2010) and socioeconomic disadvantage has been shown to make a major contribution to ethnic inequalities in health (Nazroo 2001, 2003).

However, although the direct impact of racism on health and of socioeconomic inequalities on ethnic inequalities in health have been well documented, and even studied together (Karlsen and Nazroo 2002, Nazroo 2003), their joint effects within a broader conceptualization of racism have been rarely assessed. One exception is Wallace et al. (2016), a study that set out to assess the broad contribution of racial discrimination to ethnic inequalities in mental health. It did this by simultaneously modelling two dimensions of racial disadvantage that lead to poor health: the effect of direct experiences of racism on physiological changes (Clark et al. 1999) and the social and economic consequences of living in a racialized society (Nazroo 2003). The study found that adjusting for socioeconomic disadvantage and experiences of racial discrimination eliminated ethnic inequalities in mental health for Pakistani and Bangladeshi people and reduced inequalities for Black Caribbean people. The implication is that the ethnic inequalities in health that we observe can be attributed to processes of racism leading to social and economic inequality and personally targeted threat.

Causal pathways and opportunities to address ethnic inequalities in health

As summarized above, the stress associated with having a negatively racialized identity is, not surprisingly, associated with an increased risk of experiencing mental illness. This is in part a consequence of the social and economic inequalities associated with racialized identities as a consequence of structural and institutional racism, and in part a consequence of the direct impact on health of experiences of racism and discrimination. In the case of direct experiences of racism, the course of the pathway between socially inflicted trauma and health, beyond any immediate physical injury, is little understood. In general, it has been suggested that long-term exposure to inferior treatment and a devalued status is damaging to self-esteem, invalidates self-worth and may block aspirations. Such exposure may shape the content and frequency of stressful life events and may limit the range of feasible responses to them, as well as the social support available. All of these will have severe consequences for health. More specifically, the discriminatory act may produce a sense of threat within the victim that may cause various reactions, including fear, distress, anger, humiliation and denial. These reactions could produce a physiological response (be it cardiovascular, endocrine, neurological, immunological) that subsequently affects health.

It is also important to acknowledge here that racism, unlike other criminal acts, need not be personal to produce a threat, because it is targeted at phenotypic and cultural characteristics that are shared across individuals, communities and groups, rather than solely at an individual (Virdee 1997).

Such attacks thus might impact more broadly on people’s identities, fear, humiliation, etc. In addition, people living in a climate of fear and insecurity may adapt by constraining their lives to avoid vulnerable situations, a response that may also lead to stress (Virdee 1997).

One response to such psychological vulnerability would be to argue that we should find ways of enhancing individuals’ resilience in the light of such negative events and circumstances. However, this response is based on a narrow perspective on resilience that sees it predominantly in terms of psychological resources. This type of response would shift the problem away from the racialized nature of society that directly or indirectly supports racism and discrimination, and away from community action, towards the individual at risk of experiencing racism, placing ever greater burdens on members of marginalized and racialized communities while leaving unchanged, and unchallenged, the underlying causes of racism and health inequalities. Instead, we should focus on community, societal and political responses. There are some clues in the literature as to the value of this.

One comes from the literature that suggests that ethnic minority people living together is protective for their health, a so-called ethnic density effect. So, after taking account of the concentration of poverty and deprivation in a neighbourhood, studies have found ethnic minority people who live in ethnically dense areas to have better mental health (Shaw et al. 2012) and, for some outcomes, better physical health (Bécares et al. 2012) compared with those who live in areas with lower ethnic density. A handful of studies have explored what might be driving this
ethnic density effect and these have shown that the main pathway is through a decrease in experiences of interpersonal racism and discrimination (Bécares et al. 2009b, Das-Munshi et al. 2010). Also, related to this, some research has shown that not only is the frequency of experiences of racism lower in places of higher ethnic density, there is also a tendency towards a weaker association between racism and health as ethnic density increases (Bécares et al. 2009b). Ethnically dense areas also have the potential to provide increased opportunities for social support, civic engagement and social cohesion, which is also protective of health (Stafford et al. 2009). So, ethnic density, which is generally thought of in terms of the negative impacts of residential concentration, is perhaps better considered in terms of social networks and supportive communities, providing health-protective and health-promoting effects for ethnic minority people (Halpern and Nazroo 2000, Bécares et al. 2009b, Pickett and Wilkinson 2008).

Another clue comes from the evidence suggesting that ethnic minority people who explicitly recognize the racist nature of their experiences retain higher levels of self-esteem and self-efficacy, compared with those who internalize or deny their experiences (Krieger and Sidney 1996). The implication is that the public recognition of such events as racist, as the product of social factors unconnected to the targets of the action, is protective. Overall then, it seems that a public recognition of racism and the ways in which it operates in our society, together with a lack of tolerance for the expression of prejudicial, racist and discriminatory attitudes, is crucial to reducing exposure to and the impact of racism. Here grassroots political action, and central political leadership, may well be crucial.

**Concluding comments**

Here we have summarized the evidence showing the harm that racism does to ethnic minority people's health, either directly or through consequent social and economic disadvantage; the pathways through which these effects operate; how racism is the fundamental driver of ethnic inequalities in health; and the need to respond to this. Although only a minority of racist incidents do physical harm, it is clear that living in a society where their identities are racialized does harm to the health of ethnic minority people – their life expectancy and their healthy life expectancy are shortened. Insofar as the racism experienced by Muslim people is shaped by Islamophobia, as argued elsewhere in this report, it is clear that Islamophobia harms health, a claim that is supported by the evidence that the impact of racism on health does not vary across ethnic minority groups (Bécares et al. 2009a).

The broad policy implication of this is clear: to protect the health of ethnic minority people we need to understand the nature of and address racism in our society.
Layla’s story
Nurse, 23, London, British Arab, female

‘I work in healthcare because I want to help people and make them better but in my job I regularly face Islamophobia and racism’

I’m a born and bred East Londoner and despite London’s multiculturalism, the amount of Islamophobia I experience is astonishing. I work in healthcare because I want to help people and make them better but in my job I regularly face Islamophobia and racism, particularly after the terrorist attacks across Europe in 2016 and 2017.

For example, I had a middle-aged man who had various medical issues and he refused to acknowledge me as his nurse from his first night. When I asked why he told me to ‘fuck off back to your Paki country’. When I explained I’m not Asian and I’m only here to help him he got increasingly abusive, calling me a ‘Terrorist bitch’, ‘Terrorist cunt’, asking me whether I was having intercourse with Osama Bin Laden and taunting me throughout the night about me wearing the hijab. He refused to take any of the medication I had given him and said that he would ‘rather die than be nursed by a terrorist’.

When I asked to be allocated a different patient my manager told me that it was unprofessional of me to make such a request. This should have made me upset but sadly it didn’t because I’ve also experienced Islamophobia and racism from a young age which has made it a normality within my everyday life. My classmates in secondary school mocked the hijab, the Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. After the 2017 terrorist attacks in London, I’ve seen more and more of my own friends from university, colleagues that I work with and train with, express their contempt for Muslims on various social media.

Many Muslims will tell you that they don’t pay much attention to the Islamophobic comments from strangers because of their ignorance, but you can’t play down comments from your own colleagues and friends who’ve know you for years. My family and some of my friends give me a lot of support but even though they’re no strangers to racism they can’t understand what I am going through. Offloading to them is not enough. Healthcare professional are bound by law to treat people in a non-judgmental manner even if patients are being abusive. But what about us?

* Layla’s name has been changed to protect her identity
Introduction

Hate crime has consistently been an issue for policymakers, academics and public and private sector stakeholders. Following the Brexit vote and terrorist attacks in Manchester and London in 2017, we have now seen a sharp rise in hate crimes and anti-Muslim attacks in Britain (Sharman and Jones 2017, Littler and Feldman 2015). These incidents include mosques being targeted, Muslim women who have had their hijab (headscarf) or niqab (face veil) pulled off, and two Muslims in London who were the subject of a horrific acid attack (Hooper 2017). A 2017 analysis of Tell MAMA's (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) data found that it recorded 141 hate crime incidents after the Manchester attack, and after the London Bridge attack they rose sharply again (Dodd and Marsh 2017). According to a survey by the Pew Research Center's Pew Global Attitudes Project, opinions about Muslims in Europe are considerably negative. For example, (52%) Spanish and (50%) German respondents rated Muslims unfavourably. According to the survey, one in four people in Britain and the United States also hold unfavourable views about Muslims (Pew Research Center 2008).

Research has shown that in most cases, the victims of Islamophobic hate crimes are wearing traditional Islamic clothing at the time of the incident, and the perpetrators are overwhelmingly white male (Awan 2016, Littler and Feldman 2015). Muslims, particularly those with a ‘visible’ Muslim identity, are therefore more vulnerable to anti-Muslim hostility, intimidation, abuse and threats of violence. Indeed, for repeat victims, there is a continuity of anti-Muslim hostility in a globalized world. From this perspective, it is crucial that we have a better understanding of anti-Muslim hate crime and its impact upon Muslim men and women, their families and wider communities, and that as a society we examine and identify ways to prevent and respond to anti-Muslim hostility in Britain. For example, measures to help increase reporting of anti-Muslim hate crime, the services offered to support victims of Islamophobic hate crime, the recording of Islamophobic hate crimes and the use of educational workshops in schools are important measures in tackling Islamophobic hate crime.

Individual impacts

Being a victim of any kind of crime can have devastating and long-term impacts upon individuals, including emotional, psychological, behavioural, physical and financial effects. However, evidence shows that ‘hate crimes hurt more’. Empirical studies of targeted victimization emphasize the more severe impact for victims of hate crime when compared with non-hate victims (see, for example, Smith et al. 2012, Chakraborti et al. 2014, Williams and Tregidga 2014). In the context of anti-Muslim hate crime, both virtual- and physical-world attacks upon Muslims ‘hurt’ more than ‘normal’ crimes as they are seen as an attack upon the victims’ Muslim identity (Awan and Zempi 2015). From this perspective, the impact of anti-Muslim hate crime may exceed that of ‘normal’ crime because of victims’ perceived and actual vulnerability due to their affiliation to Islam.

In addition to potentially suffering physical injury, victims of anti-Muslim hate crime can be affected emotionally. In particular, there are distinct emotional effects associated with this victimization, including feelings of fear, insecurity, anxiety, vulnerability, isolation and depression. Given that they are targeted because of the ‘visibility’ of their Muslim identity – which is easily identifiable, either in the virtual world or in the physical sphere, because of their Muslim name and/or Muslim appearance – victims are unable to take comfort in the belief that what happened to them was simply random and ‘could have happened to anyone’. Rather, they are forced to view this abuse as an attack on their Muslim identity, and this has severe implications for their levels of confidence and self-esteem as well as their feelings of belonging and safety in the UK.

A key finding in research conducted by Awan and Zempi (2015) was that participants were multiple and repeat victims of both cyber- and physical-world forms of anti-Muslim hate crime. Rarely did participants describe anti-Muslim hate crime as ‘one-off’; rather, there was always the sense, the fear, the expectation of another attack. Repeat incidents of cyber- and/or physical-world anti-Muslim hate increase feelings of insecurity, vulnerability and anxiety among victims. Bowling (2009) states that repeated or persistent victimization can undermine the security of actual and potential victims, and induce fear and anxiety. The distressing nature of
anti-Muslim hate crime, coupled with the frequency with which these acts are committed, creates high levels of fear among actual and potential victims.

Participants in Awan and Zempi’s study also highlighted the relationship between cyber- and physical-world anti-Muslim hate crime, and described living in fear because of the possibility of online threats materializing in the ‘real world’ (Awan and Zempi 2015). Unarguably, the internet allows people to take on a new and anonymous identity, and to bypass traditional editorial controls, to share their views with millions. Online anti-Muslim hate messages can be sent anonymously or by using a false identity, making it difficult to identify the offender. The anonymity aspect in cases of online anti-Muslim hate messages is extremely frightening, as the perpetrator could be anyone and the online threats could escalate into the physical space.

In light of the profound negative impacts of anti-Muslim hate crime, it is clear that the emotional scars can last for a long time. When another incident takes place, victims relive previous incidents of anti-Muslim hate crime. As a result, some individuals might suffer from depression, eating disorders, sleep pattern disturbances including insomnia and nightmares, flashbacks, and memory lapses. The continual threat of abuse can be emotionally draining for victims, who not only relive past incidents but also feel the need to be constantly on the alert. This shows that anti-Muslim hate crime can result in a cumulative experience of psychological trauma and emotional burn-out over time.

In this context, individuals appear to manage impressions of their Muslim identity in public and online mainly through concealment, with the aim of reducing the risk of future abuse. Zempi (2014) found that Muslim women who wear the niqab often try to become less ‘visible’ by taking the niqab off. Relatedly, Zempi (2014) found that the threat of anti-Muslim hate crime had long-lasting effects for individual victims, including making them afraid to leave their homes and leaving them feeling like ‘social lepers’ and ‘social outcasts’. As a result, common sensations cited by veiled Muslim women were those of panic attacks, worry, extreme anxiety and depression, which were said to derive from the fear of having to endure future victimization when in public. Thus women were often reluctant to leave the house through fear of being attacked, particularly on the street, in parks, in shops and on public transport. However, some women described feeling like ‘prisoners in their own home’. Although the experience and fear of anti-Muslim hate crime had ‘forced’ these women to withdraw from wider social participation, this was seen as the ‘only way’ to decrease their sense of vulnerability as they felt that there was nowhere else that they could be safe from the threat of anti-Muslim hate crime. It is important, too, to highlight the gendered nature of anti-Muslim hate crime. Indeed, Zempi (2014) found that veiled Muslim women face anti-Muslim hostility not only because of their religion but also because of their gender and, specifically, gender performance.

Overall, this discussion illustrates how the enactment of geographical boundaries impacts upon ‘emotional geographies’ in relation to the way in which actual and potential victims perceive spaces and places inside and outside their ‘comfort zones’ (Hopkins 2007). Rather than risk the threat of being attacked, many actual and potential victims choose to retreat to their ‘own’ communities and as a result become reclusive. Clearly, this limits the behavioural options and life choices of individuals, as it determines their area of residence, their vocational pursuits and leisure activities, their mode of transport, and even their access to educational opportunities. Concurrently, this reality often results in segregation in housing, transportation, education, employment and leisure activities. However, for Perry and Alvi (2012) this is not a voluntary choice; rather, it is the ‘safe’ choice. Whether cyber- or physical-world, the reality of anti-Muslim hate crime creates ‘invisible’ boundaries, across which members of the Muslim community are not ‘welcome’ to step.
Community and societal impacts

As discussed above, anti-Muslim hate crime may damage victims’ self-esteem, confidence and feelings of security far more than ‘ordinary’ crimes. In this regard, it is victims’ intrinsic identity that is targeted: something which is central to their sense of being and which they cannot or do not wish to change. The emotional, psychological and behavioural harms associated with anti-Muslim hate crime are not restricted to victims; rather, the harm extends to the wider Muslim community, both nationally and globally.

Awareness of the potential for anti-Muslim hate crime enhances the sense of fearfulness and insecurity of all Muslims due to their group membership. Consequently, the threat of anti-Muslim hate crime impacts upon notions of belonging and cohesion among Muslims, who are reminded of the appropriate alignment of ‘us’ and ‘them’. This shows that Islamophobic hostility affects not only the individual victim but also the community to which victims belong. Indeed, as Perry (2001) points out, hate crimes are ‘message crimes’ whereby a message of hate, terror and vulnerability is communicated to the victim’s broader community. Within this framework, incidents of anti-Muslim hate crime send out a terroristic message to the wider Muslim community. Specifically, the intent of hate crime offenders is to send a message to multiple audiences: the victim, who needs to be punished for his/her inappropriate performance of identity; the victim’s community, who need to learn that they too are vulnerable to the same fate; and the broader community, who are also reminded of the appropriate alignment of ‘us’ and ‘them’.

As such, anti-Muslim hate crime affects wider society on the basis that it isolates and excludes Muslims, thereby creating fear, resentment and mistrust of the ‘Muslim Other’. The separation of communities based on this dichotomy promotes a situation where both Muslims and non-Muslims live in fear of each other. This separation prevents ‘us’ and ‘them’ from interacting with each other and increases fear of engagement on both sides. As such, anti-Muslim hate crime promotes the notion of ‘parallel lives’ and self-enclosed communities. The separation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ means that Muslims and non-Muslims have little or no experience of each other’s daily existence (Zempi and Chakraborti 2015). In addition, this separation contributes to a lack of shared experiences, with little opportunity for the emergence of shared values. In theory, the notion of community cohesion highlights the importance of a common sense of belonging and the need for shared values and integration. However, the pattern of separation described here shows that the community cohesion agenda is based exclusively upon the obligation of Muslim minorities to integrate, and as a result the problem of non-integration is seen to rest with Muslims themselves (Zempi and Chakraborti 2014). This demonstrates the link between anti-Muslim hate crime and community cohesion.

Conclusion

Ultimately, anti-Muslim hate crime attempts to divide the world into two homogeneous groupings, ‘us’ and ‘them’, while failing to recognize that the wider Muslim community comprises a number of fluid, overlapping and internally diverse national, racial and ethnic communities, which cut across any simple majority/minority division. Thus, the impacts of anti-Muslim hate crime extend to society as a whole by promoting the separation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Zempi and Chakraborti 2015). In this sense, the individual and societal impacts of anti-Muslim hate crime are the creation of disruption, fear, hostility, suspicion and isolation for both ‘us’ and ‘them’.
Sahar’s story
Molecular geneticist/campaigner, Cardiff, British, Arab, female

‘I want to see Muslim women confident within their identities, unapologetic about their choices, successful in every aspect of their lives, contributing to society and participating in public life.’

I am a Muslim woman of colour who chose to wear the face-veil (niqab) out of conviction of faith. I have been the target of much Islamophobic verbal, and sometimes physical, abuse in the streets, shopping centres and hospitals, so much so that I don’t know what life is without it. I have had people call me a ‘terrorist’, ‘bomber’ or shouting, ‘Go back to your country!’ with such vitriol and even grossly swearing at me. It is excruciating to live with.

I once gave an interview with the BBC and someone passed by, looked fearlessly at the camera and shouted ‘Fucking bomber’. This is what happens in front of the camera: you can imagine would could happen behind it.

It was very difficult for me to go to university because of the fear of people and their reaction to me. I considered quitting many times, thinking that the university would be just an additional place of abuse. I used to cry on my way to university, and if I had not had my supportive father who pushed me to face my fears courageously, I think I would have returned home at the steps of my university building. During my time in university, I never faced discrimination from the staff or lecturers. In fact, my personal tutor went to great lengths to support me, well above and beyond his job description.

However, soon after graduation the struggle of finding a job began. At the beginning, I was not shortlisted for any job I applied for, so I took my CV to one of my supervisors asking for it to be reviewed. The first thing she said: ‘Sahar, your CV is good and your work with the Muslim community illustrates excellent leadership, organization and communication skills. But it’s too “Islamic”, and in the current hostile environment concerning Muslims, you cannot get anywhere with it.’ I reluctantly changed my CV, and was immediately shortlisted and offered an interview.

Many Islamophobes accuse me and others of raising the victim card, belittling my struggles, blaming my choice as a polarizing tool. I want to say to these Islamophobes, yes I am a victim of your hate and bigotry, that is not a card I am raising and I don’t have the victim mentality.

As a result of my experiences I decided to take a career break for one year to campaign against Islamophobia full-time.

I just don’t want anyone to go through what I’ve been through. I want to see Muslim women confident within their identities, unapologetic about their choices, successful in every aspect of their lives, contributing to society and participating in public life. I will not spare any time or effort in achieving that.


Introduction

In order to understand Islamophobia in the UK, the state’s relationship with Muslim communities must also be examined. Following the commencement in 2001 of the ‘war on terror’, the UK government acted to restrict civil liberties and to enact laws giving the state enhanced powers to combat terrorism and to protect its citizens specifically against the threat posed by ‘Islamist extremists’, foreign and domestic. The state’s counter-terrorism focus upon Muslim communities over the past two decades has had a role in fostering and furthering Islamophobia, a form of racism that is readily identifiable in the UK today.

‘Prevent’, as a key element within ‘CONTEST’, the UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy, has been criticized as discriminatory and counter-productive from the outset. Through its specific targeting of Muslim communities, Prevent has been regarded with suspicion as a tool to collect intelligence (Dawson 2016: 6). And the criticisms of Prevent have been stronger, more specific and more widespread since the approach made it the responsibility of schools, universities, hospitals, local councils, prisons, etc. to prevent individuals from becoming terrorists. From trade unions whose members are now legally mandated to work with Prevent to international human rights research and policy organizations (Rights Watch UK 2016, Open Society Justice Initiative 2016) and UN institutions,2 the same concerns are raised again and again: Prevent is discriminatory in its operation, if not its intent, with the consequence that it alienates the very people it claims it wants to engage with; contrary to the ‘British values’ it extols, in its implementation Prevent involves denial of basic human rights.

Prevent, the public sector equality duty, the Prevent duty and Channel

Prevent has had two distinct phases. Initially it was concerned with preventing violent extremism, with the principal threat seen to come from ‘Islamist terrorists’. Prevent put the onus on Muslim communities, providing funding to support local programmes for young Muslims. Kundnani (2014) notes that during this period Prevent funding was compulsory for local authorities with Muslim populations of over 2,000, a practice he describes as ‘racial and religious profiling’ and which may well have been challenged as a potential violation of anti-discrimination legislation, had it been more widely known about at the time. Phase 2, from 2011, extended the focus of Prevent from ‘violent extremism’ to broadly defined ‘extremism’, challenging ideas which the government saw as contributing to radicalization. Prevent now relies on frontline public sector institutions, having become a legal duty of these institutions under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015).

The public sector equality duty

All of the public authorities subject to the Prevent duty are also subject to the public sector equality duty (PSED) in the Equality Act 2010:

> a public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to … eliminate discrimination, advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations between different groups defined by race, sex, religion or belief, age, disability, sexual orientation, pregnancy or maternity or gender reassignment (protected characteristics) [our emphasis].

To comply with the PSED a public body is expected to consider the impact or likely impact on persons with one or more protected characteristics of its policies and practices, taking appropriate steps to remove or mitigate adverse impact.

The PSED has been in force since April 2011. There is very little evidence that PSED requirements were taken into account in relation to Prevent, either when the revised strategy was developed, or at any time since, including when it was made a legal duty on all public authorities.3

The Prevent duty

The basic language of the Prevent duty is identical to that of the PSED:

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3 One exception is HM Government (2015a): paragraph 71 and footnote 14.
The strength of the obligations under the Prevent duty is no different to that of those under the PSED. However, differences in enforcement and in the politics of the day have resulted in authorities being incentivized to implement the Prevent duty with scant regard to the PSED, even when confronted with hard evidence of differential treatment of Muslims. Despite efforts by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), rarely does a public authority seek to meet its equality duties alongside its Prevent duties, with the inevitable consequence of discrimination becoming entrenched in the implementation of Prevent.

Under the CTSA, public authorities must have regard to the Home Secretary’s guidance on how to meet the Prevent duty. The current guidance describes the Government’s objectives and provides sector-specific guidance on compliance with the duty.

**Prevent guidance: opening the door to targeting of Muslims**

While the guidance states that Prevent is intended to deal with all kinds of terrorist threats, it is difficult not to read into it a clear targeting of Muslims. Noting that ‘terrorists associated with the extreme right also pose a continued threat’, the guidance nevertheless places particular emphasis on the dangerous ideology of Islamist extremists (HM Government 2015c).

The guidance implies a progression from non-violent extremism to terrorism – a progression that is implied to be proven, although this is denied as necessarily the case by government officials and strongly rejected by a range of experts (see for example Weaver 2015 and Gearty 2012). However, this link between ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalization’ is necessary to support the government’s emphasis on challenging ideas and pre-criminal activities as an effective means of preventing people being drawn into terrorism.

The much-criticized wide definitions of the core concepts of Prevent in the guidance permit varied individual interpretations, including those infected by prejudice, leading to implementation based on Islamophobic stereotypes and discrimination. Basic uncertainty starts from the unclear and problematic definition of ‘extremism’ as,

- vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. (HM Government 2015c)

The guidance sets out how the duty should be met within the functions of a particular sector; the primary task for all sectors is to identify and refer people at risk of being drawn into terrorism. The relevance of the duty for safeguarding responsibilities is emphasized in guidance for local authorities, education, childcare and health. A recent report suggests that some teachers feel more confident about their role in Prevent when it is made part of safeguarding, a duty they already understand (Busher et al. 2017). Other observers of Prevent dispute the legitimacy of using safeguarding – intended to protect vulnerable children and adults – for purposes of counter-terrorism.

**Impact on free speech**

The guidance for universities reflects the Government’s belief that extremists are at work on campuses preaching ‘hate’ and radicalizing students and staff (Martin 2015). Importantly, the CTSA requires universities and the Secretary of State to have particular regard to the statutory duties of universities to ensure freedom of speech and the importance of academic freedom. However, there is a real risk that in meeting the Prevent duty universities will feel obliged to give lesser weight to protecting free speech, since they are advised by the guidance that in addition to identifying individuals vulnerable to radicalization, a university should not permit an event involving an external speaker to take place unless the university is ‘entirely convinced’ that any extremist views likely to draw people into terrorism can be fully mitigated (HM Government 2015b). Prevent officers are known to have actively worked to persuade venues to cancel legitimate events on the topic of Prevent and Islamophobia, sought to place student Islamic societies on university campuses under surveillance and requested details of event attendees. Prevent is infringing on the rights of citizens, and particularly those campaigning from within Muslim civil society.

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4 For example, under the CTSA, section 30, but not the PSED, the Secretary of State can issue directions requiring compliance which can be enforced by the courts.

5 Recent research has found that none of the processes to give effect to the PSED were being followed in the implementation of Prevent by universities in England (Massoumi 2017).
Channel: dubious criteria for assessing vulnerability to radicalization

An essential element of Prevent is ‘Channel’, which now operates under the CTSA. Channel is a multi-agency programme to assess the extent of vulnerability to radicalization of a person referred by the police, and, where appropriate, draw up a (de-radicalization) support plan or refer the person to health or social care services. Some uncertainty exists regarding the requirement for consent before intervention or sharing of personal information by Channel. The assessment of vulnerability by Channel is based on a framework comprising 22 factors, grouped under ‘engagement’, ‘intent’ and ‘capability’ (HM Government 2012b), which may or may not apply to a referred person. The lack of reliable evidence to support the validity of this assessment, which is applied to children and adults referred by non-specialists via the police, gives rise to real doubts regarding the integrity of the process. While there has been little academic research conducted on Channel (not least because of a lack of transparency and openness from government in terms of data), a study by Coppock and McGovern (2014) argues that it is ‘ill-conceived’, relies on ‘pseudo science’ and, through its reliance on untested cognitive behavioural therapies, may in fact cause harm to its recipients.

Without effective Prevent training the risks of discrimination are greater

Strictly, every person in a public-facing role within all of the authorities subject to the Prevent duty should be trained; this new responsibility is too serious, and the consequences too grave, for it to be carried out by people working in different disciplines who may be unclear as to what they are expected to do. This training should also include an anti-discrimination component and cover authorities’ responsibilities under the PSED. More than two years since the duty came into force there remain serious concerns in every sector regarding the quality, content and coverage of the training, which comes in a variety of packages put together by different agencies, without any validation or regulation. For example, a BMJ survey was told by an NHS Trust in London ‘94% of staff have had basic level one Prevent training’. However, that training consists of ‘information leaflets supported by a quiz’ (Gulland 2017).

Prevent and the normalization of Islamophobia

There are numerous accounts of Muslim students in schools and colleges and at universities being referred under Prevent for what emerge as the most mundane of reasons, including simply reading a particular library book or engaging in campus-based pro-Palestine or anti-racist activism. An inevitable outcome of the CTSA is that counter-terrorism is now within the country’s classrooms, lecture halls, hospitals and public libraries. No longer solely the preserve of the police, now teachers, lecturers, doctors, social workers and public sector staff more broadly form the core of the state counter-terrorism apparatus. With key Prevent operators often only informed by a one-hour Prevent presentation of dubious quality (carried out by private companies), it is unsurprising that acts of discrimination and prejudice occur in the over-zealous reporting of supposedly ‘suspicious’ individuals (Ward 2017). Within a national climate of anti-Muslim racism, where the necessity of Prevent is routinely associated by the government and media with Muslims and/or Islam, there is evidence of frontline professionals relying on existing biases and stereotypes. There is a public debate that is yet to take place about the fact that the majority of these so-called ‘suspicious’ individuals, behaving perfectly lawfully but deemed vulnerable to radicalization, are Muslim schoolchildren, left traumatized after being wrongly regarded as potential terrorists.

Muslims consistently grossly over-represented among referrals to Channel

Whether as a result of a particular interpretation of the Home Secretary’s Prevent guidance, wholly inadequate training or anxieties regarding sanctions for non-compliance, the reality is that staff working within public sector institutions are disproportionately identifying Muslims of all ages as ‘extremists’ or ‘vulnerable to radicalization’ and referring them, via the police, to Channel, the government’s so-called ‘de-radicalization’ scheme.

The 2011 Census recorded Muslims as constituting 4.8% of the UK population; with different age demographics to the population as a whole, it is estimated that Muslims comprise approximately 8% of the population under 18. Percentages of Muslims referred under Prevent are significantly out of line with these proportions.
Statistics published by the National Police Chiefs' Council\(^6\) show a significant increase in referrals between 2014/15 and 2015/16 (the latter including nine months when the Prevent duty was in force): there was an increase of nearly 90% in the total number of Channel referrals, including an increase of 250% in referrals of children under 10 and an increase of 114% in referrals of young people under 18, between these two years. This data also discloses consistently high proportions of Muslims being referred (or referrals based on a risk of ‘Islamist extremism’, which we submit is a reliable proxy for ‘Muslim’), in both years (see Table 7.1).

For the two-year period March 2014 to March 2016, when the religion of persons under 18 referred to Channel was recorded, the total recorded as Muslim was nearly six times greater than the total recorded as belonging to any other religion. If we take population size into account, Muslim children were 44 times more likely to be referred compared to those belonging to any other religion.\(^7\)

The explanation put forward to justify this wide disparity\(^8\) which was apparent before the Prevent duty came into force, was that ‘terrorists who claim to act in the name of Islam’, who pose the ‘greatest threat to the UK, ‘specifically target Muslims’ and therefore the ‘support offered through Channel’ is predominately provided to Muslim communities. However, as 80% of Channel referrals are not taken as far as the ‘de-radicalization’ or ‘support’ stage,\(^9\) the consistent gross over-referral of Muslims, especially Muslim children and young people, strongly reflects Islamophobic prejudice and stereotyping going well beyond an accurate assessment of the risks of extremism. With pressure on teachers, social workers, doctors and the police to refer individuals and no sanctions for over-referral, it is likely that the present pattern will continue. This will mean a state-sponsored programme which results in the wholly unnecessary intimidation and stigmatization of thousands of mainly Muslim children and adults who have done nothing wrong and who, as a result, may feel further alienated from British society.

### Cumulative impact of Prevent

In contemporary Britain, Muslims are regarded as a policing and social policy problem, in requirement of state intervention. In terms of counter-terrorism, this manifests itself in Prevent, with the state demanding cooperation and partnership from the ‘Muslim community’ (no matter how much this totalizing term is rejected by Muslims themselves). However, this is also expressed through the longer-standing demand (predating the ‘war on terror’ period which saw the introduction of Prevent) for Muslim ‘integration’. Recent government reports pertaining to Muslim ‘integration’ have argued that better integration would protect against the likelihood of extremism and radicalization (see Casey 2016). While such rhetoric is politically expedient, it is completely devoid of a supportive evidence base. It is within such a climate that British Muslims feel as though they are not accepted as British by their fellow citizens (Tufail and Poynting 2013).

Understanding Prevent as a racist, Islamophobic policy allows for an analysis not only of its misguided aims, but of the real harms and deleterious consequences experienced by Muslim communities in the UK.

### Concluding remarks

Ensuring safety from terrorism is in the interests of all citizens, including Muslims. However, it is contrary to both equality and human rights law that Muslims, far more than any other group, are expected to pay for such safety at the cost of being subject to suspicion, demonization, racial stereotyping and unwarranted interference with their private lives. Of particular concern is the impact of Prevent on young Muslims.

### Table 7.1: Channel referrals for risk of Islamist extremism, 2014–2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total referrals</th>
<th>% referred</th>
<th>Referrals, under-18s</th>
<th>% referred</th>
<th>Referrals, under-10s</th>
<th>% referred</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>2,183</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/16</td>
<td>4,117</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>2,074</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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\(^7\) NPCC, ‘Freedom of Information request to National Police Chiefs’ Council’.

\(^8\) NPCC, ‘National Channel referral figures’. Available at: www.npcc.police.uk/FreedomofInformation/NationalChannelReferralFigures.aspx.

\(^9\) NPCC, ‘National Channel referral figures’.
who have grown up not only with a nearly constant stream of negative, Islamophobic headlines but also with a policy that necessitates their surveillance in schools, colleges and universities. Missing from the discussion of extremism, radicalization and terrorism is the burden Muslim minorities have had to endure through collectively being considered a terrorist threat. That such damaging treatment of Muslims under Prevent cannot be shown to reduce the risk of terrorism makes it all the more egregious, and it should be brought to an end.

The Government, the police and other bodies involved in promoting Prevent (including some Muslim civil society organizations) should acknowledge that any benefit to the state which Prevent may provide is significantly outweighed by the harm it inflicts on Muslim communities, and hence on British society as a whole, making Prevent counter-productive in terms of its purported aims. The idea of ‘fundamental British values’ serves only as a rhetorical device when it is considered that Prevent is dividing, stigmatizing and alienating one sector of the population.

One of the most striking elements of public discourse concerning Prevent is how little official recognition there is of the harm it inflicts on British Muslim minorities in schools, universities and other societal settings. On the few occasions such harm is acknowledged, it is often downplayed as the result of a misunderstanding, an aberration or a one-off experience due to poor training. There remains an institutional reluctance to scrutinize the full impact of Prevent.

As has been repeatedly recommended by academics and by human rights and civil liberties advocates, there needs to be a truly independent inquiry into all aspects of Prevent and its impact on Muslim communities, based on full disclosure by all of the agencies and institutions involved, ensuring an opportunity to hear evidence from all affected communities.

Given that the current government is committed to persisting with Prevent (and has even committed to ‘strengthening’ it after an internal review), it should at the very least recognize its equality obligations and immediately revise its statutory guidance to require compliance with the PSED in meeting the Prevent duty. Any government attempt to challenge extremism should not be directed towards a particular racial or faith group and must address societal inequalities, exacerbated over the past decade by the political choice of austerity.

In a climate of normalized anti-Muslim racism, Prevent is only one example of the ways in which the state has been able to build on public insecurities to give false legitimacy to Islamophobia. To genuinely address the issues at hand, a change of direction is urgently needed.
It was only a few years after the Runnymede Trust published its groundbreaking report on Islamophobia in 1997 that there emerged a governmental view on the alleged failure of Muslim integration. Muslims had up until then perhaps been creeping into the national consciousness as an illiberal menace (Asad 1990) or as unruly youngsters on the streets (Alexander 1998). Following the inquiries into civil unrest that occurred in some northern towns home to both small and large numbers of British Muslims at the turn of the millennium, a series of reports characterized these communities as self-segregating, adopting isolationist practices and generally leading ‘parallel lives’. The Ouseley report (2001) perhaps pioneered an approach found in other official post-riot accounts (cf. Cantle 2001, Ritchie 2001), in which Muslim settlement patterns were initially likened to those of ‘colonists’ (Wainwright 2001, cf. Meer and Modood 2009). It was a period in which ‘community cohesion’ approaches became salient, and their objectives were deemed to furnish commentators with the licence – not always supported by the specific substance of each report – to critique Muslim distinctiveness in particular (Meer 2006). When distilled, these criticisms would orbit around the claims that Muslims in Britain had less favourable views of – and therefore attachment to – Britain, and that they preferred to cluster together in self-segregating communities. Later would come security discourses and policies, in which ‘integration talk’ served as a fulcrum on which the policy fate of Britain’s Muslims has come to rest (Meer 2015a).

What of integration?
Integration is a concept with a long history that goes to the heart of how we understand the kinds of social relations that characterize modern societies, from rural to urban, from kinship to community. This dynamic has been recast in thinking about the integration of ethnic minority diversity, and a large part of European politics is presently occupied with coming to terms with how this renews and/or unsettles established social and political configurations. Here integration starts to become a debate that describes not only processes of change that occur among groups, but what a principled position on that change should look like.

What are the public philosophies of integration policy and discourse in which Muslims have been located? Several are notable. One is that integration should proceed on the grounds of established configurations which diverse cultural, religious and ethnic minorities should seek to emulate, if not assimilate into. That is to say that where Muslim minorities ‘insist on retaining their separate cultures, they should not complain if they are viewed as outsiders and subjected to discriminatory treatment’ (Parekh 2000: 197). A more nuanced and elaborate version of this position limits the comprehensiveness of assimilation to the public sphere, into which Muslims should assimilate in order to participate in the political cultures of a society, but without preventing them from retaining their diversity at the level of the family, and some parts of civil society. The insistence here is upon a prescribed ‘political culture, which includes [society’s] public or political values, ideals, practices, institutions, modes of political discourse, and self-understanding’ (Parekh 2000: 200). Some perceived this mode of integration – comprising at least partial assimilation – as ascendant (Back et al. 2002), as a solution to the sorts of societal disunity allegedly associated with ethnic minority separatism in general, and Muslim alienation and estrangement (and ultimately violent radicalism) in particular.

Such prescriptions for integration as comprising full or partial assimilation have not gone unchallenged, however, and indeed until relatively recently were viewed as less favourable than other modes of integration (Triandyfillidou et al. 2011). This would include approaches deemed as multicultural and which recognized that social life consists of individuals and groups, and that both need to be provided for in the formal and informal distribution of powers (CMEB 2000, Meer and Modood 2009, Modood 2013). This means that while individuals have rights, mediating institutions such as Muslim associations may also be encouraged to be active public players and may even have a formal representative or administrative role to play.

Governing Muslim integration
In the six UK governments that have held office since the publication of the Runnymede report, the integration of Muslims has not followed a uniform story of either assimilation or integration. There have also been important multiculturalist advances in terms of the incorporation of Muslim political organizations, even where the fate of these
achievements is marked by uncertainty. For example, a national body was created to represent mainstream Muslim opinion; with some encouragement from both the main national political parties, it led to a body to lobby on behalf of Muslims in the parliamentary corridors of power. This new body, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), was accepted as a consultee by the New Labour government of 1997 till about the middle of the subsequent decade, following the invasion of Iraq. The MCB was successful in achieving its aims of having Muslim equality issues and Muslims as a group recognized in addition to issues of race and ethnicity; and of itself being accepted by government, media and civil society as the spokesperson for Muslims. Another two achieved aims were the state funding of Muslim schools on the same basis as Christian and Jewish schools (Meer 2009); and getting certain educational and employment policies targeted on the severe disadvantage of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (who are nearly all Muslims) as opposed to on minority ethnicity generally. Additionally, it played a decisive role in persuading Tony Blair to go against ministerial and civil service advice and include a religion question in the 2001 Census (Sherif 2011). This meant that the ground was laid for the possible later introduction of policies targeting Muslims to match those targeting groups defined by race or ethnicity – or gender. Even as the MCB fell out of favour, local and national consultations with Muslim groups grew rapidly (O’Toole et al. 2013).

Alongside these practical developments of incorporating Muslim interests in certain policy areas, there has been an increased public visibility of Muslims in both the discursive and the everyday life of the nation. Where the Labour governments (1997–2010) were more active, the following coalition government (2010–2015) was slower, and its long-awaited strategy on integration was not published until February 2012. In Creating the Conditions for Integration, then-Communities Secretary Eric Pickles defined integration as an antidote to extremism and intolerance (DCLG 2012). In this, there was no shift in the discourse about Muslims as a fifth column established by talk about parallel lives over the preceding decade. Indeed, the long-awaited integration strategy folded Muslims into a general national unease that had been suggested by Sayeeda Warsi a year earlier in her assertion that Islamophobia had ‘passed the dinner-table test’ (Batty 2011). What has come to define integration talk since has been a focus on creeping change and fear as dangers to the cohesiveness (and existence) of the nation. In this, the strategy echoed concerns with ‘Britishness’ propounded by New Labour since 2006, while giving further succour to fears of an encroaching Londonistan (Phillips 2006) and Eurabia (Ye’or 2006).

Accompanying the focus on Britishness, there has been a focus on informal care and support to build integration from the ground up. Pickles’ integration policy followed in the mould of the ‘Big Society’ paraded by then-Prime Minister David Cameron as part of the Conservative Party’s 2010 election campaign, with Pickles’ ‘Big Lunch’ following in this vein. Other everyday interventions included cultivating trust between different people living in the same area through the ‘Near Neighbours’ scheme. There was then a certain banality to this integration strategy. The reference to recognizable things in everyday life – lunches, bible prayers in school and council assemblies – represented a sidestep from lofty policy language such as ‘sleepwalking to segregation’ and ‘parallel lives’.

There has also been a weighing-in of non-governmental voices in integration debates. For example, in 2014 the Social Integration Commission published its report How Integrated Is Modern Britain? It noted the challenge to ‘get policy right’ in an area considered to be more about informal or voluntary choices that people make rather than solely policy decisions. Its short report foregrounded the importance of social interactions while problematizing the ideas that more diverse areas are automatically integrated, and that only ethnic minorities should be concerned with becoming integrated (Social Integration Commission 2014). Further, we have come to see the debate about integration being played out in more popular terms with references to places with sizeable Muslim populations as ‘no-go areas’ (The Guardian 2015), and images of niqab-wearing women as out of place and Muslim/Pakistani men as sexual predators. Integration is, thus, visceralized in feelings, emotions and beliefs about others, and overwhelmingly Muslims.

The populism surrounding integration debates has been capitalized on by the UK’s main political parties, and alarmingly successfully by the UK Independence Party (UKIP), for which it also takes on more of a parochial tone, with UKIP party leaders seeking to position it as an explicitly anti-Islam party (Sloan 2017). The emergence of populist politics fed by images of ‘Little Britain’ or ‘Little England’ has meant that integration talk takes on more of a disciplinary tone too. It is not enough that the school gates become a site of intercultural exchange: classrooms have become the front line. Alongside the creeping in of changes to the curriculum to include lessons on...
citizenship and integration, schools become spaces not only for transmitting so-called ‘Fundamental British Values’ (DfE 2015) but also for the active policing of transgressors (Alexander et al. 2015: 4). The ‘Trojan horse’ hoax in 2014 epitomized the challenges to active Muslim participation at the very local level (Miah 2017). Both examples illustrate how majoritarian codes inflected with Islamophobia are crafting strategies that, in effect, police Muslim mobilizations and claims-making, most apparently here in the field of education.

Meanwhile, the ‘Muslim question’ continues to inform the current musings of former influencers of policy on integration. Trevor Phillips, for example, who introduced the term ‘sleepwalking to segregation’ into the UK policy sphere in the 2000s, has more recently returned to update his prophecies about an imminent clash of values represented in the threat of Muslims. In Race and Faith: The Deafening Silence (2016) Phillips argues that the ‘organic integration’ that accompanied post-war immigration is no longer suitable for 21st-century Britain faced with the Muslim question. In Phillips we hear echoes of David Cameron at the Munich Security Conference in 2011 when he too called for an approach that was more ‘muscular’ (Cabinet Office 2011).

Trevor Phillips has maintained a voice in integration debates through commentary and media. For example, he recently presented the Channel 4 programme What Muslims Really Think (13 April 2016), in which he offered a distorted picture of Muslim attitudes toward a range of issues, including same-sex relationships, faith schools, polygamy and, of course, religious-inspired violence, that have come to define liberal notions of citizenship. Not surprisingly the programme prompted responses from Muslims and liberals alike who challenged the validity of the sample and the interpretation of the results. The Muslim question has also featured in the reality TV programme Muslims Like Us, which aired on BBC 2 in December 2016. It sought to explore a group of selected Muslims’ relationship to Britishness through bringing together an unlikely range of Muslims and non-Muslims in one (not so Big Brother-like) house.

Much of the national focus on Muslims in relation to questions of integration and Britishness discussed above was addressed in the most recent government-commissioned exercise on integration – the Casey Review published in December 2016. The report opens with a confession that it will be difficult reading for Britain’s Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, whom it characterizes as self-segregating, with inadequate leadership, and misogynistic. The Casey Review continued with the policy approach of viewing communities and individuals as agents for change. Notably, Casey’s approach to integration involved the promotion of resilience, mainly among the young and school-aged – a group accustomed to ‘rolling with the punches’ in an era of reduced public provisions as well as spaces in order to be political and affect change (Schilling and Simone 2015). There does seem to prevail a mood in government that sees Muslims as ‘outsiders’ who need to be brought ‘inside’.

What does the evidence tell us?
If we turn away from the discursive accounts towards a more applied analysis of Muslim integration, we should ask: what indicators are best suited to measuring success and failure of Muslim integration? The indicators identified by the commentators above combine behaviour (in this case residential settlement – or where people chose to live and form communities) and attitude (in terms of how people identify, and how strongly). Using these two indicators, what can we say about patterns of Muslim integration in Britain?

Residential settlement
Residential settlement is commonly identified as a visible sign of non-integration. A prevailing view is that Muslims tend to cluster and develop very strong ‘bonding capital’ (with kith and kin) at the expense of ‘bridging capital’ (with other non-Muslim groups and communities). The 2011 census tells us that 4.8% of the population self-defines as Muslim (over 2.7 million of the UK population), and it is true that a considerable percentage of British Muslims are concentrated in certain local authorities in East London, the North West, Birmingham and West Yorkshire (as well as in areas that border these). But it does not follow that this clustering is tightly configured and nor does it mean that the pattern is fixed. If we analyse the demographic distribution using the Index of Similarity, which measures ethnic group concentration, the broad tendency is actually for Muslims to be less separate than other religious groups, and indeed to be more likely to display a pattern of dispersal (e.g. settlement away from family of origin).

As Jivraj (2013: 18) summarizes, ‘the Muslim population is relatively evenly spread through England and Wales (Index of Similarity of 54%), which means that the separation factor has decreased since 2001’.
As a comparison, the current Index of Similarity for British Hindus is 52%, British Sikhs 61% and
British Jews 63%. Claims that British Muslims have been particularly reluctant to mix with other groups therefore seem unsubstantiated, at least when considering residential location.

**Identity and integration**

This behavioural tendency is further supported by polling on the kinds of neighbourhoods Muslims would ideally choose to live in. For example, when asked, ‘If you could live in any neighbourhood in this country, which comes closest to describing the one you would prefer?’, Muslims are nearly 10% more likely than non-Muslims to want to live in ‘mixed’ neighbourhoods (of Muslims and non-Muslims) and half as likely to want to live in exclusively Muslim neighbourhoods as other groups are to want to live in neighbourhoods exclusively reflecting their ethnic or religious groups (Gallup 2011).

If we move to a further attitudinal indicator concerning self-identification with Britain, we find that Muslims are in many respects highly integrated. In analyses of the UK Government’s Citizenship Survey, Heath and Roberts (2008: 2) found ‘no evidence that Muslims … were in general less attached to Britain than were other religions or ethnic groups. Ethnic minorities show clear evidence of “dual” rather than “exclusive” identities.’ These authors point instead to hyphenated identities, showing that 43% of Muslims say they belong ‘very strongly’ to Britain and 42% that they belong to Britain ‘fairly strongly’. Taken together, these figures are higher for Muslim respondents than the equivalent figures for Christians or those of ‘no religion’. What is especially interesting is that this confident British Muslim identity has developed alongside pan-Muslim solidarities, the idea of the Muslim ‘ummah’ or ‘community of believers’. This has proved quite consistent with the widely accepted body of findings, reiterated by Wind-Cowie and Gregory’s (2011) conclusion, that ‘overall British Muslims are more likely to be both patriotic and optimistic about Britain than are the white British community’.

As our discussion reflects, the obvious problem with measuring Muslim integration is that it quickly becomes a ‘vortex’ issue that sucks in a range of others (Saggar et al. 2012). One of these is, of course, ‘extremism’ or ‘radicalization’. For, despite evidence that Britain’s Muslims are integrated according to conventional measures, international conflict, political violence and shifting national identity are in many respects the real drivers of anxiety over Muslim integration. What is insufficiently registered, however, is that they are the exception and not the norm.
Adam’s story
London, male

Growing up I didn’t really describe myself as Muslim or think much about my Muslim background. Before 9/11 it seemed easier to have a relaxed or even inactive relationship to Islam. Since then, I have experienced Islamophobia in various ways. I am regularly stopped by border officials and questioned, often for more than 20 minutes, and a few times for much longer. People have made assumptions about my views, beliefs or practices, typically presuming I am backward, illiberal or sexist.

As a non-practising Muslim, I also hear non-Muslims loosen their tongues about Muslims, asking me as a part-insider about what I really think about Muslims, and if they (i.e. Muslims) really think or do various terrible things. They assume I share their identity and sympathize with their arguments about Muslims.

Once, after giving a work presentation, which didn’t even address religion or Muslims, the first question from the audience was ‘what is your view on female genital mutilation?’ I was initially baffled by the question, but then I realized I was being asked whether as a Muslim I supported it, and that this was viewed as a reasonable and justifiable question following a presentation that had nothing to do with such issues.

This sort of thing has happened on a few occasions but, in general, secular Muslims like me don’t have the same intensity of Islamophobia compared to more obviously practising Muslims. But it also shows how no matter what a Muslim actually says or thinks, including whether or not we practise or believe in any religion, we are still always vulnerable to Islamophobic presumptions about Muslims.

One way I have dealt with Islamophobia is to affirm that I am in fact a Muslim. However I self-identify, and whatever my religious or other beliefs, that can’t override the nature and extent of Islamophobia in modern Britain (and beyond). I’ve also become more conscious about not wanting to be defensive, ashamed or in denial of my background: of course I’ve got a Muslim background, and just as being a Catholic or a Jew in the UK isn’t only or even mainly a question of religious belief or practice, Muslims too shouldn’t be asked or required to deny their ‘Muslimness’.

I’ve also become more irritated with my fellow secular and agnostic citizens, many of whom I think are blind to the discriminatory and terrible consequences of Islamophobia on real people’s lives. I still don’t believe in religious principles and this can be a challenge too: some Muslims don’t see me as part of their community, and a few will even reject me more explicitly. I haven’t often challenged people – whether Muslim or non-Muslim, religious or secular – very much about their Islamophobia, and I feel some of this is due to my concerns about expressions of Islamophobia or other prejudice being directed at me.

Secular Muslims like me are not always less vulnerable to Islamophobia where that takes the form of street-level racism and prejudice. But our relatively ‘invisible difference’ from the white British community means we don’t suffer as much as more observant Muslims (just as orthodox Jewish people are more targeted by racist attackers than are secular Jews).

Our experience isn’t perhaps the most common or most pressing one, but I hope that secular and religious Muslims can better find common ground, and of course be joined by non-Muslims in better challenging Islamophobia when we see or experience it.

* Adam’s name has been changed to protect his identity
On revisiting the original Runnymede report, the specific reference to Muslim communities and civic society groups and organizations is striking. Comprising just five recommendations, the overarching emphasis was on Muslim organizations being tasked with discussing the report and ‘identify[ing] the recommendations on which they themselves can take immediate initiatives’ (Runnymede Trust 1997: 18). This perhaps suggested that the scope for Muslim communities and civic society was limited. In fact, every part of the report was directly relevant to Muslim communities and civic society. While the report intoned that Islamophobia was a challenge for us all, that challenge was far greater for Muslims and those seeking to campaign and advocate on their behalf.

This chapter reflects on this far-from-insignificant challenge, to consider how Muslim organizations and civic society groups and organizations have been able to respond to and address Islamophobia. Focusing on how Muslim groups and organizations have changed – and indeed have been catalysed to change – over the past two decades, the chapter also considers the key socio-political factors that have not only framed how Muslim communities have been perceived but also hindered their progress in addressing Islamophobia.

Reflecting on Muslim communities and civic society at the time of the report’s publication, there was little recognition of Islamophobia among them. Consequently, few groups and organizations had the expertise necessary to adequately respond to the challenge of addressing Islamophobia, not least through campaigning and lobbying at the national political level. Lewis (1994) rightly suggests that by the late 1980s, much of Muslim civic society was typically concerned with religious and theological matters, or, alternatively, that civic society organizations were established to provide some form of welfare. Hamid (2013) similarly acknowledges how in the 1980s various Islamic youth movements began to emerge in response to specific theological and religious concerns.

It was only after the ‘Satanic Verses affair’ that things began to change, catalysing Muslims to organize and campaign on shared issues at the national level on the basis of Muslims being a distinct socio-political constituency. One organization of note to emerge out of this was the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA). Calling for legislation to make religious discrimination unlawful prior to the publication of the Runnymede report (Weller 2006), it was supported by the Commission for Racial Equality in lobbying government to use the 1975 White Paper on racial discrimination as a suitable basis upon which similar protection could be afforded to religious communities and individuals (Allen 2013).

As Weller puts it, the publication of the Runnymede report ‘moved the terms of the debate quite significantly … [introducing] into public discourse the notion that, alongside shared dynamics of discriminatory experience, there may also be particularities of Muslim experience signalled by the word “Islamophobia”’ (Weller 2006: 306). While this was so, the real challenge facing Muslim communities and civic society was the fact that very few groups or organizations had the appropriate expertise to take forward the report’s findings. Admittedly, the report was right in suggesting there was much that Muslim groups and organizations could do within their own communities. But if Muslims were to have any real impact or make real progress in addressing the social realities of Islamophobia, then they needed to engage national government, the media and others.

As regards engaging national government, the electoral success of Tony Blair’s New Labour government was seen to be a positive development not least because it was far more receptive to religion and markers of religiosity than almost any of its predecessors (Allen 2013). This was initially evident in its willingness to engage in formal Muslim–government relations via the newly formed Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), which was described as New Labour’s protege (Silvestre 2010). The Muslim Association of Britain was also established around the same time, albeit without being attributed the same status as the MCB, but campaigning to address Islamophobia was not a priority for either – at least not in the late 1990s.
The same of course was also true of other Muslim organizations at the time.

It is difficult to evidence the extent to which the Runnymede report catalysed Muslim communities and civic society to begin organizing and campaigning on the need to address Islamophobia. Nonetheless, within a few years of the publication a handful of Muslim groups and organizations began to emerge for whom addressing Islamophobia was a central tenet. The first of these was the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC). Known previously as the Human Rights Committee, it was successful in launching a report entitled _Anti-Muslim Discrimination and Hostility in the United Kingdom_ at the House of Lords in 2000. While it has continued to campaign about Islamophobia and associated issues to the present day, it is fair to say that the IHRC has had a limited impact in the national political spaces. Another body to emerge around the same time was the Muslim Public Affairs Committee UK (MPACUK). Formed in 2000 as an e-group, its initial remit was to monitor the British media for Islamophobia. Having continued since – broadening its remit to advocate for greater Muslim participation, among other aims – its impact in the national political spaces has also been limited.

One other organization of note also emerged in the wake of the Runnymede report’s publication. Having the potential to be the most significant, the Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR) was formed in 2001. With a clear remit to raise awareness about Islamophobia, it also sought to campaign and lobby government on behalf of Muslims and their communities. The first organization to specifically address Islamophobia, it had some initial success in getting the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 passed. Various factors resulted in FAIR failing to reach its potential, however, and it was largely defunct within a decade.

The demise of FAIR again opened a significant gap in campaigning and lobbying to address Islamophobia. More significant were two crucial socio-political factors that not only shaped how Muslim communities were perceived but also determined how Muslim communities and organizations were able to engage in public and political spaces.

The first of these began in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks before coming to greater prominence following the 7/7 attacks in London. Not only did the terror attacks result in Muslims and the religion of Islam coming under intense public and political scrutiny, but it significantly shifted the focus of formal Muslim–government relations. New Labour’s thinking about Muslims and Islam became almost wholly framed by matters of security, counter-terrorism and extremism. The same was largely true of New Labour’s political and policy interventions. As numerous studies have shown, this reinforced many of the public’s fears and anxieties about Muslims and Islam (Briggs et al. 2006, Spalek and McDonald 2009, Allen 2013, Kundnani 2015), and it also went some way to reinforcing many of the negative stereotypes that seemed to inform most ‘Islamophobia-thinking’ (Allen 2017). In truth, addressing Islamophobia was not a priority for New Labour, illustrated by the fact that it rarely referred to Islamophobia throughout 13 years of government. When the government did address Islamophobia, it was always part of a wider conversation about strengthening counter-terror legislation or Muslim communities needing to do more to challenge extremism (Allen 2017). It could be argued that when Islamophobia was referred to, it was little more than a ‘bargaining chip’ in the process of co-opting Muslims into endorsing and supporting policies (Khan 2009; Kundnani 2015).

The second significant socio-political factor was concurrent. While organizations such as the MCB had been afforded preferential status, cracks in the relationship were soon evident. Struggling to find the best way to navigate its protege role from the start of the ‘war on terror’, the MCB lost credibility as a result, both with the politicians who had endorsed it and with the grassroots communities that had supported it (Altikriti 2012). When the government eventually severed ties with it, a far more competitive environment for Muslim groups and organizations emerged as the New Labour government sought a new interlocutor. Seeking to fill the void, a number of new organizations emerged, such as the British Muslim Forum and the Sufi Muslim Council. It was also the first time that ‘ex-extremist’ groups such as the Quilliam Foundation emerged. It should be stressed (see Gilliat-Ray 2004) that New Labour’s engagement with Muslims – and indeed other faith-based groups and organizations – was undertaken on the basis of an unquestioned, taken-for-granted premise. Groups and organizations had to be a certain size, have a particular narrative around the heritage and history of their faith and communities, and have representatives with the right connections, experience and wealth. More importantly, they also had to be willing to unequivocally accept and support certain governmental assumptions. As Woodhead (2010) comments, if they did not – as per the MCB – New Labour’s conditional and
shifting alliances became apparent. Rather than being able to determine and shape formal Muslim–government relations, then, Muslim groups and organizations were faced with having to be complicit and agreeable or be excluded from the discussion. This was not conducive to beginning conversations about addressing Islamophobia and making it a political priority.

Allen and Guru (2012) note the detrimental impact of increased competition between Muslim groups and organizations, and set out how formal relations with Muslim civic society were significantly different from those undertaken with minority communities historically. Most obvious was how New Labour’s approach enabled the state to have a hand – initially, a less-than-direct one – in structuring and organizing Muslim political representation and subsequent agendas. Silvestre (2010) notes that such an approach sits in contention with those of other European states, where formal relations reflect levels of self-organization among Muslim communities; in such a context, not only do those Muslim communities drive the process but they also maintain a sense of autonomy in determining what is important to them. Only where little self-organization is apparent do governments typically intervene and impose a “top-down” approach. Yet as Allen and Guru (2012) note, New Labour’s latter years in government saw it seek to create its own Muslim groups through which to engage on the matters that were important to the politicians. Criticized as smokescreens behind which politicians sought to establish institutionalized forms of Islam or ‘types’ of Muslims (Allen and Guru 2012), what emerged from this were a number of groups that had little credibility or traction with grassroots communities, including the National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group and the Young Muslim Advisory Group.

The combination of the shadow of counter-terror and counter-extremism with the shift in how formal Muslim–government relations were engineered and constructed seriously and detrimentally affected not only the extent to which Muslim communities and their groups and organizations were able to address Islamophobia but, more importantly, whether they were able to even begin the processes of engaging on the issue. As well as restricting what issues were important to Muslims themselves, the political mechanisms preferred by New Labour also restricted whose voices could be heard and, in consequence, who received funding, on what basis and for what purpose. As regards the latter, any funding of Muslim civic society was almost entirely for counter-terror or counter-extremism activities: very little indeed was made available to support those seeking to address Islamophobia. Consequently, not only did Muslim communities have to take responsibility for addressing Islamophobia but they had to do so with their own resources and monies: another significant departure from how national government had historically supported minority communities working towards addressing discrimination. Admittedly, this did not stop those such as the IHRC working with grassroots communities, or the activities of those such as Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND, formerly iENGAGE). But what it did do was to seriously constrain the opportunities for such organizations’ advocacy work to be heard in political spaces.

After the 2010 general election, some evidence of potential change emerged when Baroness Sayeeda Warsi made her now infamous ‘dinner-table test’ speech, stating that, ‘Islamophobia has now crossed the threshold … For far too many people, Islamophobia is seen as a legitimate – even commendable – thing.’ Her comments were seen as something of a watershed moment. Many within Muslim civic society even saw this as a statement of intent by the coalition government (Allen 2017). Warsi’s comments were catalytic, evident in the creation of the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Islamophobia and the Cross-Government Working Group on Anti-Muslim Hate soon afterwards.

Having been actively engaged with both the APPG and the Cross-Government Working Group, the author found his optimism that things might be changing soon dissipated. While a number of factors are worthy of consideration – see Allen (2017) for a more detailed analysis – it cannot be denied that pertinent to this was the fact that the coalition government adopted a largely similar approach to that of its political predecessor as regards engaging Muslim communities. While swiftly disbanding New Labour’s self-constructed top-down groups, the coalition did, however, continue to engage only those meeting on the basis of similar unquestioned, taken-for-granted premises. Given that these groups and organizations were not always best placed to campaign and lobby government for change, despite the coalition seemingly affording greater importance to the issue of addressing Islamophobia, the result was little different from what had come before. The same governmental constraints and criteria that had rendered Muslim civic society largely impotent under New Labour had much the same effect under the coalition also.
Two somewhat contrasting civic society organizations deserve some recognition: Tell MAMA (‘MAMA’ being an acronym for ‘measuring anti-Muslim attacks’) and MEND. Initially funded by the coalition government, MAMA was established to provide a third-party reporting service to victims and witnesses of Islamophobia that enabled them to not only record details of the incident but also obtain further advice and support. Similarly to the service provided by the Community Safety Trust (CST) for victims of antisemitism, MAMA publishes data annually from which trends and developments can be identified and, hopefully, duly responded to. While MAMA has come under intense media and political scrutiny and criticism, there is little doubt that it has made significant progress in raising awareness about Islamophobia as being akin to other forms of hate, while also making a significant contribution towards evidencing the scale and prevalence of Islamophobia.

MEND too has run a number of initiatives and campaigns that have helped raise awareness about Islamophobia and what to do if individuals become victims. In addition, MEND made an extremely comprehensive and compelling submission to the Leveson Inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the British press, detailing how issues relating to Muslims and Islam are typically misunderstood and misrepresented in much news coverage. It is worth noting that all eight of MEND’s recommendations were included in the Inquiry’s final report, which was sealed by Royal Charter in October 2013. Despite this, MEND, like MAMA, is another organization that has come under intense media and political scrutiny.

On critical reflection, Muslim communities and civic society groups and organizations have faced an insurmountably difficult task in trying to address Islamophobia in the two decades since the publication of the original Runnymede report. The socio-political factors that continue to cast a long shadow over this period, combined with the political mechanisms that not only restricted and constrained but also demarcated on the basis of distinguishing ‘good’ from ‘bad’ Muslims through affording political legitimacy to particular groups, created an environment where Islamophobia was far from being a political priority and where Muslims could not meaningfully engage. While it would be easy to point the finger of blame at Muslim communities and their groups and organizations, doing so would misrepresent the realities of how difficult the task has been for Muslim civic society in particular: far more difficult than might have been envisaged back in 1997. While many were able to ‘identify the recommendations on which they themselves can take immediate initiatives’, the barriers and obstacles they have encountered in seeking to do so have meant that Islamophobia remains not only a challenge but indeed a very widespread problem for British society today.
Tariq’s story
Social scientist, London/Leeds, US American, brown male

‘You constantly question whether something that happened was indeed an attack or not.’

Anti-Muslim sentiment has had a significant impact on my life in the UK in two ways. The first, more direct verbal abuse, has been easier to handle and address than the second, diffuse and innocuous underlying psychological abuse.

I have been verbally abused for being perceived or ‘found out’ as Muslim. All but one of these was in the ‘gay scene’, by drunk, white men or women. Most times it was easier for my mental and physical wellbeing to remove myself from the situation. What was more disappointing in these situations was the silence of observers, suggesting indifference.

The underlying anti-Muslim attitudes coated in a veneer of professionalism that I have experienced in academia have had much worse effects. The most poignant example, is my abuse for four years during my PhD by my research tutor. Along with other Muslim or South Asian students, I was the target of repeated attempts to derail our academic career and mental wellbeing.

The research tutor actively made anti-Muslim or racist comments behind our backs, but nobody would confront him because of his power. In front of others he would make certain comments about my beliefs or origins that were easily veiled as ‘banter’ or seemed completely innocuous to those unaware of what he was trying to do. One example was his insistence I drink at every occasion and repeated questioning as to why I wouldn’t drink. When I would emphatically decline his offers in a tone indicating he should stop asking, I would be made to seem like the one committing a faux-pas. This is the least psychologically violent example.

Repeated gaslighting and ‘undetectable’ structural anti-Muslim actions by others are psychologically abusive because they undermine one’s sense of reality. They can never be ‘proven’ and so go unaccepted and undetected. You constantly question whether something that happened was indeed an attack or not.

I have gone through therapy to address some issues, but others will likely not be able to be addressed in the short term. I know that I’m not the only one who has suffered this way. I don’t see this as a badge of victimhood, but rather a testament to resilience in the face of structural inequality. The way forward can only be through recognizing and shunning the latent racism and anti-Muslim sentiment pervasive through UK society and attacking it not as an isolated phenomenon, but as intimately interlaced with other problems such as xenophobia and classism.

*Tariq’s name has been changed to protect his identity and the descriptors are based on self identification.*
The early years of the 21st century have seen an extraordinary proliferation of political mobilizations against Islam in many European and North American countries, including campaigns against the building of mosques and minarets, and for imposing ‘burqa bans’. This shows that anxiety about the place of Islam in ‘western’ societies transcends national boundaries. Furthermore many actors involved in these campaigns have built extensive international networks, and have long been sharing organizational models, strategies, tactics and resources. Significantly, many right-wing political parties, protest movements and advocacy groups across Europe and North America have come to view themselves as part of a transnational ‘counter-jihad’ movement dedicated to resisting what they perceive as the ‘Islamization of the west’. This sphere of activity goes beyond casual prejudice or bigotry towards Muslims: it is grounded in a developed political ideology, supported by a complex organizational infrastructure, and goes far beyond simply issuing Islamophobic pronouncements.

The aim of this chapter is to introduce some of the key actors involved in this movement and the main elements of their political discourse, situating these in relation to other parts of the resurgent political right. The chapter will go on to discuss some examples of transnational networking, before concluding with a consideration of the movement’s political impact.

Movement overview
The political geography of the counter-jihad movement is primarily transatlantic, although its wider political networks extend to countries such as Australia and Israel. The movement first began to coalesce in the mid- to late 2000s, but it had important political and intellectual antecedents. One political forerunner was the late Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn, who was one of the first to campaign on the theme of Islam as a threat to ‘western liberal values’, before being murdered by Volkert van der Graaf in 2002. Key intellectual resources for the movement include the ‘clash of civilizations’ literature developed by conservative American academics like Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis during the 1990s. Another key reference point is the ‘Eurabia’ conspiracy theory elaborated by the British author Gisele Littman (‘Bat Ye’Or’) and popularized by her disciples, including the American author and blogger Robert Spencer and the Norwegian blogger Peder Jensen (‘Fjordman’).

In organizational terms, the European counter-jihad movement includes both party-political and street-based activist wings. Its key political figurehead has long been Geert Wilders, leader of the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands. Some European parties that have formed links with the movement include the Sweden Democrats, the Belgian Vlaams Belang and the Swiss People’s Party. Other parties, such as the Alternative for Germany, the Austrian Freedom Party and the French Front National, have also mobilized against ‘Islamization’.

The street-based, activist wing of the movement has included ‘Stop the Islamization of …’ campaigns and ‘Defence Leagues’ in various European countries. The template for many of these groups was provided by the English Defence League (EDL), a street protest movement formed in the English town of Luton in the summer of 2009 (Jackson 2011). Other ‘Defence Leagues’ were formed in countries including Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden and Germany but none of these matched the mobilizing power of the EDL. Claiming to be ‘leading the counter-jihad fight’ in Europe, the EDL staged a series of provocative demonstrations in multi-ethnic towns and cities across England, including Birmingham, Leicester, Dudley and Bradford, which often involved violent clashes with anti-fascist counter-demonstrators and the police (Goodwin 2013). At its peak around 2011 it was able to mobilize up to 3,000 people at a time, but it went into long-term decline after its key leaders left in late 2013 and is today a shadow of its former self. However, the June 2017 ‘UK Against Hate’ demonstration in Manchester promoted by former EDL leader Stephen Lennon (‘Tommy Robinson’), and the similar ‘Unite Against Extremism’ event in London organized by the ‘Football Lads Alliance’ the same month, are reminiscent of the circumstances surrounding the emergence of the EDL (Smith and Shifrin 2017).

A slightly different organizational model has been provided by the German Pegida movement (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West), formed in October 2014 in the city of Dresden in the former East Germany (De Genova 2015). At its peak, in January 2015, Pegida was able to mobilize up to
25,000 people for its rallies, which were preceded by silent processions through the city centre. These ‘evening strolls’ often attracted middle-class residents of Dresden, including families with children, in contrast to the EDL’s largely male and working-class support base. Pegida groups have since been formed in other German cities and in countries including Austria, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, albeit on a much smaller scale.

In organizational terms, the North American counter-jihad movement is quite different from its European counterpart. It is dominated by professionalized advocacy organizations that are often well resourced and well connected. One key organization is the Center for Security Policy (CSP), a Washington-based thinktank run by former Reagan administration official Frank Gaffney. The CSP produces alarmist literature alleging Muslim Brotherhood infiltration of the US government, a ‘green scare’ reminiscent of the anti-communist hysteria of the Cold War-era ‘red scare’. In 2016 it launched a public counter-jihad campaign with an accompanying website, counterjihad.com. Another thinktank is the David Horowitz Freedom Center, which sponsors Robert Spencer’s Jihad Watch blog.

At the grassroots level, ACT for America claims to have organized hundreds of thousands of supporters into several hundred local ‘chapters’ across the US. In June 2017 it organized a ‘March Against Sharia’ in multiple US cities (Siddiqui 2017). Smaller activist organizations include Stop Islamization of America, a US offshoot of the European ‘Stop Islamization’ groups, led since 2010 by Robert Spencer and Pamela Geller, another influential counter-jihad blogger.

**Political ideology**

This group of actors is organizationally and ideologically distinct from the neo-Nazi far right. Many counter-jihad organizations are strongly pro-Israel, and the movement’s leadership in America includes several prominent Jewish activists and even Arab Christians. Many of these actors have emerged from the American religious right rather than the white nationalist movement or ‘alt-right’. However, the counter-jihad also encompasses some political parties and movements that have histories of association with European fascism, such as the Sweden Democrats.

What unites this eclectic group of organizations and individuals is an apocalyptic vision of western crisis, decline and impending ethno-religious war, and conspiratorial narratives of left-wing collusion with Muslims to bring about the ‘Islamization’ of the west. The discourse of the counter-jihad groups is haunted by a nightmare near-future in which a culturally eviscerated and demographically inundated Europe has been transformed into ‘Eurabia’, its population reduced to the status of second-class citizens (‘dhimmis’) living under ‘sharia law’. In weaker versions of the narrative, Eurabia is brought about through the short-sightedness and naiveté of western political elites and their excessively liberal immigration policies. In stronger versions of the narrative, Eurabia is imagined as the outcome of a deliberate plot by the political left and Muslims to undermine the national sovereignty of western nations through a ‘stealth jihad’. These conspiracy theories ignore many inconvenient facts, not least the political marginality and sociocultural diversity of Muslim populations in the west. For instance, a British Muslim of Pakistani origin might struggle even to communicate with a French Muslim of Algerian origin, making an international Muslim conspiracy extremely unlikely, to say the least (Underhill 2009).

This apocalyptic and conspiratorial discourse has a number of important historical resonances. For example, the dystopian fantasy of Europeans becoming second-class citizens in their ‘own’ countries under Muslim rule will undoubtedly remind British readers of Enoch Powell’s imagined future in which ‘the black man will have the whip hand over the white man’. Similarly, the notion of Muslims as a ‘fifth column’ secretly plotting the destruction of western nation states recalls a key trope of classical antisemitism. However, European racism and antisemitism are not the only historical analogies that might be drawn here. For instance, recent hysteria about Obama being a secret Muslim is strongly reminiscent of McCarthy-era paranoia concerning Eisenhower being a secret communist.

Religious themes and motifs have become increasingly prominent within the European political right in the context of anxieties about Muslims and Islam. For instance, some European far-right politicians now speak of western identity in ‘Judeo-Christian’ rather than ‘white ethnic’ terms, borrowing from the language of the American religious right. Much of this new political discourse is vague and arguably euphemistic, but its ambiguity is perhaps one of the things that enables conservative American Christians and Jews (who are typically strongly pro-Israel) and European white nationalists (who often have histories of association with Nazism and antisemitism) to coexist within the same political networks. A shared sense of the need to defend
‘western civilization’ against Muslims and the political left can give rise to some otherwise unlikely political alliances. For instance, the journalist and provocateur Milo Yiannopoulos is both gay and Jewish (according to Jewish law, as his maternal grandmother is Jewish) but built close links with white nationalists and neo-Nazis during his tenure as a writer for Breitbart News (Bernstein 2017).

Internationalization
The international proliferation of political mobilizations against Islam, like the international growth of far-right activism more generally, is sometimes seen as a consequence of the post-2008 global economic crisis, or as a direct response to jihadist violence. However, many of the counter-jihad groups formed long before the economic crisis, and some of their most successful mobilizations have occurred in times and places where the threat of jihadist violence had seemed to be receding. When the EDL was formed in 2009, the July 2005 London bombings were four years in the past, while the implementation of fiscal austerity still lay in the future. When Pegida mobilized in late 2014, it did so in a country where there had been no recent jihadist terror attacks and where the economy was growing.

Instead, the idea of Islam as a hostile, ‘alien’ culture has been important, and it is often refracted through specific, local experiences. For instance, the EDL grew out of the United People of Luton, a local protest group set up in response to a demonstration by offshoots of Al Muhajiroun, which had protested a homecoming parade by the Royal Anglian Regiment in Luton town centre. The first Pegida protests were organized after the movement’s founder witnessed a demonstration in Newcastle upon Tyne as a case study of street-based activism. The talk covered topics such as logistics and transportation, relationships with the police, networking and merchandizing opportunities, how to deal with counter-demonstrations by anti-racist groups, and ways of creating a cohesive group identity.

Online spaces like websites, blogs and social media have been instrumental in enabling these local, contextual experiences to be compared, analogized and woven together into broader narratives of national or civilizational endangerment and capitulation to ‘Islam’. Online spaces that have been important in the development of the movement include the US-based blogs Jihad Watch, Atlas Shrugs and Gates of Vienna, the Belgian website The Brussels Journal, the German blog Politically Incorrect and the Finnish blog Tundra Tabloids. In some cases, these virtual interactions have given rise to real-world organizations and networks. For example, the International Civil Liberties Alliance was formed in 2006 by contributors to the Gates of Vienna blog. Over the subsequent few years it sponsored international counter-jihad conferences in Copenhagen (2007 and 2009), Brussels (2007 and 2012), Vienna (2008), Zurich (2010), London (2011) and Warsaw (2013).

These international gatherings brought some far-right European parties and movements together with right-wing American activists, writers and bloggers for the first time. They also provided spaces in which to develop common tactics and strategies for resisting ‘Islamization’. For instance, the 2010 conference in Zurich included a presentation entitled ‘The anatomy of an EDL demo’, which used a demonstration in Newcastle upon Tyne as a case study of street-based activism. The talk covered topics such as logistics and transportation, relationships with the police, networking and merchandizing opportunities, how to deal with counter-demonstrations by anti-racist groups, and ways of creating a cohesive group identity.

Other transnational networks emerged in the late 2000s and early 2010s as outgrowths of existing national organizations. For instance, the International Free Press Society was founded in 2009 as an extension of the Danish Free Press Society. Its advisory board included Bat Ye’Or, Geert Wilders, staff from the Centre for Security Policy and some of the most influential counter-jihad bloggers. Stop Islamization of Nations was set up in 2012 to unite the American and European ‘Stop Islamization’ groups and there were also efforts to form a federation of European Defence Leagues around the same time. It is worth emphasizing that many of these attempts at transnational networking have been episodic and some of the organizations described here are now in abeyance.

Political impact
One measure of the impact of counter-jihad street movements in Europe is the violence they have directed towards Muslims and others who ‘look Muslim’, and the disruption they have caused to
Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all

the communities they have targeted. These groups have sometimes also had specific local impacts, for instance where they have played an instrumental role in campaigns against mosque developments. Their impact on wider public and political discourse is harder to assess, but it is unlikely to have been a coincidence, for example, that former UK prime minister David Cameron chose to give a major speech criticizing ‘state multiculturalism’ on the day of a large ‘homecoming’ demonstration in Luton by the EDL (Helm et al. 2011).

The political influence of the US counter-jihad movement is far greater than that of its European counterpart. During the 2016 US presidential election, the Center for Security Policy supplied advisors to Republican candidates including Ted Cruz and Donald Trump. When Trump announced his support for a ban on Muslim immigration to the US he did so citing a poll published by the CSP.

The links between the Trump administration and the US counter-jihad movement are extensive, so only a few key examples can be given here (for a more extensive discussion see Beauchamp 2017). Mike Flynn, Trump’s first national security advisor who was forced to resign after misleading administration officials about the nature of his conversations with the Russian ambassador, was at the time of his appointment a sitting board member of ACT for America. CIA director Mike Pompeo has spoken at ACT for America’s annual conference and sponsored events for the group inside the Capitol building. Shortly after Trump’s victory, ACT boasted in an email to supporters that it had ‘a direct line to President-elect Trump through our allies such as … Mike Pompeo’. Trump himself has met with ACT for America’s leader, Brigitte Gabriel, at his Mar-a-Lago resort.

Other administration figures with links to the counter-jihad movement include former White House chief strategist Steve Bannon and senior policy advisor Stephen Miller. Several of these individuals were reported to have been closely involved in drafting Trump’s Executive Order banning immigration to the US from seven Muslim-majority countries. Reportedly, the Trump administration has also been considering designating the Muslim Brotherhood a ‘foreign terrorist organization’. This is a policy that the CSP and other counter-jihad organizations have been pushing for years and, if carried through, would likely have a devastating effect on Muslim civil society groups in the US.

Finally, we cannot ignore the potential for conspiratorial narratives of Muslim infiltration and left-wing collusion to inspire individual acts of extreme violence. The Norwegian mass murderer Anders Breivik extensively cited counter-jihad writers and bloggers in his ‘manifesto’, and rationalized his massacre of Norwegian Labour Party youth activists on the basis that they were potential future collaborators in the ‘Islamization of Europe’. Breivik had a number of EDL supporters among his Facebook friends and posted on EDL message boards using the pseudonym ‘Sigurd Jorsalfare’ (‘Sigurd the Crusader’), the name of a 12th-century Norwegian king (Jackson 2011).

Conclusion

Rather than thinking of anti-Muslim political mobilizations in isolation, it is important to see them as part of a transnational political movement with intellectual, political and activist ‘wings’. This movement has an ideology that draws on historical forms of racism and nativism, but it has also gone beyond these to develop its own political language. The political influence of the movement varies from country to country, but it is undoubtedly in the US, under the administration of Donald Trump, that its direct impact on public policy is currently most visible. The speed with which its apocalyptic and conspiratorial narratives of western capitulation to ‘Islamization’ have entered the US political mainstream, using the Republican party as an electoral vehicle, provides an important warning for those of us living in countries where the political influence of these ideas is currently more limited.
Jasvir’s story
Lawyer, London, British Punjabi, male

‘I felt unsafe on my everyday journeys’

As a Sikh man who wears a turban I experience a hyper-visibility. Over the years various national or global events have precipitated an intensification of abuse directed at me. Most recently I found myself the target of a high level of abuse following the 2016 Brexit referendum. Much of the abuse levelled at me takes on an Islamophobic tinge. Abuse took place both online and on the street as I attempted to go to work. As I walked past people they would make monkey sounds. I was left unsure of how to react. Not knowing if responding would provoke further abuse or put me at further risk.

Online, following a tweet I sent commenting on the incidents of South Asians being attacked after the referendum I faced a barrage of abuse. This included comments such as ‘Once you niggers fuck off back to curry land …’ and people calling me Taliban or Bin Laden. It felt the same as the environment after the London bombings.

The experiences were deeply unpleasant and I felt unsafe on my everyday journeys. I became more aware of my surroundings and felt a sense of vulnerability far greater than I ever did before. Although I reported cases of abuse to the police, the incidents made me self-aware of my own safety in the weeks immediately after the referendum, as well as saddened by what I could see happening in modern Britain.

Recently, some far-right groups have been running campaigns to get their followers to differentiate between Sikhs and Muslims. This is a strategy that tries to sow divisions in communities. When I have been targeted I never say ‘I’m not Muslim – don’t attack me’ – no one should be attacked or harassed. We need to address all forms of discrimination and make sure that communities stand together against such awful behaviour.

It is vital for me to feel that I am playing my part in a united response from faith communities against racism and that we promote solidarity.

Hatred against one person is hatred against all.
11 ‘Everyone is a feminist when it comes to Muslim women’: Gender and Islamophobia
Naaz Rashid

The claim that Islam oppresses women, in ways significantly different from and worse than the ways in which women are treated in other religions and cultures, is a recurring theme of much press coverage and comment. (Runnymede Trust 1997: 28)

Introduction
The 1997 Runnymede report into Islamophobia described the dominance of gendered discourse in public debate about Islam. Twenty years on, gender continues to dominate discussions of Islam in both media and policy debates. Concurrently, racial violence disproportionately targets Muslim women, especially those wearing the hijab. Gendered stereotypes can also be a barrier in the labour market (APPG on Race and Community 2012). These discussions continue to take place against longstanding policy debates about multiculturalism, Britishness and integration, as well as, more recently, discussions about radicalization. In this short chapter I examine how debates about the veil, gender violence and the ‘war on terror’ contribute to stereotypes of Muslim women as oppressed, passive victims, symbolic of Muslim communities’ alleged failure to integrate, and increasingly as potential extremists. This type of framing does not capture or foreground the needs or experiences of Muslim women, and therefore struggles to win their support. Defending gender equality should be a more principled position, aligning with other equality and human rights perspectives, notably anti-racist ones. There is too often a contradiction between the discourse of gender rights and whether a commitment to such rights is borne out in reality.

Gendering anti-Muslim racism
Anti-Muslim racism reflects continuities and parallels with other types of racism. Different ethnic, cultural or religious groups come to experience ‘racism’ through a process of racialization whereby certain generalizations or stereotypes are created about them, through media, academic and policy narratives, based on differences in physical characteristics, appearance or other social distinctions.

Importantly, this process of racialization is gendered. In the case of anti-Muslim racism this means that the stereotypes of Muslim women and Muslim men are different but mutually constitutive of one another. That is, they are formed in relation to each other. Muslim women are seen as ‘oppressed’, passive victims and Muslim men are seen as exceptionally misogynistic. Both stereotypes, however, stem from generalizations about Islam as a uniquely patriarchal religion (Kumar 2012). This widely held stereotype denies Muslim women (and men) agency and the ability to make the moral and social choices other groups are assumed to enjoy.

The issue of gender rights notably brings together Islamophobia from across the political spectrum, including both its far-right and its liberal forms. Liberal Islamophobia assumes that Muslim communities and ‘culture’ are inherently against certain liberal values (which are frequently seen as the exclusive preserve of the ‘west’) such as democracy, human rights, free speech, and gender and sexual equality (Mondon and Winter 2017). This narrative is also reflected in far-right anti-Islam sentiments. In his infamous appearance on the BBC’s Question Time in 2009, for example, Nick Griffin, then leader of the British National Party, suggested that Islam did not fit in with British society because of its views on women, among other things (BBC News 2009).

Veiling (hijab/niqab)
While there have been no concerted efforts to ban the veil in the UK, it remains a source of concern and controversy. The veil is regarded as problematic for a variety of different reasons. First, it is seen as oppressive and representative of the presumed inferior position of women in Islam. This narrative relies on denying Muslim women wearing the veil any agency, the presumption being that all women are being forced to wear the veil by male family members. While there will of course be instances where this happens, as Tahira argues, ‘The veil cannot be seen as a black-and-white-issue; each woman who wears it has a different story and I would like to see these women recognized as individuals’ (BBC 2017). Equally, it could be argued that Muslim women are being pressured to remove their veils out of fear of anti-Muslim discrimination or violence.
Second, wearing the veil, and the niqab in particular, is frequently seen as a sign of a lack of integration and a failure to conform to British values. In 2006, Jack Straw, Labour home secretary at the time, infamously asked a niqab-wearing constituent to remove her niqab. As well as saying it would make him more comfortable, he described face veils as ‘a visible statement of separation and difference’ that made ‘better, positive relations between the two communities more difficult’ (Meer et al. 2010). Media coverage of integration invariably includes stock photos of women wearing niqabs, thus making the association very explicit. Unsurprisingly, the veil has been incorporated into discussions about inclusivity and Britishness.

Third, the veil has raised security concerns and has been associated with extremism. While there may be valid practical questions about whether it should be worn in particular professions (e.g. by nursery nurses) or contexts (e.g. in court or during security checks at airports), these can be largely accommodated. More problematic is that the veil continues to be associated with religious conservatism and therefore potentially non-violent extremism. For example, Tony Blair, in a defining speech on integration after the 7/7 London bombings, implied that veil wearing was a possible sign of extremism when he said, ‘it is not sensible to conduct this debate as if the only issue is this very hot and sensitive one of the veil. For one thing, the extremism we face is usually from men not women’ (Prime Minister’s Office 2006).

More recently, the Channel 4 newsreader Fatima Manji (who wears a hijab) was the subject of an inflammatory attack by Kelvin MacKenzie in The Sun in which he suggested that it was not appropriate for her to be presenting the news following the terrorist attacks in Nice in 2016. He asked, ‘Was it done to stick one in the eye of the ordinary viewer who looks at the hijab as a sign of the slavery of Muslim women by a male-dominated and clearly violent religion?’ In response, Manji, supported by Channel 4, complained to the press regulator, the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO), suggesting that ‘The purpose of the article appeared to be to incite hatred against Muslims in general, Muslim women in particular, and me.’ IPSO, however, rejected the complaint against the Sun columnist, thereby arguably legitimating the association between wearing a hijab and support for terrorism (Greenslade 2016).

These very public debates, which frequently do not include the voices of veil-wearing women, inform wider public opinion and continue to make veiled Muslim women targets of discrimination and racial violence.

**Forced marriage and honour-based violence**

Two forms of gendered violence dominate the policy landscape when discussing gender equality in Islam. These are forced marriage and honour-based violence (HBV). Forced marriage is distinct from arranged marriage in that coercion of either a physical or an emotional nature is used to force someone into marriage. ‘Honour’ violence, refers to instances of domestic violence or familial/child abuse where the motivation of protecting family ‘honour’, or izzat, is used as an extenuating factor.

Both these issues are rightly a matter of public concern and there are many third sector women’s organizations which undertake valuable work alongside government agencies to support women (and also occasionally male victims of such violence). And while it is important to recognize the culturally specific nature of these forms of gendered violence, in the climate of anti-Muslim racism such crimes have been sensationalized and racialized as distinct from a wider spectrum of gender violence. For example, such crimes are regularly described as ‘cultural practices’, separate from forms of domestic violence or child abuse which are committed across society more generally but which are never deemed to be cultural phenomena. These crimes are instead widely seen as the exclusive preserve of Muslims, reflecting the exceptionalism accorded to Muslim misogyny. While the increased attention given to honour killings in the media has opened up the issue of individual human rights for these women, it has also had the effect of exacerbating Islamophobia and fear of the ‘Other’ (Meetoo and Mirza 2007).

It is also striking that these issues are discussed in the context of the UK’s counter-terrorism agenda. There may be valid questions about the relationship between extremism, gendered violence and toxic masculinity. Such discussions, however, usually only address Muslim men, and where non-Muslim men are involved this is not generalized into a wider stereotype.

Finally, while violence against Muslim women is regularly invoked and instrumentalized in order to show the ‘backwardness’ of Muslim communities, this is not matched by a corresponding commitment to funding organizations working to tackle such violence, unless under the auspices of the Prevent agenda. This can be seen in the high-profile
campaigns against closure by organizations such as Apna Haq (Dugan 2015).

**Gendering the ‘war on terror’**

The original Prevent strategy and the specific initiatives which were introduced to engage with Muslim women between 2008 and 2010 were framed in terms of ‘empowerment’. The narrative of empowerment resonates with the idea that all Muslim women are oppressed. These initiatives were not premised on the idea that girls and women were at risk of being drawn into terrorism: that threat was seen to emanate principally from young men. It was only as mothers, sisters and wives that women and girls were engaged with, as people who might ‘prevent’ male family members from becoming involved in terrorism.

This representation of Muslim women can be seen in David Cameron’s controversial comments about Muslim women being “traditionally submissive” in 2016 (Hughes 2016). As PM at the time, he was promoting funds to teach Muslim women English in order to combat extremism. Just as David Blunkett blamed Asian (Muslim) parents for not speaking English at home for the urban disturbances which took place in the northern former mill towns of Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001 (Akbar 2002), so too have non-English-speaking Muslim mothers been blamed for the radicalization of Muslim youth.

In early 2015, reports of three 15-year-old British Muslim girls from the east end of London who had gone to join ISIS in Syria dominated the national and international news. These girls formed part of an increasing number of British Muslims travelling to join ISIS. The incidence of Muslim schoolgirls travelling to Syria sits in stark contrast to the way in which Muslim girls were presented in earlier Prevent initiatives. Muslim girls are increasingly being characterized as both ‘dangerous’ and ‘in danger’ (Mirza 2015: 40).

Now that the targets of the Prevent agenda have widened to include young people leaving the UK to join ISIS, counter-terrorism policies have been reframed as being about ‘safeguarding’. This conflates concerns about radicalization and terrorism with those about female genital mutilation (FGM), forced marriage and HBV. In a speech about extremism in July 2015, David Cameron provided more information about the number of cases of FGM and HBV than he did about the number of young people who had been ‘radicalized’ (Dearden 2015). While there is no denying that these are issues which require policy interventions, the conflation with extremism and radicalization suggests that they are being instrumentalized as part of a broader anti-Muslim narrative.

**Conclusion**

In this short chapter I have explored contemporary mainstream public debates about gender and Islam. Earlier in 2017, UKIP’s election manifesto included a ban on the ‘dehumanizing’ burqa and full face coverings in public places partly on the grounds that veils ‘prevent intake of essential vitamin D from sunlight’. The manifesto also proposed introducing a screening programme of annual non-invasive physical check-ups for girls identified to be at risk of FGM (Maidment 2017), thus illustrating how everyone claims to be a feminist when it comes to Muslim women (Rashid 2016).

There is clearly a need to address many of the issues affecting Muslim women, to improve their wellbeing and tackle issues of gender inequality. However, these issues need to be approached more carefully, by both media and policymakers. Currently, the effect of many of the public and policy debates on Muslim women is to locate the problem of gender inequality squarely within Islam rather than in patriarchy more generally. In doing so, patriarchy becomes particularized to Muslims, thus feeding anti-Muslim stereotypes, which then adversely affect Muslim women. It is hard to see how this either benefits Muslim women or, ultimately, addresses concerns about gender equality.

Instead, policy responses need to develop and support a wider analysis of gender inequality in relation to Muslim women. It should be clearly recognized that Muslim women exist as actors in wider society, not just as members of ‘the Muslim community’. This means that for Muslim women, gender inequality is inextricably linked to anti-Muslim racism and one cannot be tackled without dismantling the other. They are also subject to patriarchy in wider society, not only from within their communities. In addition, they are affected by economic inequality; BME women (including Muslim women) are most adversely affected by austerity-driven budget decisions – hardly an indicator that their needs and preferences are at the forefront of policymaking (Hall et al. 2017).

In addition, policy discussions need to avoid simplistic generalizations and to centre the voices of Muslim women. That is not to suggest that all Muslim women think the same; recognition and reflection of the diversity among Muslim women
is key to addressing their stigmatization. There are already many Muslim women's organizations, activists and academics who are undertaking that task themselves. From organizations which have encouraged Muslim girls to learn fencing (Maslaha: http://maslaha.org/muslim-girls-fence) to hijab-wearing spoken word artists (The Brown Hijabi: https://thebrownhijabi.com), there is certainly resistance to the simplistic narratives about Muslim women discussed in this chapter.

This is not only a question of good social-scientific and policy analysis, but one of solidarity. People who purport to be feminist when it comes to Muslim women, while at the same time affirming Islamophobic tropes and failing to address wider gender or other inequalities, are inconsistent. Tackling gender inequality generally will indeed benefit Muslim women, but those benefits will be incomplete unless anti-Muslim racism is directly challenged too. Because of the way that Muslim women are particularly affected by anti-Muslim racism, we must reaffirm the need to challenge all forms of gender and racial inequality, to improve the lives of Muslim women and all people affected by social inequalities and injustice.
PART III: DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF ISLAMOPHOBIA
12 Islamophobia and the Muslim struggle for recognition

Tariq Modood

It was not very long ago that Anglophone scholars of racism understood racism in terms of biology, and specifically in terms of the black–white binary. At the same time, other scholars, especially in continental Europe, understood racism in terms of antisemitism, especially in the recent biologized forms that Europe manifested in the 20th century. When it began to be clear that these two paradigms were failing to capture some contemporary experiences, such as anti-Asian cultural racism in Britain or anti-Arab cultural racism in France, some scholars began to move away from these paradigms. Even so, the pull of these biologistic models was so strong that even today many scholars of racism understand cultural racism in quasi-naturalistic terms, seeing culture as a ‘code’ for the biological racisms that they find more intelligible. Western European Muslims have found these scholarly hegemonies an especially galling obstacle to getting academia and fellow citizens to understand the exclusionary discourses and misrecognitions that Muslims are subject to. Following the assertive Muslim agency triggered off by the Satanic Verses affair and other Muslim controversies, as Muslims responded to such hostilities and articulated their misrecognition, they were constantly told, especially in Britain, that there is no such thing as anti-Muslim racism because Muslims are a religious group and not a race. Hence Muslims could legitimately ask for toleration and religious pluralism but not for inclusion in anti-racist egalitarian analyses and initiatives. While this view continues to be expressed even today, and some deny that there is a racism that could be labelled ‘Islamophobia’, it no longer has the hegemony it once did.

In that sense, the concept of Islamophobia and the study of Islamophobia has come of age. It is being studied in terms of its specificity, untrammeled by narrow paradigms of racism, based on other times and other oppressions, and studied alongside more familiar racisms such as antisemitism and anti-black racism. While, then, understanding some contemporary treatment of Muslims and aspects of their societal status in terms of ‘racialization’ is an advance, the conceptualization of Muslims in the west should not be reduced to racialization or any other ‘Othering’ theoretical frame such as Orientalism. By definition ‘Othering’ sees a minority in terms of how a dominant group negatively and stereotypically imagines that minority as something ‘Other’, as inferior or threatening, and to be excluded. Indeed, the dominant group typically projects its own fears and anxieties onto the minority. Minorities, however, are never merely ‘projections’ of dominant groups but have their own subjectivity and agency through which they challenge how they are (mis)perceived and seek to not be defined by others but to supplant negative and exclusionary stereotypes with positive and prideful identities. Oppressive misrecognitions, thus, sociologically imply and politically demand recognition. Our analyses therefore should be framed in terms of a struggle for recognition or a struggle for representation (Modood 2005).

Recognition of course does not mean thinking of Muslims as a group with uniform attributes or a single mindset, all having the same view on religion, personal morality, politics, the international world order and so on. In this respect Muslims are just like any other group – they cannot be understood in terms of a single essence. No one in the social sciences thinks that identities are based on cognitive or behavioural properties that are shared by all who may be members of a relevant group such as women, black people, gay and lesbian people and so on. If group members do not share a common essence then they cannot be simply demarcated from non-group members because there will be many cases where individuals are not simply on one side of the boundary or the other. So, groups cannot have discrete, or indeed fixed, boundaries as these boundaries may vary across time and place, across social contexts, and will be the subject of social construction and social change. This ‘anti-essentialism’ is rightly deployed in the study of Islamophobia and Muslims. It is a powerful way of handling ascriptive discourses, of showing that various popular or dominant ideas about Muslims, just as in the case of women, gay people etc., are not true as such but are aspects of socially constructed images that have been made to stick on to those groups of people because the ascribers are more powerful than the ascribed. Anti-essentialism is an intellectually compelling idea, and a powerful resource in the cause of equality.
It is also common, though, for authors to accuse each other of essentialism. This is because there are different versions of anti-essentialism. Some sociologists interpret the ‘anti’ to mean that all groups are fictitious constructions and that the task of sociology is to ‘deconstruct’ them. If we take this approach there is no space left for genuine group identities, and so none for recognition or group accommodation. I think groups are necessary both to social science and to anti-racism or egalitarian politics, and so I work with an alternative interpretation of anti-essentialism derived from the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1968). His concept of family resemblance offers a way of recognizing that just as it does not make sense to say that games or languages do not exist because they do not share a common, definitional essence, so the lack of group essences and discrete, bounded populations with unchanging characteristics is not a good reason to assert in an a priori way that groups do not exist. Rather, we have to have a more flexible, looser and more variable notion of a group and of group membership that allows for open-textured and overlapping boundaries and overlapping memberships. If it seems difficult to reconcile this with our a priori concept of group, let us call the entities ‘groupings’. The key point I drew from Wittgenstein was that once we stopped demanding that groups measure up to our impossible definitions we would lose the temptation to conclude that groups suffer from an ontological deficiency, that they do not ‘really’ exist (Modood 2013). Another way of putting it is that just as the complete self-made individual of some liberal theories does not exist, it does not follow that individuals do not exist, that we have to give up ‘individual’ from social science vocabularies; so, similarly, with groups.

Essentializing often takes the form of ‘Othering’ or ‘racialization’, the ascription of various negative features and roles that are supposed to define a group of people. These can take many different forms. Some of the most common are to do with having lower intelligence, with being less capable of disciplined, responsible behaviour, and with a propensity for criminal or violent behaviour. In relation to Muslims, some of the negative traits are an obsession with religion over other aspects of life, moral conservatism, especially in relation to sexuality, patriarchy, and a tendency to act on religion or politics in extreme and violent ways.

Analysis of Othering is clearly an important tool when it can be deployed to show the operation of these negative perceptions in the media, in news reports, in political discourses and the way public concerns are raised and expressed (e.g. in relation to ‘radicalization’ or women’s dress), in television programme content, in the activities of the security services and so on. There is, however, a limitation to such analyses of Othering or racialization, namely that sometimes there is a lack of agreement between those doing the Othering and those being Othered about whether certain features are necessarily negative. Most people will agree that to describe a group as less intelligent is to say something negative about it. But is this the case with religious strictness and moral conservatism? Here it is possible that the dominant group may take one view of the matter, namely that such attitudes and behaviours are negative and backward, but the minority – that is to say, substantial numbers within the minority – may refuse the suggestion that such characterizations are negative. In recent years, we have seen this most starkly in Europe, in the dominant society’s view that the wearing of the headscarf or the burqa by Muslim women is a sign of oppression. Despite the dominant society delivering this judgement through the popular and intellectual media, the numbers of women engaged in such practices has increased and the increase has been accompanied by the women in question saying that they are donning such clothes out of choice, and not in compliance with the demands of Muslim men.

To accept, to qualify or to resist such Muslim women’s perspective is to invoke a normative framework. In recent years aspects of feminism and liberalism (e.g. ‘western feminism’ and ‘muscular liberalism’) have been cynically and insincerely used to critique and undermine various Muslim practices and claims for accommodation, including issues of women’s dress. However, not all such appeals have to be cynical or insincere. They can be principled and reasonable (without necessarily being valid). Without trying to spell out in any detail the sincere and insincere versions of these highly complex and varied ‘isms’, I am simply making the point that some such normative framework is necessary. An analysis of Othering, e.g. of how the fact of living within a hegemonic secularism subtly influences Muslim subjectivity, is incomplete without an appeal to a normative framework, for without that we cannot know to what extent the influence is a result of an exercise of self-interested power, of domination, and to what extent it is an aspect of benign social change on the part of Muslims themselves, who on a reasoned basis come to adapt their practices and modify their sense of what it means to be a Muslim. To stick with my earlier example, to argue that the hijab, or niqab or burqa, are or are not a form of oppressive Othering is not just a matter of empirical
inquiry or discourse analysis but implicitly or explicitly appeals to how to distinguish between what is negative and what is positive in the characterization of Muslims. If it is implicit, it needs to be made explicit. Either way the normative presuppositions need to be questioned; that is to say, they cannot be taken for granted but stand in need of argument and justification. Without such justification not only may an analysis of Othering be incomplete or distorted, but it may itself be an exercise in Othering, namely in seeing the groups in question as prejudicially Othered as, for example, religious conservatives when that is exactly how the group may wish to think of itself and to be respected for being.

This will of course be an empirical matter. But it may also be a refusal to accept the group on its own terms. That may not be wrong as such. My point is that to accept or not to accept will require a normative argument and so perspectives such as Orientalism or anti-Islamophobia are incomplete without normative argument. Thus, the kind of normative disavowal that one finds in the influential work of, say, Talal Asad is misplaced. He has been a powerful force for getting us to rethink secularism but his conceptual framework does not explicitly help us to determine whether secularism is a good thing, or which version of secularism is better than another. Or, to put it another way, everyone will agree that Islamophobia must be distinguished from reasonable criticism of Muslims and aspects of Islam, yet not only is this a difficult distinction to make but it begs the question of what are reasonable criticisms that Muslims and non-Muslims may make or discuss, in relation to some Muslim views about, say, gender or education or secularism. Not only must the study of Islamophobia not squeeze out the possibility of such discussion, but by showing us where it becomes Islamophobic – by caricaturing, by assuming that all Muslims think in a particular way, by creating a climate in which reasonable dialogue is impossible – it should help to guide us on to the terrain of reasonable dialogue. Merely identifying the unreasonable and the populist is not enough; our frames of analysis should lead us to the reasonable, to what criticisms may be made of Muslims and/or Islam and what criticisms that Muslims want to make of contemporary western societies too are worthy of hearing. The minority in question must be able to negotiate, modify, accept criticism and change in its own way; a dialogue must be distinguished from a one-sided imposition.

Let me give another example. It is generally agreed that Islamophobia is part of the backlash against multiculturalism, and this is indeed important to bring out given that, especially in Britain, ‘race’ and/or class perspectives have tended to dominate analyses in relation to minorities. We need, however, to go beyond identifying the racisms and insecurities, cultural and material, that are among the sources of anti-multiculturalism. We need also to identify principled and reasonable concerns that may be part of anti-multiculturalism or criticisms of aspects of multiculturalism. This means a normative reference point for evaluating criticisms of multiculturalism and for offering reasoned and effective responses to such criticism (Modood 2013). This may be to offer suitable and reflexive understandings of multiculturalism that are able to take criticisms on board, while also pointing out the weaknesses in the criticisms. Or it may be to offer an alternative standpoint. What is not adequate is to merely identify and rhetorically condemn the backlash without considering what is right and wrong in the criticism of multiculturalism – or, to return to the main example, popularly expressed criticisms and anxieties about Muslims and Islam.

Islamophobia should therefore be studied within a normative framework, and not just one that exposes the normative presuppositions of others while evading the challenge of justifying one’s own normative presuppositions. The framework I use is that of multiculturalism, or a struggle for recognition and institutional accommodation. In the 1970s and 1980s a certain type of anti-racism developed in the academy and in certain polities like Britain. While critically alerting society to various forms of direct and indirect racism, it tended to frame non-white minorities in terms of racism, even to the point of creating a singular subject as the victim of racism, namely ‘blacks’, as if such groups of people had no identities of their own that were equal to those identities ascribed to them by white people (or by the political project of blackness). I have indicated that there is a danger that ‘anti-Islamophobia’ could go the same way as the earlier form of anti-racism, and some of the ways that this can be avoided – namely, to ensure that Islamophobia does not become the primary analytical frame for the study of Muslims in the west but that it is situated within a broader ‘struggle for recognition’ frame, a normative framework which prioritizes groups fighting negative outsider perceptions by giving normative and political weight to insider identifications in all their plurality.
Twenty years on from the reintroduction of the term ‘Islamophobia’ into public and policy discourse, are we closer to approaching analytical rigour in the framing of the concept and the formulation of metrics of assessment to enable reasoned and reliable comparative analysis on whether ‘conditions for Muslims in Europe’ are worsening, as Douglas Murray (2006) infamously called for, or improving? As we reflect on the intervening period since the word was first put into contemporary circulation to name and challenge hostility towards Muslims and its practical consequences, is it time to consider jettisoning ‘Islamophobia’ in favour of any of the myriad of substitute terms that have since been coined? Is ‘Islamophobia’ more a hindrance than a help to those of us concerned about negative outcomes for individuals who are, or are assumed to be, of Muslim background?

In its report of 1997, the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia deemed that sufficient evidence existed to substantiate their assessment that ‘anti-Muslim prejudice has grown so considerably and so rapidly in recent years that a new item in the vocabulary is needed’ (Runnymede 1997). The Commission’s introduction (note: not invention) of the term Islamophobia into policy discourse from 1997 has provoked many varied reactions to the phenomenon (or lack thereof, as some would have it), its usefulness in capturing historical, contingent and contextual antipathy towards Islam and Muslims which reverberate to the present day, and its application in differing contexts in the multi-layered policy landscape where its corrective purpose is its most visible form. The 1997 report primarily engaged a policy discourse and proposed corrective strategies, with its emphasis on national and local government initiatives and interventions by Muslim and non-Muslim civil society organizations to tackle Islamophobia in the UK, having identified its existence, form and breadth.

It is perhaps worth reflecting on the prevalence of the concept in the contextual spheres where its corrective purpose is directed, if only to offer insight into the domains where contestation of and mobilization around the concept have in some ways projected themselves on the utility ascribed to Islamophobia. Disagreements over conceptual clarity and analytical rigour notwithstanding, ‘Islamophobia’ is a term more widely used by British Muslims than in policy discourses about tackling discrimination or prejudice experienced by Muslims. In other places, Islamophobia is referred to in policy documents with an assumptive bias, with the implication that the term is sufficiently well understood not to require clear definition. In more recent developments, we find a reversion to categories of race and discrimination based on ethnic markers. What accounts for these shifts, and what do they mean to the value and significance of Islamophobia as a concept?

It is the case that more attention has been devoted to problematizing the term itself than to the phenomenon it seeks to describe. There’s the preoccupation with the suffix, connoting ‘irrationality’, which some would argue inadvertently advantages those whose hostility is cold and calculated, bearing no relation to the irrational at all.

There’s the normative disquiet about supposedly placing religion above criticism and thus rendering Islam superior to all else that it might reasonably, and rightly, be considered fair to criticize. Moreover, with the continued use of conflations to circumvent the use of the word ‘Islamophobia’, might we make better progress in tackling the impact by displacing the obsession with one word and making use of substitutions?

There’s ‘anti-Muslim racism’, for those who want hostility towards Muslims to be recognized, as a process and in outcomes, as similar in type to colour-based racism.

Or ‘anti-Muslim prejudice’, for those who favour a milder terminology to capture bias motivations that hinder equal access to goods, services and life chances.

‘Anti-Muslim discrimination’ has its uses too, although the term would appear to be too narrowly construed and too weak to reflect the broad range of adverse outcomes, from violent assault to recruitment bias, that is currently evoked by the more wide-ranging use of ‘Islamophobia’.

I want to show that while these different terms have gained currency over the last 20 years, retaining the word ‘Islamophobia’ to describe
‘unfounded hostility towards Islam [and] also to the practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities and to the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social affairs’ (Runnymede Trust 1997: 4) is necessary for two reasons. Firstly, it is necessary because analysis of media reporting on Islam and Muslims shows that ‘Islam’ and ‘Islamic’ are more likely to be negatively framed in the British press (Baker et al. 2013, Baker and McEnery 2015b) than ‘Muslims’, thus placing group association and (perceived) group membership at the core of collective stereotyping and its consequences. Secondly, with the growing propensity in the British media to blame ‘extremist Islam’ for radicalization and terrorism, and the frequent use of the phrases ‘Islamist extremism’ or ‘Islamist terrorism’ in political discourses, reverting to a victim-centred terminology (focusing on the ‘Muslim’, not ‘Islam’), risks bifurcating the counter-narrative and dislodging it from contextual factors that are themselves collectivizing and homogenizing when it comes to Islam and Muslims.

If the point of departure for identifying Islamophobia in practice is the presence of ‘Muslim or Islamic identifiers’ (Allen 2010: 62), then reporting on Islam and Muslims in the British press offers plentiful food for thought. Media and its bias against Muslims occupied considerable attention in the 1997 report, and, were the exercise of the Commission to be repeated 20 years on, it would probably find much the same today. I rely on two pieces of academic research using corpus linguistics to illustrate the importance of retaining the use of the term ‘Islamophobia’ precisely because it centres the focus of hostility on Islam, and consequently Muslims.

In their analysis of a corpus of 200,037 articles, or 146 million words, on the representation of Islam and Muslims in the British national newspapers between 1998 (a year after the publication of the Runnymede report) and 2009, Baker et al. (2013) find no mention of the term ‘Islamophobia’ in the period 1998–2003. Islamophobia makes its first appearance in the corpus in 2004, reappearing in 2005 and 2006, the first of these denoting the publication of the follow-up report, before falling off the radar, while terms such as ‘discrimination’ and ‘diversity’ becoming more notable among ‘hate and tolerance’ keywords.

Baker et al. (2013) found that ‘Islamophobia’ (and related terms ‘Islamophobic’, ‘Islamophobe’, ‘Islamophobes’) occurred 2,169 times, or 12.73 times per million words, in the 1998–2009 corpus. There were 1,574 occurrences of the term itself, suggesting that it occurred more frequently than its related terms. In a random selection of 100 occurrences analysed closely, Islamophobia was used ‘sarcastically or to deny that the concept exists’ a third of the time (33 occurrences). Frequency of usage is thus a necessary but not sufficient condition to probe the term’s acceptance and penetration in public discourse.

In a later study, which I commissioned in 2015, by Baker and McEnery (2015b) analysing corpus data for the period 2010–2014 (consisting of almost 80 million words) ‘Islamophobia’ (and the related terms) appeared 1,706 times, or 18.61 times per million words, indicating that, proportionally, discussion around the concept has increased over time. A similar analysis of 100 occurrences in the second corpus found that incidence of sarcastic uses or denial of the term fell from a third to a fifth (21 occurrences). The term itself occurred in the corpus 1,087 times, again appeared in the corpus more frequently than the related terms.

Comparing the average frequency of occurrences per year in the two corpora reveals an almost doubling in the number of mentions of Islamophobia, from 131.66 (1,574 mentions across 12 years, 1998–2009) to 217.4 (1,087 mentions across 5 years, 2010–2014).\(^\text{10}\)

Given the concentration in occurrences of ‘Islamophobia’ as a term in the first corpus in the period 2004–2006, what might account for its revival in the second corpus?

If the point of departure for identifying Islamophobia in practice is the presence of ‘Muslim or Islamic identifiers’ (Allen 2010: 62), then reporting on Islam and Muslims in the British press offers plentiful food for thought. Media and its bias against Muslims occupied considerable attention in the 1997 report, and, were the exercise of the Commission to be repeated 20 years on, it would probably find much the same today. I rely on two pieces of academic research using corpus linguistics to illustrate the importance of retaining the use of the term ‘Islamophobia’ precisely because it centres the focus of hostility on Islam, and consequently Muslims.

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Table 13.1 illustrates the frequency of mentions of the word ‘Islamophobia’ (and related words ‘Islamophobic’, ‘Islamophobe’ and ‘Islamophobes’) by British national newspapers in 2010–2014, as well occurrences per million words.

We can see that the left-wing newspapers (Guardian, Independent, Mirror and Observer) mention Islamophobia a third more often than the right-wing papers, a combined total of 1,051 mentions compared with 659 mentions (61.5% compared with 38.5% in right-wing newspapers), though the left-wing newspapers’ overall contribution to the corpora comprises 42.6% of the total and that of the right-wing newspapers 57.4%. It is fair to say that Islamophobia is more likely to be a matter of interest on the left of the political spectrum than on

\(^{10}\) I am grateful to Professor Paul Baker of Lancaster University for the average frequency per year figures for the two corpora.
Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all

This is not surprising given the locating of Islamophobia within debates centred on race, equality, diversity, integration and identity, issues that are more likely to be encountered on the left than on the right.

If one of the assumptions made in the first decade since the Runnymede report was that the media was where the report’s binary construction of the concepts of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ views of Islam were ‘at their most useful’ (Allen 2010: 54), because of the ability to ‘to identify Islamophobia in certain given situations’ (Allen 2010: 52), the paucity of mentions of the concept in the media over the greater part of the two decades since the 1997 publication would suggest that its ‘usefulness’ has been limited to classifying and analysing media content, rather than succeeding in popularizing the concept in everyday discourse or raising awareness about what it is and why it matters.

To look closely at how Islamophobia has been constructed in the media over the two periods of analysis, we can look to the collocates, or word associations, used alongside the keywords (Islamophobia, Islamophobic, Islamophobe, Islomophobes). Collocates are words which appear alongside a keyword more often than can be put down to mere chance. Table 13.2 shows the top 20 collocates of the keywords in the two periods.

The collocates show the association of Islamophobia with racism and other forms of group-based antipathy, such as antisemitism, homophobia, sexism and xenophobia. The collocates also show how Islamophobia is reported as increasing, with ‘rampant’, ‘rise’, ‘risen’ and ‘upsurge’ appearing in the first corpus and ‘rife’, ‘virulent’ and ‘tide’ appearing in the second. Islamophobia appears as taking institutional form in the first corpus, presumably relating to the second report published in 2004, where the term ‘institutional Islamophobia’ was coined (Runnymede Trust 2004). In both corpora, the top 20 collocates refer to significant events in relation to tackling Islamophobia. In the first corpus the words ‘Commission’, ‘forum’ and ‘against’ refer to the second commission and the establishment of the first Islamophobia monitoring body, the Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism. In the second corpus, the words ‘Warsi’, ‘dinner-table’, ‘hotline’, ‘tell’ and ‘mama’ refer to the speech by Sayeeda Warsi in 2011, in which she declared Islamophobia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>1998–2009</th>
<th>Occurrences per million words</th>
<th>2010–2014</th>
<th>Occurrences per million words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Express</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15.57833</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>25.35279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guardian</strong></td>
<td>602</td>
<td>24.72824</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>36.67562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent</strong></td>
<td>430</td>
<td>16.80218</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>24.00714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mail</strong></td>
<td>214</td>
<td>12.43014</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15.80155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mirror</strong></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>7.4373</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10.58573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observer</strong></td>
<td>137</td>
<td>13.34634</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>31.56634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>People</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.507859</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.94838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Star</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6.368315</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12.64952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sun</strong></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9.76406</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>10.16676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Telegraph</strong></td>
<td>201</td>
<td>12.46448</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>14.33871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Times</strong></td>
<td>358</td>
<td>12.08566</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>13.09181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 13.2: Top collocates for ‘Islamophobia’ and related terms, 1998–2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>antisemitism, racism, racist, accusations, xenophobia, forum, against, homophobia, institutionalised, institutionally, Mido, institutional, bullying, rampant, prejudice, Commission, rise, risen, upsurge, verged</td>
<td>racism, racist, antisemitism, incidents, dinner-table, Warsi, mama, hotline, virulent, accusations, rife, chanting, homophobia, socially, tell, homophobic, collective, sexism, witch-hunt, tide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

had passed the ‘dinner-table test’ (Batty 2011, BBC News 2011), and to the coalition government’s support for a third-party initiative to record anti-Muslim hate crimes, the Tell MAMA hotline.

Turning to my second point, about collectivizing and homogenizing discourses, there are two findings from the corpus linguistics analysis that I wish to focus on. The first relates to the prevalence of radicalization as a subject in the corpora and the rise in ‘extremist Islam’ as the dominant explanatory factor. In the 2010–2014 analysis, Baker and McEnery found that when ‘Muslims are discussed as a collective group the most salient pattern is in the context of the radicalisation of young British Muslims’ (Baker and McEnery 2015a).

When analysing the causes of radicalization offered by the British press, Baker and McEnery found an ‘increasing attribution of blame for radicalisation on extremist Islam – in 1998–2009 this occurred in 1 in 3 cases. By 2014 it is 2 in 3 cases’ (Baker and McEnery 2015a).

Secondly, and related to the first point, references to extremism were also found in negative association with the term ‘Islamic’. Baker et al. (2013) found that in the 1998–2009 corpus, references to extremism occurred next to the word ‘Islamic’ one in six times, thereby concluding that ‘Islamic is now difficult to use in a neutral way as it is so heavily laden with negative overtones and disapproval’. The negative association persists in the second corpus.

It is hard to see, given the breadth of subjects that would fall under the descriptive power of the term ‘Islamic’ (food, dress, lifestyle, schools, finance, etc.) how a focus on Muslims but not Islam would provide redress for both the object of hostility and its victims. Would it be reasonable to expect Muslims to adopt a utilitarian approach to challenging biased attitudes, focusing on the victims (Muslims) but not the object of hostility (Islam)?

There is some evidence that public policy discourse is moving in this direction, with Islamophobia rarely appearing in policy documents and references to race or ethnicity prevailing over religion in reports assessing ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious bias’ and their effects. The hate crime strategies published in 2012, the updated version in 2014 and the revised strategy in 2016 make no mention of Islamophobia (HM Government 2012a and 2014, Home Office 2016), and the cross-departmental working group set up to provide a consultative forum for civil society organizations, policymakers and academics is named the ‘Anti-Muslim Hatred Working Group’.

It seems to me circuitous and disingenuous to omit Islamophobia from explicit mention in such formats: much more so when the wider context of negative associations centring on ‘Islam’ and ‘Islamic’ is taken into consideration. Anti-Muslim hatred cannot be divorced from the pervasiveness of anti-Islam discourses, in our print media and as explanations for radicalization in our political discourse.

There is a normative and positive reason for Muslim civil society organizations to adopt ‘Islamophobia’ as favoured terminology while its relevance in policy discourses, for the most part, seems to be waning. Disputed definitions aside, ‘Islamophobia’ presents Muslims with an opportunity to address both the causes and the effects of anti-Muslim animosity. The 1997 report, with its typology of open/closed views of Islam, did precisely this by presenting the effects on Muslims of closed views. While the definition offered by the report may have been too expansive to be useful, the centrality of negative views about Islam for Muslims as victims was instrumental to devising initiatives to tackle the causes as well as the effects.

At a time when the terms ‘Islam’, ‘Islamic’, ‘extremist Islam’ and ‘Islamist’ are prolifically used and laden with negative overtones, is it so surprising that ‘Islamophobia’ retains its potency in naming the object of hate?
14 Fear, indifference and engagement: Rethinking the challenge of anti-Muslim bigotry
Kenan Malik

The original 1997 Runnymede Trust report observes of the word ‘Islamophobia’ that ‘it is not ideal’ but is nevertheless ‘a useful shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam – and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims’ (Runnymede Trust 1997). I want to argue in this chapter that the word is not just ‘not ideal’ but deeply problematic, and one that makes it more difficult to challenge bigotry and discrimination against Muslims.

The term has come to be used by both proponents and opponents of bigotry to blur the distinction between criticism and hatred. On the one hand, it enables many to attack criticism of Islam as illegitimate because it is judged to be ‘Islamophobic’. On the other, it permits those who promote hatred to dismiss condemnation of that hatred as stemming from an illegitimate desire to avoid criticism of Islam. In conflating criticism and bigotry, the very concept of Islamophobia makes it more difficult to engage in a rational discussion about where and how to draw the line between the two, and about how to challenge the latter.

I am not simply making a semantic or terminological point. I am questioning, rather, a particular way of looking at the problem that seems often to compound, rather than alleviate, the problems facing Muslims.

In thinking about how to deal with anti-Muslim bigotry and discrimination, we need to distinguish four categories: criticism of Islam; hatred of Muslims; discriminatory practices; and violent acts. For reasons of space, I will, in this chapter, deal largely with the first two issues – that is, issues primarily of speech and thought – and will have little to say about the latter two, though the question of how to confront discrimination, in particular, raises equally challenging issues.

When it comes to the criticism of ideas, nothing, in my view, should be out of bounds. Nothing should be unsayable simply because someone finds it offensive, or because it is culturally or religiously sensitive. It is a view that today finds little resonance. Much of the discussion about Islamophobia revolves around questions of what speech should be limited and how.

To unpack this discussion, we need again to separate out certain distinct categories. We need, in particular, to distinguish between the giving of offence, the promotion of bigotry or hatred, and the incitement of violence. The boundaries between the categories are blurred, and have deliberately been made more so in recent practice and policymaking. The 1986 Public Order Act, for instance, forbids the use of ‘threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, within the hearing and sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby’, a phrasing that conflates offence, hatred and violence. The use of the concept of Islamophobia has helped further erode such distinctions. The distinctions are, nevertheless, important, as are the different ways in which we should respond to the different categories.

I will argue in this chapter that the giving of offence should be acceptable in an open, plural, democratic society. The fomenting of hatred can be deeply problematic, creating fear within certain communities and begetting violence. But while bigotry and hate speech need urgently to be tackled, they need tackling primarily at a political and moral level, rather than through the use of legislation to restrict speech. The legal line should come at the point not of incitement to hatred but of incitement to violence; direct incitement should be an offence, just as the violence being incited is an offence.

It has become commonplace to argue that while free speech may be a good, it must necessarily be less free in a plural society. For diverse societies to function and to be fair, so the argument runs, we need to show respect not just for individuals but also for the cultures and beliefs in which those individuals are embedded and which help give them a sense of identity and being. This requires that we police public discourse about those cultures and beliefs both to minimize friction between antagonistic cultures and beliefs and to protect the dignity of those individuals embedded in them. As the sociologist Tariq Modood has put it, that ‘If people are to occupy the same political space without conflict, they mutually have to limit the extent to which they subject each others’ fundamental beliefs to criticism’ (Modood 2005).
I want to argue the opposite: that it is precisely because we do live in a plural society that we need the fullest extension possible of free speech. In a plural society, it is both inevitable and, often, important that people offend the sensibilities of others.

It is inevitable because where different beliefs are deeply held, clashes are unavoidable. Almost by definition such clashes express what it is to live in a diverse society; they should be openly resolved rather than suppressed in the name of ‘respect’ or ‘tolerance’.

And it is often important because any kind of social change or social progress means offending some deeply held sensibilities. Or to put it another way: ‘You can’t say that!’ is all too often the response of those in power to having their power challenged. To accept that certain things cannot be said is to accept that certain forms of power cannot be challenged.

The notion of giving offence suggests that certain beliefs are so important or valuable to certain people that they should be put beyond the possibility of being insulted, or caricatured or even questioned. The importance of the principle of free speech is precisely that it provides a permanent challenge to the idea that some questions are beyond contention, and hence acts as a permanent challenge to authority. This is why free speech is essential not simply to the practice of democracy, but to the aspirations of those groups who may have been failed by the formal democratic processes: to those whose voices may have been silenced by racism, for instance. The real value of free speech, in other words, is not to those who possess power, but to those who want to challenge them. And the real value of censorship is to those who do not wish their authority to be challenged. Once we give up on the right to offend in the name of ‘tolerance’ or ‘respect’, we constrain our ability to challenge those in power, and therefore to challenge injustice.

Commentators and critics often talk about ‘offence to a community’. And from The Satanic Verses to Charlie Hebdo, speech regarded as offensive to Muslims is often described as ‘Islamophobic’.

More often than not, though, what is deemed an ‘offence to a community’ refers in reality to debates within communities. Some Muslims found The Satanic Verses offensive. Others did not. Few Muslims objected when the Danish cartoons were first published. Only months of campaigning, primarily by Saudi Arabian authorities, turned the issue into a flashpoint (Malik 2009: 142–147).

It is because what is often called ‘offence to a community’ is in reality debate within communities that so many of the flashpoints over offensiveness have been over works produced by minority artists – not just Salman Rushdie, but also Hanif Kureishi, Monica Ali, Sooreh Hera, Taslima Nasrin, M. F. Hussain and countless others.

Part of the reason that the debates within communities are often ignored, and the spotlight shone only on the ‘offence’, derives from the way that many today have come to understand the meaning of community and of diversity. Anti-Muslim bigots look upon Muslims as comprising an undifferentiated lump. Muslims, in their eyes, constitute a single, homogeneous community, all speaking with a common voice, all defined primarily by their faith, all hostile to ‘western values’ and all bearing social views that have remained unchanged for over a millennium.

Put like that, few liberals would agree with such a perspective. Yet, the common liberal or left-wing view of Muslim communities is not that different.

Naser Khader is a secular Danish MP of Muslim background. He tells of a conversation with Tøger Seidenfaden, editor of Politiken, a left-wing Danish newspaper that was critical of the Muhammed cartoons. Seidenfaden claimed that ‘the cartoons insulted all Muslims’. Khader responded: ‘I am not insulted.’ ‘But you’re not a real Muslim’, was Seidenfaden’s response (Malik 2009: 164).

“You’re not a real Muslim.’ Why? Because to be a proper Muslim is, from such a perspective, to find the cartoons offensive. Anyone who is not offended is by definition not a proper Muslim. The argument of the liberal anti-racist here meets that of the anti-Muslim bigot. For the latter, the real Muslim is the reactionary Muslim; for the former, the liberal Muslim is not a real Muslim. And in eliding criticism of Islam with hatred of Muslims, the concept of Islamophobia helps makes it easier for the bigot to portray his bigotry as criticism of Islam and for the liberal to view criticism of Islam as a form of bigotry.

This leads us to the questions of bigotry and of incitement to hatred. It is one thing to cause offence; it is quite another to foment hatred. If the giving of offence should be acceptable in an open, plural society, hatred, bigotry should not. How, then, should we challenge such bigotry and hatred?
Hate speech laws – the outlawing of certain forms of speech defined as hateful – have become accepted as essential weapons in combating bigotry. But just as the received wisdom that it is morally wrong to give offence is misplaced, so is the received wisdom that hate speech and bigotry should be outlawed. We certainly need to resist all attempts to use criticism of Islam to demonize Muslims. But criticism, of whatever kind, even if it is hateful or bigoted, should be seen as a moral and political, not legal, issue.

The argument that we should censor speech to prevent bigotry raises a number of questions. The first is about who decides what should be censored.

In January 2006, Iqbal Sacranie, then secretary general of the Muslim Council of Britain, made some derogatory comments about homosexuality on Radio 4’s Today programme. Homosexuality, he said was ‘harmful’ and ‘not acceptable’. According to Sacranie, ‘scientific evidence’ showed that homosexuality led to ‘illnesses and diseases’ (BBC News 2006).

Sacranie saw himself as merely expressing what he considered to be the Islamic view. Many gay groups saw his comments as promoting hatred. Scotland Yard’s community safety unit launched an investigation into whether Sacranie’s comments constituted ‘hate speech’, and whether he had fallen foul of the 1986 Public Order Act, which forbids the use of ‘threatening, abusive or insulting words’.

In response to the police investigation, 22 imams and Muslim leaders wrote to The Times (2006) demanding the right to be able to ‘freely express their views in an atmosphere free of intimidation or bullying’. They added that ‘We cannot truly claim to be a free and open society while we are trying to silence dissenting views’. Many of those same leaders had called for Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses to be banned. Sacranie himself had said of Rushdie, immediately after the Ayatollah Khomeini issued his fatwa calling for the author’s murder, that ‘Death is too good for him’. And every one of the signatories to the Times letter had wanted the Danish cartoons, published just four months before Sacranie’s comments, to be censored.

The kind of hypocrisy, or moral blindness, expressed by those Muslim leaders is widespread. Many of those happy to see cartoons lampooning Mohammed draw the line at anything mocking the Holocaust. Many gay rights activists want Muslims to be prosecuted for homophobia but want the right to criticize Muslims as they see fit. Racists such as Nick Griffin of the British National Party (BNP) or Tommy Robinson of the English Defence League (EDL) want to be free to spout racist abuse but want Muslim clerics locked up for doing the same. And so it goes on. The argument for the censorship of bigotry quickly degenerates into the claim that ‘my speech should be free but yours is too costly’.

The problem of censoring bigotry is not simply the difficulty in defining what it is that should be censored. It is also that the consequence of such censorship is not what many believe it to be. Banning certain forms of speech does not reduce or eliminate bigotry. It simply festers beyond the public gaze. Sheffield University social geographer Gill Valentine, for instance, suggests that hate speech restrictions do not reduce bigotry but rather ‘change its form’ and ‘privatize’ it. ‘The privatized nature of contemporary prejudice’, Valentine argues, ‘makes it more difficult to expose and challenge, producing a frustration that offenders are “getting away with it”, and making it harder to identify patterns of prejudice in form and intent.’ For those ‘critical of the progressive social norms … there is a sense of anger and frustration that their views are being silenced in public by the law’. The danger, Valentine concludes, ‘is that if these mutual and antagonistic senses of injustice are not openly acknowledged they might be exploited by extremist political parties and erupt into tension and conflict’ (Valentine 2014).

The rise, in the past few years, of anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim political parties throughout Europe bears out Valentine’s warning. The emergence of such organizations has been regarded by some as showing the necessity for even tighter controls on bigoted speech. In fact, the attempt to outlaw bigotry through censorship has itself provided some of the fuel for such bigotry.

The consequence of challenging bigotry through censorship also leads ‘anti-racists into a false comfort zone, where it feels like the basic arguments against prejudice no longer need to be put’, as the journalist Paul Mason (2014) has put it. It helps absolve us, in other words, of the responsibility of tackling such ideas openly and robustly.

It is, in my view, morally incumbent on advocates of free speech also to challenge bigotry. Part of the reason for free speech is to be able to create the conditions for open, robust debate, conditions necessary to allow us to challenge obnoxious views.
And part of the reason that such obnoxious views continue to flourish is that too many remain keener to censor than to challenge.

It is worth noting too that, just as with the attempt to censor offence, minorities themselves are all too often the victims of legal constraints on bigotry. The 1965 Race Relations Act introduced Britain’s first legal ban on the incitement of racial hatred. The first person convicted under its provisions was not a member of the National Front or of the Racial Preservation Society but the Trinidadian Black Power activist Michael X, sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment in 1967. Four members of the Universal Coloured Peoples’ Association were also convicted that year for stirring up hatred against white people at Speakers’ Corner.

In the 1960s and 1970s, incitement laws were often used to target black activists whose views were regarded as unacceptable or dangerous. Today, those with unacceptable Muslim or Islamist views are more likely to be targets. In Britain, Muslims with unpalatable views, from Samina Malik (the so-called ‘lyrical terrorist’) to protestors against the Danish cartoons, who were jailed for up to six years for chants that ‘solicited murder’ and ‘incited racial hatred’, have felt the coercive impact of such laws (BBC News 2007a, 2007b). In France, after the Charlie Hebdo killings, the government organized a huge march through Paris in defence of free speech. It also used hate speech laws to criminalize those who dissented from the official view, from the antisemitic comedian Dieudonné to schoolchildren who refused to honour the slain cartoonists (Agence France-Presse 2015, Amnesty International 2015). Many countries now use hate speech laws to outlaw support for the anti-Israel BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) movement.

Critics of such policies usually cry ‘Islamophobia’. But what has helped legitimize such incitement is the way that anti-racists themselves have both demanded the criminalization of hate and helped expand the meanings of ‘hatred’ and ‘incitement’. When the state gets to criminalize dissenting speech, even if it is bigoted, minorities themselves too often suffer.

All this suggests that the concept of Islamophobia not only elides criticism and bigotry in a problematic fashion, but is also an expression of a wider way of thinking about racism, and of how to combat it, that seems to me unhelpful. To understand this better, let me finish by returning to the question of ‘diversity’, of how we conceive of it today, and of how we should conceive of it.

When we talk about diversity, what we mean is that the world is a messy place, full of clashes and conflicts. That is all for the good, for such clashes and conflicts are the raw material of political and cultural engagement. The importance of diversity is that it allows us to expand our horizons, bringing different values, beliefs and lifestyles face to face, and forcing us to think about those differences. Only this can create the political dialogue and debate necessary, paradoxically, to help forge a more universal language of citizenship.

But the very thing that is valuable about diversity – the cultural and ideological clashes that it brings about – is precisely what many fear. That fear can take two forms. On the one side there is the nativist sentiment that immigration undermines social cohesion and erodes our sense of national identity. Islam, in particular, elicits such fear. Many view Islam through the lens of the ‘clash of civilizations’, a perspective that leads politicians and commentators – not just on the right but self-proclaimed liberals too – towards deeply illiberal arguments: insisting, for instance, that Muslim immigration must be limited, or that racial profiling is necessary in the ‘war on terror’, or that it is not possible to be racist against Muslims because Muslims are not a ‘race’.

And on the other side there is the multicultural perspective, that sees Britain, in the words of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, whose report was published by the Runnymede Trust in 2000, three years after the Islamophobia report, as ‘a community of citizens and community of communities’, in which equality ‘must be defined in a culturally sensitive way and applied in a discriminating but not discriminatory manner’ (CMEB 2000). In practice, the idea of a ‘community of communities’ has helped erode that of a ‘community of citizens’. Diversity is too often ‘managed’ by putting individuals from minority communities into particular ethnic and cultural boxes, defining needs and aspirations by virtue of the boxes into which people are put, and allowing the boxes to shape public policy. Muslims in particular have come to be seen less as citizens who happen to be Muslim than as Muslims who happen to live in Britain.

At the same time, defining equality in a ‘culturally sensitive way’ has led many to view respect for others as meaning the need to accept their ways of being, and to regard criticisms of, or challenges
to, others’ values or practices as ‘insensitive’, even racist. As a result, boundaries between groups have increasingly become policed in an effort to minimize clashes and conflicts.

The one perspective encourages fear, the other indifference. What neither begins to address is the question of engagement. Engagement requires us neither to shun certain people as the Other, with values and practices inevitably inimical to ours, nor to be indifferent to such values and practices in the name of ‘respect’, but rather to recognize that respect requires us to challenge the values and beliefs of others. It requires us to have a robust, open public debate about the values to which we aspire, accepting that such a debate will be difficult, and often confrontational, but also that such difficult, confrontational debate is a necessity in any society that seeks to be open and liberal.

It requires us, in other words, to remake the very framework within which Islam, and Muslims, are viewed from both sides of the debate.
Islamophobia became a matter of public debate in the 1990s and ever since then its congruence with antisemitism has been a recurrent theme. As early as 1994, three years before the publication of *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*, the Runnymede Trust convened a commission on ‘the persistence and dangers of antisemitism’. One member, Akbar Ahmed, expressed his hope that the Trust would set up a similar commission ‘to study prejudice against Muslims and Islam’. His colleagues agreed to the extent that they included the aspiration in their final report (Runnymede Commission on Antisemitism 1994: 15). This tentative connection drawn between Islamophobia and antisemitism has been supplemented and developed more systematically in the last decades by scholars, as well as by institutions whose aim is to combat racism and discrimination. Together they suggest that Islamophobia and antisemitism should be conceived within a single frame of analysis and action, though they differ over how exactly this should be done.

In the following pages I explore these attempts to bind together opposition to Islamophobia and antisemitism. However, I also highlight the social, political and conceptual constraints that limit the impact of ecumenical anti-racism of this sort, and which promote division between Muslims and Jews.

In 1978 Edward Said drew attention to the connectedness of antisemitism and aspects of what we would now call Islamophobia when he observed that ‘Orientalism’ in its ‘Islamic branch’ and antisemitism ‘resemble each other very closely’ (Said 1978: 28). Orientalism, for Said, was the nexus of western knowledge about the Orient which both expressed and enabled western power over the Middle East. Without denying the significance of modern empires and what they have conceived as their civilizing mission, more recent writers have emphasized the common roots of antisemitism and Islamophobia in a conception of Europe, and of modern national identity within Europe, which has been essentially Christian. In 2002/3 the European Union Monitoring Commission Board chairman, Robert Purkiss, illustrated the currency of this idea that Muslims and Jews alike faced a single source of discrimination and hostility:

> Our conceptions of European identity are significant drivers of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. One of the similarities between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia is their historical relationship to a Europe perceived as exclusively Christian. Jews have of course suffered the most unspeakable crimes by European Christians. But it is true that all other religions, including Judaism and Islam have been excised from the prevailing understanding of Europe’s identity as Christian and white. Both Islam and Judaism have long served as Europe’s ‘other’, as a symbol for a distinct culture, religion and ethnicity. (Bunzl 2007: 9)

Increasingly, scholars have argued that the process of stigmatization and discrimination experienced by Muslims and Jews has not only marked them as religious minorities but has also been characterized by their ‘racialization’. Religious differences, they argue, were conceived as immutable cultural differences which converted the messy diversity of Muslims and Jews into the collective ‘Muslim’ and ‘Jew’. These negative stereotypes did not denote differences of belief only but were markers that saturated their subjects’ being. Often these stereotypes were linked with ideas about lineage, blood and phenotypical characteristics, but the more vital point is that both Jews and Muslims were branded with negative generalizations that were about not only their religious lives but their immutable attitudes and behaviour more broadly (Meer 2014).

Other writers have focused less on religion, or on the common processes of racialization, and more on the ways in which the histories of Islamophobia and antisemitism form a shared story. For Matti Bunzl the relationship between the two is sequential. Since the 19th century, he suggests, secular ideas and projects have formed the mainspring of prejudice. Antisemitism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was anchored in ideas about race, was fuelled by geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East and by population movements that have brought millions of Muslims to Europe. It does not turn on religion or race, he proposes, but on the idea of civilization and the notion that Islam engenders a worldview that is fundamentally
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Most recently, Gil Anidjar, James Renton and Ben Gidley have argued that Islamophobia and antisemitism have changed over time but they have changed together. Jews and Muslims were jointly expelled from Iberia in 1492 and the idea of Europe never broke free of Christendom. Jews were ‘the Other’ within, Muslims the external ‘Other’, one that appeared increasingly threatening, following the Ottoman seizure of Constantinople in 1453. In the 19th century Jews and Muslims were jointly conceived as Semites, bound by a linguistic and racial heritage as well as by Abrahamic monotheism. Arabs were Jews on horseback, as Disraeli wrote. It was only in the 20th century, Renton argues, following the alliance in 1917 between the British Empire and Zionism, that European notions of Muslims and Jews entered a new period in which Jews ceased to be ‘Oriental’ and Islam was reconceived as a political problem (Anidjar 2003, Renton and Gidley 2017, Renton 2017).

These efforts to draw Muslims and Jews closer together by highlighting the combined development of antisemitism and Islamophobia are a significant and collective intellectual achievement. They are also a political intervention. Relations between Jews and Muslims in the UK are often distant and sometimes vexed. This is the case notwithstanding the everyday interactions between Muslims and Jews in employment and consumption and the valiant efforts by a few to build understanding. In this context, by insisting on the histories and challenges shared by Muslims and Jews, the scholars and activists I have been discussing push back against the current.

The lack of contact between Jews and Muslims in Britain arises in large part from their divergent social experiences. Whereas the Jewish population is mainly UK-born and coded as ‘white’, just over half of the Muslim population in Britain was born outside of the country, and it is composed largely, though by no means entirely, of people of colour. Moreover, the class profiles of the two populations diverge widely: 50% of Muslims in the UK are living in poverty, and Muslims constitute the religious population most likely to experience poverty, whereas Jews are the least likely, with just 13% living in poverty. Just 9% of Jews live in social rented accommodation compared with 27% of Muslim households, and Jewish households are correspondingly more likely to own their homes. At the upper end of the scale, we find Muslims are the religious group least represented in “top professions” in England and Wales in proportion to their total number while Jews are the most highly represented proportionate to their total number. These different experiences generate spatial as well as social distance: 46% of the Muslim population live in the 10% most deprived areas in England; the figure for Jews, by contrast, is just 3% (Graham et al. 2007, Muslim Council of Britain 2015, Feldman et al. 2017, Heath and Li 2015, Reynolds and Birdwell 2015).

Differences in social class are supplemented by political divergence. Most British Jews are now supporters of the Conservative Party, whereas Muslims tend to support Labour (Heath et al. 2013, Survation 2017). Further, Jews and Muslims tend to have contrary and, often, deeply felt allegiances in the conflicts produced by the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, by the Nakba, the policies of the state of Israel and the development of the Palestinian national movement. If we turn from these allegiances overseas to the ways in which Muslims and Jews are represented within domestic political debate we see a further striking dissimilarity. Whereas Jews have been portrayed by David Cameron and other political leaders as a model minority – law-abiding, aspiring, with a strong sense of collective identity that dovetails with patriotism – Muslims are presented as a group that places itself and others in jeopardy – inhabiting a culture of poverty, insufficiently integrated into British society, and a source of sympathy for terror and the nation’s enemies (Jewish Chronicle 2011, Gov.uk 2015).

These social and political differences are matched by the suspicion with which significant elements in the Jewish and Muslim populations regard each other. Since 2000 there has been a steady rise of recorded antisemitic incidents in Britain and this has been matched by a growing fear of antisemitism among the British Jewish population (Feldman et al. 2017, FRA 2013). Although there is no credible evidence that Muslims are responsible for the rise in the number of reported antisemitic incidents, some individuals and institutions assert that “radical Islam” is the primary driver of antisemitism in the UK (Feldman et al. 2017). This suspicion of the Muslim population among some Jews is returned in kind by a significant minority of Muslims. The most recent and extensive survey of antisemitism in Britain found that most Muslims do not respond positively to antisemitic statements but, at the same time, antisemitism ‘is consistently higher among the
Muslim population of Great Britain than among the population in general’ (Staetsky 2017: 6, 56).

In the face of much that pulls Jews and Muslims in different and sometimes opposite directions, when scholars and activists point to the shared foundations and functions of Islamophobia and antisemitism they highlight the common sources of prejudice that have afflicted both groups. Nevertheless, the very terms that we use in these discussions – Islamophobia and antisemitism – are sometimes used in ways that subvert this fragile solidarity. A greater awareness of where the terms come from and how they are used will bring this into view and make us more aware of the pitfalls and complexity we face.

The term ‘antisemitism’ was first popularized in Germany in the late 1870s and 1880s. Here self-proclaimed antisemites argued that equal rights for Jews – which had been decisively achieved only in 1871 – had been a grave mistake and that the state should take urgent action to protect Germans and Germanness from Jews and Jewish influence. It was only at this point that the word was taken up by Jews and their allies, and by commentators, and was disseminated rapidly across languages as they fought to sustain and vindicate equal rights for the Jewish minority. It meant something very specific: the attack on the Jews’ legal and political rights. As one German-Jewish Zionist put it in 1913, ‘the antisemitic movement grew up on German soil; it is almost as old as the enfranchisement of the Jews’ (Feldman 2017). Two points follow from this. First, although we have become accustomed to thinking of antisemitism as ‘the longest hatred’, synonymous with all forms of anti-Jewish prejudice over millennia, the term both is quite young and originally had a very narrow and precise meaning. Second, we can see how the charge of antisemitism was closely connected to a programme of claiming rights for Jews: in this case, equal civil and political rights in Germany.

In other words, objections to antisemitism were never just that. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries antisemitism was identified with an assault on equal rights. This conception of antisemitism did not disappear in the inter-war years. Indeed, the victories of National Socialism in Germany and Austria illustrated its continuing relevance. After 1945 the campaign against antisemitism extended to Jews in the Soviet Union. For some this was a fight to secure Jews their rights under the Soviet constitution, for others it was Jews’ human rights that were at stake, and for others still the campaign for Jews to be allowed to leave the USSR and go to Israel was a struggle for their national rights as Jews.

The campaign against antisemitism at the same time invoked a set of rights that was being violated.

What then of Islamophobia? In a suggestion that meshes well with the development of the concept of antisemitism, AbdoollKarim Vakil proposes, ‘Islamophobia … is about contestation and the power to set the political vocabulary and legal ground of recognition and redress, naming and claiming Islamophobia as a social category with legal purchase’ (Vakil 2011: 277). As presented by Runnymede in 1997, Islamophobia was anatomized and analysed in the context of liberal and social democratic values. Indeed, the harms identified as Islamophobic make no sense without these other, positive values. ‘The term Islamophobia’, the report stated, ‘refers to unfounded hostility towards Islam.’ The report went on at length to develop a contrast between what it called ‘closed’ and ‘open’ views of Islam. ‘Phobic dread of Islam’ is said to be the recurring characteristic of closed views which have malign practical consequences: first, unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities and, second, exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social affairs. This we might take to be the liberal characterization of Islamophobia, derived from a tradition of late-20th-century responses to racism. The roots of the problem are seen to lie in prejudice, in faulty cognition, and the answer lies in respect for empirical variation (which will undermine any negative generalization about Islam or Muslims) and rational debate. The goal of policy should be to promote equal opportunities and harmonious relations between members of different communities. The key recommendation, therefore, was to extend anti-discrimination legislation to cover religious as well as ethnic minorities (Runnymede Trust 1997).

In the same ways that the charge of antisemitism has carried an assertion of the Jews’ claims for rights, so too the charge of Islamophobia claims rights in the name of the Muslim population. In the years that followed the Runnymede report’s publication we also see the charge of Islamophobia being articulated in a new register. Tariq Modood has reflected that the expression of grievances concerning Islamophobia in Britain is closely connected to a rise in Muslim consciousness and a ‘struggle for recognition’ (Modood 2014). Salman Sayyid similarly proposes that ‘an understanding of Islamophobia in absence of an understanding of the way in which there has been a global reassertion of Muslim identity is difficult to sustain’ (Sayyid 2011: 11). There has been a shift from the universalism that shaped the attack on Islamophobia in 1997. At the very least, this
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We can see something similar in the case of antisemitism. Through much of the 20th century the meanings attached to antisemitism rested on universal ideals as well as Jewish interests – upon the ideas of equality vested in Jewish emancipation and minority rights. This concept of antisemitism has not disappeared but it has been supplemented and sometimes overshadowed by a concept of antisemitism that is attached to the defence of Israel, its right to exist and its policies. The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 marked a radical break in Jewish history. When Israel is the subject of debate the charge of antisemitism may still invoke the rights of a historically persecuted minority, such as whenever Jews are labelled as a uniquely self-interested and darkly conspiratorial force. However, the charge of antisemitism often arises in contexts in which Jews defend the policies of a state which defines itself as Jewish and in which Jews compose the majority of the population, in which the non-Jewish minorities suffer some systematic disadvantage and which since 1967 has exercised dominion beyond its internationally recognized borders (Peleg and Waxman 2011). When the charge of antisemitism arises in the context of debate on the politics of Israel/Palestine it is wielded, in part at least, as an adjunct to state power and not as an auxiliary to the claims of a vulnerable minority.

The changed appearance of the politics of anti-antisemitism renders common cause with anti-Islamophobia decreasingly likely. Paradoxically, one tendency held in common among Muslims and Jews in recent decades only serves to deepen separation: namely, the politics of identity. A large majority (93%) of British Jews report that Israel forms part of their identity as Jews, and 90% support Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state (Miller et al. 2015). This is one potent reason why rhetorical attacks on Israel are experienced by them as attacks on their identity as Jews and are labelled as antisemitic. In the case of Islamophobia too, AbdoolKarim Vakil notes, ‘Where Islam is integral to Muslim identities, the denigration of Islam impacts on Muslim respect and self-worth’ (Vakil 2011: 276).

An anti-racist politics built on the language of rights may (just) be able to negotiate the space between Jews and Muslims both in British society and as they respond to conflict in Israel/Palestine. But an anti-racist politics built on the politics of Muslim and Jewish identity will help entrench those domestic and international differences that currently drive Muslims and Jews further apart.
16 The Runnymede Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia: A history
Robin Richardson

The Runnymede Commission on Islamophobia and British Muslims had its formal origins in a Runnymede project in the early 1990s concerned with antisemitism. One of the recommendations arising from that project was that a similar project should be established concerned with Islamophobia (Runnymede Commission on Antisemitism 1994). Less formally, it arose from discussions among Runnymede’s staff members and some of its trustees about the nature and definition of Runnymede’s core subject matter, race relations. These latter discussions had been influenced by contact with the An-Nisa Society in north-west London, the journal Q News, the development of plans to create the organization that in due course became known as the Muslim Council of Britain, and personal and professional contact with the author of a range of papers and articles about British Muslims and the forms of discrimination they encountered, Tariq Modood. I was for my own part director of Runnymede throughout the three years, 1993–1996, during which the plans for a commission on Islamophobia gestated and were finalized, and acted as drafting editor of the commission’s report in the period 1996–1997.

Terminology
It was in May 1996 that the first meeting took place of, as it was at that time called, the Runnymede Trust Commission on Islamophobia. From the outset there was a lively and lengthy discussion about the terms of reference for the commission, starting with its proposed name.

Some of the commissioners supported ‘Commission on Islamophobia’ as the project’s title and were not prepared to modify it in any way. They had agreed to be members of the commission, they indicated, on the understanding that the proposed title would not be changed. Others said that, minimally, the title needed modifying but preferably should not contain the word ‘Islamophobia’ at all. Arguments underlying the latter position included: the concept of phobia is unacceptable, since it implies deep-seated mental illness and should only be used in medical contexts and by medical experts; the word ‘Islamophobia’ is virtually unknown in the wider world and its use in the title of the commission would provoke derision or anger, or both, among people unfamiliar with it; all the commission’s members were UK citizens or long-term residents of the UK and as a group they would not have appropriate expertise or credibility to talk about Islamophobia even in the rest of Europe, let alone in the world at large – and for this reason if no other the title must imply a focus on Britain rather than on everywhere; and the hostility that Muslims in Britain and the world experience from others is to an extent caused by themselves and their worldview and behaviour, and the commission should signal awareness of this in its very title.

Those who did not want the word ‘Islamophobia’ in the commission’s title coalesced around the view that the title should be ‘Commission on British Muslims’. This was unacceptable to others, particularly in view of some of the arguments that had been advanced in support of it. Eventually the chairperson proposed ‘the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia’. No one objected.

In various ways these arguments and disagreements have continued to be replayed in national conversations about Islamophobia over the last two decades.

Origins
The Runnymede Trust was founded in 1968. Up until about 1992 the dominant terms in Runnymede’s discourse were ‘race’, ‘race relations’ and ‘colour’ – the Trust’s work reflected, that is to say, the conceptual consensus established by the Race Relations Acts of the 1960s and 1976. The dominant discourse portrayed everyone as either white or coloured – or, according to the terminology developed in the eighties, white or black (later, since about 1998, white or BME – Black and minority ethnic). The worldview reflected in this language was derived in part from the United States and in part from Britain’s experience as a colonial power.

Alternative worldviews were, however, advocated within the Runnymede staff team and by some of its trustees, and in 1992 the Trust set up a commission on a form of racism that was clearly not essentially to do with colour: antisemitism. As stated above, one of the report’s formal recommendations was
that there should be a broadly similar commission on Islamophobia.

It took almost two years to begin implementing this recommendation. There was difficulty in agreeing who should be approached to chair the proposed commission on Islamophobia and how to choose its members. Some of the trustees were concerned about such a radical departure from the prevailing race relations paradigm enshrined in the 1976 Act, and had unhappy memories of how CARD (the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination) had fragmented and collapsed in the 1960s.

**Discussions and disagreement**

In due course, however, a commission was established that had substantial expertise and credibility. The chairperson, Gordon Conway, was entirely clear that the commission was about Islamophobia, not about British Muslims, but equally clear that it was about the impact of Islamophobia in Britain, not in the world generally. In early 1997 the commission published and circulated a consultation paper. This was entitled *Islamophobia: Its Features and Dangers* and took the form of an A5 24-page booklet. It concluded with five principles or propositions to guide further action. Also, there were nine questions for discussion and consideration. The five propositions were as follows:

- **Urgency.** Islamophobia is a serious and dangerous feature of contemporary affairs and culture. It is urgent that substantial measures should be adopted to confront and reduce it.

- **Many roles.** Many different people in Britain have significant roles to play, both separately and in cooperation and coordination with each other. They include politicians and journalists, both nationally and locally; opinion-formers and policymakers in a wide range of fields, including education, the justice system, employment and government; church leaders; and prominent members of Muslim communities.

- **Many tasks.** Many kinds of action are required. No one measure will be sufficient in itself. Changes in the law on discrimination are probably required, for example, but so also are less tangible and visible measures relating to attitudes and beliefs, and to building trust and respect.

- **A significant distinction.** A distinction needs to be drawn, by both Muslims and non-Muslims, between phobic opposition to Islam on the one hand and reasonable criticism and disagreement on the other. Not all criticisms of Islam are intrinsically phobic.

- **The international dimension.** Islamophobia within Britain is affected by trends and events elsewhere. So also, within Britain, are Muslim self-definitions, perceptions and identities. The international dimension needs to be borne in mind, but is no excuse for not tackling Islamophobia within Britain with great urgency.

The written responses to the booklet were overwhelmingly positive, particularly from Muslim organizations and individuals. They included a remarkably substantial submission from the Islamic Foundation, and this was invaluable when the commission came in due course to formulate its final report. There was virtually no response from the race relations world. The booklet was sent to all race equality councils in Britain and to a wide range of race equality officers in public bodies. Very few, however, replied.

**Outcomes and reflections**

*Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All* was published in autumn 1997 and was launched at the House of Commons by then-Home Secretary Jack Straw. It made 60 formal recommendations and many of these were in due course implemented, though not necessarily – of course – as a direct result of the commission’s report.

Key recommendations included the following:

- **Government departments, bodies and agencies should review equal opportunities policies in employment, service delivery and public consultation, and ensure these refer explicitly to religion as well as to ethnicity, race and colour.**

- **The Department for Education should collect, collate and publish data on the ethnic origins and attainment of pupils in all schools … and on the religious affiliations of pupils in all schools; should review and if necessary modify the criteria and procedures for providing state funding to religiously based schools, to ensure they do not discriminate against Muslim bodies; ensure Muslim educationists, as also educationists from other faith communities, are involved in discussions of education for citizenship; give guidance to registered inspectors on points to look for when reporting on the arrangements which schools make for the pastoral, cultural and religious needs**
of Muslim pupils; encourage more Muslims to train as teachers, including but not only for the teaching of religious education.

- The legal system should make discrimination on religious grounds unlawful; ensure that proposed new legislation on racial violence makes reference to religion; and the Public Order Act 1986 to make incitement to religious hatred unlawful.

- Healthcare organizations should develop guidelines on good practice in healthcare relating to religious and cultural needs, including topics such as the following: employment and use of non-Christian chaplains, religious observance, diet and food ... consultations and contacts with local faith communities, advocacy and befriending services.

However, some of the potentially most important recommendations were ignored or misunderstood. Consider, for example, recommendation number 56, very slightly adapted for quotation out of context:

- Race equality organizations and monitoring groups should address Islamophobia in their programmes of action, for example by advocating and lobbying for the policy and procedural changes recommended in this report.

It was further clarified that this would entail reviewing the definition of racial harassment used in policy documentation and ensuring it contained an explicit reference to religion, and routinely complaining to the Press Complaints Commission and to the newspapers concerned when it was considered that coverage of Islam or of Muslims had been inaccurate, misleading or distorted. Race equality organizations did not comment formally on this recommendation, let alone make any attempt to implement it. Instead, they put their weight behind moves to define Islamophobia as nothing more than ‘discrimination on grounds of religion or belief’.

Conclusion

The task of an operation such as the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia is to do what is doable and say what is sayable, in the circumstances and constraints of its time and history, and with the human and material resources available to it. This chapter has in effect implied that the commission on Islamophobia was as successful as could be reasonably expected. The fact remains, however, that the dominant race relations paradigm was not at the time affected, and still has not been materially affected 20 years since the commission’s report was published.

With hindsight it is easier than it was 20 years ago to see some of the things that went wrong or were inadequate, and to engage in some wistful ‘what if’ questions:

- What if the commission had engaged, from the very start, with senior civil servants at the Home Office?

- What if Runnymede had continued to give it high-profile support?

- What if the commission had found a way of raising and discussing difficult and sensitive questions about complexities, conflicts and dilemmas within and between British Muslim communities, and if it had then discussed and given guidance on the ensuing responsibilities of public bodies?

Well, ‘what if” questions have their uses. In particular they can help us to look again at potential and possibilities in the here and now, and to do what is doable, and say what is sayable, here, now, today.
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Robin Richardson was director of the Runnymede Trust from 1990 to 1996, and for several years before that was chief inspector for education in a London borough. He was the drafting editor of *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*, published by Runnymede in 1997, *Islamophobia: Issues, Challenges and Action* (Trentham Books, 2004) and *Young, Muslim and Citizen: Identity, Empowerment and Change* (Runnymede, 2009). More recently he was co-editor of *Pointing the Finger: Islam and Muslims in the UK Media* (One World Publications, 2011) and *Living with Difference: Community, Diversity and the Common Good* (Woolf Institute, 2015).

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20th-Anniversary Report
This report marks the 20th-year anniversary of Runnymede’s 1997 report Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All. Part I represents Runnymede’s position, including 10 recommendations to address Islamophobia, Part II outlines the evidence on Islamophobia in various social domains, and Part III includes differing perspectives on how to understand Islamophobia.

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